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DEMOCRACY
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The C-SPAN Archives, located adjacent to Purdue University, is the home of the 
online C-SPAN Video Library, which has copied all of C-SPAN’s television content 
since 1987. Extensive indexing, captioning, and other enhanced online features 
provide researchers, policy analysts, students, teachers, and public officials with 
an unparalleled chronological and internally cross-referenced record for deeper 
study. The Year in C-SPAN Archives Research presents the finest interdisciplinary 
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n very recent times, the proclamation “I do my own research” has become 
popular among the ranks of the misinformed. Despite its unintentional irony, 
this mantra helps call attention to several interrelated concerns regarding the 
modern information environment. These include the preponderance of both bad 
information and those willing to disseminate it, and the obstacles conscientious 
citizens face when endeavoring to separate the information wheat from the chaff. 
The development of full solutions to these matters will not come easily, but any 
meaningful progress surely will hinge at least partly on the widespread availabil-
ity of high-quality source material, together with analysts who utilize that source 
material to conduct rigorous and transparent investigations.
It is in this context that the remarkable C-SPAN Archives is shown to be not 
merely valuable but instead truly essential. In its 35-year history, the C-SPAN 
Archives has grown tremendously under the leadership of Purdue University’s 
Professor Robert X. Browning. Independent of any related research, the sheer 
existence of the Archives represents the very best in terms of information avail-
ability and transparency. Here, interested individuals can gain access to videos 
and other records of communications from thousands of actual and aspiring 
federal officials — presidents, justices, representatives, senators, political candi-
dates, and more — as those individuals engage one another and the American 
public. This enormous collection of raw material comes free of interpretation 
and spin from pundits, whether they be newspaper or cable news journalists or 
obscure commentators from the murky corners of social media or the blogo-
sphere. With the Archives, interested citizens truly can do their own research.
Even were it solely a repository, the importance of the C-SPAN Archives 
would be well-established. But the Archives initiative also includes an active re-
search component. Over the years, the resources provided by the Archives have 
functioned to spark impressive creativity in the scholarly community, leading to 
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countless insights on a wide array of political questions. The research collected 
in the current volume exemplifies this. For any readers new to the Archives re-
search series, you are encouraged to peruse the many outstanding studies cata-
loged in the six previous volumes.
The present compilation continues this pattern of creativity and excellence. 
In this volume’s 12 studies, entrepreneurial researchers have drawn on informa-
tion from the Archives to address questions about a host of intriguing matters. 
These include the roles of social communication and gender schema in candidate 
evaluation, factors affecting the prevalence of emotional content in campaign 
speeches, the noteworthy rhetorical elements on display in Donald Trump’s ral-
lies, contemporary conceptions of citizenship, congressional discourse about and 
policy responses to COVID-19, the congressional decision-making that led to 
C-SPAN broadcasts of Senate proceedings, citizen assessments of private foun-
dations as erstwhile sources of policy expertise, threats to democracy posed by 
political elites who strive to undermine the free press, and the impact of humor-
ous content from late-night television on congressional rhetoric. 
As should be clear, these 12 studies explore very different questions. None-
theless, two common threads link them: all reflect the achievements of skilled 
and perceptive authors, and all reveal insights that were gained through exam-
ination of information drawn from the Archives. One should be in awe of both 
the data source that inspired such rich and varied research and the scholars 
who conceptualized and carried out these studies. This is what actual research 
is and should be.
These, of course, are challenging times. All of us — the mass public, political 
elites, journalists, and the academic community — must strive to contribute to 
more effective democratic governance. Doing so will strengthen the American 
political system and help us to develop optimal responses to the issues — and 
the threats — of the day. In this context, we should be heartened by the C-SPAN 
Archives and the research the Archives fosters. Together, they exemplify the 
path forward. 
Jeffery J. Mondak
James M. Benson Chair in Public Issues and Civic Leadership




t the seventh annual research conference sponsored by the Center for C-SPAN 
Scholarship & Engagement in the Brian Lamb School of Communication 
at Purdue University, 12 papers were presented. All used C-SPAN video 
or derived data in some fashion to present findings about communication and 
politics. The conference was held virtually, but nonetheless there was a lot of 
interaction about the variety of topics covered.
With each conference the authors are more creative and innovative in their 
topics and methods. The topics are also timely, reflecting what scholars are in-
terested in knowing about. This seventh conference saw papers about debate, 
emotion in candidate appearances, congressional rhetoric, and late-night com-
edy references in Congress. COVID-19 in Congress was another timely topic of 
two different papers. There were also two papers that looked at President Trump’s 
rallies from different perspectives. A historian looked back at the development 
of the Clinton health plan by examining the role of private foundations. There 
was also a paper tracing the decision to adopt Senate television. And there were 
papers on gender.
These 12 papers each addressed different questions, using different approaches 
and methods. There was a paper that looked at the bills introduced on COVID-19 
as well as the role of African American congresswomen taking the lead on 
COVID relief. One paper on Trump rallies used in part the participant observa-
tion method, while another was a social deconstruction. A historian used orig-
inal documents supplemented by C-SPAN caller reactions. Another account 
of Senate television debate also used original source documents from other ar-
chives. Others used the C-SPAN Video Library closed-captioning text records.
These papers are not so much a tribute to the richness of the C-SPAN Video 
Library as they are to the ideas and creativity of their authors — the creative schol-
ars who are asking social questions whose answers are made possible thanks to 
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the video, text, and indexing of the C-SPAN Video Library. These scholars use 
modern social science and humanistic and historical techniques to ask and an-
swer these questions.
As organizers, we do not limit the questions or the techniques. In some cases, 
we do select papers that address the same topic in different ways, such as the 
Trump rallies or congressional rhetoric. One scholar looked at criticism of the 
media in congressional rhetoric, another at citizenship concepts, and still an-
other at how members of Congress used anecdotes from late-night television 
to make their points.
We hope that the readers will recognize these different approaches and ques-
tions and be motivated to ask their own research questions. The C-SPAN Video 
Library is free and open to all for searching, clipping, and downloading and has 
an API for more advanced computational research. Future conferences and vol-
umes in this series will continue to demonstrate the research questions of com-
munication, political science, and history as well as other scholarly disciplines 
that recognize video as a source for answering those questions.
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EVALUATING CANDIDATES FAST AND SLOW
Can Initial Impressions Be Socially Influenced?
Julie Grandjean, Jeffrey Hunter, and Erik P. Bucy
I
n the popular imagination, democracies are built upon a foundation of reason-
ing, deliberation, and citizens working together to evaluate the best possible 
candidates to lead them. This notion, while comforting, is not necessarily 
based in fact. Rather, people’s voting decisions reflect a variety of factors, many 
unrelated to the enlightened reasoning the supposed ideal citizen is assumed to 
employ (Lodge et al., 1989). Sometimes, decisions may not be deliberate or even 
conscious but reactionary and automatic, reflecting voters’ assessment of non-
verbal cues. Indeed, the ability to read expressive displays develops in the early 
stages of life (Antonakis & Dalgas, 2009). Although people often don’t trust their 
own ability to make snap judgments about political candidates, reliable infer-
ences about leadership traits and election winners can nevertheless be made on 
the basis of thin-slice exposures to political images lasting a few seconds or less 
(see Benjamin & Shapiro, 2009; Olivola & Todorov, 2010; Todorov et al., 2005)
While experimental research has convincingly demonstrated how quickly 
viewers are able to arrive at accurate assessments of political candidates on their 
own, this project seeks to slow down and socially assess the judgments behind 
these outcomes. We are also interested in the extent to which people change their 
initial voting decision after a group discussion. Similar to the thin-slice experi-
mental paradigm, this study asks viewers to rate still images and short video clips 
of political candidates using footage from the C-SPAN Video Library. But rather 
than stopping there, we employ online focus groups to elicit discussion about 
the factors that influence viewer judgments — and whether the social context of 
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discussing political evaluations with others causes some participants to change 
their mind after the fact — and why. Our approach thus complements and ex-
tends previous studies in which participants were only able to offer a one-time 
candidate assessment based on a short exposure.
To create the conditions for social evaluation, the study employs focus groups 
as a context for participants to share the smaller cues and larger factors that in-
fluence judgments of candidate viability — an approach that contrasts with previ-
ous studies in which researchers have mostly used close-ended questions asking 
viewers to instantly judge candidates based on traits such as competence, like-
ability, and authenticity. In our focus groups, we show participants a mix of still 
photographs and video clips from recent political debates from around the coun-
try and first ask for a snap judgment about which candidate won their election. 
After each thin-slice evaluation, we give participants the opportunity to articu-
late the reasons for their initial vote and ask if anyone would like to change their 
vote based on the discussion. We find that about 20% of participants do change 
their mind when given the opportunity to rethink their initial assessment.
THINKING FAST AND SLOW
The contrasting styles of candidate judgment that this study seeks to understand 
can be summarized by the differences between System 1 and System 2 thinking, 
or the dual processing model of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition (see 
Kahneman & Frederic, 2005; Stanovich & West, 2000). Kahneman (2011) de-
fines System 1 as the type of thinking that “operates automatically and quickly, 
with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control” (p. 20), while “System 
2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including 
complex computations” (p. 21). The operations of System 2, Kahneman notes, are 
often associated “with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concen-
tration” (p. 21), indicating how this mode of thought plays out over time. Most 
people assume important decisions involve rational thoughts and that intuition, 
feelings, and rapid assessments are either unrelated or unhelpful to that process 
(Kahneman, 2011). However, research suggests that individuals rely heavily on 
System 1 processing (Olivola & Todorov, 2010) — and if their decisions involve 
other people, they often rely on the primary source of social information avail-
able: facial cues (Grabe & Bucy, 2009; Masters, 1992).
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Studies have shown, for example, that assessments of intelligence can be in-
ferred on the basis of facial cues alone (Zebrowitz et al., 2002). Other politically 
relevant traits such as competence (Ballew & Todorov, 2007; Mattes et al., 2010) 
may also be inferred quite rapidly, below the level of conscious awareness. This 
process often takes less than a second, as people unconsciously compare between 
thin slices of experiences (Olivola & Todorov, 2010). According to Marcus (2013), 
“our brains know far more than our conscious minds know” (p. 107). Indeed, 
while our brain may preconsciously respond within the first 100 milliseconds 
of a visual stimulus, conscious awareness of the stimuli only appears after half 
a second (Marcus, 2013). The efficiency of the visual cortex allows the brain to 
make relatively accurate snap judgments based on such short duration expo-
sures, even while the mind may be consciously unable to fully explain how we 
arrived at that decision.
System 1 thinking is also relevant to decisions typically assumed to be de-
liberative, such as those surrounding vote choice. But even here, instead of re-
lying solely on candidate policies, news coverage, or even personality, voters 
might rely on certain cognitive and affective heuristics or judgmental shortcuts 
(Stewart, 1997). Nonverbal cues from still images, for example, are referenced 
as people form first impressions, and these impressions can have lasting reso-
nance and remain fixed in memory (Antonakis & Dalgas, 2009; Naylor, 2007). In 
politics, nonverbal aspects of candidate presentation are critical to voter evalu-
ation of such traits as competence, integrity, likeability, and general fitness for of-
fice — and can be controlled in ways to manipulate voters’ preferences (Rosenberg 
& McCafferty, 1987, p. 44). Faces are especially potent sources of social infor-
mation (Grabe & Bucy, 2009), projecting the emotional state and motivational 
intent of the communicator while conveying important insights about more en-
during personality traits (Olivola & Todorov, 2010).
System 1 thinking fits within the “thin slice” research paradigm, which holds 
that “exposures to expressive behavior as brief as a few seconds tend to be highly 
predictive of reactions to much longer exposures” (Benjamin & Shapiro, 2009, p. 
523). The most common form of thin-slicing is the ability to assess and make so-
cial judgments of other people (Ambady et al., 2000), including the visual presen-
tation and nonverbal behavior of political leaders (Gong & Bucy, 2016; Masters, 
1992). Thus, politicians’ facial cues and physical appearance alone can trigger 
powerful associations in voters’ minds. When inferences made from thin-slice 
exposures are systematically investigated, they are predictive of election outcomes 
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at a rate that far exceeds chance. In one well-known study, assessments of com-
petence from brief (1 second) exposures to photographs of pairs of U.S. Senate 
candidates predicted winners in 68.8% of races shown (Todorov et al., 2005). 
A follow-up study also using still images of candidate faces (Ballew & Todorov, 
2007) found an even higher prediction rate of 72%.
Using the same general procedure but utilizing short (10 second) videos from 
gubernatorial debates, Benjamin and Shapiro (2009) found higher predictive ac-
curacy for candidate videos evaluated with the sound off than with the sound 
on. When sound was involved, and viewers were allowed to hear the candidates 
speak, the success rate of correctly guessing the winner dropped. As Gladwell 
(2007) has observed in his summary of the thin-slice paradigm, the popular 
book Blink, more information is often not only useless — it is also impairing. 
Rather than enhancing the ability to identify election winners, videos of candi-
dates with the sound on cue partisanship and policy stands that allow viewers 
to more accurately assess the candidates’ party affiliation (Benjamin & Shapiro, 
2009). Interestingly, when viewers start thinking too much about how others 
voted in an election and rely on System 2 thinking, they are more likely to make 
the wrong guess about election winners than when they go with their initial “gut 
feeling” (Ballew & Todorov, 2007, p. 87).
Political Appearance
Inferences from candidate appearance have the strongest effect on undecided 
voters, a phenomenon that holds up cross-culturally (Sussman et al., 2013). Vot-
ers tend to assess political candidates with preexisting expectancies — for gen-
der, age, authenticity, attractiveness, and other factors — about how a politician 
should look and behave. Previous studies show that viewers positively evaluate 
leaders who exhibit expected nonverbal behaviors, while they suspiciously eye 
and closely scrutinize those who violate these nonverbal expectancies (Bond 
et al., 1992; Bucy, 2011; Gong & Bucy, 2016). Violating nonverbal expectations 
erodes support, while meeting them promotes confidence. Indeed, images of 
leaders that violate normative expectations of appropriate political behavior 
can trigger critical evaluations by viewers and provoke widespread specula-
tion among journalists (Bucy, 2011, p. 199). Studies have shown that voters dis-
like candidates deemed too young or too old, preferring candidates who are in 
the prime of life (Hain, 1974; Oleszek, 1969). Indeed, candidates who look too 
young, such as “Mayor Pete” Buttigieg, who was in his late 30s during the 2020 
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Democratic primaries, look inexperienced compared to older candidates like 
Joe Biden, who was in his late 70s. On the other hand, older candidates can be 
seen as close-minded, which tends to dampen voting intentions. Regardless of 
perceived competence, whether a candidate has a “baby face” is a good predic-
tor of election results in collectivist countries, though it is worth nothing that it 
is not in more individualistic-oriented (Western) societies (Chang et al., 2017, 
p. 105). So, while the phenomenon of inferring politically relevant traits based 
on candidate appearance does hold cross-culturally, these inferences have vary-
ing impacts depending on the cultural context.
Another expectation that voters hold about politicians is authenticity, an 
alignment between the candidate’s public/political self and their private self 
(Louden & McCauliff, 2004, p. 93). In recent years, authenticity has become a 
salient lens through which voters evaluate candidates and officeholders (Pillow 
et al., 2018). Discrepancies between the expectations that citizens have for those 
running for office and how candidates present themselves in public can erode 
perceptions of authenticity, and therefore credibility, among voters (Pillow et 
al., 2018; Rosenberg & McCafferty, 1987). Research also reveals a marked ten-
dency to evaluate candidates according to physical attractiveness (Lawson et al., 
2010). Indeed, judgments of attractiveness can produce a well-known “halo ef-
fect” where individuals who are considered more attractive are also judged more 
positively in terms of intelligence, social skills, and success (Hart et al., 2011, p. 
182). Voters with less political knowledge and interest tend to evaluate attrac-
tive candidates more positively, while political sophisticates tend to correct or 
even overcompensate their evaluations to be more negative toward attractive 
candidates (Hart et al., 2011, p. 190). Interestingly, unattractive candidates are 
not judged as negatively as attractive candidates are judged positively, because 
negative stereotypes are not considered a valid justification for judgment (Hart 
et al., 2011, p. 197).
Gender is another important factor in candidate evaluation. Johns and Shep-
hard show that male and female candidates are evaluated differently: Men are 
seen as stronger, while women are deemed warmer (2007, p. 443). Female poli-
ticians deemed attractive are also seen as nicer and more dynamic, which may 
indirectly boost voting intentions (Sigelman et al., 1987). Yet, in a study on the 
influence of weight on candidate evaluations, Miller and Lundgren (2010) show 
that obese female candidates are judged more negatively than nonobese female 
candidates, but obese male candidates are judged more positively than non-
obese male candidates.
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Other research on nonverbal displays of political candidates has examined 
differences in the reception of visual cues, whether between voters in different 
national contexts (e.g., France and the United States) (Masters & Sullivan, 1989a, 
1989b), or the relationship between crisis news and nonverbal leader displays 
(Bucy & Newhagen, 1999). This literature finds that tepid reactions or miscal-
ibrated nonverbal responses provoke doubt in viewers because leaders should 
be capable of handling emergency situations — especially communicating reas-
surance and resolve amid dire circumstances (Bucy, 2003). When facial displays 
and other nonverbal behaviors (e.g., gesture, tone of voice) are deemed inap-
propriate, there is an emotional cost that impacts the offending politician neg-
atively. Rather than conveying reassurance, the performance sends “the wrong 
emotional tone and, instead of promoting curiosity or other harmless cogni-
tions, evokes doubt, anxiety, and other aversive responses” (Bucy, 2011, p. 213).
Socially Influenced Decisions
The role of social influence in group decision-making has been studied exten-
sively, not only in political psychology but also in criminal justice in the case of 
jurors who are required by law to deliberate before making consequential de-
cisions that are deemed fair and just (e.g., Bornstein & Greene, 2011; Kerr & 
MacCoun, 1985; MacCoun, 1989; Salerno & Diamond, 2010). Pettus (1990) con-
ducted interviews with criminal jurors within a week of their verdicts to better 
understand how they arrived at their decisions. From her observations, Pettus 
concluded that jurors focus more on the negative and ineffective aspects of the 
evidence, defendant, and witnesses — and more on the positive attributes of the 
defense attorney, judge, and prosecutor (p. 88). Thus, there was some deference 
to the perceived expertise of the subjects under scrutiny.
Though individual members within a group may arrive at a firm decision 
prior to deliberation, they may also change their mind post-deliberation. This 
phenomenon can be caused by two different group dynamics: normative influ-
ence or informational influence (Kaplan & Miller, 1987). Normative influence 
taps into the basic human need for acceptance by the rest of the group through 
agreement with other members (Kaplan & Miller, 1987), while informational 
influence relates to a more deliberative analysis of the information provided by 
other group members and the acceptance or rejection of their arguments based 
on accuracy (Kaplan & Miller, 1987). These two influences are at play in any so-
cially influenced decision-making process.
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In the case of juries, as in the case of other group decisions, it is unsurpris-
ingly easier to reach an agreement when a majority, rather than unanimity, is 
needed. It is interesting, however, that issues that require more judgment tend to 
be solved though normative influence, while issues that require intellectual rea-
soning tend to be solved through informational influence. While voting seems 
to be primarily an act of intellectual reasoning, it can happen that voters focus 
extensively on heuristics, that is, System 1 thinking, and regard their vote as an 
exercise in judgment rather than intellectual reasoning. In such cases, we expect 
group discussion to exert more normative influence on their choices.
Regardless of the speed at which decisions are made, we also wonder whether 
there are generational differences in decision-making processes, particularly 
in light of the stereotype of younger individuals being more impulsive in their 
choices. From a consumer research perspective, Viswanathan and Jain (2013) 
suggest that Gen Z — that cohort of young people born between 1997 and 2012 
(Bond, 2020) — tends to rely more on System 1 thinking while older generations, 
such as Gen X and Baby Boomers, tend to rely on System 2 thinking. Whether 
this finding applies to political judgments is an open question. But given that 
Gen Z tends to prefer social modes of information gathering (e.g., what their 
friends and family say), we would expect younger participants to be more open 
to group influence in evaluating candidates than older participants — an outlook 
that should be reflected in their willingness to change their initial voting choices.
Based on the thin-slice paradigm, we expect that our focus group participants 
will first have considerable success in identifying the winning candidate when 
shown pairs of photographs or short videos of competing candidates without 
sound. In the social setting of a focus group, we also expect participants to com-
ment on how well the candidates’ physical appearance, age, overall demeanor, 
and facial expressions comport with preexisting expectations. We also expect 
comments about inferred personality traits, since viewers are quite effective at 
making trait-related judgments. After some discussion about their initial deci-
sions, we anticipate a certain number of participants who had guessed the elec-
tion winner correctly to change their “vote” and name the losing candidate as the 
winner because they will overthink the decision task and allow themselves to be 
persuaded by others, making a conscious judgment rather than going with their 
“gut feeling.” In addition to testing these expectations, we are also interested in 
identifying the main themes that emerge in focus group discussion about how 
people arrive at socially influenced voting decisions based on short-term expo-
sure to visual stimuli.
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To structure the analysis, we pose three research questions that guide our re-
porting of the results:
RQ1: How accurately will focus group participants, both younger and older, 
be able to identify election winners from short-duration exposures of 
candidate photographs and videos?
RQ2: What percentage of focus group participants change their initial vote 
after group discussion and social consideration of candidate qualities, 
and will these new choices be more or less accurate than their initial 
choices?
RQ3: What justifications and themes emerge in focus group discussion about 
how people arrive at socially influenced political decisions based on 
short-duration exposures to candidate photographs and videos?
METHOD
Participants
To address these questions, we ran a series of focus groups with younger (18 to 
45 years old) and older (55 and up) participants. Altogether, the study involved 
55 participants between the ages of 18 and 71 (M = 37.39). Of these, 23 (41.8%) 
identified as male, 31 (56.4%) as female, and one respondent (1.8%) chose not to 
answer. Younger participants (n = 32, 58.2%) were recruited via a student study 
participation pool at a large southwestern university. Older participants (n = 23, 
41.8%) were recruited via a community database maintained by our Center for 
Communication Research, as well as through word of mouth.
Visual Stimuli
The stimuli shown to focus group participants consisted of 21 different sets of 
video clips and still images featuring two competing major-party candidates 
taken from gubernatorial and senatorial debates that were televised on C-SPAN 
between 2010 and 2020. Since the debates took place all over the U.S., candidates 
were for the most part not identifiable to any of our participants; only a few can-
didates were recognized in all the tests run. Debates provide an ideal setting for 
comparing visuals of candidates because the setting, lighting, and camera angles 
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are consistent for each candidate. In order to minimize judgments based on ste-
reotypes, we took efforts to ensure that most candidate pairs shown to partici-
pants were of the same gender, race, and age range. Each focus group was also 
asked to rate one pair that intentionally featured a contrasting difference in can-
didate gender, race, or age so that we could test whether stereotypes played a role 
in participant voting and identification of election winners.
Figure 1.1 shows a representative sampling of four candidate pairs used in 
the study. Video clips consisted of 10 seconds of debate footage and were shown 
without sound. The decision to show muted versions of the clips was made on 
the basis of the thin-slice forecast literature showing higher accuracy for se-
lecting election winners when videos of politicians are shown without sound 
(Benjamin & Shapiro, 2009), and the practical fact that news networks routinely 
broadcast image bites of politicians where candidates are shown but not heard 
(see Grabe & Bucy, 2009). Care was taken to ensure that camera framing, body 
orientation, and even the gestures of each candidate were roughly comparable 
in each clip. The clips were selected to portray a typical representation of each 
candidate’s performance, not a one-time gaffe or inappropriate display. Still im-
ages consisted of one frame from the 10-second video clips. Both the video clips 
and still images were displayed in their original 16:9 proportions.
Procedure
During the recruitment process, participants were contacted by email and re-
ceived a three-digit identification code to facilitate anonymization. In the ini-
tial contact, they were also asked to complete an online pre-study questionnaire 
to record their demographic data, political orientation, interest in politics, me-
dia habits, and attention to national and state elections. From this information, 
participants were placed into one of eight focus groups according to their age. 
The size of the groups varied from 4 to 13 participants, depending on the days 
and time offered and the availability of participants. Four groups consisted of 
participants aged 18–45 and four groups consisted of participants 55 and older. 
Grouping participants in this manner facilitated some generational cohesion 
during the discussion and provided the opportunity to look for trends based on 
age. Of our 55 participants, 29 (51.7%) were shown still images and 26 (48.3%) 
were shown 10-second video clips.
Focus groups were held online and recorded using the Zoom communica-
tion platform. Before the start of each group, participants were asked to provide 
Caucasian male vs. Caucasian male
Caucasian female vs. Caucasian female
African American male vs. African American male
FIGURE 1.1 representative sampling of four candidate pairs used in the study. The pairs included six different matchups 
in all: Caucasian male vs. Caucasian male; Caucasian female vs. Caucasian female; Caucasian male vs. Caucasian female; 
Minority male vs. Minority male; Minority male vs. Minority female; Minority male vs. Caucasian male.
African American male vs. Caucasian male
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their informed consent by completing an online form. Next, the group was pro-
vided with detailed instructions by the moderator about the procedures for the 
discussion. To help participants learn the procedures, navigate the software in-
volved, and successfully switch between the Zoom platform and the study ques-
tionnaires on their web browser, a series of three pretests were conducted with 
each group. During the pretests, participants were shown practice stimuli on 
their Zoom screen and then asked to switch to their web browser and complete 
a short questionnaire. No data was collected from the pretests — they were held 
simply for training purposes. Time was allowed for participants to ask ques-
tions and for the moderator to help participants with any technology problems. 
Following the development of a discussion protocol, the first two authors mod-
erated all focus groups.
The actual study began after all participants expressed comfort in their abil-
ity to complete the assigned tasks. Following specific instructions by the mod-
erator to pay attention to the images on their screen, the group was shown the 
stimuli. The stimuli, either two still images or two video clips, were shown side 
by side and labeled as “Candidate 1” and “Candidate 2.” Still images were shown 
for 5 seconds, while video clips were each 10 seconds in length to compensate for 
the additional information present in moving images (e.g., gestures and other 
candidate movements). The 10-second length is also consistent with an earlier 
study by Benjamin and Shapiro (2009). After the allotted time, the screen went 
blank and the moderator asked participants to switch to their web browser and 
complete a questionnaire.
The questionnaire began by asking participants to indicate who they would 
vote for based on the images they just saw; in other words, who their preferred 
candidate was. Next, they were asked to provide their best guess on who they 
thought won that election, which is a different question. Finally, they were asked 
to evaluate candidates on six traits: competent, trustworthy, qualified, deter-
mined, authentic, and likeable using a 7-point scale (where 1 = “not at all” and 7 
= “very”). Following this, participants were asked to return to their Zoom screen, 
where the candidate images were again presented side by side for the whole dis-
cussion. The moderator then led the group in a guided discussion where partici-
pants were encouraged to elaborate on their choices about which candidate they 
voted for and which candidate they thought won. After the group discussion, 
they were asked to return to their online questionnaire and indicate whether 
the discussion had changed their mind about either of their votes. This proce-
dure was then repeated until the allotted time expired. The number of candi-
date pairs evaluated in each group varied between 4 and 6, depending on the 
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length of each discussion. Altogether, 21 sets of video clips and still images were 
evaluated by our groups.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics indicate the percentage of participants who voted for a pre-
ferred candidate and then guessed the winning candidate before and after dis-
cussion. Overall, participants “voted” correctly 45.9% of the time after short 
exposures to candidate images and videos when asked to choose who they would 
vote for. This rate is lower than expected but our sample size is small and non-
representative; moreover, the focus here is more on whether the social context 
of group discussion changes initial impressions, not the accuracy of those im-
pressions. For this reason, tests of significance are not performed on the results, 
although we do report frequencies. Certain subgroups of participants, notably 
older female participants, were quite accurate in selecting winners based on their 
personal vote choice when shown video clips — 75% before discussion and 66.7% 
after. But this rate did not hold for estimates of election winners or for still images.
After the group discussion about their choices (summarized below), respon-
dents changed their vote for their preferred candidate 13.3% of the time. Of these 
changes, 5% of participants changed their mind to vote for the winning candidate 
and 8.3% for the losing candidate, dropping the overall rate of correctly voting for 
the winning candidate from 45.9% to 44.2%. When asked to choose which can-
didate they thought actually won the election after brief exposures to the stimuli, 
participants guessed the actual winner 40.5% of the time. Following discussion, 
participants changed their guesses 22.7% of the time, with 9.1% now choosing the 
winning candidate and 13.6% now choosing the losing candidate — so the overall 
rate of successful snap-judgment guesses again decreased, to 36%.
Throughout the study, the accuracy of participant votes varied depending 
on the type of stimuli that participants were shown. Indeed, there were slightly 
more accurate votes for the winning candidates when participants were shown 
still images (47.3%) than when they were shown short videos (44.4%). The dif-
ference becomes more pronounced after discussion, with participants exposed 
to still images voting for the winner 48% of the time by changing their mind in 
favor of the winning candidate, but with the accuracy rate for video-based votes 
decreasing to 40.2% in the direction of the losing candidate.
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As for guessing who actually won, participants accurately selected the winning 
candidate 43.2% of the time following short exposures to still images, but that rate 
dropped to 37.6% after discussion. When focus group participants were shown 
the 10-second videos, the accuracy rate was even lower: participants guessed the 
winner just 37.6% of the time before discussion, and 35.9% after.
In response to the still images, participants changed their mind about their 
preferred candidate 13.6% of the time (5.6% for the winner, and 8% for the los-
ing candidate). Compared to their personal preference, participants were much 
more likely to change their mind about who they thought actually won the elec-
tion, switching their vote 24.8% of the time — but mostly in the direction of the 
loser (16% compared to 8.8% for the winning candidate). In response to the 
video portrayals, people changed their vote and guess about who won slightly 
less. Participants changed their mind about their preferred candidate 12.8% of 
the time (4.3% for the winner, 8.5% for the losing candidate). They changed their 
mind about who they thought won the election 18.5% of the time (9.4% for the 
winner, 11.1% for the loser).
At least in the case of our participants, the analysis overall shows that older 
citizens (55.3% before discussion, 53.2% after) are better at voting for the winning 
candidate than younger citizens (39.9% before discussion, 38.5% after) based on 
short-duration exposures. As for guessing who won their respective elections, 
younger participants have a slightly higher success rate before discussion (41.2% 
compared to 39.4%), but after discussion older participants are more accurate at 
detecting likely winners, correctly guessing 40.4% of election outcomes, while 
the accuracy of younger participants drops to 33.1%.
Next, we wanted to see whether the presence of an incumbent within a can-
didate pair increased or decreased the success rate for both preferred candidate 
voting and correctly guessing the winner in a given race. For this analysis, we 
utilized the data from all eight of our focus groups and ran a series of chi-square 
tests of independence. For preferred candidate choices, the chi-square test was 
not significant: χ2 (1) = .07, p = .8, V = .02. In races where an incumbent was pres-
ent and won, participants voted for the incumbent 45% of the time. When there 
was no incumbent, participants voted for the winner 46.6% of the time — vir-
tually the same rate. A second chi-square test for guessing the winning candi-
date showed no significant difference whether an incumbent was in the race 
or not: χ2 (1) = .63, p = .4, V = .05. Participants guessed the winner 35.8% of the 
time when an incumbent was present, and 36.1% when there was no incumbent.
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Finally, we wanted to see whether the success rate of participant voting de-
pended on the type of candidate matchups in terms of demographics (white male 
vs. white male, white female vs. white female, white male vs. white female, mi-
nority candidate vs. minority candidate). Another chi-square test of indepen-
dence was run and, for the most part, the gender and racial composition of our 
candidate pairs made no difference. Voting results were marginally significant 
only in the white male vs. white female matchups, χ2 (4) = 9.101, p = .06, V = .19. 
A comparison of column proportions showed participants voted for the win-
ner of these contests 70.8% of the time. As for guessing the actual winner, an-
other chi-square test of independence was conducted but it was not significant: 
χ2 (4) = 7.33, p = .119, V = .17.
ANALYSIS OF RECURRING THEMES
We next analyzed the focus group transcripts for recurring themes, following an 
inductive process of bottom-up discovery The theme identification process was 
adapted from a previous thematic analysis of visuals by Krause and Bucy (2018), 
which parsed open-ended responses to images of fracking. To ensure partici-
pant anonymity, assigned first names were used in the transcription process and 
no identifying information was retained. Rather than using specific ages, only 
group age range is reported in the theme analysis (e.g., 18–45, 55+). During the 
focus group discussions, participants mentioned a total of 783 different reasons 
they voted for one candidate over another. Of these, 355 were reasons against 
the candidate they did not select and 422 were reasons for the candidate they 
did select. All of these reasons were first sorted into 14 general categories, which 
included character judgments, comments about clothing, emotional displays, fa-
cial expressions, comments about posture, hand placement, interaction style, eye 
gaze, hairstyle, candidate age, mouth configuration, production features, candi-
date gender, and candidate race (see Figure 1.1).
From this sorting process, we were able to infer six recurring themes that 
played a role in participant vote choices: (1) thin slices of behavior hold enough 
information for accurate character inferences; (2) political candidates are judged 
based on their sartorial choices; (3) over-expression by candidates (i.e., expec-
tancy violations) engenders doubt; (4) faces are rich sources of social informa-
tion on which viewers base voting decisions; (5) posture is an impactful element 
of candidate self-presentation; and, (6) hand placement and gestures serve as 
important decision cues. (See Figure 1.2.)


























































REASONS FOR VOTING FOR OR AGAINST A CANDIDATE
FIGURE 1.2 reasons for voting for or against a candidate.
Theme 1: Thin slices of behavior hold enough information 
for accurate character inferences
The main theme that emerged from focus group discussion is confirmation that 
viewers are quick to make inferences about candidate character within a matter 
of seconds following brief exposure to still images or a 10-second debate video. 
This phenomenon is consistent with Todorov and colleagues’ findings that view-
ers can make reliable trait assessments in a mere fraction of a second (e.g., Olivola 
& Todorov, 2010). The influence of candidate appearance on citizen perceptions 
and vote choice has been known for some time (see Rosenberg et al., 1986) and 
gets regularly recycled in campaign lore. Warren Harding was elected in 1920 
not because he was particularly smart or well-versed in public policy, the story 
goes, but because he looked presidential (Gladwell, 2007, p. 128). But what does 
it mean exactly to look like a great candidate? Our focus group participants said 
they preferred candidates who appeared authentic, knowledgeable, professional, 
or even “more fun in office.” Trustworthiness was another character trait men-
tioned many times:
Dakota (18–45): “I think Candidate 2 won. He just seems more trustworthy, 
even though I don’t like his expressions. I still think he would have more and 
have gotten, like, people’s trust and he, in a way, seems more likable than the 
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other one. The other one just . . . the candidate . . . even though I would’ve 
voted for Candidate 1, he just seems very hard-headed.”
Here as well we see a discrepancy between who participants thought won an 
election versus who they would have voted for. In rendering broad judgments 
about candidates’ intelligence and fitness for office, participants relied on their 
gut feelings and quick impressions after short exposure to the stimuli:
George (18–45): “I don’t know if that’s just me, [but Candidate 1] just doesn’t 
look very trustworthy or, uh, even that, like, intelligent. I don’t know. It’s just 
something . . . something. I got a bad vibe from him [Candidate 1].”
The more personable a candidate seemed to participants, the more they 
tended to judge them to be of good character:
Amanda (18–45): “You always want to try to relate the best that you can to 
the audience, ’cause it kind of seems more personal, [like] building a connec-
tion. I just feel like with [Candidate 1 ] . . . there is no connection. Like, at all. 
Whereas with number 2, I feel like I’m more able to be like, ‘Oh, you seem 
nice,’ like I feel like we could be friends, like you’re someone I could like, see 
getting coffee with or something like that.”
Female candidates had the added burden of also needing to appear nur-
turing (Everitt et al., 2016). For instance, a participant explained how she 
voted against a female candidate because “she yells at children, you can tell.” 
Participants noted this higher threshold for positive character judgments of 
fe male candidates:
Fischer (18–45): “I think your point is, I think it’s kind of hard to answer be-
cause for women politicians, I mean, they have to walk this very thin line of 
being educated and being bitchy. And if they come off the wrong way, they’re 
going to lose everything. So, I believe it probably is a lot harder for women 
politicians to come off with passion without turning people off.”
Fallon (18–45): “But still coming off nurturing and loving and feminine, so 
to speak.”
Fischer (18–45): “And knowledgeable.”
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Theme 2: Public figures are judged based on their sartorial choices
Several participants paid close attention to the outfits the candidates were wearing 
and said that clothing and accessory choices readily indicated “what party they’re 
from or what they’re standing for.” Men were often judged by the color and pattern 
of their ties. But they were also deemed less competent if their tie was crooked. 
Such findings are consistent with experimental research showing that clothing 
and presentation differences in candidate photographs — a clean compared to 
a slightly unkempt look — influence electoral choices (Rosenberg et al., 1986):
Debbie (55+): “I hate to say that’s a funeral tie to me or a, you know, after-
noon, flower garden tie, you know? It’s not a tie that stands out that says, ‘I’m 
here.’ And it’s kind of bunched up a little bit from what I could see. He needs 
to straighten himself out. Maybe his wife needs to help him.”
If a male candidate was spotted wearing a wedding ring, he was deemed more 
committed and trustworthy. Female candidates, on the other hand, were judged 
more on the style and color of their dress as well as for their accessory choices:
Mary (55+): “[The] red [dress] is a power statement.”
Debbie: “Candidate 1 makes me think of Tweety Bird. I mean she’s got on the 
yellow, and then she’s got the high hair. She’s trying too hard to me. Participants 
frequently attempted to infer party affiliation based on the clothing choices of 
both male and female candidates.”
Many participants said they voted for one candidate over the other simply 
because of the color of their outfits. Since blue is now considered the color of the 
Democratic Party and red the color of the Republican Party, if either of these 
colors were part of the candidates’ outfits, participants would select who they 
would vote for based on assumptions about the partisan meaning of color. In 
one instance, candidates both wore blue ties, which stumped some participants:
Michael (18–45): “I was looking at their ties. They’re both, like, blue, so I won-
der if they’re in the same party.”
The presence or absence of lapel pins (of flags and other symbols) was also a 
subject of conversation, especially in cases where one candidate was wearing a 
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pin and one was not. Pins were an indication that candidates were “conscious of 
public impressions,” and the presence of a pin was an important detail for some 
participants, who inferred messages ranging from issue advocacy to patriotism 
all from the presence of an accessory:
Henry (18–45): “I think that makes me pay more attention to them, because 
whenever I look across a lot of local officials . . . you can tell that they’re in-
volved in different advocacy programs. It really leaves an impact on a lot of 
different people, rather than them not being involved in any advocacy.”
The absence of a flag pin on a candidate when the opponent was wearing one 
caused many participants to assume an affiliation with the Democratic Party. 
As one participant, Kennedy (55+) said, “to be honest with you, not having the 
flag maybe tells me more than having it.” The display of religious symbols also 
influenced participant choices. In one instance, a female candidate wore a cross 
necklace, and participants mentioned it multiple times:
John (18–45): “I would definitely choose Candidate 1 because of the cross neck-
lace. . . . To just wear a cross necklace it’s like a, it’s a personal decision. But 
whenever they choose to do that on that stage, that is much more a message.”
Theme 3: Over-expression by candidates (i.e., expectancy violations) engenders doubt
Participants tended to react unfavorably toward candidates who were highly ex-
pressive, preferring those who instead appeared calm and composed. This brings 
us back to the discussion of expectancy violations and how displaying too much 
emotion or inappropriate signaling — sentiments that do not fit the rhetorical 
setting — can generate critical assessments. For instance, participants selected as 
winners candidates who looked like they were “trying to get their point across” 
but rejected those who seemed to be “defending themselves.”
Travis (18–45): “Candidate 2 looks like he’s, he’s getting caught up, like he looks 
like he’s even stuttering a little bit. And you can definitely tell that he’s talking, 
but it also looks like he’s getting confused, [maybe] not confused, um, he’s like, 
back-stepping, even. It, just the way that it looks, it’s just what I’m perceiv-
ing. He looks defensive, whereas Candidate 2 looks like he’s taking charge.”
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Participants responded well to candidates who appeared to be conversational 
but disliked those who seemed “too chill and relaxed.” They did appreciate when 
they saw candidates who looked passionate. Participants overall responded well 
to candidates who came across as comfortable and “natural,” compared to those 
who seemed intent on displaying strong emotion.
Debbie (55+): “What stood out to me like in [Candidate 1], it looks like he’s 
a deer with his head . . . he’s stuck in the headlights. He also looks like he’s 
sweating to me. . . . And that’s what stood out to me like, ‘Why am I here?’ 
[Candidate 2] looks like he came prepared. He’s calm, cool, collected. You 
know, he’s just . . . he’s ready.”
To many participants, over-expression equaled under-preparedness. Attributes 
like confidence were closely connected with composure.
Trey (18–45): “I felt like [Candidate 2] was moving a little bit too much. [He] 
almost comes off as maybe a little bit nervous or not confident in what he 
was saying.”
Theme 4: Faces are rich sources of social information 
on which viewers base voting decisions
In their visual scanning of candidate images, participants looked for flaws in 
candidate faces, mentioning for example the lack of eyebrows, a “dark spot on 
top of his lips,” or bags under the candidates’ eyes. But their main focus was 
on what their eyes could convey. Participants detected anger, passion, or confi-
dence just by peering at the candidates’ eyes. They were also keen to track where 
the candidates were looking and based part of their evaluation on this visual 
trajectory. If candidates were perceived as looking away, they were deemed ei-
ther not trustworthy or lacking in confidence. If they were looking straight at 
the camera, they were generally deemed more confident and trustworthy, ex-
cept in cases where they appeared too invasive, as if “staring into our souls” 
(Alice, 18–45).
Emma (55+): “I don’t know why, but [Candidate 2] almost looks like he’s mad 
to me. Um, I can’t [put my finger on it].”
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Interviewer: “What makes you think he looks mad?”
Emma (55+): “I don’t know, it’s just the . . . the downturn in his mouth or 
something.”
Blake (55+): “I don’t know, there’s something about the way Candidate 2 holds 
his mouth [that] just strikes me as not being honest.”
Participants also used comparisons to describe some candidate faces and would 
use the perception of familiarity as a heuristic or decisional guide when voting for 
candidates who looked like someone they might have known (grandma, grandpa, 
school librarian), or disliked (“Vladimir Putin,” “Prince An drew,” school secre-
tary). Overall, candidate expressions were the most important facial feature influ-
encing participant choices. Often, facial expressions were used to make broader 
judgments about candidate preparedness. Adam (18–45) observed that one candi-
date appeared to have a “glib look on his face, and it makes me think he is caught 
off guard by something or [is] not as knowledgeable.” Other times, participants 
scrutinized facial expressions to determine whether candidates were likeable:
Fallon (18–45): “Candidate 1’s facial expression is very brash, and this image 
of him just does not make him look likable. He’s someone that I’m like, ‘ugh,’ 
about. I don’t know how else to describe it.”
Diane (55+): “I think her . . . looking straight ahead to me that . . . makes me 
feel like she’s actually more authentic because she’s not afraid to look you in 
the eye. Uh, with [the other candidate’s] head tilt, to me that . . . that’s not a 
good communication skill. It’s, uh, a little off-putting for me.”
Theme 5: Posture is an impactful element of candidate self-presentation
Posture also surfaced as an important consideration when participants articu-
lated specific reasons they accepted or rejected a candidate. Participants pointed 
to a “confident stance” and “relaxed posture” as indicators of preparedness, de-
pendability, strength, and positive character:
Charlie (18–45): “He looks like he’s confident. He has a good sense of compo-
sure, uh, just the way that . . . his shoulders are locked, you know, in a good 
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position. His posture, his hand motion, just the way that he sits and the way 
that he’s looking, he looks like a more likable, dependable, confident candidate.”
Even more impactful than good posture, however, was bad posture. Parti-
cipants described candidates with bad posture as looking “lazy” because of their 
“slouchy posture,” or “uncomfortable” on account of a slacked stance:
Brenda (55+): “His shoulders are stiff. I mean, you could look at the other one 
and see that his shoulders are relaxed, and he seems like he’s in his element. 
Candidate 2 looks stiff to me like he’s, you know, he’s stiff and his shoulders 
are tight.”
Bad posture communicated not only discomfort in the eyes of participants 
but also lack of physical and mental preparation:
Emmerson (18–45): “The way he’s leaned in his chair . . . he’s not sitting up 
straight. His posture is not as good as the other [candidate’s]. And I feel like 
that’s something they probably, like his campaign manager probably said, ‘You 
know, have good posture, sit up straight, seem confident.’ [Instead] he’s just 
kind of like, slumped down and seems like he’s really having to think hard 
about what he’s going to say.”
Emma (55+): “To me, her shoulders pulled back the way that they are, uh, as 
far as I’m concerned that kind of just shows confidence. Whereas, his are kind 
of almost slouched forward a little bit, which almost seems like, ‘Uh, okay, 
what’s the big deal, you know? I’m here.’ That’s kind of what I’m getting . . . 
just from their stance alone.”
Theme 6: Hand placement and gestures serve as important decision cues
A candidate’s use of their hands to communicate, whether in recognizable ges-
tures or just to signal agency, was also deemed a valid reason participants se-
lected or rejected one candidate over another. Sometimes this was the primary, 
but not sole, reason for a participant’s vote choice. Participants felt that candi-
dates who showed the back of their hands, for instance, were too “closed-off,” 
while those using open hand gestures seemed inviting. Indeed, hand gestures 
conveyed to participants impressions about candidates’ motives and disposition:
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Finley (18–45): “I think Candidate 2 looks like he’s trying to, like, defend him-
self over something that he did or said.”
Moderator: “What about him makes you think that he’s defensive?”
Finley (18–45): “The way he moves his hands like that, is kind of like, ‘Hold 
on,’ you know, like he’s trying to defend himself, like, his sudden hand move-
ments [mean something].”
In some instances, participants commented on how they thought candi-
dates were overusing hand gestures or that their gestures were “too passionate.” 
Overwrought hand movements made a candidate appear out of control:
Emma (55+): “I tend to think that somebody who makes at least some hand 
gestures is a little bit more comfortable than somebody who makes none, but 
if then there’s somebody up there waving their arms around, you know, like 
crazy, I would think something’s wrong with that guy and I don’t want to vote 
for that person because they can’t control their emotions.”
When noticed, hand gestures were expected to be firm, direct, and not off- 
putting. Otherwise, they communicated negative attributes:
Olivia (55+): “Candidate 1’s hands are not strong. They’re kind of flopping over. 
And that’s distracting to me. It’s like he’s not really making a point that he truly 
believes in if his hands are not as strong as Candidate 2.”
DISCUSSION
This study has attempted to enhance our understanding of the kind of nonver-
bal cues that people pay attention to when casting their vote based on thin slices 
of candidate behavior and illuminate the dynamics of social influence driv-
ing second-chance voting decisions. To facilitate second-chance decisions, we 
utilized focus group discussion of voting choices based on brief exposures to 
candidate images to explore the question of what happens after snap voting de-
cisions are made in response to thin slices of visual information. Our results are 
informed by the nonverbal communication literature, as well as the thin-slice 
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forecast paradigm, which holds that reliable inferences about leadership traits 
and electoral viability can be made rapidly on the basis of System 1 thinking, 
which feels effortless and automatic.
In answer to the study’s core question — whether vote choices based on ini-
tial impressions of political candidates can be socially influenced — we find that 
yes, the context of group discussion can change votes. Vote changes happen 
more for the candidate participants think won the election (22.7% of the time) 
than for their personal vote choice (13.3% of the time), reflecting a stronger 
commitment to a personal favorite. In each case, however, more participants 
switched to the losing candidate than the winning candidate, suggesting that 
social decision-making actually depresses voting accuracy. This was especially 
the case for the short videos compared to still images; decisions became less ac-
curate for candidates shown in 10-second video slices than in still photographs. 
Given the small N nature of the study design, these results can only be consid-
ered exploratory — but they offer ample evidence to justify follow-up research 
on a larger scale.
Interestingly, the vote choice analysis showed that older participants (55+) are 
better than younger participants (18–45) at recognizing winners — and less likely 
to change their vote after subsequent discussion. In focus group discussion, older 
participants were particularly keen to evaluate candidate images based on small 
cues such as the decision to wear a lapel pin, the look in a candidate’s eyes, hand 
placement, the presumed evasion in a head tilt, or wearing a dour or inappro-
priate expression. The presence of an incumbent in our candidate pairings did 
not seem to make a difference in voting accuracy, nor did the gender or racial 
composition of candidate pairs. Our mostly Caucasian participants were most 
likely, however, to vote for the winning candidate in white male vs. white female 
matchups, voting for the winner of these contests 70.8% of the time.
Close analysis of the focus group discourse revealed six themes that reinforce 
the significance of nonverbal cues in voter decision-making. Each of these themes 
reinforces findings from the thin-slice and nonverbal communication literatures, 
showing the complementarity of diverse methods. Notably, the reasons given for 
voting or not voting for a particular candidate were verbally articulated by our 
participants and not inferred from indirect measures of attention or response, 
suggesting the utility of qualitative data in understanding voter decision-making. 
In addition to focus groups, other qualitative techniques such as depth inter-
views, open-ended responses to picture prompts, or discourse analysis could be 
gainfully employed to demonstrate similar decisional processes.
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Although our primary intention with this study is to illuminate the dynam-
ics of social influence driving second-chance voting decisions, our results for 
the snap judgment part of the study do not align perfectly with the thin-slice 
literature, which has found higher predictive accuracy. We see three potential 
reasons for this. First, while we had more than enough participants to reach sat-
uration in our focus groups, the sample size was quite small for the snap deci-
sion task, where participants were asked who their preferred candidate was and 
who they thought had actually won the election (asked before and after the dis-
cussion). A much larger sample size determined by an experimental power anal-
ysis for this part of the study would likely yield different results. Second, due to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the study was conducted online rather than in person, 
and some participants were not paying close attention like they would have in 
a face-to-face setting. Finally, there is the role of the images themselves to con-
sider. While each pair contained similar shots of the candidates, they are much 
more recent than the sets of images used in previous thin-slice studies of polit-
ical images. Could it be that nowadays political candidates are so polished and 
similar in their presentation that it has become more difficult to guess the win-
ner based only on a thin slice of behavior?
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READ THE ROOM
The Effect of Campaign Event Format on 
the Use of Emotional Language
Zachary A. Scott
“I’m f***ing moving to Iowa”
 — Kamala Harris 1
W
hen politicians (and, more recently, politically inspired amateurs) decide 
that they want to campaign for a major party’s presidential nomina-
tion, they are signing up for spending a lot of time talking to a lot of 
people. They will be attending the Iowa State Fair. They will attend Politics & 
Eggs at Saint Anselm College. The Democrats will speak at the newly renamed 
Eleanor Roosevelt Dinner and attend Jim Clyburn’s fish fry. The Republicans 
have their Lincoln-Reagan Dinner and often make it a point to speak at CPAC 
(the Conservative Political Action Conference). In between are countless ral-
lies, town halls, fundraisers, press events, meet and greets, and house parties.
All of these individual events coalesce into a campaign that is heavily fo-
cused on the ground game, at least until the surviving candidates make it to 
Super Tuesday. This emphasis on in-person campaigning is effectively dictated 
by the structure of the races, which affords prominence to small states with po-
litical cultures that demand candidate-voter interactions, and the nature of the 
electorate, which is deprived of easy heuristics like partisanship or large ideo-
logical differences to simplify decision processes. The result is that candidates 
spend hour upon hour, month after month pleading their case to voters in the 
early states and beyond.
As they traipse around attempting to motivate, persuade, and engage, candi-
dates find a powerful weapon in their arsenal in the form of emotional appeals. 
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Since at least Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the importance of emotionality or pathos has 
been appreciated. And a growing political psychology literature (e.g., Albertson & 
Gadarian, 2015; Banks, 2014; Brader, 2006; Groenendyk & Banks, 2014; Marcus, 
2000; Phoenix, 2019; Valentino et al., 2011) gives us a better understanding of the 
nature and magnitude of influence that emotional appeals possess.
Yet we know comparatively little about the practical ways candidates use emo-
tions. Studies documenting the use of emotional cues and language in campaign 
communication are few (Borah, 2016; Brader, 2006; Phoenix, 2019; Ridout & 
Searles, 2011; Scott & McDonald, 2020). Most of these studies do not consider 
primaries, yet the distinctive conditions of the race described above show why 
they stand as a unique campaign communication environment. Furthermore, 
the studies looking at campaign emotionality are overwhelmingly focused on a 
narrow view of campaign strategy as a driving factor: do candidates use emo-
tions in situations where the elicited behavioral change should be advantageous? 
We know little about what alternative constraints might also be at work.
The implication is that we have a party nomination system that pushes can-
didates into ground-game events like rallies, town halls, and candidate forums, 
but we have little notion of how these in-person event formats affect candidates’ 
abilities to use emotional rhetoric despite the clear and powerful effect such rhet-
oric has on public opinion and political behavior.
I investigate this topic in this chapter. I introduce two theoretical constructs 
to capture attributes of in-person campaign events: the candidates’ autonomy 
over the rhetoric and the loyalty of the audience at the event. I conceptualize 
autonomy as the level of control the candidates possess over their rhetorical en-
vironment. For example, some campaign events involve candidates responding 
to questions from an audience. The candidates’ responses are constrained by the 
need to abide by the give-and-take of the exchanges in a way they are not when 
speaking unilaterally to an assembled crowd. The candidates’ autonomy is lower 
under such circumstances. I argue that events with low candidate autonomy will 
feature less emotional rhetoric on average because candidates must minimize ex-
plicit emotional appeals to maintain an interactive communication environment.
I conceptualize audience loyalty as the attachment the audience has to the 
candidate prior to the candidate’s formal engagement with the crowd at this spe-
cific event. Some audiences meet specifically to see a candidate and so the candi-
date can reasonably infer that an established loyalty exists. Other audiences meet 
because of an attachment to another cause and so the candidates must assume 
that — while the crowd could be persuaded into support — there is no established 
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loyalty. And sometimes the candidates speak in front of audiences that are am-
bivalent about their political ambitions and will never become loyal supporters. 
I argue that candidates will avoid emotionality at events with such weak audi-
ence loyalty as there is little reason to try to persuade the crowd if they are not 
inclined to be supportive.
In contrast, events with the potential for loyalty will feature high levels of 
negative emotions as candidates attempt to conjure a mutual outgroup threat, 
which prior literature suggests is an effective means of building a shared iden-
tity (Jardina, 2019), as well as high levels of trust as the candidates posit them-
selves as the guardian against this threat. This will be the case because such an 
emotional messaging strategy will be rhetorically persuasive, not because such a 
cocktail of emotional appeals induces receptivity to new information (Albertson 
& Gadarian, 2015). Finally, I argue that events with strong audience loyalty will 
use more positive emotions to make voters think that they have made a good 
choice. As a bond already exists between the candidate and the members of the 
audience, one does not need to be invented through a shared outgroup threat, 
freeing the candidate to embrace language meant to induce revelry in the shared 
connection that already exists. Such events will also most closely hew to the in-
ference of the political psychology literature by featuring high levels of approach 
emotions like anger and joy and low levels of persuasion emotions like fear and 
surprise. Taken together, these arguments form a theory of the ways event for-
mat affects rhetorical strategy, a category of incentives that works outside the 
existing behavioral strategy theory derived from the political psychology liter-
ature on the induced effects of emotional appeals.
I test these hypotheses using an original data set of speeches and remarks 
made by declared presidential primary candidates from 2000 to 2020 gathered 
primarily from the C-SPAN Video Library. I measure the amount of emotional 
rhetoric in each transcript using the EmoLex emotional sentiment dictionaries 
(Mohammad & Turney, 2013). I regress these measures of the use of different 
emotional cues on indicator variables of the type of campaign event while con-
trolling for notable candidate- and campaign-level features.
The results largely confirm my hypotheses. Events with low candidate auton-
omy feature less emotional rhetoric across the board. The same is true of events 
with weak audience loyalty. Events with high potential loyalty feature high levels 
of negative emotions and trust language. And events with strong loyalty feature 
more positive emotional language. I find that hypotheses reflecting the behav-
ioral strategy theory find the least support. Taken together, the results point to 
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the powerful role that event format has on the amount of emotional rhetoric 
candidates use, a role that appears to be conditional on how the format affects 
rhetorical strategy incentives. The findings have significant implications for how 
we organize our ground-game-centric primaries.
WHY EMOTIONS MATTER
Popular discussion of politics tends to gravitate toward emotionality. President 
Trump’s rhetoric, from his “American carnage” inauguration speech (Rosenthal, 
2017) to how he has discussed the COVID-19 pandemic (Slevin, 2020), is often 
framed by the media in reference to anger. President Obama’s rhetoric, on the 
other hand, was often discussed from an emotional lens of hope (Westphalen & 
Marshall, n.d.). Coverage of debates similarly highlights who appeared “fiery” 
or “reserved.” The emotional nature of political speech is often among the first 
elements that journalists and pundits pick up on when trying to convey mean-
ing to their audiences.
Recent political psychology and behavior studies suggest that this focus 
on emotionality is well placed. Emotions play a large role in politics (Marcus, 
2000). Anger operates as an approach emotion, activating political attitudes that 
can boost political participation (Groenendyk & Banks, 2014; Phoenix, 2019; 
Valentino et al., 2011). The connection between anger and symbolic racist atti-
tudes also leads to higher rates of opposition to redistributive policies (Banks, 
2014). Fear and anxiety, on the other hand, prompt people to search out new in-
formation and put more trust in experts (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015). Disgust 
can lead to the activation of Jim Crow racist attitudes (Banks, 2014). Enthusiasm 
plays a similar role as anger, leading people to greater levels of political activity 
based on their existing attitudes (Brader, 2006). This robust and growing em-
pirical literature is coupled with a growing realization in normative theory that 
emotionality serves as a powerful compliment, rather than antagonist, to ratio-
nality (Morrell, 2010).
Given that the importance of emotions is a mainstay of conventional wisdom 
and that the powerful role emotions play is defended by a robust literature doc-
umenting effects on political behavior, public opinion, and political psychology, 
it is peculiar that scholars of political communication and campaigns have paid 
the topic so little attention. Scholars have studied candidate tone (Geer, 2006; 
Payne & Baukus, 1998; West, 2010), but the literature makes clear that this is 
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insufficient for appreciating the diverse effects of emotional cues. Anger and fear 
are both negatively valenced. The former prompts action and boosts turnout; 
the latter prompts reconsideration and introspection. Treating both as equiva-
lent because of their mutual negative charge therefore overlooks an important 
distinction in the psychological processing they elicit.
The number of studies examining elite emotionality is small (Borah, 2016; 
Brader, 2006; Phoenix, 2019; Ridout & Searles, 2011; Scott & McDonald, 2020) 
and does not, as of yet, provide a robust theoretical accounting of why candi-
dates use emotionality outside of the role of behavioral strategy considerations. 
Brader (2006) shows that challengers tend to use more fear in campaign ads while 
incumbents use more enthusiasm and that competitive races feature more fear 
and less enthusiasm. Similarly, Ridout and Searles (2011) find that frontrunners 
tend to use more enthusiasm and pride language, while trailing candidates use 
more fear. 2 These findings point toward campaigns evaluating their electoral sit-
uation and employing emotional cues strategically based on the type of behav-
ioral response from the electorate that would be most advantageous.
But more recent studies have begun noting important factors other than 
campaign strategy. Borah (2016) shows that the Republican presidential can-
didates in 2008 and 2012 used more fear rhetoric in their Facebook posts than 
did Obama, who instead used enthusiasm as a defining emotional frame. It is 
unclear whether this stems from a partisan difference or the fact that Obama 
was favored in both elections. Phoenix (2019) uses a discourse analysis to show 
that Black candidates generally avoid anger, although he does suggest that re-
cent Black politicians like Nina Turner and Stacey Abrams may be pushing 
back on that trend. Scott and McDonald (2020) incorporate theories on gen-
der and the emotional foundation of partisanship and find Republicans use 
more fear rhetoric and women candidates to use positively valenced emotional 
cues, most specifically joy. 3 A secondary finding from Ridout and Searles (2011) 
is that Republican Senate candidates used more fear and anger language than 
their Democratic counterparts.
What these studies suggest is that strategy matters for the use of emotions in 
campaigns but that it is far from the only salient consideration. The incorpora-
tion of theories on partisanship, gender, and race constraints is a welcome addi-
tion. But there are still other constraints that may very well exist and are worth 
deeper consideration. Given the powerful role emotions play in electoral pol-
itics, a more thorough understanding of when candidates can and cannot use 
emotionality as a rhetoric tool is important.
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CAMPAIGN EVENT FORMAT AND EMOTIONAL RHETORIC
I pay special attention to the format in which a candidate communicates and 
how that may constrain the capacity to invoke emotional language. In the Ar-
istotelian conception, emotional rhetoric is primarily valuable as a means of 
persuasion for its ability to influence the manner with which the audience per-
ceives the message. Event formats present fundamentally distinct relationships 
between the rhetor and the audience. This may therefore affect both the rhetor’s 
options and likelihood of success when employing emotional rhetoric. Addition-
ally, scholars of rhetoric have long theorized that situational factors play a strong 
role in structuring the availability of rhetorical options (Blitzer, 1968; Campbell 
& Jamieson, 1978). Even if event format does not fundamentally alter the effec-
tiveness of emotional rhetoric as a means of altering audience mindsets, it does 
vary the rhetorical situation to which rhetors respond.
Notably, what makes emotions an effective rhetorical tactic is not the same 
as what makes them an effective tool for altering political behavior. With the 
latter, emotional appeals are effective because they induce a desired behavioral 
response. But effectiveness from a rhetorical perspective is tied to how an emo-
tion changes the audience’s perception of an argument. It is the argument itself 
that is meant to elicit a behavioral response; the emotionality’s role is making 
that outcome more likely.
This distinction may seem minute, but even this minor difference can create 
conflicting scenarios. Consider an unpopular incumbent politician who is trail-
ing in the polls. Their electoral situation would be best rectified by moving those 
who are undecided or voting for the competitor to reconsider their options. The 
political psychologist would thus prescribe a healthy dose of fear and anxiety 
appeals. But this candidate is also an incumbent, and so perhaps invoking fear 
and anxiety will make the candidate’s argument that they are worthy of another 
term in office unpersuasive. A conflict between rhetorical strategy and behavioral 
strategy can create conflicting incentives that have, as of yet, not been adequately 
recognized by scholars examining the use of emotional appeals by candidates.
The importance of this is further amplified when we consider the reinforce-
ment mechanism by which candidates learn what messages are effective. As de-
scribed above, we are continuously learning about how emotional appeals affect 
voters. This naturally raises the question of whether campaigns are aware of the 
effects. The most common response is that they are in the business of knowing 
what messages do and do not work. Campaigns that cannot effectively message 
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will lose and so they invest great resources in honing their craft. Much of this 
occurs through trial and error. But when a candidate delivers remarks in front 
of a live audience, the responses they get — cheers, applause, laughter, silence, 
boos — will be primarily tied to the persuasiveness of their argument rather than 
their success at eliciting particular behavioral responses. This means that what 
candidates learn from this trial-and-error process is primarily rhetorical effec-
tiveness, not behavioral effectiveness. If event format is related to the effective-
ness of emotional rhetoric, as the above discussion suggests, then precisely how 
those event formats create distinct rhetorical circumstances is of utmost concern.
Many studies that look at rhetorical patterns in primaries struggle with the 
distinction of event format for a very simple reason: it requires a significant 
broadening of scope conditions (Bostdorff, 2009; Savoy, 2018, but see Schroedel 
et al., 2013). A similar problem affects the studies of emotionality in campaign 
communication (Borah, 2016; Brader, 2006; Ridout & Searles, 2011; Scott & 
McDonald, 2020). Whether it is campaign ads or social media posts or speeches, 
all of these studies examine messages as a singular entity without considering 
the important ways the format may interact with the ability to invoke emo-
tional rhetoric.
There are two features of an event format that I specifically consider. The first 
is the degree of autonomy the candidate has over their message. In some con-
texts, candidates can speak directly to their audience in precisely the manner 
they wish. In others, candidates are engaging in dialogues with others — a voter, 
a journalist, another candidate — and do not have complete control over what is 
being communicated. In this latter situation they do not have full autonomy. The 
second feature is the candidate’s evaluation of the loyalty of the audience. At cer-
tain times, candidates may find themselves speaking primarily to true believers in 
their cause. At other times the audience may not be so decidedly in their corner.
Both format attributes should affect candidates’ ability to invoke emotional 
language. To explain why, consider the example of teaching a class. Anyone 
who has instructed both a large lecture and a smaller seminar knows that the 
method of presentation of material changes drastically across those two envi-
ronments. Similarly, picture a class where the students are clearly disinterested 
in what you have to say compared to one in which they are highly engaged with 
the material and at the edges of their seats waiting for more. Once again, such 
conditions tend to create different rhetorical impulses. The same basic logic, I 
argue, works in incentivizing or constraining the use of emotional rhetoric in 
campaign communication.
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Starting with autonomy, we should expect that candidates will want to use 
emotional appeals in their rhetoric given how effective such cues are (Brader, 
2006). When they have autonomy over their rhetoric, they can follow this im-
pulse. When their autonomy wanes, however, they will have to refrain from 
prominent emotional cues. This is because the decline in autonomy means their 
rhetoric necessarily becomes more interactive. Direct appeals to emotionality are 
less effective in such a scenario. Emanuel et al. (2015) provide an instructive ex-
ample as to why. They analyze three cases of websites attempting to make emo-
tional appeals via interactive forms of communication. In all three, appeals to 
emotions are subtle. This is because a direct reference to emotionality disrupts 
the interactivity; it becomes one party telling the other how to feel instead of 
letting the other party determine their feelings for themselves as would be be-
fitting an equal in an interactive communication process.
When autonomy is low, candidates will therefore find themselves less able 
to tap into explicit emotional appeals out of restraint imposed by the interac-
tivity of the dialogue. This, of course, does not imply that their communication 
partners are uninterested in emotional rhetoric. The media craves emotional-
ity as it resonates with their desire for conflict and drama (Cook, 1998; Scott, 
n.d.). Voters, who generally struggle with more cognitively demanding rheto-
ric given their low political knowledge and weak ideology (Kinder & Kalmoe, 
2017), should also find emotionality appealing. As such, it is not necessarily the 
case that low autonomy should lead to low emotionality because the candidates’ 
dialogue partners wish to avoid emotion, but rather because the format prevents 
them from invoking emotional responses unilaterally.
H1 (autonomy hypothesis): Events with low candidate autonomy will feature 
less emotional rhetoric.
The second attribute of an event format I consider is the loyalty of the audi-
ence. Importantly, loyalty is more complicated than a binary evaluation on the 
campaign trail. There are situations in which the candidate must assume the au-
dience will never support them. Other times the audience may be sympathetic 
but not, as of yet, committed to the candidate’s cause. On other occasions the 
audience will be composed of the candidate’s base. This creates a three-category 
conceptualization of loyalty: weak loyalty, potential loyalty, and strong loyalty. 
From a rhetorical perspective, an audience with weak loyalty is one that will not 
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be persuaded by appealing to different emotions. They are not eligible for per-
suasion in the first place. As such, candidates should avoid emotional rhetoric 
when facing such an audience as their ineligibility for rhetorical persuasion re-
moves the impetus for such a tactic.
H2 (weak loyalty hypothesis): Events with weak loyalty will feature less emo-
tional rhetoric.
In formats where the audience exhibits potential loyalty, the need for rhe-
torical persuasion is at its highest. Candidates will therefore want to employ 
emotions that create a bond of commonality with the audience. Nothing cre-
ates common ground like the perceptions of an outgroup threat (Jardina, 2019; 
Tajfel, 1979). And so emotional cues that are tied to attitudes of outgroup threats 
(Banks, 2014) will be especially effective. Prompting emotional reactions to per-
ceived outgroup threats should be particularly effective in primaries as the in-
traparty nature of the race means candidates need to establish connections to 
the various interest groups and activists who form the party whose nomination 
they seek (Bawn et al., 2012). As such, if a candidate is at a campaign event in 
which they do not perceive the audience as directly loyal to them but think that 
they can win the audience over, they should invoke negatively valenced emo-
tions as a means of conjuring a common enemy that threatens those in the au-
dience, reminding those in attendance that participation in the party coalition 
is a means of self-preservation.
H3 (threat conjuring hypothesis): Events with potential loyalty will feature 
more negative emotional rhetoric.
Once this bogeyman has been called forth, the candidates then need to posi-
tion themselves as the one who can protect the audience from this threat. They 
need the audience to trust that they can guard them. As such, candidates should 
supplement high negative emotions with high-trust language when speaking in 
front of an audience who is not immediately loyal to them but could become 
loyal in the future.
H4 (guardian hypothesis): Events with potential loyalty will feature more trust 
rhetoric.
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As a practical example, imagine a Republican candidate speaking at an NRA 
forum. The candidate assumes that the audience is not there because they are 
loyal to them; instead, they must assume that the audience is there because they 
care about protecting their Second Amendment rights. As long as the candi-
date is a vocal supporter of the Second Amendment, however, they can proba-
bly also assume that many in attendance are sympathetic to their candidacy. To 
pull the audience toward their camp, the candidate should conjure the threat of 
Democrats taking away guns — using cues of anger, fear, and disgust — but then 
say that they can be trusted to prevent that from happening. This is, of course, 
not a partisan thing. Democrats should behave similarly when discussing re-
productive freedom at a Planned Parenthood campaign forum, for example.
Finally, in strong loyalty situations a connection has already been forged be-
tween the candidate and the audience, removing the dire need to use emotions 
as a rhetorical form of persuasion. The persuasion has already occurred. This, I 
argue, should create an environment where the behavioral strategy incentives in-
ferred from the political psychology literature should be strongest. If the crowd 
is already on your side, the primary goal of the rhetor has been accomplished. 
What remains is to provide the emotional cues that will create the preferred be-
havioral response.
As such, I hypothesize that these events will most closely approximate the 
expectation of behavioral strategy. They will feature high levels of approach 
emotions meant to activate support and low levels of emotions meant to in-
voke persuasion.
H5 (motivation hypothesis): Events with strong loyalty will feature more anger 
and joy rhetoric.
H6 (persuasion avoidance hypothesis): Events with strong loyalty will feature 
less fear and surprise rhetoric.
This comes with one exception rooted in the fluid nature of primaries. Given 
how rapidly the races can shift — a function of the intraparty, multicandidate, 
and serial format — primaries feature complex messaging environments. As such, 
candidates should not solely rest on their laurels, assuming that rhetorical per-
suasion is completely unnecessary, when speaking to a loyal audience. Instead, 
they should engage in positive emotional rhetoric to assure the audience that 
they have made the right choice.
392. rEAD THE rOOM
H7 (good choice hypothesis): Events with strong loyalty will feature more 
pos itive emotional rhetoric.
Taken together, these hypotheses establish a broad expectation that the format 
of events creates rhetorical constraints that affect candidates’ propensity to use 
emotional appeals. Given the powerful effects emotional cues have on political 
behavior, the existence and strength of these constraints is of significant concern.
DATA AND METHODS
To test these hypotheses, I first need to construct a corpus of candidate rheto-
ric where the candidate’s autonomy over messaging and loyalty of the audience 
vary. I use the C-SPAN Video Library to do so. The C-SPAN Video Library in-
cludes videos of campaign events throughout the primary. Most of these videos 
are accompanied by transcripts of the event, typically from closed-captioning. I 
searched through the archive for each presidential primary candidate from 2000 
to 2020 from the time they announced their candidacy through the end of their 
campaign and retrieved a transcript for each campaign event. This forms the 
bulk of the speech portion of the Presidential Primary Communication Cor-
pus (Scott, 2021) that I use for this analysis, with each individual transcript of 
an event representing a unit of analysis. 4
I then measured the amount of emotional language used in each transcript by 
applying the EmoLex emotional sentiment dictionaries (Mohammad & Turney, 
2013). EmoLex includes dictionaries for four positively valenced (joy, trust, an-
ticipation, and surprise) and four negatively valenced (anger, fear, disgust, and 
sadness) emotions. I applied each dictionary to the corpus to get a count of the 
number of words in each transcript that matched with each emotion. I divided 
each count by the total number of words in the transcript to calculate the per-
centage of words in a transcript that match with each of the eight emotions. To 
make testing hypotheses related to overall emotionality simpler, I also created ag-
gregate measures of the proportions of negatively and positively valenced words. 
The percentage of words in the transcript for an event that are coded as each of 
the eight discrete emotions, as the sum of all negatively valenced emotions, and 
as the sum of all the positively valenced emotions serve as the 10 dependent vari-
ables in the analysis. All are continuous variables with Gaussian distributions.
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For my primary independent variables, I use a four-category typology assess-
ing the format of the campaign event. First are rallies (n = 1,383), which are high 
in candidate autonomy and feature strong audience loyalty. Rallies typically fea-
ture candidates giving largely prepared and uninterrupted speeches to a crowd 
that has chosen to be there for a reason. Second are town halls (n = 508), which 
are generally exchanges between the candidate and audience members (low au-
tonomy) who, like with rallies, have chosen to be in attendance (strong loyalty). 
Third are press events (n = 368), where the audience is made up primarily of re-
porters who are asking questions of the candidate. These events are low in can-
didate autonomy as they are dialogues with journalists. The candidates are also 
aware that the reporters are not an existing base of political support and they 
are unlikely to be won over to their cause given their commitment to profes-
sional independence, meaning the events feature weak audience loyalty as well. 
Finally, there are externally organized events (n = 1,105). These include major po-
litical events like the Eleanor Roosevelt Dinner (formerly the Jefferson-Jackson 
Dinner), CPAC, state party meetings, and candidate forums hosted by interest 
groups. The audiences are not purely loyal to any one candidate; if anything they 
are drawn there by loyalty to a state party organization, particular political fig-
ure, or organized interest. As such, there is significant potential for future loyalty 
but little reason to think there is strong loyalty in the moment. These events also 
feature high candidate autonomy. 5 In summary, indicator variables for whether 
the event is a rally, town hall, press event, or an externally organized event serve 
as the four independent variables in the analysis. 6
I also include a number of control variables to account for other factors that 
might influence candidates’ use of emotional rhetoric and which, if excluded, 
might introduce omitted variable bias. First are several candidate-level controls 
including the candidate’s party, race, and gender. I also control for the candi-
dates’ position in the polls, which is important given the strategic incentives the 
political psychology literature on emotions in politics implies.
Because attachments to the status quo political order may prevent some can-
didates from appealing to certain emotions, I control for whether the candidate 
is running for the nomination of a party that controls the White House and 
whether the candidate worked in the incumbent administration.
The contours of the race itself must be accounted for as they may also af-
fect the ability to engage in emotional rhetoric. Candidate messaging tends to 
change between the invisible primary and the start of the real electoral season 
(Haynes & Rhine, 1998), so I control for the phrase of the campaign. Candidates 
may also vary their emotional rhetoric based on the competitiveness of the 
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race (Ridout & Searles, 2011). Assessing competitiveness in primaries is com-
plicated given the multicandidate field. I attempt to do so using a modified 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (Steger et al., 2002), which uses the distribution 
of shares of a resource, in this case poll standing, to calculate how concentrated 
that resource is. For my purposes, this measure approximates the number of 
“effective” candidates in the race. More “effective” candidates implies a more 
wide-open competition. 7
Finally, the data involve several hierarchical levels that may create mean-
ingful variation. I account for this via election-year fixed effects and candidate 
mixed effects. The dependent variables are all continuous, warranting ordinary 
least squares regression.
RESULTS
Table 2.1 presents the regression models for the four negative emotions and an 
aggregate measure of negatively valenced emotions. Table 2.2 presents a sim-
ilar table for positive emotions. To make comparisons of substantive magni-
tude easier, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot the coefficients grouped by event type. In all 
models, rallies are treated as the excluded category, meaning all regression co-
efficients for the three independent variables are in reference to the campaign 
rally event format.
The autonomy hypothesis (H1) stated that events with low candidate auton-
omy, town halls and press events, should feature less emotional language overall 
as candidates are not in full control over the emotional narrative. The aggregate 
emotional measures are most useful for testing this hypothesis. The results pro-
vide strong evidence in support of this hypothesis. Both town halls and press 
events use less negative and less positive emotion words than the baseline (ral-
lies) or externally organized events. The candidate’s autonomy over the rhetoric 
appears to strongly influence their ability to invoke emotional appeals, which 
lines up well with my theory that interactive dialogues constrain explicit emo-
tional appeals.
The remaining six hypotheses all dealt with differences based on the loyalty 
of the audience. The typology posits media events as featuring weak audience 
loyalty. H2 predicts that such events will be the least emotional. Media events 
rank as the second least negatively and, by a wide margin, the least positively 
emotional type of event. The summation of these two patterns is that they are 
indeed the least emotional type of event, which supports H2. 8
















































































































































Observations 3,353 3,353 3,353 3,353 3,353
log likelihood 12,764.670 11,705.580 14,555.220 12,707.630 8,806.560
Akaike information criterion −25,491.340 −23,373.150 −29,072.450 −25,377.260 −17,575.120
Bayesian information criterion −25,375.110 −23,256.920 −28,956.210 −25,261.020 −17,458.880
Note: Asterisk (*) denotes p < 0.05, one-tailed. All models include candidate mixed effects and election 
year fixed effects not presented to preserve space.
















































































































































Observations 3,353 3,353 3,353 3,353 3,353
log likelihood 11,266.320 10,830.600 12,397.500 12,367.280 7,806.318
Akaike information criterion −22,494.640 −21,623.210 −24,756.990 −24,696.560 −15,574.640
Bayesian information criterion −22,378.400 −21,506.970 −24,640.760 −24,580.320 −15,458.400
Note: Asterisk (*) denotes p < 0.05, one-tailed. All models include candidate mixed effects and election 
year fixed effects not presented to preserve space.
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H3 and H4 dealt with event types with significant potential for future loy-
alty. In externally organized events, the audience is gathered primarily due to a 
commitment to some sort of other organization: an interest group, a state party, 
a notable state political figure, and so forth. Often, multiple candidates will be 
speaking at the event. As such, the candidate cannot assume that the audience 
supports them and should instead develop a rhetorical strategy meant to per-
suade. This should mean using a combination of negative emotions meant to in-
voke a reaction to a threatening outgroup and particular positive emotions meant 
to assure that the candidate can help protect from the threat. Take, for example, 
candidate forums hosted by the NRA and Planned Parenthood. In such contexts, 
candidates should mention threats to shared beliefs (“they” will take away your 
guns/bodily sovereignty) tied to emotions such as fear and anger. Once such an 
outgroup has been summoned and vested with the proper negative emotional 
charge, candidates should then posit themselves as guardians against that threat 
(you can trust “they’ll” only do it over my dead body). Taken together, this pat-
tern predicts that events with high potential loyalty will feature more negatively 
valenced emotional rhetoric and more trust rhetoric than other types of events.
The results once again strongly support these hypotheses. Externally orga-
nized events feature the most negative emotional language overall. This is also 
true of all the individual negative emotions, although the differences are most 
pronounced for anger and fear, two emotions that are particularly useful for 
cuing outgroup threats (Banks, 2014; MacWilliams, 2016). When we turn to 
positive emotions, however, we see that the high emotionality of externally or-
ganized events is particular to negativity. Such events feature less positively va-
lenced emotional rhetoric than rallies and less joy, anticipation, and surprise 
specifically. There is one exception, however: trust. Externally organized events 
are the event format with the most trust language on average. This means that 
H3 and H4 are both supported by the results.
The final three hypotheses applied to events with strong loyalty. At these 
events, the candidate can presume that many of those gathered are already in 
their camp. This includes both campaign rallies and town halls. Given that loy-
alty is already established, there is little need to conjure a threatening boogey-
man to win over new supporters. Instead, the candidate can make the audience 
feel good about their choices via positive emotional cues. And, given the strate-
gic incentives that the political psychology literature implies, they can try to mo-
tivate audience members to act on their support by invoking approach emotions 
and avoiding emotions that elicit reconsideration and reappraisal. This suggests 
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COEFFICIENT PLOT OF EFFECT OF EVENT TYPE 
ON NEGATIVE EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE
Externally organized event Town hallPress event
that candidates should use more anger and joy (H5), less fear and surprise (H6), 
and more aggregate positive emotions (H7) at such events.
The results here are more equivocal than for the other hypotheses. Campaign 
rallies do use the greatest amount of positive emotional language. Town halls 
use less positive emotional rhetoric than rallies, to be expected given their low 
autonomy, but the magnitude is still unexpectantly steep. That the gap between 
them and press events is so big is encouraging, however.
Rallies use the most joy language and are only behind externally organized 
events in terms of anger. Town halls are also relatively high in joy, at least in 
comparison to the other event format with low candidate autonomy, but fea-
ture the lowest percentage of anger rhetoric, contrary to expectations. That said, 
perhaps the media’s preference for anger in connection with its conflict news-
worthiness value (Scott, n.d.) can partially explain this finding. In some, the 
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evidence is broadly supportive of H5, albeit not as consistent as for the previ-
ous hypotheses.
The evidence for the persuasion avoidance hypothesis is weaker still. Given 
the autonomy and threat conjuring hypotheses, it is no surprise to find rallies in 
the middle of other event formats in terms of fear rhetoric. Town halls feature 
the least amount of fear rhetoric on average, which is also consistent with the 
hypothesis, although the substantive difference with press events is small. But 
rallies and town halls are the event formats highest in surprise rhetoric, which is 
contrary to expectations. The substantive magnitudes are sufficiently weak that 
little should be gleaned from that insight, however.
Several of the controls display statistically significant relationships with can-
didates’ use of emotional language. Notably, it appears that attributes of the race 
itself, more than the attributes of the candidates, affect candidates’ propensity 
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for using emotional rhetoric. Several notable results found in another study 
(Scott & McDonald, 2020) are still present once the format of the event is taken 
into account.
DISCUSSION
To summarize, events where candidates do not have full autonomy over their 
rhetoric feature less emotional language than events where the candidates have 
greater control. Candidates also use fewer emotional cues when speaking to 
an audience that does not (and will not) support them. In contrast, candidates 
use a great deal of negative emotions — most prominently anger and fear — as 
well as trust when speaking to an audience that could potentially support them 
in the future. Finally, candidates tend to use more positive emotions — spe-
cifically joy — when speaking to an audience that is already supportive. Taken 
holistically, these results provide strong evidence in support of H1–4 as well 
as the good choice hypothesis (H7). The results for H5 and H6 are suggestive 
but equivocal.
This study makes three primary contributions. First, it demonstrates the lim-
itations of relying solely on inferences from the political psychology literature 
in studying patterns of campaign communication. This paradigm goes as fol-
lows: Approach emotions like anger and joy/enthusiasm lead to the activation 
of existing attitudes, boosting turnout among supporters. Emotions like fear 
and surprise instead lead people to slow down and reconsider their options. So 
frontrunners should use anger and joy, while those trailing should prefer fear 
and surprise. Yet the results do not paint such a neat picture. Poll standing, the 
best measure of candidates’ strategic incentives, displays either statistically in-
significant or counterintuitive relationships with emotional rhetoric. While bet-
ter performance in the polls is correlated with less surprise language, it is also 
correlated with less joy language and displays no relationship at all with anger 
or fear. Event format, with its ties primarily to rhetorical incentives, is a more 
substantively notable correlate.
The second primary contribution reflects the locus of this research. There 
are very few studies of the use of emotional cues in campaign communication. 
This extends that small, but hopefully growing, literature to the electoral context 
of presidential primaries and the communication format of campaign events. 
Neither of these domains have been commonly studied in the past.
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Finally, it draws our attention to the normative consequences of campaign 
event formats. None of the results presented here undermine the existing polit-
ical psychology literature on the behavioral ramifications of emotions, even as 
they suggest that putting the lessons learned from that literature into practice 
is a more complicated process than previously thought. The implication is that 
event formats, by incentivizing the use of some emotional appeals, manifest re-
percussions on the attitudes and actions of the electorate.
Deriving normative conclusions from these results is complicated by the oft- 
nuanced nature of the political psychology literature on this subject. Take a sin-
gle emotion: anger. Anger can prompt greater political activity and participa-
tion (Valentino et al., 2011), which is often seen as normatively desirable. Anger 
also primes people to be more reliant on their racial resentment attitudes when 
making political decisions (Banks, 2014), which is normatively undesirable. That 
candidates struggle to elicit anger in town hall settings means that they should 
struggle to motivate those in the audience to turn out and support them. The po-
litical culture of New Hampshire, which emphasizes the town hall, may therefore 
limit candidates’ abilities to excite their supporters. By the same token, however, it 
may push candidates to avoid emotional rhetoric that would prime voters to rely 
on their racial resentment when casting their ballots. Similar barters can be ar-
ticulated for the other emotional cues or for more or less emotionality in general.
This makes evaluating tradeoffs a complicated calculus. Emotions are cru-
cial for helping people make sense of and engage with the political world, but 
their effects are complicated. This makes it difficult to proclaim that any one 
type of campaign event format leads to preferrable emotional rhetoric output. 
But while such a definitive claim will not be made here, that does not mean that 
the repercussions of emotional rhetoric vanish. Different event formats appear 
to facilitate different emotional appeals. These different emotional appeals likely 
affect the electorate who consumes them, which in turn affects the electoral for-
tunes of the candidates in the race. The consequences are significant and need 
to be considered.
This study is not without limitations. As is often the case with observational 
research, there is ample reason to be skeptical of causality. I am not able to ran-
domly assign an event format to a speech writer and measure what rhetoric 
they produce. Future research might benefit from qualitative interviews with 
the specialists who prepare campaign communication to unpack why they use 
emotions as they do. It is also fair to question whether similar rules would ap-
ply to other campaign formats or electoral contexts. The presidential primary 
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communication corpus does not include debate transcripts, but would candi-
dates’ emotional rhetoric follow what would be expected from a low-autonomy, 
high-potential-loyalty event in such a format?
Likewise, presidential general election candidates also hold rallies and town 
halls, engage with the press, and speak at forums organized by organizations out-
side the campaign. Intuitively, many of the same hypotheses should apply. The 
mechanisms underpinning the hypotheses are largely the same. A key differ-
ence may lie in the changes in the electorate, however, especially in the context 
of externally organized events. Because the average persuadable voter goes from 
being a partisan who is confronted with a bevy of intraparty options to a per-
son whose commitment to a party camp is weaker, the ingroup broadens, mak-
ing it harder to identify a singular outgroup threat that can serve as an effective 
scapegoat. This may weaken the efficacy of this rhetorical tactic. Future studies 
should investigate whether the results are replicated in other electoral contexts.
That said, this study stands with only a handful of other works dipping a toe 
into questions of the constraints on the use of emotional rhetoric outside of cam-
paign strategy. And it is one that demonstrates clear evidence that those other 
constraints do indeed matter.
NOTES
 1. Zhou, L. (2019, September 19). Kamala Harris is f***ing committing to Iowa. Vox. 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/19/20873953/kamala-harris 
-iowa-south-carolina-primary
 2. Counter to a strategic theory, however, they also find that trailing candidates 
use more anger, an emotion that should prompt further commitment to a dis-
advantageous electoral situation.
 3. They also find that candidates performing well in the polls use more fear lan-
guage, while those performing worse use more anger, a pattern of results that 
runs counter to strategic theories on the use of emotions.
 4. The American Presidency Project (Woolley & Peters, n.d.) served as a supple-
mentary resource for a small number of additional transcripts. When both the 
C-SPAN Video Library and the American Presidency Project provided tran-
scripts for the same event, I deferred to the C-SPAN Video Library.
 5. This is not universal: Sometimes the events feature hosts who will engage in 
a Q&A with the candidates after giving them a chance to make a prepared 
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APPENDIX: TABLES A.1–A.4
TABLE A.1 Descriptive Statistics on Emotional Rhetoric in Candidate Speeches
Median Mean St. dev Minimum Maximum
No. of words 
in Emolex 
dictionary
Anger .012 .012 .006 .000 .083 1,247
Fear .016 .017 .008 .000 .083 1,476
Disgust .006 .006 .003 .000 .031 1,058
Sadness .012 .013 .005 .000 .139 1,191
Total negative emotions .046 .048 .018 .000 .333 2,732*
Joy .022 .024 .009 .000 .089 689
Trust .043 .044 .010 .000 .100 1,231
Anticipation .024 .025 .006 .000 .066 839
Surprise .012 .014 .006 .000 .061 539
Total positive emotions .103 .106 .024 .000 .299 2,194*
*Total unique words.
TABLE A.3 Event Type by Candidate Partisanship




































TABLE A.2 Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables
Median Mean St. dev Minimum Maximum
rallies .000 .411 .492 0 1
Town halls .000 .151 .358 0 1
Press events .000 .110 .312 0 1
Externally organized events .000 .329 .470 0 1
GOP .000 .447 .497 0 1
Woman .000 .155 .362 0 1
Nonwhite .000 .166 .372 0 1
Poll standing 13.500 22.470 25.410 0 100
Incumbent .000 .216 .411 0 1
Previous administration .000 .059 .237 0 1
Post-Iowa .000 .358 .479 0 1
No. of effective candidates 4.346 4.037 1.913 1 10.354
TABLE A.4 Event Type by Election Year



















































































Congressional Discourses in U.S. Citizenship Policy Speeches
Alison N. Novak
I
n a 2018 speech by Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the Senate majority leader 
identified one of the most “challenging and yet important” areas of “policy 
under the Trump presidency”: citizenship (C-SPAN, 2018a). Policies enacted 
by President Trump often conflict with traditional models and practices on the 
topic, which motivate citizen protest (both in support and opposition), congres-
sional outrage, and changes in international relations.
Early policies in the Trump presidency centered on issues of citizenship, in-
cluding a travel and immigration ban on countries with large Islamic popula-
tions, eliminating birthright citizenship for some groups, and supporting ICE 
raids. These policies were met with both intense public backlash and social me-
dia support messages and were largely debated by Congress. As Representative 
Joaquin Castro (D-TX) reflected, “his laws are not just about who is an who 
shouldn’t be a citizen, but about what makes a citizen and what a citizen should 
do” (C-SPAN, 2019a).
As noted by Castro, scholars determine that “citizenship goes far beyond who 
issues your passport” (Hooghe & Oser, 2015). Invoked in policy debates are many 
definitions of citizenship with varied meaning to different ideological groups and 
cultures (Dalton, 2009). Within the United States, citizenship can mean the le-
gal residency identity of an individual, the duties associated with performing 
citizenship, or the characteristics and common practices of individuals with a 
similar regional background. Definitions also evolve over time, with different 
generations constructing and adopting their own interpretations.
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While citizenship is debated and constructed across many platforms and con-
texts, one of the most powerful lenses includes policy debates over citizenship 
laws. These speeches go beyond articulating who should and should not be able 
to apply for citizenship in the United States and also describe citizenship mean-
ing and responsibilities. Visible in congressional speeches about proposed pol-
icies, the discursive meaning of citizenship impacts those who seek to establish 
identity within a country. How citizenship is described in these speeches influ-
ences the ways that citizenship is enacted by (current and prospective) members, 
taught by citizenship instructors, and formally and informally enforced through 
laws and social norms. In short, these speeches articulate not only who should 
be allowed to be a citizen but also what makes a good citizen.
CITIZENSHIP AS POLICY
Petroccia et al. (2018) note that citizenship is both a set of policies and an iden-
tity construct, with often conflicting interpretations and boundaries. As a set 
of policies, citizenship defines who is and who is not considered part of a geo-
graphical region and a constituent of a governmental group such as a country. 
Throughout the world, citizenship is granted by the government to individuals 
who meet a set of criteria, such as place of birth, residency, and familial origin. 
In the United States, citizenship is granted automatically to individuals born of 
other U.S. citizens, and pathways to citizenship exist for others (such as green 
cards, work and education visas, and service programs).
Citizenship policies change frequently, often matching the political inter-
ests of those in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. A president can 
set citizenship and immigration policies (although the courts can check this 
power), and members of Congress have oversight on offices like the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) — although this oversight is often limited. Changes in citi-
zenship policies can happen quickly and dramatically, often denoting changes 
in executive leadership. For example, shortly after President Trump took office 
in 2017, he announced a ban on travel and immigration from Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. This ban was met with protest and legal chal-
lenges from groups who thought it unfairly targeted predominantly Muslim 
countries. Further, there was little warning prior to the ban, thus causing indi-
viduals to question the ramifications and details of this new policy.
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Other citizenship policies impacted during the Trump Presidency include the 
DACA Act, which does not provide a direct pathway citizenship for children 
who are born or are brought to the United States unlawfully to remain through-
out their childhood. This was a change from the DREAM Act, which was en-
acted under President Obama, that did provide a pathway to residency for these 
individuals. Further, during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, President Trump 
announced other updates to citizenship, such as halting immigration and the 
approval of new visa applicants.
Del Mar Farina (2018) argues that the rapid change of citizenship policies of-
ten leaves individuals confused about options for immigration and residency. 
This is particularly true of policy changes that are not announced in advance, 
meaning all those involved in citizenship are left without clear instructions or 
processes. Frey and Whitehead (2009) suggest that the entire citizenship indus-
try — including nonprofits and advocacy groups, lawyers, and citizenship ed-
ucators — is often left scrambling to interpret changing federal policies, often 
waiting for the courts to weigh in and deem new policies constitutional or not.
As a result of confusion and rapidly changing policies, Kerwin and Warren 
(2019) note that individuals seeking citizenship in the United States begin to pri-
oritize practices and behaviors of citizens. While policy may be difficult to in-
terpret, individuals focus on learning and adopting social norms and identity 
markers. In this vein, citizenship is constituted not singularly by policy and le-
gal status but also by the characteristics and practices of individuals. However, 
this too changes over time, and individuals learn identity and behavior from a 
variety of sources.
CITIZENSHIP AS BEHAVIOR/IDENTITY
Despite the numerous developments in policies on citizenship, Dalton (2009) 
notes that citizenship is better understood as a series of practices and identity 
than a policy framework. While various government groups oversee determin-
ing legal citizenship rules and regulations, the cultural meaning and practice of 
citizenship is largely linked to the norms identified and accepted by groups of 
people. As such, these practices and identities evolve over time, as do the cul-
tural boundaries of who is, and who is not, considered a “good citizen.”
Mayne and Geißel (2018) reflect that to the public, citizenship is not just the 
legal identity of an individual but also their ability to meet the expectations and 
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adopt the norms of a culture. Meeting these (often unexpressed or informal) ex-
pectations demarcates individuals as “good citizens” because they live up to the 
standards set by the rest of the group (in this case other citizens). However, be-
cause expectations and norms evolve over time, the qualities of good citizenship 
also change. Dalton (2009) notes that throughout the 20th century, good citizen-
ship was bound to definitions of duty and the required actions necessary for be-
ing part of a democracy. In short, voting was identified as one of the main ways 
that individuals could be “good American citizens.” But beyond just a set of ac-
tions, good citizens throughout the 20th century needed to understand voting as 
a duty required to uphold democracy. Voting was tied to good citizenship duty 
through political speeches, election campaigns, and advocacy communication. 
Through these iterations, voters were framed as good citizens because of their 
ability to carry out the duties associated with their membership.
However, throughout the late 20th and early 21st centuries, the qualities as-
sociated with good citizens changed as social norms and expectations shifted 
to meet the changing cultural environment. Tupper and Cappello (2012) reflect 
that this was particularly associated with the emergence of the millennial gen-
eration and the technological advancements embraced by the group. Millennial 
expectations of good citizenship looked different than those of previous gener-
ations, in part because of their access to digital technologies that provided new 
ways to participate in civic and political issues, as well as because the group en-
tered adulthood during different cultural contexts than did previous generations. 
Millennials (and future generations) heralded “engaged citizenship” rather than 
duty-based models, where individuals were encouraged to participate in democ-
racy through means other than (and in addition to) voting. This included joining 
protest movements, running for office, and using digital technologies to sup-
port activist groups. Rather than framing citizenship as a series of duties, good 
citizens were now expected to critically engage the political and social systems.
In contrast to duty-based citizenship, engaged citizenship emphasizes the in-
dividual’s efforts to support social and political issues and causes that are person-
ally relevant (Schaarschmidt & Könsgen, 2019). There is no consensus on what 
these issues are, nor over the position that individuals should have. Tupper and 
Cappello (2012) note that the goal for engaged citizenship is for individuals to 
become part of social and political movements, not to restrict what those move-
ments are or the positions (for or against) individuals should have.
Logan et al. (2017) suggest that citizenship norms and expectations change 
subtly over time because of changes in the makeup of the group as well as the 
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cultural environment. As new generations come of age, generational experi-
ence and expectations start to shape citizenship practices and identities. This 
can be impacted by political and policy changes, but several authors call for 
more scholarship that looks at how politicians end elected representatives frame 
“good citizenship” before more conclusions are drawn (Almgren, 2017; Lapp, 
2012; Schaarschmidt & Könsgen, 2019)
CONGRESS AND CITIZENSHIP
One group responsible for impacting citizenship, including the policies that reg-
ulate the naturalization process, is Congress. While Congress does not have di-
rect oversight over citizenship rules, it often responds to changes made through 
the executive branch or federal agencies such as the United States Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE). Through policy proposals, hearings featuring agency leadership, and re-
sponsive speeches on constituent needs and problems, members of Congress fre-
quently reflect on citizenship as both a legal status and a set of cultural practices 
and expectations. Cardinal and Brown (2007) note that while Congress may not 
directly set citizenship policies, its perception of citizenship and the way that it 
is framed impact both media and constituent views on the subject. Members of 
Congress can point attention to specific issues and policies, thus impacting the 
public’s understanding and perception.
Recent examples of this attention appeared throughout the Trump presi-
dency — for example, the 2017 travel and immigration ban established by Pres-
ident Trump and affecting individuals from countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Following civic protests at airports and in 
cities around the country, members of Congress spoke out about the policy and 
its implementation. They spoke on the congressional floor to encourage and 
support lawsuits, posted messages of support and opposition on social media, 
and even joined in on the protests by appearing in-person at events (Reardon, 
2017). While parts of the 2017 restrictions were eventually overturned, the ban 
was referenced in congressional speeches over the next few years as an example 
of the anti-Muslim policies of the Trump administration. For example, in a 2017 
emailed statement to The New York Times, Representative Carolyn B. Maloney 
(D-NY) reflected on her frustrations and outrage with the order: “It also appears 
that the executive order imposes an unconstitutional religious test on immigrants 
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and refugees seeking entry to our country by giving priority to one religion over 
another” (Wamsley & Neely, 2017). Alternatively, Senator Steve Daines (R-MT) 
made this statement: “We are at war with Islamic extremists and anything less 
than 100 percent verification of these refugees’ backgrounds puts our national 
security at risk. We need to take the time to examine our existing programs to 
ensure terrorists aren’t entering our country. The safety of U.S. citizens must be 
our number one priority” (C-SPAN, 2018b). These references help shape pub-
lic understanding of the topic while framing issues surrounding citizenship.
Other events and issues push members of Congress to speak on citizenship, 
often reflecting on the differences between the legal definition and the cultural 
practices associated with the concept. For example, a 2019 whistleblower report 
found that a child died while in federal detention facilities managed by ICE. This 
tragic outcome prompted speeches from congressional members, calls for con-
gressional investigation, and protests by activist groups. Here, many reflected on 
the policies as “unethical” and violating the spirit of the United States. In a June 
2020 letter to the Department of Homeland Security signed by 80 members of 
Congress, lawmakers argued for the reunification of families and that separation 
“should never be this country’s policy” (Congress of the United States, 2020). 
Again, this reinforces separation between American values and actual policies 
as they are enacted by federal agencies. While members of Congress see a dis-
tinction between policies and the identity practices that constitute citizenship, 
no studies examine how these meanings are presented by members of Congress. 
This study seeks to fill this void.
METHODS
This project asks three questions about the nature of citizenship as it is invoked 
in policy discussions by members of Congress. First, it asks how congressional 
speakers construct “citizenship,” specifically examining what practices and re-
sponsibilities are associated with U.S. citizenship. The study specifically looks for 
evidence of Dalton’s (2009) definitions of duty-based citizenship and engaged 
citizenship within congressional speeches to identify how citizenship practices 
required more social and cultural meaning than residency. Second, it asks how 
members of Congress articulate changes in citizenship policies and practices. 
As noted by Ricci (2004), the practices of citizenship change over time, and dis-
courses of change powerfully narrate contemporary meaning and boundaries 
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of identity. Third, the project will reflect on how Congress responds to policy 
changes from the executive branch and public reaction to new policies.
To study how speakers discursively construct “citizenship,” this project adopts 
a discourse analysis technique established by Gee (2012). In this approach, a set 
of texts is read (or watched) and analyzed for the presence of seven meaning- 
making tasks: significance, practices, identities, relationships, politics, connec-
tions, and sign systems/knowledge. For a definition of each practice and exam-
ple, see Appendix A to this chapter.
To collect data for this study, the newly developed C-SPAN Video Library 
API was used to download videos that include the words “citizenship” and “pol-
icy” together. To study citizenship during the Trump presidency, the collection 
was limited to the period January 20, 2017, to May 1, 2020. Then, the data set was 
narrowed to include only speakers who are members of Congress or members of 
the executive branch. This includes 937 videos within the data set. Importantly, 
this 40-month period allows researchers to exhaustively identify the ways that 
congressional speakers construct, use, and invoke discourses of citizenship pol-
icies. For a step-by-step methodology, see Appendix B to this chapter.
The C-SPAN Video Library makes this research possible by providing a thor-
ough and immense collection of congressional videos. The C-SPAN Archives, 
with its closed-captioning data, allows researchers to study how members of 
Congress develop, apply, and use discourses such as those on “citizenship.” The 
study of congressional discourses is important because of its implications for 
public engagement, media efficacy, and legislation development. In short, study-
ing congressional discourses lends insight into how policies are developed, pro-
posed, and promoted within the legislative process.
As noted, the study of citizenship policy an emerging field involving interdis-
ciplinary perspectives from political communication, public policy, and inter-
national relations. The C-SPAN Video Library provides a unique and previously 
unexamined way to learn how the language of citizenship impacts governmen-
tal processes. This study holds implications for those studying political commu-
nication, governmental discourses, and public policy.
Discourse 1: Citizenship as a set of responsibilities
In the process of referencing citizenship, most congressional speakers identified 
it as a set of responsibilities that comprise identity groups — rather than a tech-
nical designation of regionality. For example, this was evident in congressional 
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meetings and speeches on the prospect of granting Washington, D.C., statehood. 
In a June 25, 2020, speech by Representative Steny Hoyer (D-MD), he reflects that 
citizens in Washington, D.C., demonstrate their ability to meet the responsibili-
ties associated with citizenship: “Should we include them in the union as Amer-
ican citizens deserve to be of course full citizenship? Of course, full citizenship” 
(C-SPAN, 2020c). Intrinsic to his argument is that citizens have a right to vote 
for representation in federal bodies and that the right to vote is a responsibil-
ity of citizens — one that, he argues, the citizens of Washington, D.C., can meet.
Voting and the ability to vote for representation was easily the most common 
responsibility associated with citizenship. In a February 6, 2019, speech by Rep-
resentative Elijah Cummings (D-MD; Figure 3.1), he weaves the concepts of vot-
ing and citizenship together through repeated references to both:
I believe we should do everything in our power to make sure it is easier for 
American citizens to exercise their constitutional right to vote, not making it 
harder. We should be making it more convenient, not less. We should 
be encouraging more people to cast their votes, not fewer. We should 
be promoting early voting, absentee voting, voting by mail, and other 
ways to help citizens cast their ballots. (C-SPAN, 2019b)
Discursively, the concepts of voting and citizenship are woven together to demon-
strate their ties. To Cummings, voting is the responsibility of citizens, which is 
either aided or prevented by actions of Congress and elected officials. He therefore 
FIGURE 3.1 rep. Elijah Cummings (D-MD).
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argues that government should help individuals carry out the responsibilities of 
citizenship by supporting voting access and practices.
Other congressional members similarly verbalized a link between voting and 
citizenship as well as other responsibilities. For example, in a 2019 hearing on 
campaign finance laws, Representative Chip Roy (R-TX) argued that donating 
money to political candidates is a form of free speech that supports the citizens’ 
responsibility to vote and impact political leadership and representation: “Are 
we aware of the negative impact that you have on forcing American citizens to 
exercising their free speech to have that information be disclosed?” (C-SPAN, 
2019b). Here, Roy questions policies that require individuals to disclose personal 
information when donating to political parties, groups, or individuals. To Roy, 
these policies stifle citizens’ rights to free speech (performed via political dona-
tions) and citizens’ ability to impact political outcomes. By repeatedly using the 
words “citizen” and “citizenship,” he ties these practices discursively together.
Other identified responsibilities besides voting include enlisting in the U.S. 
military (although you do not need to be a citizen to join, which is the focus of 
discourse 3), participating in advocacy movements and groups, and seeking ac-
cess to government-sponsored programs such as public education and health 
care. While these mentions were few and far between, the language of “responsi-
bility” was consistent throughout the videos. By using “responsibility,” the speak-
ers denote that good citizenship requires individuals to take responsibility for 
their political interests. In this way, citizens, not government (of any level), are 
responsible for performing citizenship.
Discourse 2: Citizenship rights enacted over a lifetime
Beyond citizen responsibilities, there were also many mentions of the rights 
granted to U.S. citizens. The most mentioned were freedom of speech and pro-
test. Unlike the framework of responsibility, here these items were framed as 
rights that were granted by the government to citizens, thus making them the 
responsibility of government leaders to protect and enact. During a 2019 hear-
ing on the deportation of critically ill immigrant children, Representative Deb-
bie Wasserman Schultz (D-FL) reflected that although the children were not 
legal citizens of the U.S., because they were in the custody of ICE or USCIS, 
they had a right to the same levels of health care and treatment as citizens 
(C-SPAN, 2019d). In her description, health care, and humane treatment while 
in government custody are repeatedly referred to as U.S. rights extended to cit-
izens of the country.
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Similarly, in 2019 Representative Katie Hill (D-CA) referenced the rights of 
citizens to protest and speak openly about the mistreatment of immigrants de-
tained by ICE. She argued that protests outside suspected ICE facilities were 
constitutionally protected, even if they revealed secret or protected government 
areas. Here, she reflects on the right to protest as a part of citizenship, and she 
even praises citizens who used protest to draw attention to human rights vio-
lations and concerns. Her praise of these protest groups and her connection to 
their rights as citizens discursively constructs their actions as the performance 
of “engaged citizenship” (C-SPAN, 2019c). Similarly, other leaders vocalized sup-
port of protest groups and connected the right to protest to the rights of U.S. 
citizens. For example, Representative Al Green (D-TX) encouraged citizens to 
question candidates’ stance on Black Lives Matter, connecting political dismiss-
als of the movement as an attack on the right to protest (C-SPAN, 2020b). It is 
important to note that the right to protest is seemingly an adaptation of the First 
Amendment, or the right to peacefully assemble. While there were no mentions 
of these rights being granted by the Constitution, the repeated use of “protest” 
seems to be a refence to this set of rights.
Unlike the discursive construction of responsibility, the construction of rights 
ties to the framework of engaged citizenship. Citizenship is noted not by a set 
of duties that need to be performed but rather by a way of engaging the politi-
cal process and enacting change on relevant issues.
Discourse 3: True citizenship dictated by culture, not policies
This was particularly true of speeches and testimony on the 2020 U.S. census, 
where President Trump’s administration sought to include a citizenship ques-
tion. In a 2020 hearing on the census, Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) 
reflected that, even ignoring the ethical question of whether a citizenship ques-
tion should be included on the census, the question would not produce valuable 
insight since citizenship is more than legal residency — it is the cultural practices 
to which an individual belongs. While opposing the citizenship question, Malo-
ney discursively constructs citizenship as a cultural practice and identity rather 
than a legal residency. She also suggests that the nuances of citizenship are too 
complex for a simple survey question, thus providing support for removing it 
from the census (C-SPAN, 2020a).
Other policy-based discussions yield similar responses, with congressional 
speakers acknowledging that citizenship is both legally and cultural defined and 
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practiced. This was apparent in a 2019 House session featuring Representative 
William Lacy Clay (D-MO): Is the law “to facilitate the automatic acquisition 
of citizenship for lawful permanent resident children of military and Federal 
Government personnel residing abroad, and for other purposes . . . or to see in-
dividuals as part of the country without legal reference” (C-SPAN, 2019f). Here 
Clay identifies the two perspectives on citizenship: legal status and cultural iden-
tity. Without weighting one over the other, Clay presents both as critical com-
ponents to understanding the role of individuals in governmental organizations 
such as the military.
While discussions of citizenship as cultural are common, the specific dimen-
sions of culture are rarely mentioned. Further, there are no mentions of how cul-
tural citizenship might be different among countries or regions. This ambiguity is 
clear from speeches where cultural practices are the framework for citizenship. In 
a 2019 congressional hearing on citizenship and military families, Representative 
Lou Correa (D-NY) raises the question, “When you say the government promised 
citizenship what does that mean? . . . They promise you citizenship but one of the 
things that doesn’t happen is that they sit down with you and actually make sure 
that you know” (C-SPAN, 2019e). Here, Correa reflects that citizenship is more 
than “forms and paperwork” and instead indicative of informal and unarticu-
lated cultural practices. He argues that while citizenship is granted to the families 
of enlisted military personnel, there is no program that helps these new citizens 
navigate the cultural practices and assumptions of this status. Correa is joined by 
Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) during the same hearing, who similarly 
argues that the citizenship process for members of the military should include 
programs that help acculturate and educate these individuals (C-SPAN, 2019e).
Discourse 4: Congressional policies as “reactive” to changing definitions of citizenship
While infrequent, members of Congress reflected on the policy developments 
around citizenship, which particularly referenced changes coming from the ex-
ecutive branch. After the 2017 travel and immigration bans enacted by President 
Trump, members of Congress reflected on their own bills and policy proposals 
as responding to changes coming from the president. Senator Charles Schumer 
(D-NY) reflected that the polices emerging from the president forced members 
of Congress (from both the House and Senate) to create responsive policies that 
would challenge those enacted by the president (C-SPAN, 2017b). The frame-
work of responsive policy on citizenship during the Trump presidency was used 
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when members of Congress felt they needed to vocalize opposition to altered 
immigration policies and those that limited citizenship.
Importantly, in these instances, drafting policies that would repeal the Trump 
travel and immigration ban were framed as enactments of “engaged citizenship,” 
where members of Congress used their positions to join protesters and sup-
port prospective citizens. In 2017 speeches by Senator Michael Bennet (D-CO) 
and Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), both senators verbalized support for 
protestors (by thanking them) and framed their own speeches as acts of resis-
tance against the policies of President Trump (C-SPAN, 2017a). Bennet shared 
his own family’s history of immigration as refugees during the Holocaust, not-
ing that his speech articulating opposition to the Trump policies was his way 
of supporting his constituents protesting outside of airports and ICE offices. By 
framing their speeches as tied to protest groups opposing the changing policies 
around citizenship, Bennet and Blumenthal identify a paradox of discourses on 
citizenship: that to be a good, engaged citizen means sometimes opposing the 
duties and policies of citizenship.
This is further evidenced by a question-and-answer session with Senator 
Charles Schumer (D-NY) as he called a federal court ruling that upheld the 
travel and immigration ban “un-American” (C-SPAN, 2018c). He suggests that 
the travel ban, despite its design to limit citizenship to a narrower definition of 
“Americans,” is actually un-American because it relies on narrowing citizenship 
based on personal attributes like religion.
Discourse 5: Changing meanings of citizenship based on needs of immigrants
While reflecting on the nature of citizenship, several speakers referenced that 
it likely changes over time to meet the needs of the individuals both seeking 
and holding citizenship in the U.S. This was common when looking at speeches 
that reflected on the process of becoming a citizen, such as the practice of civics 
tests given by the USCIS. In a 2020 speech, Representative Kirsten E. Gillibrand 
(D-NY) reflected on the changing nature of citizenship tests to match the polit-
ical context of the moment (C-SPAN, 2020e). While Gillibrand did not specifi-
cally identify how these tests changed, she reflected that future tests would likely 
include questions about the activist groups currently protesting in the U.S. She 
seemingly invokes the Black Lives Matter movement and the Me Too movement 
without naming them directly in relation to the tests.
Other government representatives also noted that the nature of citizenship 
should change to meet the needs of immigrants and the country. In a 2020 speech 
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about the 2020 U.S. census, Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ) argues that “today’s 
citizenship goes beyond a category or a status” and is different than the iden-
tity that new citizens took on during the mass immigration periods of the 20th 
century (C-SPAN, 2020d). Menendez was not the only speaker to draw contrast 
to periods of mass migration to the United States, particularly those during the 
late 1800s and early 1900s. Several speakers noted that citizenship for today’s 
immigrants is more than “a status” and instead is connected to ideas of identity 
(C-SPAN, 2020d). Again, this promotes the framework of engaged citizenship 
in that there is a contrast drawn from previous periods of history. The contrast 
emphasizes the ways that citizenship is performed and enacted, rather than a 
set of rules to be followed (as in previous periods).
Importantly, on the issue of the deportation of children in ICE custody, there 
were mentions of times when it was good to ignore the rules and boundaries of 
citizenship in order to do the right thing. When members of Congress questioned 
the conditions of detained children in ICE facilities, they verbalized support for 
protest groups that highlighted the human rights violations — drawing a stark 
contrast between the contempt for the policies associated with citizenship and 
border control and the support for protest actions and movements (C-SPAN, 
2020d). The parity established in this case demonstrates some instances where 
the duties associated with citizenship may be inferior or unjust, especially when 
contrasted with the practice of engaged citizenship.
REFLECTION
While this is not a quantitative project that examines statistical frequency of 
term use, it is quickly noticeable that most of the mentions of “citizenship” in 
Congress during the Trump presidency are from Democratic members. While 
congressional reactions to Trump’s citizenship policies are regularly found in 
newspapers and social media, in congressional speeches, references are few and 
far between. Without further research, it is difficult to identify why Democrats 
are much more likely than Republicans to use the term “citizenship” in congres-
sional speeches, but previous work on engaged versus duty-based citizenship 
suggests that it is perhaps based on how each group conceptualizes its meaning.
For most Democratic speakers, citizenship is not just the policies that de-
termine where a person belongs but more their practices and cultural norms. 
This often means political and civic engagement, and congressional speak-
ers view their own role as ensuring that this practice can take place. This is 
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accomplished by calls for protest, encouragement of voting, and support of 
social movements.
Importantly, as identified by various speakers evoking engaged citizenship, 
a paradox of citizenship is displayed in congressional speeches. There are times 
when speakers encourage citizens to use engaged citizenship to protest unjust 
boundaries of membership. For example, after the 2017 travel and immigration 
ban that launched hundreds of protests, members of Congress voiced support 
for the protesters and their opposition to the restrictions. In this way, protest-
ers were characterized as good citizens because they opposed the policies that 
would restrict citizenship.
The paradox also appears when speakers reflected on their own citizenship 
journeys. These stories were discursively used as evidence of past immigration 
processes that were under threat by the Trump administration. Here, the sto-
ries of family immigration, or challenges faced by family members, served as 
evidence that citizenship is about more than the policies that allow or disallow 
membership, but rather the cultural practices that denote identity.
This is not to say that duty-based citizenship definitions were not featured 
throughout the congressional speeches. Many members reflected on policies that 
seemed to identify what duties individuals needed to perform to be considered 
good citizens or ones that fulfilled the responsibilities of citizenship. Specifically, 
voting was characterized as a responsibility and duty of citizens, not just a way 
to demonstrate or enact political engagement. Good citizens are voters who 
see voting as a responsibility associated with membership. Voting was not just 
a means to be part of the process, but a responsibility that individuals take on 
when becoming Americans. For members of Congress, citizens voting is a nec-
essary part of the American identity.
It is likely that voting appeared throughout these mentions because of its sa-
lience during the Trump presidency. With ongoing controversies about his 2016 
election, allegations of voter fraud during the 2020 primary season, and efforts 
from various political groups to suppress and support voter registrations, this 
became a central focus of citizenship discussions. It is possible that other politi-
cal contexts, such as a war, may focus citizenship mentions on other dimensions 
(such as enlistment), but more research is necessary. This may support the re-
active discourse in that it suggests citizenship mentions are often responsive to 
current events, new policy developments, or emerging issues facing constituents.
While this project focused on discussions and mentions of citizenship, fu-
ture research should look at closely related concepts, such as immigration and 
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refugees. A cursory look at the C-SPAN Video Library demonstrates that both 
parties use these words, often debating the processes and the practices of the 
immigration process.
It is expected that changes in citizenship policies will occur due to the out-
come of the 2020 election, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, and conflicts in 
international relations. As such, it is likely that members of Congress will con-
tinue to focus on this important topic, debating how it shapes American identity 
and how the practices of citizens shape its meaning. Through the five discourses 
identified here, members of Congress repeatedly invoke the duty-based and 
engaged models that describe the practices adopted by individuals to demon-
strate citizenship. As these practices evolve, more research should examine how 
Congress responds and reacts to these developments.
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APPENDIX A: PRACTICES AND EXAMPLES
Task Description Example from data set
Significance Speech reflects importance 
of citizenship
“Voting is the most important part of 
citizenship.”
Practices Speech describes 
citizenship for listeners, or 
engages/provides action 
for other listeners in 
conversation
“We saw protesters, in the vein of 
citizenship, fighting for others who 
are denied the same rights.”
Identities Speech uses nouns and 
adjectives to describe 
citizenship
“What makes us good citizens is 
the diversity within each one of us. 
Citizenship is a blend of all of our 
backgrounds.”
Relationships Speech connects 
citizenship to other 
events, or foci
“Citizens help each other, even in 
the face of challenges to their very 
citizenship.”
Politics Speech reflects on the 
social, historical, civic, 
or political nature of 
citizenship
“We can’t stand here and debate what 
makes our country great; it’s found in 
the citizenship of this country.”
Connections Speech discusses the 
relevance of citizenship by 
comparing or relating to 
other issues
“Citizenship in the United States is 
more complicated than any other 
country in the world.”
Sign systems 
and knowledge
Speech adopts common 
language practices, jargon, 
or cultural knowledge
“How far we’ve come from the boats 
at Ellis Island bringing immigrants 
dreaming of citizenship in a 
new world.”
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APPENDIX B: STEP-BY-STEP METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURE
1. Using the Archives API, all mentions of “citizenship” and “policy” from Jan-
uary 20, 2017, to May 1, 2020, were collected and downloaded. Data set was 
narrowed to include only mentions from congressional members. Total video 
collection was 937.
2. Researchers watched all videos, looking for use of Gee’s meaning-making 
practices: significance, practices, identities, relationships, politics, connec-
tions, and sign systems/knowledge.
3. Researchers met to share findings and reach consensus on five discourses 
that represent the patterns of communication around citizenship policies.





Black Congresswomen’s Response to COVID-19
Nadia E. Brown, Jasmine C. Jackson, and Michael Strawbridge
“We have a pandemic upon a pandemic in the African American community.”
 — Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) 1
B
lack communities (along with other marginalized and stigmatized social 
groups) are disproportionately affected by COVID-19. According to the 
COVID Racial Data Tracker, Black or African American deaths make up 
98 of every 100,000 COVID-19-related deaths in the United States, 2.3 times 
the rate for white people in the U.S. (Ledur/COVID Tracking Project, 2020). 
Compared to non-Hispanic white people in the U.S., Black people have 2.6 times 
higher incidences of cases, are hospitalized 4.7 times more often, and have a 2.1 
times higher death rate (CDC, 2020). When comparing 20 U.S. counties with 
the highest infection rates and 20 counties with the highest death rates, the top 
9 counties of highest infection rates are predominantly white, whereas 3 of the 
top 5 counties of highest death rates are predominantly Black. Indeed, Black 
communities represent the largest racial group in 7 of the top 20 counties with 
the highest death rates in the U.S (Ledur/COVID Tracking Project, 2020).
Members of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) often use rhetorical strat-
egies to shape the political agenda. As a caucus made up of Democrats who were 
the minority party in government during the 116th Congress, the CBC members 
lacked institutional power to push their policy preferences into law. Thus, their 
discussion of the disparate impact COVID-19 is having/has had on Black com-
munities is a symbolic form of political representation as they were unable to alter 
legislation to effectively address racial disparities in COVID-19 relief legislation.
The members of the CBC recognize racism as an enduring systemic failure 
of the American democratic project. As the epigraph quote by Rep. Barbara 
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Lee (D-CA) notes, the COVID-19 pandemic is only one of the ills that Black 
Americans are facing. In April 2020, the CBC shared its legislative response to the 
coronavirus pandemic and its adverse impact on African Americans. Since this 
news conference, the women of the CBC have been the face of the organization’s 
legislative response to the coronavirus. National and local initiatives from Reps. 
Karen Bass (D-CA), Robin Kelly (D-IL), Barbara Lee (D-CA), Sheila Jackson Lee 
(D-TX), Joyce Beatty (D-OH), and Gwen Moore (D-WI) sought to help Black 
communities that are disproportionately affected by COVID-19. Examples in-
clude discussions of the Economic Relief Bill, primary voting, women’s leader-
ship, and ongoing legislation. In contrast, in the same time frame following the 
CBC’s April response, only two male CBC members, G. K. Butterfield (D-NC) 
and Emmanuel Cleaver (D-MO), appear in the C-SPAN Video Library discuss-
ing their coronavirus initiatives, as compared to the six women listed above.
This gendered observation of the kinds of advocacy work members of the 
CBC undertake led us to develop a more systematic approach to understanding 
the role male and female members of Congress play in addressing COVID-19 
racialized inequities. As representatives of Black communities, do all CBC 
members rhetorically challenge the government’s role in contributing to ra-
cialized inequality during the pandemic? In this chapter, we assess how Black 
caucus members discuss race and the coronavirus. Previous scholarship has 
demonstrated that women members of the CBC have been more vocal on Black 
Lives Matter initiatives (Tillery, 2019). Drawing on this finding, we expect the 
possibility of gendered differences in their political expression of the racial-
ized impact of COVID-19. This chapter’s central question is Do women mem-
bers of the CBC use their platform to argue that racism has caused Blacks to 
have an unparalleled rise of COVID-19 sickness and deaths as compared to 
Black congressmen?
In what follows, we engage with the relevant literature on political commu-
nication, race, gender, and representation. We then provide an overview of the 
CBC. From there, we present our data and methods followed by a discussion of 
our data analysis. We end with some concluding findings and discuss possible 
next steps for future research. We demonstrate a need for a gendered analysis of 
the political representation provided to minoritized Americans by CBC mem-
bers. We view the advocacy of the CBC as consistently reminding this country 
of its original sin — anti-Black racism — as particularly visible in members’ re-
marks during legislative sessions on the government’s responses to COVID-19.
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RACE, GENDER AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
Elected representatives use multiple platforms to communicate with their con-
stituents. Legislative hearings are one such way lawmakers communicate with 
those in their districts by rhetorically emphasizing issues of interest to their con-
stituents. Scholars identify the essential role of communication between elites 
and voters in the representation process (Evans & Hayden, 2017; Fenno, 1978; 
Fridkin & Kenney, 2014; Grimmer, 2013). Representatives communicate with 
voters to educate them. This allows the constituents to hold representatives ac-
countable when voting. Furthermore, these messages from representatives also 
bolster trust and support for them (Eulau & Karps, 1977). Brown and Gershon 
(2017) found that Congress members’ messages during hearings and floor de-
bates can inform voters of what the government is doing and allow the public to 
see the differences in beliefs elected officials may have about current issues. In 
examining congressional hearings, Minta and Sinclair-Chapman (2013) found 
that the more diverse Congress is, the more likely minority interests will be on 
the legislative agenda.
Elected officials emphasize different policies in their political communication. 
As such, issue categories often correspond to specific demographics. Women’s 
issues are policy preferences held by women, and Black issues are policies that 
African Americans will care more about. In turn, women and Black lawmakers 
are stereotyped as experts in these areas (Caliendo & McIlwain, 2006; Canon, 
1999; Dolan, 2005; Kahn, 1996; Terkildsen & Damore, 1999; Windett, 2014; Zil-
ber & Niven, 2000). Healthcare, education, and poverty are examples of issues 
deemed women’s issues (Kahn, 1996). Women relay messages about these issues 
more than their male counterparts (Fridkin & Woodall, 2005; Gershon, 2008; 
Kahn, 1996). African American lawmakers emphasize racialized issues to their 
constituents. These racialized or “Black issues” are in the realm of racial equal-
ity or civil rights (Caliendo & McIlwain, 2006; Canon, 1999; Terkildsen, 1996; 
Terkildsen & Damore, 1999; Zilber & Niven, 2000).
Yet, there are differences in how Black men and women in Congress use their 
platform to discuss particular issues. Black women politicians hold issue posi-
tions different from other elected officials, especially Black men. Overall, Black 
women state legislators are more supportive of policies specific to minorities and 
are more likely to express universal concern for similar policy issues (Barrett, 
2001). These lawmakers prioritize education, health care, economic development, 
80 DEMOCrACY AND THE MEDIA
and employment (Barrett, 1995). Gendered differences in how Black women rep-
resent constituents and their unique policy preferences suggest that as members 
of the CBC, they will be distinct from their male counterparts during legislative 
hearings on COVID-19.
THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS
Excluding underrepresented groups from the legislative process illegitimatizes 
political institutions (Dovi, 2007; Mansbridge, 1999). Including descriptive rep-
resentatives within these institutions is one method of legitimizing our politi-
cal system. Descriptive representatives are elected officials who physically look 
like or mirror the groups from which they come (Pitkin, 1967). The representa-
tive’s shared identity assumes they also share the experiences of their constitu-
ents (Pitkin, 1967). Like most political institutions, Congress lacked descriptive 
representation until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), which triggered an in-
flux of Black legislators between 1965 and 1970. The 93rd Congress (1973–1975) 
included 13 African Americans in the House of Representatives compared to 2 
before the VRA after the Reconstruction era.
The 93rd Congress began with eight new African American legislators who 
were elected in the 1968 and 1970 elections. Founded in 1969, the Democratic 
Select Committee was the predecessor of the CBC and was organized by the 
first group of Black lawmakers to enter Congress in sizable numbers. In 1971, the 
9-member DSC evolved into a 13-member CBC due to congressional redistrict-
ing and the Civil Rights Movement, which afford Blacks the opportunity to vote 
and to elect Black representatives (Clay, 1993; Dellums, 2000; Singh, 1998). These 
pioneering 9 lawmakers feared that if there was not any expansion or re-creation 
of the DSC, this organization would become merely a space for Black legislators 
to congregate (Clay, 1993, p. 117). The purpose of forming the CBC, conversely, 
was to meet the needs and provide adequate representation to the legislators’ 
home districts and the African American constituency at large. The 13 found-
ing legislators of the CBC enjoyed early success by pressuring President Nixon 
to meet with them and to address the substantive needs of African Americans. 
The CBC developed the Black Declaration of Independence and the Black Bill 
of Rights, foundational documents that outlined a pro-Black stance on policy is-
sues ranging from education, housing, and public health to prison reform (U.S. 
House of Representatives, n.d.). The newly formed organization and its members 
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were active in promoting a Black agenda that highlighted the need to eradicate 
racism. (Figure 4.1 depicts the CBC news conference.)
In sum, the CBC was created to provide African Americans representation, 
especially since southern members of Congress explicitly stated that they rep-
resented the white race (Henry, 1977). These new members of Congress stated 
that an exclusive all-Black caucus was necessary due to the long-standing racial 
issues in the United States and the effect that the Civil Rights Movement had on 
politics (Barker & McCorry, 1976; Henry, 1977). As such, the CBC was formed 
to provide both substantive and descriptive representation for Blacks, even those 
who resided outside of the districts of the original founders of the caucus.
Since the 93rd Congress the CBC has grown by more than 300%. Scholars 
who focus on the CBC have come to an agreement that African American legis-
lators achieved full integration into the Democratic Party’s caucus in the House 
of Representatives (Gile & Jones 1995; Singh, 1998; Tate, 2014). Members of the 
CBC have often had the opportunity to serve as chairs of powerful standing 
committees as well as serve in senior leadership posts in the Democratic Party 
(Bositis, 1994; Haynie, 2005; Minta, 2011; Singh, 1998; Tate, 2014). However, re-
cent studies show that members of the CBC do not allow cues from Democratic 
leadership to influence their roll call votes on most legislation (Canon, 1999; 
Sinclair-Chapman, 2002; Tate, 2003, 2014). Thus, the CBC is independent and 
not controlled by the Democratic Party, although its membership is primarily 
Democrats.
FIGURE 4.1 Congressional Black Caucus news conference.
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The representation the CBC provides African American constituents is in-
valuable. Swain (1992) argued that African American and white legislators 
provide Black constituents the same representation. However, others identify 
ways African American legislators’ representation style is unique and benefits 
our nation as a whole. Tate (2003) examined the 103rd and 104th Congresses 
and found that African American legislators were willing to separate them-
selves from the Democratic Party to promote and fight for liberal policies in 
the House of Representatives. Other research shows that African American leg-
islators are more likely than white legislators to introduce and promote bills 
that center the interests of African Americans in committees and on the floor 
of the House (Canon, 1999; Gamble, 2007; Grose, 2011; Minta, 2009; Minta & 
Sinclair-Chapman, 2013; Sinclair-Chapman, 2002; Tate, 2003; Whitby, 1998). The 
members of the CBC represent the interests of Black Americans and as such fol-
low the tenets of its founders.
However, the growing gender diversity with the CBC requires scholars to as-
sess how and if at all, women and men represent Black constituents differently 
particularly because the initial members of the CBC were overwhelmingly male. 
In the beginning scholars attributed the CBC’s fragmentation regarding repre-
sentation styles and issues to the organization’s expansion and institutionaliza-
tion (Bositis, 1994; Singh, 1998; Tate, 2003, 2014; Tillery, 2011). Studies suggest 
that this fragmentation may be due to the increase in Black women in Congress; 
scholars have found that the presence of minority women in minority caucuses, 
such as the CBC has influenced Black men to support issues that focus on race 
and gender (Dodson & Carroll, 1991; Orey et al., 2006; Philpot & Walton, 2007; 
Simien, 2006; Smooth, 2006; Minta & Brown, 2014). Next, Alvin Tillery (2019) 
assessed the tweets of CBC members and how they used Twitter to communi-
cate with their constituents and found that CBC members tweet about race less 
than they do other issues. However, Black women members of the CBC were 
more likely to discuss the Black Lives Matter movement than Black men. Gender, 
size of margin of victory in the 2012 elections, and percentage of whites living 
within their districts were all predictors of a member’s likelihood to discuss ra-
cial issues on Twitter. These studies suggest that Black women may have a dif-
ferent representational style within the CBC.
The role of the CBC in the 21st century is one of combatting explicit and im-
plicit racial biases. There were 55 members of the CBC during the 116th Congress. 
Twenty-five members of the CBC in the 116th Congress identify as women and 
30 identify as men. In the House of Representatives, CBC members served in 
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top leadership positions. Rep. James E. Clyburn (D-SC) served as the majority 
whip in the House, while Rep. Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) served as the chairman 
of the House Democratic Caucus and Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) was the cochair 
of the House Democratic Steering and Policy Committee. There were also 5 CBC 
members who were the chairs of full House committees and 28 CBC members 
chaired House subcommittees.
However, the 116th Congress was tasked with another challenge: providing 
aid to the American people to assuage the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Given the gendered differences within issue positions and communication styles 
of Black members of Congress, we hypothesize gendered differences in how the 
members of the CBC rhetorically address the widespread racial disparities of 
COVID-19. As such, we contend that in hearings Black women legislators in the 
CBC more often discuss the effect of COVID-19 on the African American com-
munity specifically than do Black men legislators.
METHODS AND DATA
The C-SPAN Video Library contains over 260,000 hours, including coverage 
of many congressional hearings, even virtual and hybrid proceedings, coupled 
with transcripts compiled from closed-captioning, sectioned by the speaker. 2 The 
C-SPAN Video Library’s vast collection captures the real-time discussion and de-
bate of members of Congress and their unique political communication, likely 
more partisan and strategic given the environment and rules (Brown & Gershon, 
2017, pp. 194–195). We used this unique resource to observe CBC members dis-
cussing the disparate effects of COVID-19 in formal congressional settings, as-
sessing this symbolic representation’s frequency and nature. Our analysis focuses 
on members in the U.S. House of Representatives, excluding Senators Cory 
Booker and Kamala Harris. Using the available library indexes, we filtered video 
to House committee hearings between April and September 2020. We also used 
the index “Coronavirus Disease 2019,” retaining only pandemic-related meet-
ings. Our search parameters produced 97 hearings, 10 of which did not include 
a CBC member. (See Appendix A to this chapter for a list of excluded hearings.)
Two independent coders treated each instance a CBC member spoke in the 
87 included hearings as a unit of analysis (Banwart & McKinney, 2005; Kropf & 
Grassett, 2016). 3 However, these hearings include acknowledgements, greetings, 
and directives such as “I yield back,” “Reclaiming my time,” and “Please unmute 
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yourself ” that skew results. We define these statements, procedural statements, as 
“Statements of no substantive value, directives guiding the conversation, greet-
ings, formalities, and introductions” (see the codebook, Appendix C to this chap-
ter). After identifying and removing all procedural statements, 1,095 remarks 
from 49 CBC members remained. (See Appendix B to this chapter for the list 
of representatives included in the sample.) The independent coders performed 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis on the remaining remarks, observ-
ing the frequency of mentioning disparities and how members discussed them.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the measurement of the three dependent variables, bi-
nary indicators, used in the quantitative analysis. The first dependent variable, 
general disparities, denotes CBC member remarks specifically addressing a group 
or segment of the population bearing unequal burdens, consequences, and risks. 
The second dependent variable, racial disparities, denotes mentions of racial dis-
parities. The final variable, Black racial disparities, denotes explicit references to 
burdens in Black communities. Coders then used additional dummy variables 
to indicate whether remarks were from hearings focusing on disparities and also 
those hearings specifically addressing racial inequality. 4
Once coders completed the data set, we referenced Tillery (2019) to construct 
our analyses using our three dependent variables. Tillery conducted similar re-
search on CBC member racial rhetoric on Twitter during the 113th Congress. 
Besides concluding the prominent role of gender, Tillery indicates several addi-
tional variables to consider, including southern districts, rural districts, unem-
ployment rate, poverty rate, white voter concentration, and margin of victory 
in the previous election. While our primary variable of interest is gender, we 
also control for these other relevant factors. Likewise, with similar overdisper-
sion of our data, we use negative binomial regressions in our analyses (Gardner 


























FIGURE 4.2 Identifying disparity rhetoric from Congressional Black Caucus members.
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For the qualitative analysis, the coders determined themes in the data, identi-
fying passages in the text that are linked by a common theme or a set of unifying 
ideas. From there, one coder further indexed the text into categories to establish 
a “framework of thematic ideas” (Gibbs, 2007). This process is a data reduction 
technique in which the qualitative researcher is able to segment, categorize, and 
summarize the data. From there, the data are reconstructed via line-by-line cod-
ing to capture the important segments of the data set. A code refers to the name 
given to a category of data that describes what is being said. As such, codes are 
shorter and themes are larger descriptions of the data. The segmented data are 
further categorized for more detailed thematic analysis. Moving from descrip-
tion to analysis, the “framework of thematic ideas” centers on analytic and theo-
retical coding that is useful for constant comparison used in line-by-line coding 
of the text from the transcripts.
Thematic analysis is a flexible methodology allowing researchers with different 
methodological backgrounds to engage in the coding process and data analysis. 
We created broad themes that were driven by the theoretical expectations from 
the extant literature. For instance, under the broad theme of racial disparities, 
we further divided the thematic frame to include the following codes: under-
served populations, health, economy, and a targeted disparity on Black women. 
Within each theme we have further identifying nuances and differences in how 
the members of the CBC discussed these issues.
RESULTS
We analyzed 1,095 individual remarks from CBC members in COVID-19-related 
hearings between April and September 2020. We broadly identified five main is-
sues discussed: health and available resources, education, housing and econom-
ics, racial injustice, and government responsiveness. 6 As expected, members 
frequently addressed positive cases, deaths, and testing. In total, they referenced 
health and available resources 507 times (46%). Figure 4.3 shows that CBC mem-
bers also discussed housing and economics (39%), education (9%), government 
response and oversight (8%), and racial injustice (6%). While present, racial in-
justice rhetoric primarily occurred in the wake of George Floyd’s killing, as 45 of 
the 60 racial injustice mentions were between May 29, 2020, and June 30, 2020.
Pertinent to our analysis, CBC members identified racial inequalities and vul-
nerable groups during House committee hearings (Figure 4.4). They highlighted 
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disparities in 40% of all remarks. More importantly, of the 216 racial references, 
127 explicitly mention Black racial inequality (59%). As a collective, the CBC dis-
cussed the burdens of vulnerable and marginalized groups. We now assess ev-
idence of differences between CBC men and women during these discussions.
Using our sample, which includes 26 men and 23 women, we assess gendered 
differences in the likelihood of addressing disparities while also controlling for 
other relevant factors. Table 4.1 displays the results of our negative binomial 
regressions. Our models mostly fail to produce statistically significant results 
(besides median age). We largely credit this to our sample size, 1,095 units of 
analysis from April to September 2020. For perspective, the statically signifi-
cant findings from Tillery (2019) analyzed 21,692 tweets, spanning the entirety 
of the 113th Congress.
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FIGURE 4.4 Disparity rhetoric from Congressional Black Caucus members.
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While our results lack statistical significance, by looking at the individual 
interactions of members, there is still much to be said about gendered differ-
ences within the CBC. We transform our regression coefficients into incident 
rates to better illustrate our results’ substantive importance (Table 4.2). 7 In 
COVID-19-related hearings, being a woman in the CBC increased the rate of 
discussing disparities burdening variously marginalized and vulnerable pop-
ulations. Simultaneously, a CBC woman was 0.85 times less likely to address 
general racial inequalities but 1.07 times more likely to discuss those specifi-
cally burdening the Black community. When running the same models but now 
TABLE 4.1 Negative Binomial Regression Models of Congressional Black Caucus 



























































Observations 1,095 1,095 1,095
Pseudo R2 .01 .01 .01
*p < 0.1.
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accounting for the type of hearing (i.e., controlling for references to racial dis-
parities in hearings on racial disparities), similar results emerge while also not 
statistically significant. 8
Substantive findings suggest that CBC men and women did not address in-
equalities the same, and Table 4.3 further illustrates gendered differences: all CBC 
women discussed marginalized and vulnerable populations related to COVID-19; 
not every man did. Eight CBC men did not cite racial disparities, more than 
double the number of women failing to do so. Lastly, nine CBC men, more than 
one-third of those observed, did not specify Black racial disparities, compared 
to just four women.
Our quantitative analysis fails in producing statistical significance. Even still, 
we identify gender differences consistent with CBC women being more vocal 
about race (Brown, 2014; Tillery, 2019), but on a smaller scale and specific to 
the issue of COVID-19. Our binary gender variable’s conflicting coefficients do 
not indicate CBC women addressed racial disparities less than men. Instead, the 
CBC women more likely spoke about racial inequality by specifying the Black 
community in their remarks. Meanwhile, the CBC men seemingly discussed 
racial disparities in a broader sense that encompasses other minority groups, 
TABLE 4.2 Incident Rates
Dependent variable All disparities racial disparities Black disparities
CBC woman 1.010 0.850 1.070
Member age 0.993 0.996 1.000
Southern district 0.825 0.752 0.806
District median age 0.951 0.924 0.928
% rural 1.000 0.994 0.999
% unemployment 1.030 1.080 1.120
% poverty 0.988 0.966 0.995
% white 0.999 0.992 1.020
MOV 2018 0.996 0.995 1.000
TABLE 4.3 Congressional Black Caucus Members Never Discussing Disparities
Dependent variable All disparities racial disparities Black disparities
CBC women (n = 23) 0 3 4
CBC men (n = 26) 4 8 9
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with less explicit references to the Black community. Highlighting inequalities 
was also more common among CBC women than men. Nearly all CBC women 
addressed the disparate effects of COVID-19. However, a noticeable segment of 
CBC men did not. Black women of the CBC collectively addressed pandemic 
inequalities while only a subset of men did the same.
From here, we turn our attention to the qualitative analysis. Below we pay 
specific attention to how individual CBC members rhetorically addressed dis-
parities related to COVID-19 as they sought to represent to their constituents. 
We find that the CBC members used three overarching themes in their dis-
cussion of the pandemic: underserved populations, health, and the economy. 
However, only one legislator dedicated specific attention to the virus’s targeted 
disparity on Black women. Overall, we find that the CBC members saw their 
role as highlighting the general disparities faced by marginalized communities 
in the face of this pandemic, which does align with the organization’s founding 
purpose. The CBC saw themselves as advocates for their specific communities, 
which may be composed of various marginalized communities and the African 
American community at large.
GENERAL DISPARITIES
The members of the CBC discuss the disparities exacerbated by COVID-19. 
This discussion highlights how the disease and its manifold societal implica-
tions have wreaked havoc on already marginalized populations. Throughout 
the various COVID-19-related hearings, the CBC members spoke in generali-
ties on behalf of groups that have disproportionately felt the illness’s brunt and 
its economic and social fallout. For instance, Rep. Lauren Underwood (D-IL) 
implored her colleagues to consider the pandemic’s impact on marginalized 
groups during the House Hearing on Homeless Veterans and COVID-19 pan-
demic on April 28, 2020 (C-SPAN, 2020a). She stated, “We know during times 
of disaster, whether healthcare disasters and emergencies, economic disasters 
and emergencies, it is the vulnerable populations that get exacerbated.” This 
comment sets the stage for how CBC members addressed their congressio-
nal colleagues, expert witnesses, and bureaucracy agency leadership during 
House hearings on COVID-19. In what follows, we present a thematic over-
view of how CBC members represented marginalized communities in general 
and Black communities specifically.
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RACIAL DISPARITIES
Underserved Populations
The spirit of Rep. Underwood’s (D-IL) concern was echoed by her CBC col-
leagues, many of whom took to the floor to share concerns that those already 
in precarious positions are at additional risk because of the pandemic. For in-
stance, Rep. Jahana Hayes (D-CT) spoke on behalf of teachers and students with 
disabilities in the House Hearing on Reopening Schools During a Pandemic on 
July 23, 2020 (C-SPAN, 2020l). She asked Michael Hinojosa, the superintendent 
of the Dallas Independent School District, how a possible shortage of “full-time 
teachers and substitute teachers” would impact the learning outcomings of stu-
dents. More forcefully, she implored Hinojosa to directly respond to “how would 
this potential shortage in the teacher workforce affect students with disabilities?” 
Coaching her line of questioning in relation to the school leaders that she’s heard 
from during the pandemic, Rep. Hayes pressed Hinojosa to outline a plan for 
educating students with disabilities amid a possible teacher shortage. This line 
of questioning centered on a marginal group of American students who were 
largely absent from other discussions during this hearing.
Regarding the racial digital divide, a term used to describe the unequal distri-
bution in the access to and use of information and communication technologies 
between distinct groups, Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA) addressed proposed short-
comings with an app-based contact tracing system. In the July 8, 2020, House 
Hearing on Coronavirus and Artificial Intelligence (C-SPAN, 2020f), Rep. Waters 
contextualized how some ethno-racial communities would be further marginal-
ized if this technology were unavailable to them. “With use of technology, includ-
ing digital contact tracing and dealing with various social distancing protocols, 
you reminded us through your research that historically Black and brown peo-
ple, they’ve already been socially distanced through segregated housing policies 
like redlining, systemic racism. The economic opportunities and the pandemic 
highlight the current injustices of our economy for people of color.” She cited 
environmental racism, growing crime rates, unemployment, and limited access 
to quality health care as other inequalities that Black and Brown people already 
face. Now, technological barriers may “perpetuate structural inequity.” With an 
eye toward structural racism, Rep. Waters asked, “What considerations should 
digital contact tracing take to ensure that minority communities are served well 
by these app-based solutions?” While app-based contact tracing may be ideal 
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for some communities, some underserved Black and Brown communities do 
not have the infrastructure to support this technology.
Likewise, Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) connects voting rights and ac-
cess to the ballot in a time of COVID-19 as an issue that will disparately impact 
ethno-racial minorities and people with disabilities. During the June 3, 2020, 
Hearing on Voting Rights During Coronavirus Pandemic (C-SPAN, 2020b), 
she stated her expressed support for “expanding the opportunities for voters 
with disabilities.” Yet, Rep. Jackson Lee noted the in-practice failure of disabled 
Americans being able to vote: “What I have seen violated is the rights of a voter 
to come to the polls and have curbside voting. I want to make sure that it is never 
undermined and done safely in light of COVID-19.” From there, she made di-
rect connections to voter disenfranchisement for other communities, who, like 
the disabled, have laws protecting their accessibility to the ballot. “We know the 
people impacted negatively on mass mail-in balloting happens to be African 
Americans for many cultural reasons. The ballot may come, they don’t use it, they 
go to the polls, and they are punished by not being able to vote.” She then urged 
her colleagues to “think about how we have to protect minorities as it related to 
voting . . . [and] the importance of those with disabilities, but particularly the 
curbside voting which I want to focus on.” For Rep. Jackson Lee, access to vot-
ing is a key concern. Whether through curbside voting, mail-in, or in-person 
voting, she is seeking to ensure that the federal government will guarantee ac-
cess to the ballot for marginalized groups.
Health
Setting the tone for a racialized analysis on the impact of COVID-19 on margin-
alized communities, Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) made connections to the racism 
and the virus. During the Centers for Disease Control Director Testimony on 
Coronavirus Response on June 4, 2020 (C-SPAN, 2020c), she stated, “We have 
a pandemic upon a pandemic in the African American community. And so to-
day, I just want to take a moment to offer my condolences to the Floyd family 
as we mourn and grieve his loss and hope that justice is served in his mem-
ory.” In her next sentence, she pivots to the disparate loss of Black life because 
of the coronavirus. “And that goes right into the disproportionate rates of Afri-
can Americans and people of color who are dying from COVID-19.” Shen then 
asked the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) director Dr. Red-
field, “What’s your plan for how you’re going to target resources and a federal 
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response to Black and Brown communities, which are disproportionately be-
ing hit?” The “pandemic within a pandemic” metaphor helps to frame how oth-
ers — particularly Black women CBC members — are discussing the ethno-racial 
disparities of the virus.
Centering the rationale for these ethno-racial disparities that were made more 
apparent due to the coronavirus, Rep. Robin Kelly (D-IL) cited a 2003 national 
academic study that found that even when “controlling [for] various cases, mi-
nority patients have worse health outcomes than White patients. The report 
found both explicit and implicit racial bias that contributed to these outcomes” 
(C-SPAN, 2020e). These implicit and explicit biases were crucial in Rep. Kelly’s 
line of reasoning that sought to expose the psychological rationale that added 
to differences in how ethno-racial minorities and whites are treated. This study 
helped to set up her argument that these biases have disastrous effects on mi-
nority communities: “As we all have heard by now, minority communities show 
a disproportionate amount of COVID-19 cases and deaths. This is compounded 
by pandemic related shutdowns and layoffs that are hitting minority commu-
nities.” Turning her attention directly to Arthur Evans, the chief executive offi-
cer of the American Psychological Association during the June 30, 2020, House 
Hearing on COVID-19 Impact on Mental Health (C-SPAN, 2020e), Rep. Kelly 
directly asked, “How can we address disparities and access to mental health 
treatments in communities of color?” This question sought to solicit a pointed 
response about how mental health problems may be felt more in ethno-racial 
minority communities and what can be done.
Similarly, Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) pushed CDC leadership to provide an ex-
act timeline for the dissemination of updated COVID-19 data based on race, eth-
nicity, and socioeconomic level during the June 4, 2020, hearing on the Centers 
for Disease Control Director Testimony on Coronavirus Response (C-SPAN, 
2020c). She pointedly asked, “What’s our plan for how you’re going to target 
resources and a federal response to Black and Brown communities, which are 
disproportionately being hit? . . . The impact is greater disproportionately with 
people of color. How are you going to target a federal response if you don’t have 
the data? You said that you would provide this.” Because Congress is tasked with 
governmental oversight, Rep. Lee is well within her authority to push CDC lead-
ership on this issue. In requesting access to data the agency said it would pro-
vide, she is asking for information to help her and her colleagues make informed 
policy and spending issues on how to help ethno-racial communities that are 
the hardest hit by COVID-19.
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Rep. Ayanna Pressley (D-MA) spoke directly to Dr. Fauci, an immunol-
ogist who has served as the director of the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases since 1984, during the July 14 House Hearing on Ensuring 
Safe COVID-19 Vaccine (C-SPAN, 2020h). She asserted that “this pandemic has 
demonstrated the need for deliberate process of equity and inclusion. According 
to data released by the CDC, Black and Latino citizens are hospitalized at more 
than four times the rate of white Americans due to coronavirus. These are the 
same communities [that are] underrepresented in clinical trials. As people hope 
to put an end to the harm caused, it is critical there that [physicians are] in-
formed by those who are hardest hit.” Similar to her Democratic colleagues, Rep. 
Pressley pointed out the failure of the Trump administration to pay attention 
to racial disparities in health care access. She cautioned that the country could 
not fully rebound from the pandemic if all Americans were not included in the 
recovery plans. “If the United States will successfully emerge from the current 
pandemic every step of the process must be fair, and equitable.” She concluded 
that is why it was important for volunteers from diverse communities to be in-
cluded in clinical trials for potential vaccines for the virus.
Economics
In a series of hearings, members of the CBC forcefully articulate that margin-
alized communities are disproportionately suffering from an economic fallout 
because of the pandemic. Rep. Ayanna Pressley noted that “while the crisis is un-
precedented the disparities revealed in our economic system and subsequent gov-
ernment response are unfortunately very familiar” during a July 9, 2020, hearing 
on Minority-Owned Businesses and Access to Financial Services During Pan-
demic (C-SPAN, 2020g). All too often, these are ethno-racial communities. Be-
cause the CBC members overwhelmingly represent these communities, much 
of their comments during hearings reflect the needs of their districts. In one 
such illustration, Rep. Brenda Lawrence (D-MI) notes, “Since the beginning of 
the pandemic communities of color have been disproportionately impacted by 
large numbers of hospitalization and death. I represent a majority-minority dis-
trict comprised of 18 cities, including Detroit, Southfield, and Pontiac.” Build-
ing on previous comments made during the hearing that sought to establish 
that COVID-19 has devastated communities of color, Rep. Lawrence added that 
many in her district are essential workers and that the government should pro-
tect them. “These essential workers are on the front lines of hospitals, grocery 
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stores, the food processing facilities, and transportation services. The question I 
would like to direct is: are there any solutions you would recommend the federal 
government take and put into place to limit the disparate impact the coronavi-
rus has had on minority essential workers?” In pointing out these racial dispar-
ities between essential workers, particularly those who live in her district, Rep. 
Lawrence demands that the government proactively protect minority essential 
workers who are on the front line providing goods and services to Americans 
during the pandemic.
In another pointed question about the differential treatment of ethno-racial 
communities of color when compared to whites, Rep. Al Green (D-TX) asked 
Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell and treasury secretary Steve Mnuchin 
during a hearing on the coronavirus response on June 30, 2020 (C-SPAN, 2020d), 
why the Trump administration refuses to acknowledge the unequal access to 
credit based on race and ethnicity. For Rep. Green, this perceived willful igno-
rance by the Trump administration allows for the persistence of lending discrim-
ination. Citing mortgage rates in 2019, Rep. Green stated: “We see an empirical 
evidence indicating that there is indigenous discrimination in lending, especially 
as it relates to people of color. So here’s my question, my friends. Adjusting for 
educational credit score assets and other relevant factors — do you believe that 
this discrimination in lending exists against borrowers of color? . . . Next ques-
tion, do you believe this invidious discrimination against borrowers of color can 
be addressed with legislation?” Likewise, Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY) asked 
Powell and Mnuchin if they understood structural and economic racism. Mr. 
Powell’s assertion that the Trump administration sought to maintain full em-
ployment despite the coronavirus did not address how the administration would 
“pull a greater share of the minority workforce upwards, which is often the first 
to get laid off and the last to get hired. . . . [Indeed], communities of color are 
just getting out of the starting blocks, and everyone else has been running the 
race for months or years or decades.” Rep. Meeks pushed the Trump adminis-
tration to acknowledge the role of economic racism and to find ways to work 
with Congress to alleviate these race-based inequalities: “I also believe that our 
approach to addressing the legacy of economic racism and discrimination must 
include equity investments in communities that have been financially excluded 
for decades and then disproportionately impacted by the financial crisis and 
now the COVID pandemic. [They] cannot and did not borrow their way out of 
poverty end economic exclusion.” In a proposed solution, Rep. Meeks offers that 
“equity investments over the coming decade or more into communities of color 
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will be essential to lift them out of poverty.” He then proffered his proposal for 
a “national investment fund [to pull] together capital from both the private sec-
tor and government to invest in these communities over the next decade.” Rep. 
Meeks sharply sought Mr. Mnuchin’s endorsement of his proposal before yield-
ing his time back to the committee chair. Both Reps. Green and Meeks claimed 
that COVID-19 is exacerbating the economic marginality of communities of 
color and that the Trump administration must take a proactive role in lifting 
these structural barriers.
On the subject of discriminatory lending, Rep. Joyce Beatty (D-OH) articu-
lated that discriminatory lending patterns should alarm the Trump administra-
tion. In the July 16, 2020, Hearing on Mortgage Relief During the Coronavirus 
Pandemic (C-SPAN, 2020i) she admonished the “Office of Comptroller [for] 
halt[ing] or stall[ing] at least six investigations into discriminatory mortgage 
redlining against the recommendations of their own career staff. This was the 
same time that the same agency was working to water down the CARES Act, 
which was supposed to protect against this type [of] discriminatory lending.” She 
pointed out that these practices target Blacks and Latinos. During her question-
ing, Rep. Beatty asked about the perpetuation of “the social and economic injus-
tices that African Americans and other minorities continue to face.” The CARES 
Act, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, is a $2.2 trillion 
economic relief bill seeking to directly respond to the economic fallout created 
by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the bill has drawn increased scrutiny 
as ethno-racial minorities did not receive the federal coronavirus relief funds.
Rep. William “Lacy” Clay (D-MO) used his time to address the racial and 
gender wealth gap during a hearing on Minority-Owned Businesses and Access 
to Financial Services During Pandemic on July 9, 2020 (C-SPAN, 2020g). In ad-
dressing minority-business owners, Rep. Clay stated that the “racial and gender 
wealth gap has been a persistent challenge for this country. It has increased over 
the past 50 years and limits the ability of would-be women and minority entre-
preneurs from starting new businesses.” Indeed, he uses statistics to advance a 
claim that “minorities are not as likely to have access to generational wealth and 
personal assets as a funding source of new business formation.” For Rep. Clay, 
the lack of generational wealth is an impediment to starting a minority-owned 
business — particularly during a pandemic.
Disaster relief as part of the Trump administration’s COVID-19 response left 
several things to be desired, according to Rep. Emmanuel Cleaver (D-MO). As he 
pressed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administrator Gaynor 
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during his July 22, 2020, testimony on the coronavirus response (C-SPAN, 2020j), 
Rep. Cleaver acknowledged FEMA’s attempts to address historic inequalities in 
disaster responses and empathized with the hard work of leading this bureau-
cratic agency: FEMA published a bulletin “entitled Ensuring Civil Rights During 
the COVID-19 response [that] emphasiz[ed] FEMA’s legal and moral obligation 
to deliver COVID-19 pandemic relief and disaster assistance to communities ir-
respective of race, color, religion, national origin, sex and so forth.” Rep. Cleaver 
pointedly asked, “[Is] the agency is doing enough of the right things that will 
reduce the disparity between the people of color who are disproportionately 
affected by the pandemic? What else can you do? Is there something that you 
should be addressing and sending to the public or those who are fighting this 
deadly disease?” Directing her comments to FEMA administrator Peter Thomas 
Gaynor, Rep. Cleaver sought to push the agency to go a step beyond acknowl-
edging its responsibilities to adhere to the civil rights of people who have expe-
rienced a disaster but also learn what other tangible and practical things FEMA 
could undertake to alleviate ethno-racial disparities.
TARGETED DISPARITIES: BLACK WOMEN
Rep. Ayanna Pressley was the only CBC member who distinctly spoke about the 
disparate impact of COVID-19 on Black women in the hearings collected for 
this sample. During the hearing on Minority-Owned Businesses and Access to 
Financial Services During Pandemic, which was held on July 9, 2020 (C-SPAN, 
2020g), Rep. Pressley pressed the Trump administration to disclose racial data 
on how federal funds have been allocated to help minority-owned businesses. 
She stated, “I appreciate the data on who received loans, but the data we need 
is on who didn’t receive the PPE [personal protective equipment] funding and 
who was denied.” Rep. Pressley framed these loan denials in racialized terms 
as part and parcel of the “exclusionary policies of past federal responses.” This 
path-dependent argument helped to highlight the “41% of Black businesses [that] 
have shuttered since the pandemic began.” In a more pointed analysis, Rep. Press-
ley shared that “experts estimated [that] 95% of Black women business owners 
would be left out of the funding.” Not having access to PPE funding and banking 
has left Black women disproportionately shouldering the burden of economic 
uncertainty, which has caused them to close their businesses.
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This attention to Black women by Rep. Pressley is further illustrated in her 
July 23, 2020, remarks during the Hearing on Economic Recovery During 
Cor onavirus Pandemic (C-SPAN, 2020k). She begins her comments with a 
broad and historical view of Black homeownership. She notes that the “2008 
financial crisis was a great depression level event for Black Americans, wip-
ing out decades of gains in Black homeownership, which [was at its] lowest 
rating since the passage of the 1968 Fair Housing Act.” This historical back-
ground was necessary contextualization for Pressley’s following remarks. She 
advanced that “by 2019, nearly 66% of Black households rented their homes” 
after the Great Recession where former Black homeowners became renters. In 
a plea of desperation, Rep. Pressley reminded her colleagues of the seriousness 
and implication of ending the unlimited eviction moratorium in which “30% 
of Americans . . . are staring down an unprecedented financial [crisis, and] the 
necessary urgency seems to be limited to this chamber.” She then pointedly 
asked, “As bluntly as possible, what is the economic impact of millions losing 
their housing all at once?”
Rep. Pressley quickly provided an answer to her own question. She said that 
“we know the burden will disproportionately fall on Black renters and Black 
women in particular.” In providing a contextual example by highlighting the 
experiences of her constituents, Rep. Pressley declared, “In my home state of 
Massachusetts, Black renters are almost two and a half times more likely to have 
an eviction filed against them, while Black women are three times as likely to 
have evictions filed against them that are ultimately dismissed — a stain that re-
mains on their credit report, nonetheless.” This pointed analysis of how Black 
women face disparate impacts of eviction was only discussed by a Black woman 
legislator. Rep. Pressley, unlike her peers in the CBC, presented a targeted por-
trayal of how the impending evictions of Black women will have lasting impli-
cations if the moratorium is lifted. She also cautioned lawmakers to think about 
renters who do not know their legal rights and may be intimidated by landlords. 
For Pressley, the likelihood that “neighborhoods of color, many who are renters, 
[even with the] Cares Act, still face legal eviction. How likely is [it] that renters 
will know their rights against landlords?” It is unlikely that a non-Black woman 
would have directly addressed the plight of Black women citizens. Previous re-
search demonstrates that it is imperative for deliberative bodies to have Black 
women lawmakers as they best represent the needs of Black women (Brown, 
2014; Brown & Gershon, 2017.)
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CONCLUSION
The government’s handling of COVID-19 is as much a public health concern 
as it is a political issue. The members of the Congressional Black Caucus use 
their role as representatives of Black America to call attention to how vulnera-
ble populations are disproportionately affected in a multitude of ways. During 
the congressional hearings and meetings on the pandemic, we learn that these 
lawmakers are steadfast in their advocacy for Blacks — and often other minority 
groups — that shoulder the burden of the disease and its varied social, economic, 
and political fallout. Members of the CBC highlight the antidemocratic practices 
of inequality, inequity, and injustice exacerbating the effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic on vulnerable populations. Our analysis speaks to the enduring na-
ture of racialized and gendered expectations in how legislators represent mar-
ginalized communities. Even in a time of a global financial crisis and health 
pandemic, we find that CBC members are steadfast in their advocacy for mar-
ginalized constituents.
Black women members of the CBC, however, differ from their Black male 
counterparts in their unyielding and resolute advocacy for marginalized groups. 
The Black women in our sample are more likely to speak during congressional 
hearings, and when they do so they are speaking about how the virus has im-
pacted Black communities. While the Black men in our sample recognize and 
rhetorically address ethno-racial-based disparities, they do not use specific ex-
amples or address particular minoritized groups in the ways that Black women 
lawmakers do. This distinct difference is born out in our qualitative data in which 
we demonstrate that Black women are speaking more often and with more speci-
ficity than their male colleagues. In unambiguous terms, the Black women of the 
CBC are arguing that the government should pay particular attention to how its 
COVID-19 responses may have unintended consequences for already marginal-
ized populations. As Rep. Jackson Lee (D-CA) noted, Black Americans are suf-
fering from a “pandemic within a pandemic,” and Rep. Ayanna Pressley (D-MA) 
pinpointed the disparate way that Black women are disadvantaged within this 
population. The statements of these Black women from the CBC show that they 
are indeed champions for democracy and are committed to holding the United 
States government accountable for meeting the needs of the American people 
during these times of distress.
Drawing primarily from Alvin Tillery’s (2019) research, we anticipated that 
women would be the most vocal proponents of racial issues within the CBC. 
994. TAlkIN’ AND TESTIFYING
Our analysis confirms this gendered difference in how the organization’s mem-
bers talk about race and exposed the nuances in how they rhetorically repre-
sent Black communities. While our statistical analysis is too small to show that 
gender is the best predictor of a CBC member’s discussion of the dispropor-
tionate impact of COVID-19 on Black communities, our qualitative analysis 
demonstrates this finding. By extensively showing how Black men and women 
differed in discussing the consequences of the pandemic, we illustrate the use-
fulness of a research design that embraces multiple methods (Shames & Wise, 
2017; Tripp & Hughes, 2018; Wineinger, 2019). Our multi-method study offers a 
dynamic view of how CBC members represent their constituents and the African 
American community on pandemic-related issues, particularly those related to 
the economy, health care, and underserved populations. It also aligns with pre-
vious research suggesting there is still fragmentation within the CBC regarding 
how members choose to symbolically represent their constituents and the Black 
community through rhetoric and legislative messaging about particular issues 
(Bositis, 1994; Singh, 1998; Tate, 2003, 2014; Tillery, 2011).
Future studies may do more to examine the gender differences among the 
CBC members and how this impacts the kinds of representation that they offer 
their constituents as well as Black communities outside of their districts. This ex-
amination would also allow scholars to better understand fragmentation in the 
current Congress. Because the coronavirus pandemic is ongoing, it is necessary 
to revisit this analysis in the coming months — and perhaps years — to assess the 
political effectiveness of the CBC members on issues of concern highlighted here. 
For instance, it is too early to tell whether the CBC was able to direct the govern-
ment’s response to coronavirus relief to include concerns and the material issues 
experienced by ethno-racial communities and other underserved populations.
NOTES
 1. C-SPAN (Producer). (2020, June 4). Centers for Disease Control director testi-
mony on coronavirus response [Video]. https://www.c-span.org/video/?472614-1 
/centers-disease-control-director-testimony-coronavirus-response
 2. CC transcripts were checked for typos, missing transcriptions, and other inac-
curacies using accompanying video.
 3. Intercoder reliability was calculated using 10% of the entire sample, producing 
an average agreement of 89%.
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APPENDIX A: HEARINGS EXCLUDED
House Rules Hearing on Coronavirus-Related Legislation (4/22/2020)
House Rules Hearing on Coronavirus Aid and Remote Voting by Proxy (5/14/2020)
Governors Polis, Whitmer and Hutchinson on Coronavirus Pandemic Response 
(6/2/2020)
House Hearing on Coronavirus Response and Drug Treatments (6/19/2020)
House Hearing on COVID-19 Vaccine Research and Development Efforts (7/21/2020)
House Hearing on the Impact of COVID-19 on Rural Economies (9/10/2020)
House Ways and Means Subcommittee Hearing on COVID Tax Legislation Inaction 
(9/11/2020)
House Hearing on Improving VA Medical Supply Chain Amid Coronavirus Pandemic 
(9/16/2020)
House Hearing on NASA Cybersecurity During Coronavirus Pandemic (9/18/2020)
House Hearing on Paycheck Protection Program Loan Forgiveness Process (9/25/2020)
106 DEMOCrACY AND THE MEDIA
APPENDIX B: REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDED
APPENDIX C: CODEBOOK
1. Date
2. Hearing ID #
3. Unique ID #
4. Member’s name
5. The purpose of hearing is to discuss any inequalities/disparities. (y/n)
6. The purpose of hearing is to specifically discuss racial inequalities/disparities. 
(y/n)
7. Procedural: Statements of no substantive value, directives guiding the conversa-
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Note: No participation in identified COVID-19-related hearings by Colin Allred, Ilhan Omar, 
and Anthony Brown. Deceased CBC members Elijah Cummings and John Lewis listed for the 
116th Congress. We include Cummings’s successor, Kwesi Mfume, elected May 2020. Lewis 
did not have a successor. Senator Timothy Scott and Representative William Hurd are Black 
Republicans not in the CBC.
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a. Examples of procedural statements: “Thank you. I yield”; “No further ques-
tions”; “Thank you for your service. I yield back”; “Representative Smith is 
recognized”; “Your time has expired”; “Dr. Smith?”; “Thank you. Dr. Smith?”; 
“Care to comment?”; “Thoughts?”; “Yes or no?”; “Reclaiming my time”; “An-
swer the question”; “Without objection”; “Point of order”; “Is your camera 
on?”; “Please unmute”; “We can’t see you.”
b. Example of a non-procedural statement: “The gentleman’s time has expired. 
But I would ask the gentleman to think about his question and put it in terms 
of crowds at political meetings at fundraisers without masks on an oil rig in 
Texas. Nobody wearing a mask at a fundraiser. Would that be problematic? 
With that, I yield five minutes to Mr. Foster.”
Issue Areas (categories are not mutually exclusive)
1. Health and available resources: COVID deaths/cases, health care access, access 
to testing, access to PPE, protecting vulnerable populations (essential workers/
front lines, prison populations, nursing homes, elderly minorities, etc.) (y/n)
2. Education: student relief, student support for online learning, colleges (y/n)
3. Housing and economics: PPP, loans, grants, unemployment, housing, rent, in-
come (y/n)
4. Racial injustice: Ahmaud Arbery, George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, discrimination, 
harassment, racial profiling, racialized environmental injustice, police brutality, 
systemic racism (y/n)
5. Response and oversight: Federal/state/local government and agency response 
and oversight (y/n)
Dependent Variables
1. All disparities: Specifically addresses a group or segment of the population expe-
riencing differential effects (y/n)
2. Racial disparities: Specifically references racial differences (y/n)
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TOEING THE LINE IN POLARIZED TIMES
Congressional Attacks on the Media
Carly Schmitt
D
ecember 10, 2016, marked the first time on Twitter that then-president-elect 
Trump attacked the media as reporting “fake news” (Borchers, 2018). 
Targeting CNN specifically (a favorite of Mr. Trump), he went after its 
reporting on whether he would continue his working relationship with The 
Apprentice. But attacking the media was not at all new for Mr. Trump. He was 
consistently criticizing the media for false reporting. And, going back to his early 
campaign days in 2015, one key element of Trump campaign rallies was to point 
at the press in the room and encourage the audience to boo and degrade them. 
He would also focus on specific reporters. If the president’s attacks on the me-
dia were relegated to just insults, then despite the vitriolic tone of his messages, 
democracy should be able to carry on and the Fourth Estate (the press) would 
be protected. Presidents have long been critical of the press, and, although the 
messaging and tactics are at the extreme, Mr. Trump’s dislike of the media is not 
in itself novel. However, President Trump used his office to retaliate against the 
press by denying access and benefits to journalists assigned to the White House, 
attempting to get reporters fired for negative coverage, and suggesting that his 
administration would pursue an agenda to ease up on libel laws so that he could 
sue news organizations, and he went directly after Jeff Bezos — a target of his from 
early in the campaign driven by the negative coverage in Bezos’s Washington 
Post — by having the executive branch look into postal rates for Amazon (West, 
2018). Further, the attacks on the press have mounted into an all-out campaign 
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to challenge the media’s credibility. These attacks extend beyond just cheap 
talk — they threaten the health of democracy.
It is unclear whether President Trump’s agenda to take down the press was 
limited to the president himself, or if it transcended more broadly into American 
politics. To assess this, I explore whether members of Congress (MCs) use their 
political offices to take on or guard the Fourth Estate. Looking at the time pe-
riod from January 2011 to November 2020 (112th–116th Congresses), I empir-
ically assess the extent to which legislators criticize, attack, are supportive of, 
or merely neutrally mention the press in their statements on the floor of the 
United States House of Representatives. My findings indicate that although MCs 
of both parties do engage in partisan behavior in their critiques and support of 
the press, Republicans in the House increased their attacks on the press follow-
ing the 2016 election.
This study offers insight into normative considerations on the health of our 
democracy. If MCs, unlike the president, are not using the tools of their elec-
tive offices to attack the media, then this bodes well for the Fourth Estate and 
democracy at large. Here, efforts to denigrate and limit freedom of the press are 
limited to a single individual: President Trump. If, however, MCs are following 
in the footsteps of the executive, then this raises questions about the preserva-
tion of First Amendment rights. Although segments of the citizenry might be 
eager to engage in the takedown of the press, it is up to our elected leaders to 
preserve it. Freedom of the press is a cornerstone of democracy, and without it 
democracy is threatened.
POLARIZATION, TRUMP, AND THE “FAKE NEWS” MEDIA
In 2015, the amplified levels of polarization in the modern political climate pro-
vided a ripe opportunity for then-candidate Trump to target the press. With 
Democrats and Republicans more homogenous than ever and partisan conflicts 
more exaggerated (Abramowitz, 2011; Levendusky, 2009), the divide between 
the parties has led to polarization along cultural, racial, social, geographic, and 
religious lines (Mason, 2018; Sides et al., 2018). Today, individuals face fewer 
cross-pressures when it comes to partisanship as their various identities now 
work in concert together to reinforce views. Because of this, voters are not more 
ideological, but instead they now have socially linked identities that have evolved 
into “mega identities” that impact the way they see themselves and those like 
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them (their party, the in-group) and those not like them (the other party, the 
out-group) (Mason, 2018). Socially and culturally homogenous parties consist-
ing of fewer individuals with cross-pressures leads to a strong sense of us versus 
them in contemporary political life. Today, this is what is driving the growth of 
hostility and intolerance between the two political parties. As a result, disagree-
ments between parties are not necessarily over public policy, but rather about 
winning and defeating the other (Mason, 2018).
Then-candidate Trump tapped into this heightened sense of polarization in 
his attacks on the press by framing the press as his nemesis. By pointing to the 
media as the enemy, the fake news, President Trump has been able to create 
another out-group for his supporters that extends beyond party, one in which 
cannot be believed or trusted. White House chief strategist Steve Bannon even 
went so far to label the press, not necessarily Democrats, as the “opposition 
party” (West, 2018). This divide is evident, for example, in the public’s view on 
the role of the media in checking the power of political leaders. In 2013, for ex-
ample, 69% of Republicans and 67% of Democrats agreed that the media serves 
as a watchdog over political leaders (Pew Research Center, 2013). In 2019 this 
gap widened, with 82% of Democrats believing that it is the media’s role, while 
only 50% of Republicans agreed with this statement (Gottfried et al., 2019). But, 
over the course of his presidency, approval and trust in the media was also 
tied to views on President Trump himself, as evident by the divides within the 
Republican Party. In this same 2019 poll, 42% of Republicans that were strong 
Trump supporters agreed that the media’s criticisms of political leaders aids in 
keeping them in check, while 71% of Republicans that did not approve of the 
president’s performance in office believed that it does. Undoubtedly, President 
Trump’s attacks on the press are driving these divides within the Republican 
Party by creating an us versus them mentality that maps on to the polarized na-
ture of American politics today.
Nevertheless, President Trump’s consistent assaults on the press could be 
chalked up to the typical behavior of presidents when faced with an unfriendly 
press. As is well documented, the media was no friend to President Clinton in 
the 1990s. Between the sexual misconduct with an intern coming to light, perjury 
charges, and the House-appointed special prosecutor, President Clinton was in 
the middle of a media storm for a good deal of his presidency. But however un-
happy he was with the press and its coverage, President Clinton did not wage a 
war and claim any unflattering coverage as fake news. If we go further back into 
history, there are plenty of examples of presidents calling out the media publicly 
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and admonishing them. As recalled by the late Katharine Graham (1998), at the 
1964 Republican National Convention former president Eisenhower gave a speech 
“in which he attacked newspaper columnists [and] convention-goers through-
out the entire hall started booing the press. Eisenhower’s theme was taken up by 
every other speaker” (pp. 357–358). However, no modern president since Nixon 
has engaged in an ongoing, consistent attack on the press to the level of President 
Trump. 1 The Committee to Protect Journalists (2020), a highly respected inter-
national nonprofit organization, contends in a recent report that the Trump ad-
ministration’s “most effective ploy [in hurting the press] has been to destroy the 
credibility of the press, dangerously undermining truth and consensus.”
CONGRESS AND THE PRESS
Although the media do not provide a daily accounting of the activities of MCs 
as with the president, the media serve a vital role for both constituents at home 
and for MCs themselves. Voters rely on the media for information about what 
their elected representatives are doing, and MCs are not only aware of this but 
also modify their legislative activity — from what bills they introduce to what 
they say on the floor of Congress — because of it (Arnold, 2004). As Iowa Repre-
sentative Steve King (R) stated in a floor statement in the 112th Congress, “bring 
the press into the [congressional] hearings because the press helps us a lot; they 
convey that message back to the American people” (C-SPAN, 2011).
In addition, journalists rely on MCs as sources for stories and thus need 
to maintain working relationships with legislators. In turn, legislators rely on 
journalists to cover their legislative activity — both national and local news orga-
nizations (Arnold, 2004). More recently, MCs have professionalized their com-
munications offices and have used their relationships with the press to attract 
media attention to shape their reelection prospects and influence public policy 
(Vinson, 2017). Nevertheless, despite the long-standing relationship between 
the press and those in Congress — which at times is mutually beneficial, but 
also MCs can find themselves at odds with the press in light of less than desir-
able coverage — the political climate around the role of the press and their cred-
ibility shifted during the 2016 election. In January 2017, as new and returning 
members of the U.S. House headed into Washington, D.C., did Republicans in 
Congress toe the new party line on the fake news media?
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With President Trump’s focus on the press as the enemy, and his support-
ers falling in line with this message, we should expect Republicans in public life 
across the country to take their cues from the president in their efforts to appeal 
to their party base and, in the case of congressional members, appease the new 
leader of their party. Research on rhetorical strategies indicates that the presi-
dent often sets the tone on how issues are discussed, particularly during divided 
times. For example, as Coe and Bradshaw (2014) note “even absent war, speeches 
[by presidents] focused on the world abroad might contribute to an ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ mentality that could encourage journalists — consciously or not — to take 
steps to defend the in-group” (p. 277). Similarly, American politics has become 
an us versus them narrative and, for Mr. Trump, the press is the “them.” Given 
this, we should expect that Republicans will take up the president’s rhetorical 
strategy and echo the president’s sentiments on the press.
There is evidence that Republicans from all levels of government have taken a 
page from Mr. Trump’s book. During the global COVID-19 pandemic, for exam-
ple, when asked about a coronavirus hot spot in Jasper County, Illinois, a county 
board member disputed the state’s counts and said that the reporters covering 
the pandemic were “socialists, liberals, and communists” (Earley, 2020). In pub-
lic interviews and on social media, Republican elected officials have taken the 
term “fake news” and have used it freely when talking about the press, even in 
local newspapers (Hutchins, 2017).
I expect that prior to the arrival of President Trump into office, Republicans 
in the U.S. House of Representatives were more critical of, and engage in more 
attacks on, the press as compared to Democrats, as the media has long been crit-
icized by Republicans as being politically biased. However, once Mr. Trump ar-
rived into the White House in 2017, I anticipate that Republicans responded to 
his growing calls to attack the media and its credibility, and that they did so in 
their legislative activity. After the 2016 election, these attacks should be most 
likely for Republican MCs from districts with high levels of Trump support, as 
Republican MCs seek to appeal to their party base, Trump strongholds, as they 
echo the rhetoric of the president. In the wake of growing attacks on the press by 
the president and the Republican Party, I expect that Democrats increased their 
level of support for the media in their legislative activity in response to this new 
dimension of polarization between the parties. Here, Democrats in Congress 
likely set out to support the press as the president’s claims of fake news were 
largely as a response to negative news coverage of him.
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DATA
To explore whether MCs use their offices to take on or perhaps guard the Fourth 
Estate, I utilize data on the legislative activity of legislators in the U.S. House of 
Representatives from the 112th–116th Congresses (January 2011 through Novem-
ber 2020). 2 With these data I empirically assess the extent to which legislators 
use their floor statements to criticize, attack, defend, or simply mention the me-
dia and/or its news coverage. Individual MCs have a number of legislative tools 
to engage in position-taking and affect policy change, and floor statements are 
ideal activities for studying legislative behavior in the U.S. Congress. Although 
MCs do not have control over whether a bill comes up for a roll call vote, they 
do have control over what they say on the floor of the U.S. House. Floor state-
ments provide the opportunity for legislators to discuss their policy positions 
and priorities. In doing so, members engage in position-taking (Mayhew, 1974). 
Given the size of the U.S. House, speaking time on the floor of the House is con-
strained. Members do have the opportunity for five-minute floor speeches during 
scheduled morning hour and, at times, during one-minute time periods out-
side of debate on legislation. Party leaders have often encouraged members to 
use floor time to pursue the party agenda (Harris, 2005), and one of President 
Trump’s key agenda items was to take down the press.
Using the C-SPAN Video Library, I coded the content of all mentions of the 
“press,” “media,” and/or “fake news” during the 112th–116th Congresses (January 
2011 through November 2020) to gauge whether congressional attacks and de-
fenses of the press may have shifted in response to President Trump’s rhetoric 
and executive actions. Included are the floor statements of MCs that were pres-
ent the entire length of a given Congress, and omitted are the statements of those 
that resigned, died, or were appointed/elected after the start of a given Congress. 3 
Each floor statement that included one, two, or all three of these key words are 
included in the data set. The focus is exclusively on a legislator referencing the 
activity or action of the media in general, a particular news organization(s) and/
or journalist(s), or the mention of freedom of the press as a constitutional right. 
This latter aspect is important to include because upholding this foundational 
right is critical to the survival of democracy. Excluded from the data set are floor 
statements whose use of these terms are not focused on journalists, news organi-
zations, reported stories, or the like. For example, references to “press releases” or 
“media events” in relation to governmental actors such as the president or party 
leaders in Congress are not included in the data set. In addition, the term “fake 
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news” is used by MCs not only to describe the media and its reporting but also 
to attack the actions and statements of the president and members of Congress 
(e.g., “what the president said he is going to do is fake news”). Only those state-
ments with a focus on the press itself are included in the data set.
Table 5.1 shows the number of times the press is discussed in floor statements 
in the U.S. House. Overall, there are 1,735 floor statements that use the terms 
“media,” “press,” and/or “fake news” in these Congresses. The 113th and 115th 
Congresses consist of the most floor statements with these mentions, 397 and 
419, respectively. Across all Congresses, MCs use the term “media” when dis-
cussing the press far more than “press” or “fake news.” Referencing the media 
as “fake news” does not emerge until the third day of the 115th Congress. Here, 
Representative Lamar Smith (R-TX) said, “You may have heard about this new 
phenomenon called fake news. Fake news usually consists of false and made-up 
stories. Actually, it’s not new and has been around as long as there have been me-
dia” (C-SPAN, 2017). In total, there are 29 instances of MCs using this term in 
their floor statements when referencing the press in this Congress, but this drops 
substantially in the 116th Congress (as of November 2020) to just 6 floor state-
ments. Across Congresses, there are 60 floor statements where members discuss 
the press as both “media” and “press,” 15 floor statements where members use 
both “media” and “fake news,” 1 instance in which an MC uses all three terms 
in his floor statement, and no instances where “press” and “fake news” are used.
Next, I coded the tone of floor statements. I created four categories that re-
flect whether the statement is critical of the press, attacks the press, supports the 
press, or is neutral toward the press. A critical tone toward the media is when 
TABLE 5.1 Number of Floor Statements With “Media,” “Press,” and/or  
“Fake News” Mentions by Congress
Congress Media Press Fake news Total
112th 190 156 0 346
113th 223 174 0 397
114th 173 105 0 278
115th 255 141 23 419
116th (as of 11/20) 198 91 6 295
Total 1,039 667 29 1,735
Note: Data show the number of floor statements in the U.S. House with MCs using the terms 
“media,” “press,” and “fake news” in the 112th–116th Congresses (through November 2020).
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MCs disparage the coverage or lack of coverage in the press on a particular story 
or issue, or express disappointment in the media. Here, legislators may be dis-
approving of the press or its coverage, but there is no outward aggressiveness 
or name-calling. Most often, MCs criticize the press for not covering particular 
stories they think are important, or are critical of aspects of a story that the me-
dia does cover. Alternatively, floor statements that attack the press include any 
statement that engages in name-calling or is outwardly aggressive. As an illus-
tration of this difference we can look at two examples from the 112th Congress. 
When discussing the SMART Port Security Act, Representative Laura Richardson 
(D-CA) was critical of media coverage of the U.S. Congress and said, “At a time 
when media reports assume that Congress doesn’t work together, I’m pleased to 
note that I’ve been able to work with Chairwoman Miller and the Committee in 
a bipartisan fashion” (C-SPAN, 2012b). In contrast, Representative Joe Wilson 
(R-SC) attacked the press and their reporting on the Obama administration by 
contending that “the biased liberal media can no longer conceal the truth of the 
president’s failed policies” (C-SPAN, 2012a). 4
Floor statements that are supportive of the press and the media vary in context. 
Here, MCs may express support for the freedom of the press as a constitutional 
right or the press as whole, or support or praise for a particular story, journalist, or 
news organization. As an example of the latter, Representative Pete Olson (R-TX) 
contends that “there is no America without a free local press” (C-SPAN, 2020). 
Included are statements made in the context of both domestic and international 
media/press. Floor statements that are supportive of the press in other countries are 
almost exclusively framed as a constitutional right, as in the case of Representative 
Hank Johnson (D-GA) in his floor statement on the Egyptian government detain-
ing journalists: “[The Egyptian people] have made it clear their choice is one of 
democracy and freedom, and for those goals to be achieved, freedom of the press 
and freedom of speech must respected and promoted” (C-SPAN, 2014).
The final category is neutral statements. These statements are centered on the 
instances in which members mention a press story, news coverage, news orga-
nization, or journalist but do not have an assessment or tone associated with 
the content. Most often MCs use a particular story or event covered in the me-
dia as a reference point in discussing a particular issue or piece of legislation.
Because of the House rules on limited floor time, most floor statements are 
uncomplicated to code — statements are concise and focused on a particular is-
sue, and the tone remains consistent. But one issue that does emerge when cod-
ing floor statements it that sometimes MCs discuss the media in multiple ways. 
For statements that contain both critical tone and attacks, I coded the statements 
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as attacks. For statements that contain both supportive and critical mentions, 
I coded the statement on the overall tone and whether the press is framed in a 
negative (critical or attack), positive (supportive), or neutral way. Nevertheless, 
coding for tone becomes tricky for lengthier floor statements that discuss the 
media, press, or fake news in different ways. Given this, there are a limited num-
ber of floor statements that are coded with more than one tone.
Table 5.2 shows the number of floor statements by tone and Congress. There 
are a total of 1,688 floor statements, with 46 that have two or more different tones. 
Across Congresses, the bulk (51%) of references to the media/press/fake news are 
neutral in tone. The data also indicate that legislators are more apt to be critical of 
the press than to be supportive. In the 113th and 116th Congresses this difference 
is most pronounced with double (94 compared to 43) in the former and nearly 
double (72 compared to 41) in the latter. In general, MCs tend to attack the me-
dia less than they criticize it (206 compared to 386). But following the 2016 elec-
tion, MCs in the 115th Congress were close in their number of criticisms (87) and 
attacks (75). Notably, this Congress also shows the highest number (59) of floor 
statements that are supportive of the press. What these data do not show is who is 
doing the attacking and supporting — Democrats, Republicans, or a mix of both.
IS THERE A “TRUMP EFFECT”?
Because I contend that there are partisan motivations behind how MCs discuss 
the press in their floor activity, I aggregated the number of floor statements that 
are critical, attacking, neutral, and supportive of the media for each House mem-
ber in each Congress. Then, I developed four dichotomous dependent variables 
TABLE 5.2 Tone of Floor Statements by Congress
Congress Critical Attack Neutral Support Total
112th 74 20 192 49 335
113th 94 34 220 43 391
114th 58 30 146 39 273
115th 87 75 179 59 400
116th (as of 11/20) 72 47 129 41 289
Total 386 206 865 231 1,688
Note: Data show the number of floor statements by tone in the U.S. House in the 112th–116th 
Congresses (through November 2020).
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that indicate whether MCs, in at least one floor statement in each Congress, are 
critical, engage in an attack, are supportive, or use a neutral statement in refer-
ence to the press. The unit of analysis is the individual MC in a Congress, and 
MCs appear in the data set for as many Congresses as they serve full terms.
Table 5.3 shows the number of MCs in each Congress who are critical, make an 
attack, are neutral, or support the press, separated by party. Overall, Republican 
MCs are more critical of the press than Democratic MCs. Fifteen percent of 
Republican legislators (172) are critical in at least one floor statement during this 
time frame, but less than half (7%) as many Democratic legislators (70) engage 
in such rhetoric (t = 5.94, p < .01). This same pattern emerges for attacks on the 
press. Whereas 59 (5%) Republican MCs attack the press in a floor statement, 
only 9 (less than 1%) of their Democratic colleagues do so (t = 5.67, p < .01). There 
is no difference in the tendency for Republican and Democratic MCs to discuss 
the press in a neutral way (a total of 270 and 236, respectively), nor is there a 
partisan difference in the level of statements of support (79 and 83, respectively).
To more closely examine whether there is a “Trump effect” in the tendency for 
Republicans to be critical of or attack the press on the one hand, and Democrats 
to perhaps be more supportive on the other, the next step was to look at the 
partisan differences in floor statements before and after the 2016 election of 
President Trump. Here, I compare the mean level of Republican and Democratic 
MCs with floor statements that are critical of, made an attack on, are neutral 
toward, or are supportive of the media during the time in which Obama is 
president (2013–2016/112th–114th Congresses) and when Trump is president 
TABLE 5.3 Number of MCs Making Floor Statements on Press by Tone, Party, and Congress
Critical Attack Neutral Support
Congress reps Dems reps Dems reps Dems reps Dems
112th 33 21 10 0 55 48 13 20
113th 40 12 9 3 66 49 18 10
114th 25 18 6 1 57 41 20 9
115th 39 14 12 4 49 57 10 28
116th (as of 11/20) 35 5 22 1 43 41 18 16
Total 172 70 59 9 270 236 79 83
Note: Data show the number of members of the U.S. House of Representatives who made at least 
one floor statement that was critical of, attacked, was neutral toward, or was supportive of press 
in the 112th–116th Congresses (through November 2020).
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(2017–2020/115th–116th Congresses). Although then-candidate Trump was run-
ning for election in 2015/2016 and his anti-press rhetoric was a critical part of the 
campaign, Mr. Trump was not yet the leader of his party, with many Republicans 
outright rejecting candidate Trump and his brand of politics. 5 Thus, falling in 
line with Mr. Trump even during the height of the 2016 election/114th Congress 
was not necessarily the norm among Republicans in Congress at this time. Thus, 
I group the 114th Congress with the other Obama Congresses.
Figure 5.1 presents the mean level of legislators in Obama Congresses and 
Trump Congresses who are critical of, make an attack on, are neutral toward, 
or are supportive of the press in at least one floor statement in a given Congress, 
separated by Republican and Democratic House members. Republicans were 
not more critical of the press during the Trump presidency, but they were more 
likely to attack the press during this time. When President Obama was in of-
fice (112th–114th Congresses), an average of less than 4% of Republican MCs 
in the House attack the press, but this doubles to 7% when President Trump 
took office (115th–116th Congresses; t = −3.27, p < .01). Republican MCs were 
no more or less likely to be supportive of or neutral toward the press during the 
Obama Congresses compared to the Trump Congresses. It would seem, then, 
that Republican MCs upped their attacks on the press during the Trump era as 
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TONE OF FLOOR STATEMENTS IN OBAMA AND TRUMP CONGRESSES BY POLITICAL PARTY
FIGURE 5.1 Tone of floor statements in Obama and Trump Congresses by political party. Data represent the percentage of 
republican and Democratic MCs with a floor statement that is critical of, attacks, is neutral toward, or is supportive of the 
media in the Obama-era Congresses and the Trump-era Congresses.
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A different pattern emerges for Democratic legislators. During the Obama 
presidency, Democrats in the House were more critical of the press than they 
were in the Trump era — 9% compared to 4% (t = 2.73, p < .01). At the same time, 
Democrats advanced their support of the media in their floor statements more 
during the Trump Congresses than during the Obama Congresses — 10% com-
pared to 7% (t = −1.99, p < .05). Attacks on the press and floor statements with 
neutral references were unchanging over time.
Together, these findings indicate that critiques and support of the press is a par-
tisan affair. Across Congresses, Republicans are more critical and attack the press 
to a larger degree than do their Democratic colleagues. There is evidence that as 
President Trump took office, members of both parties in the U.S. House may have 
been responsive to his agenda to take on the press. Republicans in the House in-
creased attacks on the press in the 115th and 116th Congresses. Democrats, on the 
other hand, were not only less critical of the press in the Trump-era Congresses 
but also more supportive during this time. Nevertheless, these results could be a 
function of perhaps MCs being more critical of (or, in the case of Republicans, 
more willing to attack) the media when the president is of the same party.
PREDICTING THE TONE OF FLOOR STATEMENTS
To more fully investigate what is driving these divides, I developed two sets of 
models that predict the tone of floor statements for Republicans and Democrats 
in the U.S. House based on the results of the difference in the means tests above. 6 
For Republicans MCs, I created two multivariate models that predict whether 
they engage in an attack on the press in at least one floor statement in a given 
Congress, separated by Obama Congresses (112th–114th Congresses) and Trump 
Congresses (115th–116th Congresses). I expect that Republican MCs from dis-
tricts with higher levels of Trump support should be more likely to fall in line 
with the president’s attacks on the media. District Pres Vote is a measure of the 
percent Republican presidential vote share in each congressional district. In the 
Trump Congresses (115th–116th Congresses/2017–2020) this is the Trump vote 
share. In the Obama Congresses this is the percent Romney vote share for the 
113th–114th Congresses (2013–2017) and the percent McCain vote share for the 
112th Congress (2011–2013). Included in the models is a variable for MCs’ own 
vote share in the previous election (General Vote Share). Vulnerable legislators, 
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particularly those in the Trump era, might take out their precarious electoral 
fortunes on the press, as President Trump often did.
In order to rule out whether any increase in attacks on the press were a func-
tion of enhanced polarization in Congress along ideological grounds rather than 
the emergence of President Trump, I used DW-NOMINATE scores (Lewis et al., 
2020). Here, congressional roll call votes are scaled to create a measure of ide-
ology for members of the U.S. Congress for their tenure in Congress. This vari-
able ranges from 1 (most conservative) to −1 (most liberal). I also incorporate a 
variable (Freshman) that indicates whether the MC is new in a given Congress, 
as it could be, for example, that the 2016 election brought with it a new class 
of Republican MCs in the 115th Congress that were eager to take on the me-
dia as they rode the president’s coattails into Congress. Finally, in the Trump 
Congresses, there is a change in the majority party, with Republicans losing con-
trol of the House in the 116th Congress. The variable Majority Party is an indica-
tor of whether the MC was in the majority party (the 115th Congress). If there is a 
significant effect for this variable in the Trump-era Congresses, then this would 
indicate that Republicans’ attacks on the media are larger or smaller when their 
party controls both the U.S. House and the White House.
The results in Table 5.4 show the models predicting whether Republican MCs 
engaged in at least one attack on the press in a given Congress in their floor state-
ments during the Obama Congresses and Trump Congresses. Here, we see that 
the Republican presidential vote share had no effect on whether MCs attacked 
the press before President Trump took office. However, following the 2016 elec-
tion, Republican MCs from districts with higher levels of Trump support at-
tacked the press more frequently. Taking a closer look at this, I estimated the 
predicted probabilities. Setting all variables at their means, the likelihood of at-
tacking the press in a floor statement for Republican MCs in Trump Congresses 
is 4%. Keeping all the remaining variables at their means, if we look at the like-
lihood of attacking the press in a floor statement for those from districts where 
Trump received 50.5% (one standard deviation below the mean level of district 
Trump support), then this drops to around 2%. For those from districts with 
higher levels of support for Trump, 67.1% (one standard deviation above the 
mean), the probability of attacking the press in their floor activity jumps to over 
9%. Given that such effects are not present in pre-Trump Congresses, this sug-
gests a “Trump effect” emerging for Republicans in Congress after controlling 
for other factors that could be driving the results.
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The results also indicate that MCs’ own electoral vulnerability impacts whether 
they attacked the press in the Trump era. Again, when all variables are set at 
their means, the predicted probability of Republicans attacking the media in 
their floor statements during Trump Congresses is 4%. The mean level of gen-
eral election vote for Republican legislators during this time is 63.2% with a stan-
dard deviation of 10.2%. If we estimate the likelihood of electorally vulnerable 
MCs (those with one standard deviation below the mean, 52.9) attacking the 
press, the probability triples from 4% to nearly 14%. This effect is not present in 
the Obama Congresses and suggests an indirect effect from the 2016 election 
and President Trump: electorally insecure Republican MCs attack/discredit the 
media as a mechanism to shore up support for the next election or place blame 
for their poor performance in the previous election.
Unsurprisingly, conservative House members across both models are more 
likely to attack the press. The results also suggest that Republican MCs do not vary 
in their attacks on the media when they are the majority or minority. Over all, the 
TABLE 5.4 Predicting Republican Attacks on the Press
Obama Congresses (112th–114th) Trump Congresses (115th–116th)



























Pseudo r2 .09 .14
Note: The unit of analysis is the individual Republican member of Congress in a given Congress. 
The dependent variable is an indicator of whether an MC made at least one floor statement 
that attacked the media in a given Congress during Obama-era Congresses and Trump-era 
Congresses. The table shows the coefficients and standard errors from logit models. Standard 
errors are clustered by MC.
**p < .01 ; *p < .05.
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Trump Congresses model explains variation on the dependent variable better than 
the Obama Congresses model, with an adjusted R2 of .14 and .09, respectively.
For Democrats, I developed multivariate models that predict whether MCs 
are critical or are supportive of the press in at least one floor statement in a given 
Congress separated by Obama Congresses (112th–114th) and Trump Congresses 
(115th–116th). I used the same set of variables as in the Republican models, though 
District Pres Vote is the Democratic presidential vote share from the previous pres-
idential election. In the Trump Congresses (115th–116th Congresses/2017–2020) 
this is the district percent Clinton vote share. In the Obama Congresses (112th–
114th/2011–2017) this is the district percent Obama vote.
The models predicting support for press (Table 5.5) suggest that support for 
the press among Democrats in the U.S. House does not vary with presidential 























































N 571 425 571 425
Pseudo r2 .03 .05 .04 .12
Note: The unit of analysis is the individual Democratic member of Congress in a given Congress. 
The dependent variables are indicators of whether an MC made at least one floor statement that 
was (1) supportive or (2) critical of the media in a given Congress during Obama-era Congresses 
and Trump-era Congresses. The table shows the coefficients and standard errors from logit 
models. Standard errors are clustered by MC.
**p < .01 ; *p < .05 ; #p < .15.
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electoral support or MCs’ own electoral fortunes. The only variable that appears 
to exert an effect on how supportive MCs are of the media is in the Trump 
Congresses. Here, when Democrats are in the minority in the U.S. House, the 
115th Congress, the probability of supporting the press in a floor statement is 
around 5% higher than when they are in the minority, the 116th Congress (12% 
and 7% respectively). This may be a result of the Democrats in Congress react-
ing to the recent election of President Trump and the emergence of his fake news 
agenda, it could be a function of differing strategies that Democrats use during 
their floor time when they are in the majority compared to when they are in the 
minority, or it could be a function of the incomplete data for the 116th Congress 
(and thus fewer data points).
The models predicting Democratic criticism of the press suggests a partisan 
dimension. While President Obama was in office, Democratic legislators from 
districts with higher levels of Obama support are more critical of the press, as 
are those who are electorally marginal. However, there are no such effects in the 
Trump Congresses. This is the same pattern discussed above for Republican leg-
islators’ attacks on the press when the president is from their party. With all vari-
ables at their means during the Obama Congresses, estimates of the predicted 
probabilities indicate that 8% of Democratic MCs engage in at least one critical 
floor statement in a given Congress during this time. For those from districts 
whose support for Obama is one standard deviation below the mean level of sup-
port (54.3%), the likelihood of criticizing the media decreases to 4%. For those 
from districts with high levels of support for Obama, estimated at one standard 
deviation above the mean level of support (77.5), the probability of criticizing 
the press in at least one floor statement increases to 15%.
Further, vulnerable Democrats, those receiving one standard deviation be-
low the mean level of general election vote share (53.98%), also have a 15% like-
lihood of criticizing the press in a floor statement during Obama Congresses — a 
nearly 7% increase over the average Democrat in the House. During the Trump 
Congresses, criticisms of the press by Democrats are driven by ideology, new 
members, and when MCs are in the minority in the House (the 115th Congress). 
Whereas there is a 7% likelihood of the average freshman Democratic MC during 
the Trump-era Congresses criticizing the press, there is less than a 3% likeli-
hood for their colleagues that returned for another term in Congress to do so. 
In the 116th Congresse, when Democrats took control of the House, they were 
nearly 5% more likely to criticize the media in their floor statements than in 
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the 115th Congress when they were in the minority (6% compared to just under 
2%). As discussed above, this could be a function of strategic considerations by 
Democrats after the 2016 election, patterns of behavior of legislators when in 
the minority party, or simply a function of an incomplete data set in the 116th 
Congress. 7
CONCLUSION
My findings indicate that Republicans and Democrats both engage in partisan 
behavior in regard to how they discuss the press in their floor statements in the 
U.S. House. When the president is from their party, Democrats are more crit-
ical, and Republicans attack the press more. This latter result, though, is likely 
more a function of Trump-style politics: attacking the press to take down its 
credibility and delegitimatize negative coverage. At the same time, Democrats 
increased their supportive statements of the press in the 115th Congress imme-
diately following the 2016 election, in no doubt to combat the emergence of the 
fake news media narrative.
Given this, there is reason to be concerned about the extent to which Repub-
lican MCs have toed the party line in recent Congresses. The uptick in attacks 
on the press is in no doubt a function of an emergence of the media not just as 
a troublesome force but as the enemy, with its credibility thrown to the wind. 
This leaves room to sow the seeds of doubt for citizens about the media and the 
news stories for which they come across. If, in fulfilling their role as a govern-
ment watchdog, the press reports stories and the public does not believe them, 
then accountability for nefarious officeholders will fall to the wayside. This is 
does not bode well for democracy. Nevertheless, the results suggest that attacks 
on the press may have been more present in the 115th Congress as compared the 
116th Congress. Perhaps, then, the uptick in attacks were an immediate reaction 
to the Trump era and such attacks are subsiding.
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NOTES
 1. Snyder (2017) argues that President Trump’s attacks on the press even reach be-
yond the scope of Nixon’s.
 2. The official end of the 116th Congress is January 2021.
 3. In the data set, there are 425 MCs in the 112th and 113th Congresses, 429 in the 
114th and 116th Congresses, and a low of 423 in the 115th Congress.
 4. Attacks on the media are a bipartisan affair on the floor of the U.S. House, with 
Republicans attacking the “liberal” media and, though less so, Democrats at-
tacking the “right wing” media.
 5  Indeed, in a December 2015 interview with CNN, Senator Lindsey Graham 
(R-SC) called then candidate Trump a “race-baiting, xenophobic religious bigot.” 
He further stated that “he [Trump] doesn’t represent my party” (CNN, 2015).
 6. Only models predicting the dependent variables for which the difference in 
means tests indicate a significant difference between Obama Congresses and 
Trump Congresses are analyzed.
 7. Nevertheless, the models overall perform rather poorly. In the Trump Con-
gresses’ critical model, however, the pseudo-R2 is higher, as it it appears that 
ideologically extreme MCs, new members, and the 115th Congress are driving 
the results.
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6
CONGRESS AS COMEDY AUDIENCE
A Discursive Analysis of Late-Night Comedy 
Cited in Congressional Debates
Stephanie Brown
O
n February 15, 2012, Jeff Merkley, the junior Democratic senator represent-
ing Oregon, took to the floor to contribute to the debate on a highway 
infrastructure bill. Speaking in opposition to a proposed amendment that 
would give employers the right to impose their beliefs about health care cover-
age on their employees, he recounted a bit from The Daily Show to illustrate his 
belief in the absurdity of the policy:
There’s some interesting humor on this on late-night television. I believe it 
was Jon Stewart’s show, The Daily Show, in which he said, “You know, in my 
business, I happen to think that humor is the best medicine. So I’m 
going to impose a health care bill or a health care policy on all of the 
folks who work for me that says if you get sick, you have to go to a 
comedian for therapy or have to read a joke book.” (C-SPAN, 2012)
While congressional policy debates are a consequential and important aspect of 
our deliberative democracy, members of Congress use their floor time not only 
to take part in serious debate but also to build camaraderie, lighten the mood, 
connect with colleagues and constituents, garner favor, brand themselves, and 
create moments of spectacle that are more likely to be circulated across media 
outlets. Congressional debates are rife with examples of humor, cheeky posters, 
and hyperbolic rhetoric. Not just a site of state power, congressional debates are 
a unique “public nested within the state” (Brouwer, 2001, p. 92) in which those 
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elected to represent us deliberate, often colorfully, over the pressing issues of our 
democracy. If we understand policy as a process in which the “rhetorical texts 
of public controversy incorporate discourses circulating in different places and 
at different times” (Keremidchieva, 2013, p. 139), then it’s useful to understand 
not just the humor and playful rhetoric of these debates, but specifically how 
the arguments and bits circulated by late-night comedians are incorporated into 
policymaking.
My work as a feminist cultural studies and media scholar has centered broadly 
on the intersection of identity, power, and popular culture. I’ve done work on sat-
ire and activism; specifically, how satirical television frames protests and activ-
ists and how satire itself may or may not function as a kind of activism. In other 
words, I tend to focus on how satirists push back against power and the state or 
how they cover citizens pushing back against power and the state. But for this 
project I wanted to explore whether and how those in power, who are often the 
targets of satirists and activists, invoke satirical discourses. This question also in-
tersects with my research on fandom and reception studies, two fields that tend 
to frame audiences of satirical television in terms of citizens, activists, or “reg-
ular” viewers. In this sense, I’m interested in how politicians, specifically mem-
bers of Congress, function simultaneously as the subjects of satirical television 
and as audiences or fans of satirical television.
Scholars have theorized how satirical television affects the political views 
and participation of citizens, reflects the current cultural moment, and pushes 
back against those in power, but few have theorized how those in power func-
tion as audiences of satirical television. Members of Congress, like all of us, like 
to laugh and are fans of popular culture, but we, understandably, don’t tend to 
theorize them as fans. Similarly, scholars have consistently found that satirists 
shape audience discourse around politicians and leaders (Young, 2020, p. 182), 
but how do satirists shape politicians’ discourse about themselves? After con-
ducting a discourse analysis of C-SPAN Video Library clips in which members 
of Congress reference late-night political comedians in floor debates, I found 
that references fell primarily into five categories, which I will develop as themes:
1. Citing a joke to support an argument
2. Citing a joke for color
3. Using late-night as a metaphor for dysfunction
4. Acknowledging that late-night television programs are key parts of the 
news and political information landscape
5. Drawing boundaries between politics and comedy
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While further research is needed to more fully understand the interplay between 
political comedy and policy, these initial findings illustrate the complexity of 
our media landscape and the importance of not siloing politics and pop culture 
into separate arenas. When C-SPAN clips are remediated on late-night comedy 
shows and politicians are referencing Saturday Night Live sketches, researchers of 
political communication and political comedy should “reach across the aisle,” so 
to speak, to better understand the relationship between policy and pop culture.
Satirists are often painted as outsiders or court jesters deconstructing the 
political news of the day while members of Congress are insiders portrayed by 
that news. In this project, I seek to upend this common frame, focusing instead 
on Congress as both the subject and an audience of satirical programming. As 
Amber Day (2011) notes, “satiric media texts have become a part of (and a pre-
occupation of) mainstream political coverage, thereby making satirists legiti-
mate players in serious political dialogue” (p. 1). Indeed, I found that satirists 
not only play a role creating, shaping, and disseminating political information 
and ideologies to everyday citizens about our democratic process, they also 
shape how Congress understands and articulates its role in that process. While 
my lofty goal is to explore how satire functions within U.S. democracy beyond 
its effect on citizens’ voting behavior, activism, and public opinion, I went into 
my archival research with two research questions:
1. How do members of Congress understand and deploy references to pop-
ular satire?
2. How do members of Congress function as both an audience of satiric pro-
gramming and the subject thereof?
To answer these questions, I conducted a discursive analysis of mentions of 
satirical television hosts and programs from 1985 to 2020 in House and Senate 
proceedings in the C-SPAN Video Library. While I want to eventually broaden the 
scope of this investigation, the C-SPAN Video Library offers a valuable starting 
point for understanding the connection between how politicians discuss policy 
issues and their coverage by late-night comics. For instance, in both 2014 and 2017 
John Oliver’s weekly late-night political comedy show on HBO aired segments 
on net neutrality, informing viewers about the issue and encouraging them to 
comment on the FCC’s website arguing for the classification of broadband as a 
public utility in 2014 and against the repealing of that classification in 2017. The 
2017 segment was then brought up by the Senate Democratic leadership in a 
weekly briefing with reporters on their policy priorities as an argument against 
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Chairman Pai’s efforts to roll back the Obama-era ruling (C-SPAN, 2017b). This is 
just one example of a serious policy argument by a late-night comic being invoked 
by actual policymakers. While we tend to focus on the coverage of politicians 
by comics, we haven’t looked closely at the coverage of comics by politicians.
In addition to policy debates, I am also interested in how invocations of co-
medic programming have changed over time, the patterns of referencing politi-
cal humor across and between party lines, and the rhetorical strategies members 
of Congress use in deploying references. Investigating these questions will al-
low us to more fully understand as media and communication scholars the ma-
terial role that satire plays in the creation and implementation of U.S. policy. A 
major question in the field of media studies is how television functions within 
and as a public sphere; and so, it’s important to understand different stakehold-
ers within that sphere and how television is taken up strategically by those with 
power. It is important to understand not just the effects of satire on audiences 
interpellated by television programming but also the effects on those who are 
often critiqued and discussed by these comedians.
AUDIENCES, FANS, AND VIEWERSHIP
Popular media texts have become the “equipment for living” that audiences 
draw on in order to make sense of their lives (Young, 2000), and television is 
a cultural forum that actively raises and comments on issues of the day (New-
comb & Hirsch, 1983). Thus, it becomes important to understand politicians as 
both media audiences and media subjects. Indeed, this chapter’s goal is to start 
to understand how politicians draw on popular media to further policy discus-
sion, an examination that is pertinent not only to an understanding of political 
communication but also to fan and audience studies. Influenced by Stuart Hall’s 
(1973) incorporation/resistance model, which refuted the notion that all view-
ers mindlessly adopt a media text’s intended meaning, fan studies grew out of 
cultural studies’ embrace of popular culture and audience studies’ focus on re-
ception rather than representation or production. Radway (1984) argues that in 
order to fully understand a text within popular culture, researchers must shift 
their focus from the text in isolation, to “the complex social event of reading,” 
where audiences “actively attribute sense to lexical signs” in the context of their 
ordinary lives (p. 8). While members of Congress don’t lead what many of us 
would consider “ordinary lives,” quoting popular texts in a floor debate is a part 
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of their normal schedule. Thus, analyzing the ways that political comedy is ref-
erenced within the process of policymaking and debate is a way to understand 
members of Congress as specialized audiences and as members of a unique pub-
lic drawing on “rhetorical texts of public controversy” (Keremidchieva, 2013, p. 
139). While in an industrialized, media-saturated society we’re all fans and audi-
ences of something (Lewis, 1992, p. 1), the trajectory of fan studies, particularly 
digital fan studies, has narrowed the definition of fandom to a very particular 
set of behaviors and fan objects. Specifically, the fans that get labeled and stud-
ied are those that are visible, vocal, and active. These tend to be fans of serial-
ized, fictional, science-fiction, or fantasy dramas. In other words, there are many 
more studies of Star Wars and Marvel fans who write fan fiction, make fan videos, 
and debate about the canon on Twitter than there are lovers of stand-up com-
edy, rom-coms, or Aaron Sorkin dramas who express their enthusiasm through 
quoting lines amongst their friends or streaming content on their phones. Scott 
(2008) has argued that categorizations of fandom, such as the semiotic, enun-
ciative, and textual tripartite of fan productivity outlined by John Fiske (1992), 
need to be constantly reimagined; however, even as fan studies scholarship re-
imagines fan practices, visible creative textual productivity still often receives the 
greatest attention. It is important, though, to also understand how fandom has 
become the “fabric of our everyday lives” (Gray et al., 2007, p. 9). The increas-
ingly quotidian nature of fandom in our hypermediated pop culture landscape 
means that fan studies scholarship should interrogate the ways in which we bring 
pop culture into our everyday conversational practices (Barker, 2014, p. 215).
SATIRE, DEMOCRACY, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
If understanding how popular culture is taken up in policy debates, why study 
comedy in particular? As scholars of satire and political humor have noted, sat-
ire and politically comedic television have become important political speech 
in and of themselves, “affecting the direction of public discourse while elevat-
ing the parodists to the level of legitimate political experts” (Day, 2011, p. 81). 
As Young (2020) compellingly argues, right-leaning outrage programming and 
left-leaning satiric late-night comedy are both responses to the problematic as-
pects of the journalistic and political spheres (p. 48). These problems include the 
increasing artificiality of politics and the polarization of news programming and 
politicians. She further argues that both fall short in actually addressing these 
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systemic failures in journalism and politics (p. 65). While I would eventually like 
to add outrage programming to this project, I draw on comedy and satire as a 
starting point as a site at which a rich scholarly literature exists.
Satire has long been theorized as a crucial tool of democratic and politi-
cal activism, able to sharply critique and push back against hegemonic ideolo-
gies and denaturalize commonsense understandings of our society and culture 
(Hutcheon, 1985, p. 43). Most definitions echo this sentiment: satire is comedy 
that seeks to correct behavior through mockery. Indeed, in the foreword to their 
book Satire TV, Gray et al. (2009) note that the term tends to be “reserved for a 
particular kind of humor that makes fun of human folly and vice by holding peo-
ple accountable for their public actions” (p. ix). Since the rise in award-winning 
satiric television shows like The Daily Show and The Colbert Report at the turn 
of the millennium, the influence of popular television satire has only grown, 
increasing the scholarly study of satire’s political influence as well. Scholarship 
in this area over the past 15 years has analyzed the extent to which these series 
inform audiences about the news and policy (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; 
Becker & Bode, 2018), the role satire plays in teaching audiences to be critical 
consumers of media (McKain, 2005; Painter & Hodges, 2010), the effects of sat-
ire on political participation by citizens (Lee & Kwak, 2014; Young, 2020), and 
the ways in which these shows cover and participate in political activism and 
dissent (Davisson & Donovan, 2019; Haugerund, 2012; Jones et al., 2012; Kilby, 
2018; Warner, 2007). Additionally, popular press coverage has long covered sati-
rists and comedians’ takes on the news, from Johnny Carson and Saturday Night 
Live to John Oliver, Samantha Bee, and Trevor Noah.
In addition to effects-based research and textual analysis of these programs, 
scholars and historians also seek to explain satire and comedic programming 
within their cultural, political, and industrial contexts. One key context is the 
blurring between news and entertainment that has long been a byproduct of our 
profit-driven news industry, which satirists both comment on and are a product 
of. Critics, audiences, politicians, and journalists alike often wring their hands 
and wish for a time when news was news and entertainment was entertainment; 
however, as James C. Smoot (2010) writes, this imagined simpler time is merely 
a “mirage” (p. 79). As I found combing through clips in the archive dating back 
to the 1980s, long before scholarly and critical preoccupation with the impor-
tance of studying politics and comedy, members of the Senate and House were 
already referencing Carson, Saturday Night Live, and Leno and playing up their 
sense of humor for their colleagues and the cameras.
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Others contextualize often-left-leaning satire within the increasing polariza-
tion and political branding of news analysis and punditry on TV. This polariza-
tion has a number of interrelated causes: the development of cable and digital 
technologies, the increasing tendency toward media deregulation starting in the 
1980s under President Reagan, the removal of requirements on the amount of 
informational programming broadcasters have to supply, the repeal of the fair-
ness doctrine, and reduced limits on media ownership. Within these contexts, 
scholars argue that mainstream satiric TV is embedded within a news landscape 
focused primarily on profit, cheap programming, pundits replacing investigative 
journalism, branding, segmented audiences, and political coverage that has be-
come an entertainment spectacle — all factors leading to a lowered public trust in 
journalism (Young, 2020, pp. 32–47). Audiences have become disillusioned with 
the news media. In response, they turn to comedians and satirists, whom they 
idealize as truthful purveyors of information able to cut through the haze of the 
political spectacle coming from politicians and the news (Jones & Baym, 2010).
As illustrated, there is a robust body of research around the effects of late-night 
satire on non-congressional audiences. There is also a growing literature on the 
perception of presidential candidates, presidents, and politicians using humor 
(Bippus, 2007; Carpenter et al., 2019; Meyer, 1990). But the discursive impact of 
pop culture and humor on politicians is understudied both in audience research 
and in political science (Schulte, 2012) and little has been done on the use of hu-
mor in policy debates (Lassen, 2019). There is also surprisingly little research on 
the ubiquitous practice of quoting popular media texts; what research has been 
done posits that we quote pop culture primarily to amuse ourselves and others 
and to build camaraderie (Harris et al., 2008) and to emphasize points much in 
the same way we use metaphors (Smyers, 2016).
In this chapter, while I draw on and hope to contribute to the rich body of 
work that has been done on satire as political humor, I draw especially on Nicolas 
Holm’s (2017) recent work on the political aesthetics of humor. Holm argues that 
instead of theorizing satire only in terms of political engagement, we should in-
stead broaden our view to examine “the political consequences of contempo-
rary humor’s role as a central aspect of the media-dominated English-speaking 
world” and the material effects of “satire” becoming a dominant humor mode. 
Building on Berlant and Ngai’s suggestion that humor is a virtue that “people 
increasingly come to expect in the kinds of social interaction that take place 
in all zones of modern life” (2017, p. 237), Holm calls for us to take a more nu-
anced approach to understanding the material consequences and ideological 
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implications to our society “when one of its main cultural concerns becomes 
the cultivation and appreciation of laughter” (p. 13). In this context, members of 
Congress are not simply powerful figures deconstructed by laughter, but figures 
within our laughter-driven culture who invoke the codes and symbols of satire 
in their dealings with and performances for each other and their constituents.
While the research in this area denotes differences between political humor, 
satire, parody, and other forms of comedy that comment on the political arena, 
this chapter will tend to conflate satire, parody, and other forms of political com-
edy under the umbrella term “late-night comedy” because I’m interested more in 
discourses surrounding comedy than in the intricacies of the comedic aesthetic 
itself. Since my subjects tend to conflate the two, I will be doing so as well in my 
discussion of them. For the purposes of this chapter, I’m using “late-night com-
edy” to refer to television programming that features comedians making jokes 
about the day’s and week’s news and who tend to use humor to critique or poke 
fun at politicians. Such political humor is often framed by audiences, critics, 
and scholars in ways that, as Holm (2017) argues, “take for granted its ability, or 
at least intent, to disrupt systems of meaning and power (however they may be 
conceived)” (p. 44). As such, I use terms like “satire” and “political comedy” not 
as a well-defined, inherently disruptive comedic form but as a register of humor 
most often defined by its mocking of political figures. As Holm (2017) notes, 
all humor does political work, and so he uses “political humor” as opposed to 
“politicized humor” to talk specifically about politicians, parties, and the state.
To summarize, the study of political humor and televisual satire is a robust 
and growing area of inquiry in communication, political science, media studies, 
and cultural studies. Within communication and political science, political hu-
mor has largely been studied under the media effects model in an attempt to un-
derstand whether humor is “an agent of influence or merely a barometer of public 
opinion” (Young, 2017, p. 875). This means, to greatly simplify this research, that 
the studies tend to theorize political comics as the sender of a message about pol-
iticians and the “regular citizen” as the receiver of these messages. While critical 
and cultural studies scholars complicate this model, trying to understand politi-
cal humor as an integral aspect of the larger political media ecology, these stud-
ies also tend to theorize audiences and politicians as separate entities rather than 
considering politicians as an audience or as humorists. When the humor of politi-
cians is studied, researchers most often focus on presidential candidates. Yarwood 
(2004) wrote a book on the use of humor by members of Congress in which he 
defines humor as “incongruent shifts of thoughts, exaggeration, word play, repar-
tee, irony, satire, ridicule, and sarcasm” (p. 14). But his work doesn’t consider the 
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relationship between politicians and professional comedians. Scholars of political 
humor recognize that the relationship between citizens, comedians, and politi-
cians is complicated and significant, but few, if any, studies have been conducted 
on members of Congress as an audience of political comedy. This chapter is an 
attempt to further complicate the audience–comedian–politician relationship.
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
To find video data to answer my research questions, I searched for House and 
Senate proceedings that included one of the terms shown in Table 6.1, including 
a few common misspellings. Because there is not an accurate closed-captioning 
record for every video, there are likely clips that failed to come up in a search but 
that are relevant. Additionally, in future iterations of this search, I would broaden 
to include briefings, committee proceedings, and other C-SPAN content, but 
for an exploratory study I wanted to stick to a manageable number of results.
Next, I watched all of the clips and organized them by name or show referenced, 
while grouping clips that mentioned a list of comedians or general references like 
“late-night comedy shows” or “Comedy Central shows” under the category “ge-
neric.” I watched the clips one more time, creating a spreadsheet row for each clip 
that included the name of the congressperson speaking, their gender, their party 
TABLE 6.1 C-SPAN Video Library Search Terms
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affiliation, the date, and the comic or show mentioned. Finally, I watched the clips 
again and wrote down the general theme of each. Once I noticed consistent pat-
terns, I created a list of codes and coded each clip with its associated theme.
Data Overview
The resultant sample includes 176 total clips featuring 118 different senators and 
congresspeople, 57 of which are Democrats and 61 of which are Republicans, a 
relatively even split. The clips range from 1988 to 2020, with 36 from the 80/90s, 
57 from the 2000s, and 83 from the 2010s. This, expectedly, illustrates that the 
number of references to late-night comedy increases as the number of late-night 
television shows increases in both number and salience to political debate. In 
Figure 6.1, you can see the breakdown in popularity of reference by party. Saturday 
FIGURE 6.1 references to popular political comedy in congressional debates 1988–2020 by party.
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Night Live was by far the most referenced, with 24 Democratic mentions and 28 
Republican mentions. Jay Leno and Johnny Carson were more likely to be men-
tioned by Republicans, while David Letterman, Jon Stewart, Stephen Colbert, 
and John Oliver were more likely to be mentioned by Democrats. Generally, 
references were positive or neutral, with only about 11% being overtly negative 
or critical, which I’ll talk through more at length in the discussion below.
My favorite findings were the senators and House members who showed up in 
clips the most. The congressperson who shows up most by a significant margin is 
Texas Tea Party Republican Louie Gohmert, who appears in the sample 10 times, 
covering a range of shows. Being a notoriously colorful character and seeker of 
attention, this is not surprising, as references to political comedy are a surefire 
way to insert oneself into the larger popular discourse. There are a few members 
who aren’t as prolific, but still appear frequently. Bill Cassidy (R-LA) co-opted 
Jimmy Kimmel’s monologue in 2017 about Kimmel’s son’s surgery during the de-
bate on dismantling the Affordable Care Act. Cassidy created a tongue-in-cheek 
“rule” that he called the Jimmy Kimmel rule, which he frequently brought up 
in an effort to argue the opposite of what Kimmel was asking for. Dick Durbin 
(D-IL) seems to be a legitimate comedy fan who enjoys referencing his favor-
ite shows. And, finally, Robert Dornan (R-CA) frequently registers his distaste 
for Saturday Night Live and his affection for Jay Leno. Even this small sampling 
illustrates the various ways in which comedic texts are taken up in Congress: 
to make complex arguments, to lighten up a speech, or just to register disdain.
As this is a preliminary study, I am not conducting a thorough accounting 
of the intersection between humor, references, and gender, though, unsurpris-
ingly, women referenced comedians in their debates less frequently than men 
did: 21 of the 176 references in my data set were made by 17 women. To try to 
parse how much of this was due to an underrepresentation of women in Congress 
more generally, I looked at Congress.gov to find the number of women who have 
been in Congress since 1988. I found that while the mentions were made by 12% 
of the women in my sample of clips, this was still a slight underrepresentation 
as women made up 17% of the total number of Congress members during that 
same period (see Table 6.2). Further, no women comics were mentioned in the 
clips I could find. I was particularly disappointed that there were no mentions 
of Samantha Bee, former Daily Show correspondent and host of the TBS show 
Full Frontal. While Bee tackles a variety of important issues surrounding gen-
der and sexuality and frequently comments on Congress and policy, I assume 
that because her show skews toward a much younger and more diverse audience 
than Congress, they aren’t as likely to be aware of current debates happening 
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on the show. Women comics did appear much more frequently in the C-SPAN 
Archives when I searched beyond Congressional proceedings, which I hope to 
explore more fully in a future project.
Method and Discourse Analysis
In addition to simple percentage breakdowns, I employed critical discourse anal-
ysis to start to parse how Congress as a unique audience invokes and takes up 
discourses from and about late-night comedy and satire in speeches and debates 
about policy and how these references might reproduce or subvert hegemonic 
ideologies about the place of comedy, spectacle, entertainment, and popular 
culture in political deliberations. Because language is constructive (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987), a social practice used to accomplish things, I’m not reading 
these clips as transparent proof of a politician’s feelings, but rather as rhetorical 
tools through which politicians attempt to connect to peers and constituents, 
to make points, to brand themselves, or to draw a boundary between comedy 
and politics. Language is not a way of getting at some objective reality, rather 
the language itself constructs reality through conflict (Billig, 1991). Language is 
the location at which different ideologies or versions of the world compete for 
dominance. As Gill (2007) notes, “the emphasis on the rhetorical nature of texts 
directs our attention to the ways in which all discourse is organized to make it-
self persuasive” (p. 59).
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is therefore a process by which texts and 
interactions are analyzed as part of social and cultural hierarchies and power 
dynamics. CDA is interested not only in discourse but in the dialectical rela-
tionship between discourse and society and allows us to use textual analysis as a 
way to analyze larger societal trends. CDA sees, “texts and interactions as a part 
of the material processes of social life, or as materialities in which social life is 
ongoingly produced, reproduced, and changed” (Fairclough, 2001, pp. 25–26). 
TABLE 6.2 Mentions of Political Comedy in Congressional Debates 1988–2020 by Gender
No. of references
No. of unique 
Congress Members
No. of Total 
Congress Members
Women 21 17 269
Total 176 118 1,560
Percentage 12% 14% 17%
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CDA often takes the form of highlighting and coding for themes in a text or set 
of texts (be they written, visual, or spoken) in order to locate ruptures, contra-
dictions, and patterns. The process of socially constructing economic, cultural, 
and political realities necessarily involves discourse; it therefore becomes im-
portant to analyze how discourses are operationalized and how they inform pro-
cesses and materially affect and create social realities.
RESULTS: COMMON THEMES OF CONGRESSIONAL COMEDIC REFERENCES
While there is often boundary-keeping between serious political debate and 
humor, scholars of political humor and satire more often contend that political 
humor is a part of the larger political process of deliberative democracy (Baym, 
2005). Particularly in response to what many see as a crisis in journalistic au-
thority, some scholars have come to see political comedy as the Fifth Estate (So-
tos, 2007) that serves to keep journalists in check, which is failing to properly 
inform citizens. Does this bear out in the data on congressional citations of po-
litical humor? Does their discourse around political comedians reinforce the 
idea that political humor is an important part of deliberative democracy? What 
I first found significant is that while there is a great deal more scholarship on the 
kinds of satiric shows like The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and Last Week 
Tonight that college professors and scholars tend to prefer, and that overall are 
taken more seriously as political players, these three shows are not mentioned 
nearly as much as Saturday Night Live, Johnny Carson, David Letterman, or Jay 
Leno. My initial assumptions are that these latter shows have a much longer his-
tory on television and are of the genre generally preferred by older demograph-
ics. Media studies as a field often laments that we tend to study texts that are 
culturally significant and aesthetically sophisticated while ignoring the popular 
culture that most people actually consume.
Themes 1 and 2: Congress members referencing specific bits
The two most common themes I found were members of Congress referenc-
ing specific bits, jokes, or sketches from comedy shows for one of two reasons, 
each representing 27% of the references: (1) citing a joke to support their argu-
ment and (2) citing a joke for color. In other words, generally when members 
of Congress directly reference a specific joke or bit, they are using it as evidence 
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to support the point they are trying to make, or they use it to lighten up their 
speech and appear relatable. When I originally conceived of this project, these 
were the two themes I primarily had in mind and thus was pleased that they bore 
out in the data. The key question I wanted to start to investigate was Do politi-
cians actually adopt satirists’ arguments in debates? If, as scholars often argue, 
satirists and comedians are such an important part of a deliberative democracy, 
do their arguments make their way into politicians’ policymaking? And if pol-
iticians are fans of comedy, does that comedy become a tool in their rhetorical 
toolbox? It seems that they do to some extent.
In a little over a quarter of the clips, congresspeople used bits to support 
an argument, with more than half of those being Republicans citing Jay Leno 
bits mocking Clinton or Obama between 1992–2000 and 2008–2016. When 
Democrats cited comedians, it was a mix of Jimmy Kimmel, John Oliver, Jon 
Stewart, Saturday Night Live, and Stephen Colbert. For instance, on October 9, 
2018, Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) referenced John Oliver’s episode in which he 
brought on 97 climate scientists in an effort to illustrate scientific consensus 
on the issue in a speech on the need for climate change policy (C-SPAN, 2018). 
Unsurprisingly, Republicans tended to cite right-leaning comics taking aim at 
Democratic politicians while Democrats tended to cite left-leaning comics tak-
ing aim at Republican politicians. Therefore, just like with most audiences, it 
doesn’t seem as though politicians are having their minds changed or their power 
undermined by comics. They, like most viewers, tend to watch, agree with, and 
draw on arguments that reinforce their existing worldview. In this way, politi-
cal comedy provides rhetorical tools with which to make points that they likely 
would be making otherwise, rather than eye-opening counterarguments sway-
ing them to reconsider their positions.
The second theme, congresspeople citing comedians for color, is an exam-
ple of politicians acting just as all media audiences do: drawing on their fa-
vorite popular culture moments to connect, to amuse themselves and others, 
and to appear relatable. In these cases, instead of drawing on a comic’s point 
to make an argument, senators and House members reference a joke or bit to 
add some fun, lightheartedness, or ironic bite to their speeches. Politicians are 
just using humor on a larger scale than in a casual conversation with friends 
or acquaintances. These two themes differ in the specific rhetorical method be-
ing used, but to the same ends: to seem more relatable, down-to-earth, and au-
thentic to peers and to constituents who may not be watching C-SPAN at that 
moment but who may see a clip remediated elsewhere. Humor is a virtue that 
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“people increasingly come to expect in the kinds of social interaction that take 
place in all zones of modern life — politics, education, journalism, even reli-
gion” (Berlant & Ngai, 2017, p. 237). As Amber Day (2011) has argued, “there is 
something about the unabashedly personal, ironic, tongue-in-cheek perspective 
that appears refreshingly authentic” (p. 3), compared to the inauthentic, staged, 
focus-grouped earnestness that many assume politicians to portray. Politicians 
know that their constituents like comedians better than they like politicians. 
They are also, lest we forget, people who like to laugh and like to reference 
their favorite bits just like the rest of us do, to create a sense of camaraderie, to 
seem cool, or to seem like they don’t take themselves too seriously. As Holm 
(2017) asserted, “it should come as little surprise, then, that American presi-
dents since Franklin Roosevelt have responded to public pressure to demon-
strate their ability to take a joke, if not to deliver one” (p. 40). Politicians have 
long appeared on and talked about late-night shows to illustrate that they are 
reasonable, regular people. Many of their references or citations of comedians 
function in similar ways.
Satire and political humor also have an “integral community building func-
tion” (Day, 2011, p. 13) that creates an in-group by taking aim at something or 
someone else. When Jon Stewart or David Letterman tells a joke, he positions 
himself and the audience as the “in crowd” and the target as the outsider, thus 
uniting his audience through communal laughter and shared ideology. As the 
goal of late-night comedy and satirists in particular is to question authority, 
suspend hierarchies, and give the audience a certain degree of empowerment, a 
politician aligning themself with the satirist and their audience attempts to clas-
sify themself as an outsider in solidarity with those attempting to take down the 
powerful. Whichever side is drawing on satirical jokes is making a claim that 
they are undermining power to fight for “the little guy.” In other words, draw-
ing on popular satirical humorists is a rhetorical tool through which politicians 
attempt to obscure their own power. Further, the fact that there are few refer-
ences to anyone other than white male comics reinforces the notion that no ac-
tual power is being upended. What was most clearly indicative of the fact that 
many references to comics might not be in good faith were politicians who 
didn’t tend to take satire or comedy seriously or to critique it until it came time 
to use satire as a shield for fighting against bills to limit campaign contribu-
tions, citing them as a slippery slope toward banning all political speech, and in 
debates about political correctness gone awry. For instance, Louie Gohmert in 
one speech criticized Saturday Night Live for making fun of Sarah Palin and in 
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another lamented that shows like SNL would be outlawed if we put any restric-
tions on campaign contributions.
Additionally, when citing arguments raised on satiric or comedic late-night 
shows, politicians can distance themselves from accusations of anger or irratio-
nality in their partisan arguments. Our culture’s current hegemonic ideology 
toward humor sees it as a way to “reasonably dissent” (Holm, 2017, pp. 33–38). 
Humor is often seen as standing outside of ideology and thus a more truthful 
approach to political argument. Righteous anger and earnest arguments are gen-
erally assumed to be partisan, while jokes are often able to stand outside of ideo-
logical boundaries and arrive at something that seems more like the truth. As 
a rhetorical tool, quoting late-night humor allows politicians to distance them-
selves from ideological debate and brand themselves as populist outsiders. In 
this way, quoting or citing an argument on late-night is a way for politicians to 
align themselves with an outsider whose job it is to cut through ideology and 
spectacle, thus making their argument seem more authentic.
Theme 3: Congress members using late-night as a metaphor for dysfunction
About 18% of references to late-night comedy aimed to illustrate how Congress, 
most often members of the opposing party, was acting irrationally or destruc-
tively. This came in several forms. Congress members would complain that the 
other side was going to “make us fodder for the late-night comics,” would refer-
ence attacks or jokes currently airing on late-night that the opposition opened 
them up to, or would use late-night comedy as a metaphor, as in “this floor de-
bate seems like an episode of Saturday Night Live!” A prime example is this snip-
pet from a speech by Peter DeFazio (D-OR) in 2006, in which he ties together 
several themes running through this chapter:
Something odd has happened. There’s a lot of odd things that happen around 
here but the Republican website, the one they use for scheduling the weekly 
activities of Congress, has been hacked by writers for the Jon Stewart Show 
and they don’t seem to mind. So, we’re going to be a parody of Congress this 
week instead of a real Congress this week. Despite the fact that we’re borrow-
ing 1.4 billion to run the government, and we have the average families not 
seeing their wages go up in five years and we’re raining tax cuts on the wealthy. 
There’s a few real things that we could deal with that the American people are 
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another lamented that shows like SNL would be outlawed if we put any restric-
tions on campaign contributions.
Additionally, when citing arguments raised on satiric or comedic late-night 
shows, politicians can distance themselves from accusations of anger or irratio-
nality in their partisan arguments. Our culture’s current hegemonic ideology 
toward humor sees it as a way to “reasonably dissent” (Holm, 2017, pp. 33–38). 
Humor is often seen as standing outside of ideology and thus a more truthful 
approach to political argument. Righteous anger and earnest arguments are gen-
erally assumed to be partisan, while jokes are often able to stand outside of ideo-
logical boundaries and arrive at something that seems more like the truth. As 
a rhetorical tool, quoting late-night humor allows politicians to distance them-
selves from ideological debate and brand themselves as populist outsiders. In 
this way, quoting or citing an argument on late-night is a way for politicians to 
align themselves with an outsider whose job it is to cut through ideology and 
spectacle, thus making their argument seem more authentic.
Theme 3: Congress members using late-night as a metaphor for dysfunction
About 18% of references to late-night comedy aimed to illustrate how Congress, 
most often members of the opposing party, was acting irrationally or destruc-
tively. This came in several forms. Congress members would complain that the 
other side was going to “make us fodder for the late-night comics,” would refer-
ence attacks or jokes currently airing on late-night that the opposition opened 
them up to, or would use late-night comedy as a metaphor, as in “this floor de-
bate seems like an episode of Saturday Night Live!” A prime example is this snip-
pet from a speech by Peter DeFazio (D-OR) in 2006, in which he ties together 
several themes running through this chapter:
Something odd has happened. There’s a lot of odd things that happen around 
here but the Republican website, the one they use for scheduling the weekly 
activities of Congress, has been hacked by writers for the Jon Stewart Show 
and they don’t seem to mind. So, we’re going to be a parody of Congress this 
week instead of a real Congress this week. Despite the fact that we’re borrow-
ing 1.4 billion to run the government, and we have the average families not 
seeing their wages go up in five years and we’re raining tax cuts on the wealthy. 
There’s a few real things that we could deal with that the American people are 
concerned about. . . . The House is going to use valuable time to vote on ban-
ning the threat of gay marriage, even though we know that the constitutional 
amendment can’t move forward because the Senate has already dis-
approved this venture. But it’s good for the ratings, entertainment 
value. The Jon Stewart writers thought it would be fun to bring that 
up in the House, so we’re going to bring it up. (C-SPAN, 2006)
In line with the theory that we use pop culture as “equipment for living” 
(Young, 2000), DeFazio, and many other members when they want to make an 
emphatic point about dysfunction, draws on the most potent metaphor available: 
late-night comedic mocking. This metaphor works both in that television com-
edy has become an integral part of the political process and in that it serves as 
a warning of something members of Congress worry about. In the next theme, 
we will see that members of Congress acknowledge that political comedy is a key 
way in which many citizens make sense of the news, and so warnings of mock-
ing on late-night television may serve as a potent metaphor for dysfunction.
Further, DeFazio here is also acknowledging the fact that while politicians 
may draw a boundary between serious politics and entertainment, politics has 
itself become a media spectacle. His metaphor is not only comparing what he 
sees as attention-seeking behavior on the part of Republicans in the House to a 
satiric sketch but also condemning Congress for itself becoming indistinguish-
able from entertainment television in its aims and behaviors. Scholars of pop-
ular media, and satire in particular, have noted the continuing blurring of the 
lines between news, politics, and entertainment — a concern that isn’t new but 
that has become more extreme in the digital age. In the postmodern media land-
scape, “drama and spectacle reign as citizens become audience” (Caron, 2016, p. 
161). In drawing on these metaphors, Congress members are wrestling rhetori-
cally with their role as both politicians and performers.
Theme 4: Congress members acknowledging that late-night television 
is a key part of the news and political information landscape
Satiric hosts and late-night comedians, scholars have found, do more than en-
tertain; they shape audiences’ understanding of the news and help them make 
sense of politics by highlighting and framing issue positions, critiquing failures, 
and pointing out hypocrisy. Audience exposure to critical coverage can increase 
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negative feelings toward the political process and satirists can raise awareness 
of issues that are under-covered, like John Oliver’s coverage of net neutrality or 
Stephen Colbert’s coverage of campaign finance reform (Young, 2020, p. 182). 
About 12% of the references in the data set acknowledged and reaffirmed the im-
portant role comedians play in making political issues salient to audiences. This 
theme encompasses several subthemes in the data, including a congressperson 
acknowledges or praises comics for shaping the discourse around a topic for 
better or for worse, a congressperson lists a comedic program as one of several 
news outlets discussing a policy, and a congressperson uses as comedy show’s 
coverage of a topic to illustrate that it is salient to the public.
For instance, on February 8, 2017, Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) said of Betsy 
Devos’s confirmation hearing:
This is a hearing that people heard about, and for good reason, from lo-
cal news, to The Daily Show, to The View, and posts that went viral 
on social media. A lot of people in our country heard Betsy Devos 
for the first time in that hearing, and they were not impressed, 
(C-SPAN, 2017a)
Other times a member would note that comedy shows often frame issues 
more concretely than politicians are able to. In one clip Senator Jay Rockefeller 
IV (D-WV) acknowledges that a boring topic like aviation policy won’t break 
through unless a comedian talks about it:
It’s a very unhappy situation when people hear about it. It’s proba-
bly best explained on the one hand by Jay Leno or David Letterman. 
That would certainly drive it home. Otherwise, it is an abstract is-
sue. (C-SPAN, 2008)
Finally, congresspeople often will praise a comedian for not only bringing 
awareness to an issue but going the extra mile and actively advocating for specific 
policy change. The most common example I found of this was bipartisan praise 
for Jon Stewart pushing for the passage of the 9/11 First Responders’ Bill in 2019.
While these examples show comics being acknowledged for disseminating 
information, raising awareness, and acting as activists, they are linked by the 
common assumption and articulation of comedians as more than so-called court 
jesters or entertainment. While some scholars have called these types of satirists 
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the Fifth Estate (Sotos, 2007) meant to keep news media in check, these references 
in fact show that many in Congress see satirists not as a check on the press but as 
an integral part of the press that not only disseminates information and reflects 
information salience but also shapes public opinion and advocates for outcomes.
Theme 5: Congress members drawing boundaries between politics and comedy
The final theme, comprising 12% of the clips, encompasses the most negative 
mentions of late-night comedy in the House and Senate and includes arguments 
that late-night comedians are not serious political actors. In other words, these 
references seek to draw a boundary between politics and comedy. The three types 
of references within this theme claimed one of the following: (1) appearing on 
late-night comedy shows is a waste of time when politicians should be working 
to help their constituents, (2) we shouldn’t listen to what comedians say because 
it is a distraction, and (3) late-night comedians are covering a particular topic 
in a dangerous or illegitimate way. While several Congress members praised co-
medians like Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert for testifying before Congress, 
others were not so keen on the attention they would get, as illustrated by Dan 
Lungren (R-CA):
We can’t even get a hearing on that. Haven’t heard a thing from our judiciary 
committee. It’s more important to bring Colbert in. Maybe we ought to have 
him in character as he was on the day of the election. Maybe then we’d be get-
ting down to our concern for treatment, equal treatment of each and every 
voter in America. But when you have a Justice Department which decides they 
are not going to treat people equally based on their race, as was testified to last 
week, last Friday at the same time, on the same day, as Mr. Colbert was grac-
ing us with his presence in our Judiciary Committee. And we had this rush, 
this tremendous rush of cameras to cover him, and we have very lit-
tle coverage of the amazing testimony about terrible decisions that 
were made in the Justice Department and the Voting Rights Section 
of the Civil Rights Division. (C-SPAN, 2010)
Comedy here is a scapegoat for an issue that has nothing to do with Colbert’s 
testimony other than the fact that he was testifying around the same time an-
other hearing was taking place. Often, politicians use celebrities as scapegoats 
when complaining about important issues not getting enough attention. And 
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while this issue does merit concern, the ways in which comedy is scapegoated 
in this and other similar examples in the data illustrates that comedy becomes 
an easy target when Congress members are upset about an issue not being cov-
ered in ways they would prefer.
As scholars have illustrated, and this study has reinforced, the place of polit-
ical comedy and satire within the political process is tricky to define and quan-
tify. Caron (2016) uses a physics metaphor to try to illustrate the slippery nature 
of political comedy, stating that as light at quantum levels behaves as both a wave 
and a particle, satire “registers as both serious speech and nonserious (comic) 
speech” (p. 156). This makes political comedy notoriously hard to study; it can be 
wielded as both “just a joke” and “important truth-telling,” often at the same time. 
This dual nature is further illustrated in data I found in the C-SPAN Archives. 
Comedy is important or dangerous, depending on which serves a purpose in a 
debate. So, while politicians cite the importance and fun of late-night comedy 
when it serves their interest, they also criticize and distance themselves from it 
when it does not. In these instances, politicians are enacting what has been called 
“border maintenance” (Jones et al., 2012, pp. 48–53) in an attempt to draw a line 
between serious political discussions and unserious, superficial comedy. But, 
as illustrated in these preliminary data, border maintenance tends to only hap-
pen when it serves the interests of journalists or politicians as a defense against 
criticism and attacks.
CONCLUSION
While I went into this research imagining Congress as a particular audience, 
the resulting data have shifted my perspective toward theorizing congressional 
debates as intertextual in the same way we tend to theorize late-night comedy. 
The blurring of politics, entertainment, comedy, and journalism is often framed 
through the lens of postmodern theory, particularly Jean Baudrillard’s (1981) “re-
gime of simulacra” in which the lines that separate fact, fiction, entertainment, 
politics, truth, opinion, and spectacle are increasingly muddled. Late-night com-
edy relies heavily on intertextuality, pastiche, parody, citation, and remediation, 
and as shown in the data, Congress does as well. In a clip mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, Peter DeFazio (C-SPAN, 2006) critiques Congress in an ironic 
reg ister, imagining the Republicans as parodies of themselves created by The 
Daily Show writers. I used this clip to illustrate that instead of understanding 
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the relationship between politicians, journalists, comics, and citizens as one in 
which journalists and comics inform citizens about what politicians are doing, 
communication and media scholars need to recognize the complexity and dense 
intertextuality occurring between these four interrelated, and often overlapping, 
publics. While important activism happens in the alternative press, on social me-
dia, and in grassroots spaces run by and for those who lack institutional privi-
lege and power, politicians, journalists, mainstream satirists, and audiences are 
all a part of a postmodern media landscape marked not by truth-telling and up-
ending power hierarchies but by spectacle, entertainment, and the illusion of 
radical critique. While scholars of political humor may find instances of sati-
rists upending power dynamics and fighting for the little guy, this sample illus-
trates the ways in which mainstream political comedy can easily become a tool 
for those in power to draw on rhetorically as needed for the furthering of their 
own aims. Future studies should further excavate the complex interplay between 
politicians, comedy, and satire to supplement the work that has been done on 
the relationship between citizen-audiences and political comedy. I think this is 
a missing link in better understanding the political/entertainment landscape.
Additionally, in this chapter I drew on Young’s (2020) work on late-night 
satire and outrage entertainment but think further investigation into the “out-
rage” aspect of her work is necessary. Young contends that left-leaning political 
satire and conservative opinion shows serve parallel purposes but look differ-
ent in form, affect, and aesthetic because of differing psychological profiles of 
left-leaning and right-leaning viewers (p. 3). Notably, she argues that humor is 
not as politically motivating as outrage. A study that includes references to out-
rage pundits like Rush Limbaugh and Sean Hannity in addition to comedians 
may further illuminate how different types of political entertainment are used 
in congressional debates. I also think looking at a wider sample of videos in the 
C-SPAN Video Library would be useful in understanding how comedians and 
comedy inflect politics beyond floor debates — for instance, studying the White 
House Correspondents’ Dinner, congressional committee hearings, special pro-
gramming and panels, and call-in shows. We often lament the distortion of the 
lines between entertainment and politics and the ways in which this distortion 
has intensified in the digital age; but rather than simply critiquing it and attempt-
ing to put the toothpaste back in the tube, so to speak, we would do well to try 
to better understand it and to make attempts to harness it toward encourag-
ing a more informed and engaged electorate. From this sample, we can see that 
Congress members, like all of us, are comedy fans. We tend to like comedians 
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more than politicians; so, harnessing this power for the furthering of democratic 
deliberative process can only move us forward.
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GENDER SCHEMA AND POLITICS
A Cognitive Study on Gender Issues in Politics
Zachary Isaacs and Cassidy Hansen
I
n recent years, women have been becoming more involved in national poli-
tics. In 2021, Kamala Harris became the first woman to be elected as the vice 
president of the United States. In addition, Hillary Clinton was the presidential 
nominee for the Democratic party in 2016, and now a “squad” of congresswomen 
have become mainstream. Despite the systematic increase of autonomy and 
political rights for women over the course of United States history, women are 
still underrepresented in elected offices throughout the country. Undoubtedly, 
there are many underlying sources of this political gender divide, but scholars 
suggest that this divide can often be traced to differences in resources, resent-
ment, political orientations, and potentially culture (Burns et al., 2001; Lawless & 
Fox, 2010). Additionally, we argue that gender disparities in politics is a result of 
gender schemas. That is, gender schemas represent a cultural phenomenon that 
likely contributes to the variety of obstacles that women face in getting elected 
and being taken seriously once they have been elected.
Gender schema theory was first researched by Sandra Bem in 1981 (Bem, 
1981a, 1981b). Every society assigns certain tasks and roles to men and women, 
which naturally creates cultural expectations of who men and women are and 
what they should be doing (Bem, 1981a). For example, we often associate men 
with physical labor and “outside the home” tasks, while we associate women 
with taking care of the home. Despite changing gender norms, these gendered 
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schemata still play a major role in how we process information from a young 
age (Lay et al., 2019).
Given that gender stereotypes and schemas still exist, this study is aimed at 
better understanding the relationship between gender schema theory and polit-
ical information processing. In particular, this study interrogates whether gen-
dered schema affects perceptions of credibility and gender roles in politics. We 
thus begin by discussing gender schema and how gendered expectations have in-
fluenced media coverage and political success. Using video transcripts from the 
C-SPAN Video Library, we then tested gender schema theory through ANOVAs, 
moderation analyses, and linear regressions. In doing so, this study contributes 
to the existing literature on gender disparities in politics by adding a new dimen-
sion: how gender schema may play a role in the perception of political leaders.
GENDER SCHEMA
What Are Schemas?
Schemas can be understood as learned behaviors and structures of thought that 
are used by human beings to guide their perceptions of the world while helping 
them problem solve. These information-processing structures simplify daily cog-
nition, as schemas create default assumptions in an effort to decrease delibera-
tive cognition (DiMaggio, 1997). Schemas also can change and develop over the 
course of one’s lifetime as individuals face new obstacles and learn new infor-
mation. Personal structures have their greatest impact on perceptions of others 
when making inferences about them without any context; however, the use of 
personal schema decreases once individuals focus on the actions and behaviors 
of the other individual because active cognition has been implemented (Catram-
bone & Markus, 1987). For example, because someone grew up being socialized 
that most women want to have children, they likely will assume that a woman 
they meet wants children someday, but as they get to know the woman better 
their assumption may be corrected. Interestingly, individuals also tend to re-
call inconsistent schema over consistent schema but recall consistent or incon-
sistent schema information better than neutral information (Hashtroudi et al., 
1984). Similarly, political candidates who defy social norms are better remem-
bered, but not necessarily better liked (Hayes, 2011).
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What Is Gender Schema?
Gender schema is one type of schema that is created through the process of in-
dividuals learning sex-related associations that both organize and guide the in-
dividual’s perception as they are faced with information that either agrees or 
disagrees with their current schema (Bem, 1981a). Sex-linked associations are 
largely a result of what society teaches individuals about the dichotomy between 
males and females and how these differences are applied to everyday life and sit-
uations. Individuals are usually considered sex-typed, which is when their sex 
and gender match cultural norms, cross-typed, when sex and gender match the 
opposite cultural norm, androgynous, when an individual shows characteris-
tics of both genders and understands existing norms, or undifferentiated, when 
the individual has no understanding of gender norms and does not show an in-
clination to either gender (Bem, 1981a). Depending on the category that a par-
ticular person fits into, it affects their perception of gender roles in society. For 
example, if you are sex-typed, you are likely to see gender roles quite frequently, 
while if you are androgynous, you are unlikely to see them at all. The different 
perceptions of gender roles could affect the way that politicians are perceived.
Martin and Halverson (1981, 1983) found that after being presented photos with 
consistent and inconsistent information based on sex-schemas, children would 
change sex-inconsistent information into sex-consistent information when being 
asked to recall the information, which is congruent to the work of Catrambone & 
Markus (1987). Viewing images for both sex-consistent and sex-inconsistent in-
dividuals requires a low level of cognition, so children may default to what they 
already know in their schema instead of adapting their schema. Adults may sim-
ilarly use their gender schema and other indicators, like policy dimension or po-
litical party, when evaluating a candidate to help lower cognitive demands.
Gender Schema in Media
Scholars in the field of media studies use gender schema in two ways: to illustrate 
(1) how gender-stereotyped media activates gender schema or (2) how individuals 
perceive media using gender as a lens. For example, Rouner et al. (2003) found that 
“traditionally” gendered beer advertisements caused some adolescents to ques-
tion why gender roles, sexism, and sexual portrayal of women were used — which 
may suggest that these adolescents may be androgynous, as they understand the 
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existence of culturally defined gender schema but do not agree with the schema. 
People are generally good at picking up on stereotypical gender roles, most likely 
due to their personal experience with their own schema. For instance, Kolbe and 
Langefeld (1993) had participants assess gender role orientations of highly gen-
dered characters on television advertisements using the Bem Sex Role Inventory 
(BSRI). The authors found that participants were in fact able to recognize the gen-
dered stereotypes and were able to discriminate between more “masculine” and 
“feminine” characters, which provides further evidence that media can elicit the 
use of gender schema as individuals evaluate what content they see.
Gendered evaluation can also extend to the actions of an individual, as actions 
can be understood as more information. Despite the actors being traditionally very 
feminine or very masculine in appearance in this study, their actions within the ad-
vertisements affected how viewers perceived actor masculinity or femininity (Kolbe 
& Langefeld, 1993). Although a father was depicted as physically “hardy” with a 
Brooklyn accent, he was perceived as being less masculine because he was featured 
in a frozen treat advertisement with his son. This suggests that while non-stereotyped 
depictions can be shown in media, individuals still perceive others a certain way 
through using their personal gender schema and what limited information they have.
Indeed, many perceptions of others do rely on gender schema. For example, in 
a 2 × 2 × 2 between-subjects design experiment by Knight & Giuliano (2001), the 
authors wrote and manipulated articles about the attractiveness or athleticism of an 
athlete, then assigned a sex to the athletes in the articles. Then, the articles were eval-
uated by both male and female participants. Besides pronouns, the text of the article 
remained the same across men and women. The authors found that the perceived 
attractiveness of the female athlete featured in the attractiveness article was signifi-
cantly higher than the female athlete featured in the accomplishments article even 
though the athlete’s image featured in both articles was the same. There was no sig-
nificant difference between the two conditions for men. The authors suspect that this 
difference is likely a result of gender schema, as being attractive “softens” the incon-
sistency between what the participants are being presented and their gender schema.
Gender Schema in Perceptions of Political Candidates
Gender schemas not only affect people in normal media environments, they 
also affect how political candidates are examined. Evaluations based on gender 
schema can be beneficial to candidates in certain circumstances, but harmful in 
others. For example, in a content analysis of news coverage, Kahn (1992) found 
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that political candidates who received “male” incumbent coverage in an exper-
iment were viewed as strong leaders who were equipped to handle military is-
sues, where those who received “female” incumbent coverage were seen as more 
honest and compassionate. Male and female incumbent coverage were condi-
tions that emphasized gender differences in prominence of coverage, elements 
of campaign coverage, and candidate resources, based on a content analysis con-
ducted by the author of the paper. Moreover, female candidates were perceived 
as being better at dealing with education, health, and women’s issues than male 
candidates, but being more knowledgeable about defense or economic issues 
was not associated with male candidates. These findings are incredibly import-
ant as they provide a baseline for understanding how issue topic could be im-
portant for evaluating gender schema. As such, our study will focus on how two 
different gendered issues (e.g. terrorism for males and education for females) 
and how they could affect how we perceive speakers.
Gender schemas have also been found to affect recall. In a study that had par-
ticipants evaluating male and female candidates in existing television political 
advertisements, participants were able to recall family and appearance for can-
didates who were women and campaign activities for candidates who were men 
(Hitchon & Chang, 1995). Participants also indicated that women attacking men 
in political ads was appropriate, but men attacking women was not appropriate. 
However, this does mean that men are the only ones “punished” on the campaign 
trail for exhibiting anger. Brooks (2011) found that for both male and female can-
didates, showing anger or crying penalizes their favorability, effectiveness, and 
leadership skills proportionally. Despite penalizations being equal across men 
and women, it is important to understand that general anger was seen as more 
inappropriate from women than men, and that women who cry or display an-
ger were considered more “emotional” than men (Brooks, 2011). These differ-
ences may be a result of people relying on their gender schemas while making 
evaluations that are primed by gendered media coverage.
In a follow-up to their original study, Chang and Hitchon (2004) found that 
participants associated education and welfare issues with female candidates, while 
defense and agriculture were associated with male candidates when limited infor-
mation was used in print advertising. As information increased, participants began 
relying on the new information, which aligns with the tenants of general schema 
theory. The authors recommend that women who want to set an agenda includ-
ing “men’s issues” should include more information about these issues in their 
campaign so people don’t default to their gender schemas, which may encourage 
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voters to perceive that a female candidate is not capable of handling traditionally 
masculine issues. This idea will be further explored in this study as we identify 
whether gender schema scores can vary between education and terrorism topics, 
as we would expect from the literature (Chang & Hitchon, 2004; Dolan, 2010).
Based on a sample of candidates who ran for various offices from 1996 to 1998, 
Herrnson et al. (2003) suggested that in order to be elected, women should focus 
on issues traditionally associated with female candidates while targeting women 
and social groups that are friendly to women. Although this approach can get 
women seats, it may limit female politicians to being perceived as only being 
interested in feminine issues and unable to contribute to other policy realms, 
which could be schema enforcing. For example, in a condition where terrorism 
was present, candidate evaluation from an experiment indicated that masculine 
stereotypes had a negative influence on female Democratic candidates, but not 
on Republican female candidates (Holman et al., 2016).
Hayes (2011) also notes that media still play on both political and gender ste-
reotypes. Similarly, Dolan (2005) found that news media were more likely to 
portray men and women using political gender stereotypes than were political 
officials. Surprisingly, this is also true for children’s literature, which may be con-
tributing to development of gender schema (Lay et al., 2019).
Despite gender schema processing existing as people evaluate candidates, 
women often win at the same rates as men do in offices at some political levels, 
such as the U.S. House of Representatives (Lawless & Pearson, 2008). However, 
if women are just as likely to win as men, why does the gender gap persist? Ac-
cording to Dolan (2010), this may in part be due to men and women still holding 
trait stereotypes at various levels. She found that individuals who view women 
as able to deal with culturally masculine policy dimensions are more likely to 
support female candidates and want greater representation of women in gov-
ernment. As a result, gender schema of the public should be examined to un-
derstand why gender plays a role in political figure evaluation when information 
is limited at various levels, as it may explain differences in, and the strength of, 
political stereotypes based on gender.
Women and Credibility in Politics
Gender schema theory clearly places women’s role and expertise within the 
domestic domain. Consequently, women have struggled to build credibility in 
the political context. Funk and Coker (2016) designed a study that examined 
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how people perceive women after they are objectified (reduced to their physical 
characteristics). They created a hypothetical female political candidate with two 
different Facebook feeds, one where the candidate was objectified (contained 
comments on her body) and one where she was not objectified (and that focused 
more on policy issues). In the feed where the woman was objectified, the can-
didate had significantly lower credibility than in the other feed. Undoubtedly 
this happens often with women in politics. Sarah Palin was constantly objecti-
fied when she was the vice presidential nominee in 2008, hurting her credibil-
ity as a politician. This ultimately leads to the conclusion that women struggle 
with building credibility in politics based on their body.
While women’s credibility can be diminished because of objectifying com-
ments, it can also suffer simply because they are women. Borrelli (1997) found 
that when female secretary-designees are going through the confirmation process 
to become members of the cabinet, they struggle to build credibility like male 
secretary-designees. During the confirmation process, senators are more likely 
to treat women as “outsiders” so women have to work harder to build the same 
credibility. This further illustrates the issues women face in the political arena. 
Credibility is a deep-rooted issue facing women in the political field. Credibility 
is important to get elected, to gain the respect of constituents, and just generally 
to be believed. To that end, our study will focus on the issue of credibility and 
how it may vary based on the gender of the speaker.
HYPOTHESES
Following extant research on gender schema theory (Bem, 1981a) and women 
in politics (Borrelli, 1997; Hayes, 2011; Krook, 2017; Lawless & Fox, 2010), this 
study will test the following hypotheses:
H1: Speakers who are speaking on the issue of terrorism will be rated higher 
for masculinity than the speakers who are speaking on the issue of 
edu cation.
H2: Speakers who are speaking on the issue of education will be rated higher 
for femininity than the speakers who are speaking on the issue of ter-
rorism.
H3: Participants who score higher on the BSRI for masculinity will rate the 
female speakers as less credible than the male speakers.
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H4: Participants who score higher on the BSRI for femininity will rate the 
female speakers as more credible than participants who score higher 
on the BSRI for masculinity.
H5: Party identification will be the strongest predictor of the BSRI evalua-
tions of the speakers for femininity.
H6: Party identification will be the strongest predictor of the BSRI evalua-
tions of the speakers for masculinity.
Expected experimental outcomes for masculinity and femininity are shown in 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
STUDYING GENDER SCHEMA IN POLITICS
To examine how gender schemas influence perceptions of political credibility 
and how they may vary based on speaker gender and issue topic, we conducted 
a controlled experiment where participants read a transcript from the C-SPAN 
Video Library and then filled out a survey with the BSRI short form, a source 
credibility scale, and demographic questions.
TABLE 7.1 Expected Experimental Outcome for Masculinity
Terrorism Education
Male speaker
Highest rating for 
masculinity High-medium rating
unidentified speaker
High-medium rating for 
masculinity
Medium-low rating for 
masculinity
Female speaker
Medium-low rating for 
masculinity
Lowest rating for 
masculinity
TABLE 7.2 Expected Experimental Outcome for Femininity
Terrorism Education
Male speaker
Lowest rating for 
femininity
Medium-low rating for 
femininity
unidentified speaker
Medium-low rating for 
femininity
High-medium rating for 
femininity
Female speaker
High-medium rating for 
femininity
Highest rating for 
femininity
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Methodology
Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk). User 
location was restricted to the United States. Participants were compensated $1 
for completing the survey. An advantage to using mTurk participants instead of 
undergraduate participants is that mTurk participants are generally more diverse 
as a whole when compared to other convenience samples and tend to pay better 
attention to their assigned task. However, samples from mTurk are not entirely 
representative of the general U.S. population, as participants tend to be more 
educated, sophisticated, and politically divided (Berinsky et al., 2012; Cassese 
et al., 2013). To prevent overgeneralization of findings, participants were asked 
demographic questions involving age, education, and political ideology at the 
end of the experiment.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions (see Table 7.3). 
Each condition included speeches made by politicians on the topics of ter-
rorism and education (see the Appendixes to this chapter for the transcripts 
used in the experiment). After data collection, the sex of the participants was 
used as a covariate, making the experiment a 3 × 2 × 2 design. The speeches 
were selected from the C-SPAN Video Library. The particular speeches that 
we chose were selected because they were not clearly partisan and they both 
took about two to three minutes to read. The sex of the individual giving the 
speech was varied across conditions; however, the content of the speech re-
mained the same regardless of who was giving the speech. The survey was pro-
grammed to assign an even number of participants to each condition. Any 
survey that was taken in less than four and a half minutes was discarded from 
the data analysis. After discarding these surveys 326 surveys remained that 
were used for data analysis.
In both conditions, politicians were given “traditional” names and identify-
ing pronouns to serve as a cue for gender schema activation. The female name 
TABLE 7.3 Experimental Design
Terrorism Education
Male speaker Terrorism × Male speaker Education × Male speaker
No speaker named Terrorism × No speaker Education × No speaker
Female speaker Terrorism × Female speaker Education × Female speaker
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was “Susan Brown” and the male name was “Mark Brown.” The following sen-
tence was featured before the speech: “PRONOUN Secretary INSERT NAME 
was asked to give CORRESPONDING PRONOUN remarks on the issue of 
ISSUE on the House floor.”
After reading the transcript of each speech, participants completed a sur-
vey measuring gender schema for the politician (BSRI, discussed below). After 
finishing their assigned condition, participants were asked to fill out a gender 
schema survey for themselves. Then, participants completed McCroskey’s (1999) 
measure of source credibility. Designation of gendered issues were as follows: 
terrorism was considered a masculine issue and education a feminine issue as 
previous research has found these items to be associated with certain genders 
(Chang & Hitchon, 2004; Dolan, 2010). While other issues may be considered 
more feminine, like abortion, they were not used because of fear of ceiling effects.
Measures
BSRI
The Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) was used to identify the presence of gen-
der schemas in this study (Bem, 1981a).The BSRI contains 60 questions on a 
7-point scale. Twenty of the questions in the inventory ask about attributes re-
lated to masculinity (e.g., assertive), while 20 of the questions ask about fem-
ininity (e.g., soft spoken). The remaining inventory questions (20 items) are 
neutral items. Individuals are considered sex-typed if they score in a way that it 
reflects their sex. For example, if a person is biologically female and they score 
higher on the femininity scale than on the masculinity scale, they would be 
considered sex-typed. If they score in a way that is opposite of their sex, such 
as a biological female that scores higher on the masculinity scale, they would 
be considered cross-sex-typed. Those who score high on both the masculinity 
and femininity scales are considered androgynous. Lastly, those who score low 
on both the masculinity and femininity scales are considered undifferentiated. 
The short form of the BSRI was used in this study. The short form features half 
of the original BSRI items to reduce fatigue but still maintains internal consis-
tency, leaving 10 masculine items, 10 feminine items, and 10 neutral (Bem, 1981a; 
Kolbe & Langefeld, 1993). Additionally, this form of the BSRI is considered psy-
chometrically stronger than the full-form BSRI, making it the superior form to 
use (Hoffman & Borders, 2001).
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Source Credibility Measure
Source credibility was assessed using McCroskey’s (1999) source credibility mea-
sure. Using dichotomous terms, the scale measured three different factors in-
volved in credibility: a competence factor (e.g., intelligent vs. unintelligent), a 
caring/goodwill factor (e.g., cares about me vs. doesn’t care about me), and a 
trustworthiness factor (e.g., honest vs. dishonest). Participants were asked to 
choose a value on the scale from 1 to 7 for each item. The measure has been used 
extensively in the literature (Mazer et al., 2009; Westerman et al., 2012), usually 
having reliability between .80 and .94.
RESULTS
Data analysis was conducted in SPSS. For H1 and H2, one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted. As seen in Table 7.4, there was a significant interaction between the 
speaker gender (male, female, and unidentified) and the sex of the participant 
(F = 21.04, p = .04). The female participants perceived the male and unidenti-
fied speakers to be more masculine than the female speaker, which follows what 
we would predict. However, all other main effects and interaction effects tested 
were insignificant. As such, we fail to support H1.
TABLE 7.4 Treatment Effects on Perceived Masculinity
variable name
Sum 
of squares df Mean square F Sig.
Speaker gender 2.57 2 1.28 1.29 .44
Sex of participant 1.19 1 1.19 17.78 .15
Issue topic .01 1 .01 .01 .93
Speaker gender × Sex of 
participant 5.35 2 2.67 21.04 .04
*
Speaker gender × Issue topic 1.99 2 .99 7.81 .11
Sex of participant × 
Issue topic .07 1 .07 .53 .54
Speaker gender × Sex of 
participant × Issue topic .25 2 .13 .13 .88
Note: Outcome variable: BSRI rating for masculinity.
*Significant at the .05 level.
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For the testing of H2, we also performed a one-way ANOVA, this time using 
the BSRI rating of the speaker’s femininity as the outcome variable. As seen in 
Table 7.5, no main effects or interaction effects were significant. Sex of the partici-
pant was close to having a significant effect (F = 29.46, p = .12); however, it was not 
substantial enough. Because of these insignificant effects, we fail to support H2.
To test H3 and H4, we performed moderation analyses in SPSS using Hayes’ 
Process (Hayes, 2013). For each analysis, we used Model 1. For H3, we did three 
moderation analyses using the gender of the speaker as the independent variable, 
the BSRI rating of masculinity as the moderator, and the three different factors of 
credibility as the outcome variables (caring/goodwill, competence, trustworthi-
ness). For H3 there were no significant effects found in the moderation analyses. 
Because of this, we fail to support H3. For H4, we performed three moderation 
analyses using gender of the speaker as the independent variable, the BSRI rat-
ing of femininity as the moderator, and the three different factors of credibil-
ity as the outcome variables. Similar to the analyses for H3, the analyses for H4 
also yielded no significant effects. Due to no significant effects throughout the 
moderation analyses, we fail to support H4.
To evaluate the final two hypotheses in the study, H5 and H6, we used linear 
regression models. To evaluate H5, we used femininity as the dependent vari-
able and used party identification, education level, sex, marital status, and sex-
ual orientation as the independent variables. As shown in Table 7.6, both party 
identification (t = 2.50, p = .01) and marriage status (t = −3.21, p = .00) were 
TABLE 7.5 Treatment Effects on Perceived Femininity
variable name
Sum 
of squares df Mean square F Sig.
Speaker gender 1.36 2 .681 .46 .69
Sex of participant 5.70 1 5.70 29.46 .12
Issue topic 6.78 1 6.78 7.39 .35
Speaker gender × Sex of 
participant 2.34 2 1.17 1.52 .40
Speaker gender × Issue topic 2.99 2 1.50 1.94 .34
Sex of participant × 
Issue topic .19 1 .19 .25 .67
Speaker gender × Sex of 
participant × Issue topic 1.54 2 .77 .53 .59
Note: Outcome variable: BSRI rating for femininity.
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significant predictors of the BSRI rating of femininity of the speakers. Although 
party identification was not as strong of a predictor as marriage status, we still 
find support for H5.
For the last hypothesis, H6, we used a linear regression model using the BSRI 
rating of masculinity as the dependent variable and the same independent vari-
ables as in H5. Table 7.7 shows that once again both party identification (t = 2.30, 
p = .02) and marriage status (t = −2.38, p = .02) significantly predict BSRI rat-
ings of masculinity of the speakers. The effect size for party identification and 
marriage status are very similar, but marriage status is slightly larger. Similar to 
H5, with the strong effect size of party identification and the closeness to mar-
riage status in its predictive power, we find support for H6.
TABLE 7.6 Factors That Predict Perceptions of Femininity for Speakers
β t p-value
Party identification .16 2.50 .01**
Education level .03 .42 .68
Sex −.09 −1.48 .14
Marriage status −.21 −3.21 .00***
Sexual orientation .07 1.16 .25
Model r = .34 Model R2 = .12 F = 6.40
Note: Outcome variable: BSRI rating for femininity.
*Significant at the .05 level.
**Significant at the .01 level.
***Significant at the .001 level.
TABLE 7.7 Factors That Predict Perceptions of Masculinity for Speakers
β t p-value
Party identification .14 2.30 .02*
Education level .03 .56 .58
Sex −.06 −1.07 .29
Marriage status −.15 −2.38 .02*
Sexual orientation .12 1.89 .06
Model r = .30 Model R2 = .09 F = 5.20
Note: Outcome variable: BSRI rating for masculinity.
*Significant at the .05 level.
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DISCUSSION
This study examined how scores on the BSRI for gender schemas could vary 
based on the gender of speakers and on issue topic. In addition, the study sought 
to see whether there was a link between gender schemas and perceptions of 
credibility of politicians. Gender schema theory suggests that everyone creates 
sex-based associations and they can affect our perceptions of gender in every-
day life. Given that female politicians have yet to have as much success as male 
politicians, we theorized that gender schemas could be a contributing factor. 
Several points warrant discussion.
The hypotheses in this study were not supported by the data. Although we 
predicted that scores on the BSRI would vary based on the gender of the speaker 
and the issue topic, the data ultimately showed no significant effects between 
them. There are several possible explanations for the null hypotheses. First, it is 
perhaps the case that people do not implement gender schema when evaluat-
ing candidates. If so, that is ultimately a positive finding. From the literature, we 
know that gender schemas are activated when speakers are seen; however, much 
less is known about text-based gender schema processing (Chang & Hitchon, 
2004; Knight & Giuliano, 2001). Our study builds on this literature by adding a 
new twist: that gender schemas are not activated when the gender is only seen 
in text. This is a positive for print journalism, as it seems that gender schematic 
processing may not occur in these text-based environments.
Additionally, media richness may have also played a role. Gender is con-
structed in a variety of ways. Candidates construct gender through their verbal 
and nonverbal messages, as well as visual elements that can be seen in campaign 
advertisements and websites. Accordingly, text alone, like what was used in this 
study, may not have elicited clear gender frames. We would possibly find greater 
effects had we created videos of male and female actors giving these speeches, 
but this would also increase the ambiguity of what may or may not be causing 
the implementation of gender schema. For example, would it matter what color 
of clothing the actors wore? Their objective attractiveness? Does women’s phys-
ical presence lead to objectification? These potential hidden variables may be 
difficult to account for, but they certainly would indicate gender.
Another explanation is that the BSRI did not perform as intended. After the 
experiment, we ran an exploratory factor analysis and found that the BSRI was 
evaluating femininity well; however, the traits that make up masculinity were 
quite unclear. Even though the BSRI did not work well for our experiment, it 
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is likely that people do still evaluate people through gendered lenses. However, 
how we understand and recognize gender schema may have changed since the 
creation of the BSRI. Perhaps masculinity and femininity are better identified 
in variables not included in the BSRI. For example, variables such as combative 
and commanding could be better to appraise masculinity. In addition, variables 
such as sentimental and emotionally discerning could be better to appraise fem-
ininity. While recent literature has successfully implemented the BSRI, it may 
be time for an overhaul of the inventory.
The most likely explanation for the null findings is that the participants in 
this study may not have paid that much attention to the gender of the speaker 
and were more focused on reading the content of the text they were presented. 
The gender of the speaker was made known at the beginning of the transcripts, 
which could have easily been skipped by participants thinking that the first line 
of the transcript was not important. Additionally, the gender of the speaker was 
not explicitly stated; it was implied through pronouns such as “she” and prefixes 
such as “Madam.” It is possible that these cues were simply not strong enough 
to trigger gender schematic processing.
Although there were no statistically significant results for the first four hypoth-
eses, H5 and H6 both returned significant results. We found that both party iden-
tification (t = 2.50, p = .01) and marriage status (t = −3.21, p = .00) were significant 
predictors of femininity ratings on the BSRI for the speakers. This means that par-
ticipants who identified as Republicans were much more likely to appraise fem-
ininity in the speakers than participants who identified as Democrats. Similarly, 
participants who were married were much more likely to perceive femininity in the 
speakers than those who were single, divorced, or dating but not married. Both of 
these significant predictors stayed significant when we used the same independent 
variables but used perceptions of masculinity as the dependent variable. Both party 
identification (t = 2.30, p = .02) and marriage status (t = −2.38, p = .02) significantly 
predicted BSRI ratings of masculinity of the speakers. The result of party identi-
fication predicting perceptions of both masculinity and femininity seems to be a 
result of those who identified as Republicans being more sex-typed. That is, they 
were more likely to view sex roles within our experiment than were Democrats. 
Democrats, on the other hand, preach not stereotyping gender roles (Horowitz et 
al., 2017), so it makes sense that they would not be sex-typed. This finding shows 
the continuing evolution of both the Republican and Democratic parties.
The finding of marriage status being a significant predictor of perceptions of 
both masculinity and femininity was unexpected but not theoretically surprising. 
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Our findings show that those participants who were married were more likely 
to be sex-typed than those who were not married. Participants who were mar-
ried are more likely to observe and embody sex roles in their daily lives with 
their spouses. Therefore, it makes sense that they would also perceive those dif-
ferences in our experiment. This is an important finding because it shows fur-
ther how gender schema are activated in different groups, such as those who are 
married. Studying different groups and how they may or may not perceive gen-
der schema could be an avenue for further research.
One clear limitation of the study was that the BSRI did not perform well in 
our experiment. The BSRI appeared to be able to test femininity to a certain ex-
tent, but it could not appraise masculinity as well. We ran an exploratory factor 
analysis to determine whether the items were loading correctly and found that 
there was cross-loading on several items. Essentially, we found that the BSRI 
was appraising femininity well, but there were no clear loadings for masculinity.
Considerations for Future Research
Despite the results of this study, gender discrepancies continue to exist in the po-
litical context. Thus, scholars interested in this research will do well to use vid-
eos instead of written transcripts as the treatment for such research. The written 
transcripts were most likely not a strong enough treatment to see an effect; how-
ever, we expect that a video would be a strong enough treatment to see a signifi-
cant effect. Additionally, a scale other than the BSRI should be used to measure 
gender schema. Another scale may be better able to appraise gender schema. 
Finally, further studying how gender schematic processing may differ between 
cultural groups could prove to be helpful in examining how women in politics 
are viewed in different cultures.
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APPENDIX A: TERRORISM TRANSCRIPT
Madam Secretary Susan Brown was asked to give her remarks on the issue of ter rorism.
or
Mr. Secretary Mark Brown was asked to give his remarks on the issue of terrorism.
or
Secretary Brown was asked to give their remarks on the issue of terrorism.
I will use the broadest of brushes on how the threat picture has evolved over 
time and I’ll do that mindful of the fact there’s quite a number of people sit-
ting in this audience who have had their hands on various national intelli-
gence estimates or other key documents that have framed this problem for 
our policy community. So with apologies to some of those folks who might 
end up shaking their heads as I generalize about the nature of the threat in the 
period since 9/11. In the period right after 9/11, certainly for the first several 
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years, we were very Al-Qaeda focused. That’s not surprising. That was the ter-
rorism threat that was most proximate to the United States; certainly in terms 
of the homeland, what we were the most concerned about. We still very much 
in our mind in those early days had a model in mind of an organization that 
was trying to penetrate the United States; that was trying to, to in a sense, in-
filtrate operatives. Think sleeper cells. Think clandestine covert op race oper-
ations to get individuals inside the United States in order to carry out terrorist 
attacks. And we developed quite a strong capability to detect and mitigate 
against that kind of threat using our intelligence and law enforcement tools. 
Of course over time, as Al-Qaeda metastasized (to use a word that often gets 
used) and as Al-Qaeda became not just an organization that we were dealing 
with in South Asia but became a global organization with a series of very po-
tent and lethal affiliate groups, the challenge and pressure placed on the home-
land security apparatus to succeed in that endeavor got quite intense at times, 
and then I would argue the threat began to shift to one that actually became 
much more of a, in some ways, more challenging threat dynamic: that of the 
so-called homegrown violent extremist. The idea that we were not as threat-
ened day-to-day by that sleeper cell insurgent from abroad, but instead, it was 
most likely the individual who would be inspired, motivated, who would be 
encouraged, propelled into action by an ideology or in some cases, by actual 
individuals overseas connecting with them. That became a much more diffi-
cult and challenging problem in some ways for law enforcement because of 
course identifying those individuals in the absence of the kind of usual com-
munications patterns you see when groups are operating was not going to be 
easy. That was already an extant problem at the time Isis kind of came onto the 
scene and in a sense, I would argue at least for a period, supplanted Al-Qaeda 
as our principal terrorism concern overseas. The ISIS phenomenon I would 
argue only accelerated those trends that were already in motion in terms of 
the homegrown violent extremist problem becoming our principal homeland 
terrorism problem. I won’t go into why that is so; this is a sophisticated audi-
ence. You know how capable the Islamic State was and is in its ability to use 
modern tools of communication to motivate individuals. But that homegrown 
violent extremist model is one that I would argue translates very well to this 
new kind of threat we’re talking about today. These are again most likely to be 
individuals operating outside of the group structure, a formal group structure. 
They are not drawing their direction or capability in most cases from some 
kind of playbook that a group publishes. They are not carrying a lanyard nec-
essarily around their neck that says I belong to this group and it follows this 
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structure. So it will be interesting to hear Rebecca’s comments on this as she 
looks at the caseload inside New York City, but at least in terms of volume, 
if you go by what the FBI is saying publicly, and Director Wray has been up 
front about this, the caseload they’re managing on this set of terrorism con-
cerns has come to be at par with the international terrorism set of concerns. 
That’s something. I’ll close by saying this. And particularly when I’m in the 
overseas environment where people are saying, “Aren’t you Americans all spun 
up over domestic terrorism right now?” I say yes, we are, we should be. But 
don’t forget you almost can’t go a day or two or week or two without reading 
in the United States press somewhere about the arrest, prosecution, or dis-
ruption involving what we would call international terrorism — an individual 
tied to ideology propagated by Isis or Al Qaeda. So it’s not as if one went up 
and the other went down. Seems we are dealing with a problem of rough par-
ity right now. I’ll stop there.
APPENDIX B: EDUCATION TRANSCRIPT
Madam Secretary Susan Brown was asked to give her remarks on the issue of edu-
cation on the house floor.
or
Mr. Secretary Mark Brown was asked to give his remarks on the issue of education.
or
Secretary Brown was asked to give their remarks on the issue of education.
Over the past 40 years, federal taxpayer spending on education has increased 
about 180%, amounting to over $1.2 trillion cumulatively. We are still 24th in 
reading, 25th in science, and 40th in math when compared to the rest of the 
world. Doing the same thing and more of it won’t bring about new results. A 
great education should not be determined by where you live, nor by who you 
know. It shouldn’t be determined by family income. Education shouldn’t be 
an old-school one-size-fits-all approach. That’s why I propose something dif-
ferent: freedom. This administration focuses on freedom for teachers, free-
dom for parents, and freedom for all students, because we recognize each as 
a unique individual, and each should be treated as such. Every child should 
be free to learn where and how it works for them and how it unlocks their 
potential. So we propose a historic investment in America’s students: educa-
tion freedom scholarships. Our bold proposal will offer a dollar-for-dollar 
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federal income tax credit for voluntary contributions to 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organizations that provide scholarships to students. The students, their fami-
lies, teachers, schools, and states can choose to participate in the program, or 
they can choose not to participate. It’s a choice. Since the proposal relies en-
tirely on voluntary contributions to nonprofit organizations, it won’t take a 
single dollar from local public schools, schoolteachers, or public school stu-
dents. Something else: education freedom scholarships are not only for stu-
dents who want to attend private schools. In fact, some states may choose to 
design scholarships for public school options such as apprenticeships or trans-
portation to a different public school. States have the opportunity to be really 
imaginative and to serve the unique needs of their students. Our proposal of a 
$5 billion annual tax credit for students draws a bright contrast to what some 
have proposed. $100 billion for buildings versus $5 billion for students. This 
administration urges this body to invest in students. We believe students of 
all ages should be free to pursue the education that is right for them. That in-
cludes multiple pathways to higher education and successful careers. We pro-
pose to expand use of Pell grants for quality short-term programs. It’s born 
from recognition of reality. The vast majority of students today do not pursue 
a traditional four-year college degree. There are millions of opportunities for 
careers that don’t require university degrees. We must urgently rethink our ap-
proach to higher education because today, federal student aid holds $1.5 trillion 
in outstanding loans, a number that continues to grow. Education freedom is 
not just for parents and students; teachers need greater freedom. This admin-
istration seeks to empower teachers and elevate their profession. I meet with 
teachers who tell me they would like to choose their own development and 
customize it for their needs. To that end, we want to focus on what teachers 
find useful, not what is dictated by the district office. Teachers tell me about 
the value of mentors or residency opportunities. We want to help ensure new 
teachers have opportunities to learn from the best. It is essential teachers and 
students are safe at school. In the wake of school violence in our country, the 
president asked me to lead a commission on school safety, to support the rec-
ommendations we propose empowering communities to develop their own 
emergency plans and focus on counseling and healthy behaviors for the stu-
dents. Budgets are about priorities, students, parents, teachers, and taxpayers. 
If our country will remain secure, strong, prosperous, and free, we need stu-
dents of all ages to prepare for successful careers and lead meaningful lives. 
Thank you for this opportunity to testify.
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PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS AND THE 
HEALTH SECURITY TASK FORCE
Using C-SPAN to Understand Perceptions of Expertise
Bo Blew
H
ealth insurance, President Bill Clinton promised, would be as accessible 
and universal as a Social Security card. In September of 1993, Clinton 
kicked off the lobbying for his signature “health security” bill in a rally for 
doctors and administrative allies. Revealed in full the night before, the policy 
proposal marked the culmination of years of campaigning and months of inten-
sive planning and speculation. Now, a confident Clinton pledged that before the 
103rd Congress adjourned, he would sign into law legislation guaranteeing all 
Americans access to affordable and reliable health care (C-SPAN, 1993c). Pundits 
across the political spectrum praised Clinton’s plan. Legislators from both par-
ties complimented Clinton’s speech before Congress the previous evening and 
commended him for recognizing the need for action. The plan, developed by a 
511-member task force of experts, represented an idealized way of creating public 
policy in which policy experts come together with stakeholders and legislators 
to create a wide-ranging plan addressing a complex issue.
And yet, even before the administration could submit the bill, callers on 
C-SPAN spoke of their fears that the federal government could not solve the 
problem because the government was the problem (C-SPAN, 1993b). Over the 
next year, these concerns about government overreach intensified, and legislative 
opponents of the plan portrayed the task force and its most visible members as 
an overly complex bureaucracy of technocrats controlled by large liberal private 
foundations. Republicans claimed that the task force had been infiltrated by the 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
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(RWJF), the two largest foundations at that time dedicated to health care. They 
cited the revolving door between the foundations and the Clinton administra-
tion as evidence of bureaucratic corruption.
By thrusting the task force itself into the limelight, the public debate over 
health care launched a broader discussion about the very nature of policymak-
ing and expertise. Led by Hillary Clinton and Ira Magaziner, a close associate of 
the Clintons and senior domestic policy adviser, the policy team sought to suc-
ceed in passing a national health policy, something Democratic presidents had 
attempted and failed to do since 1948. Understanding that lobbying from insur-
ance companies, businesses, and the American Medical Association had long 
undermined health care reform, President Clinton saw the task force as a way 
to move beyond gridlock and special interests (Chapin, 2015, 2019). He wanted 
to rely on expert opinion, not partisan dealmaking, to determine the outline of 
a new health care system designed to provide universal coverage, reduce costs, 
and set new standards for private insurers regarding eligibility and portability 
of coverage (Skocpol, 1997).
Foundations had long supported this method of policy study through the 
funding of scholars, universities, think tanks, and research centers. Now after de-
cades, an administration embraced expertise and complexity as virtues of com-
prehensive policymaking. And yet, responses of C-SPAN callers and Republican 
challenges over the next 13 months suggest that the complexity only gave rise to 
confusion, and the reliance on experts was interpreted as paternalistic, not prag-
matic. In the end, the Clinton administration’s reliance on policy experts proved 
no match for a segment of the public increasingly wary about the role of bureau-
cracy in their daily lives, fears Republican organizers and politicians exploited.
The reactions of C-SPAN viewers to the task force and health care plan ex-
posed the tensions underlining the growing prominence of private foundations, 
and their claim over cultivating and deploying expertise that had reshaped the 
relationships between policymaking and politics over the previous two dec-
ades. Scholars examining the health care battles of the 1990s focus on how the 
task force insulated the plan from politics, making it harder to secure passage. 
Stakeholders that would normally be needed in ferrying the plan through the 
legislative process did not feel adequately invested after being excluded from the 
drafting process (Johnson & Broder, 1997; Katz, 2008; Skocpol, 1997). Political sci-
entist Jacob Hacker (1996) argues that the Clinton administration’s task force pro-
vided an approach focused on “policy analysis,” not politics. Hacker’s judgment 
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on the limitations of policy analysis undermines the position of private foun-
dations that sought to make expert policymaking a central piece of governance.
By examining the interactions between task force members and C-SPAN call-
ers, the tension between policy analysis and political persuasion becomes even 
more apparent. The callers engaged passionately with arguments about the size 
of government and the corruption of the administration rather than with ac-
tual details of the plan. The rise and demise of the Clinton health care plan is a 
telling episode for understanding the kinds of expertise foundations wanted to 
introduce to the policymaking process and the political challenges embedded 
within the very crafting of this type of expertise. It also exposes a fundamental 
paradox that foundations had faced since the 1970s. As nonprofit institutions be-
came more politically and economically influential, the public increasingly ques-
tioned expert opinion and who could claim the mantle of expertise. 1 Republican 
lawmakers took advantage of this public distrust to undermine the credibility 
of the Clinton health care plan and the liberal commitment to harnessing the 
federal bureaucracy to provide for the public good. In fact, the language used 
by C-SPAN callers — a highly engaged and politically involved segment of the 
electorate — often mimicked the narratives espoused by conservative media out-
lets. Expert policy analysis failed to overcome an anti-government rhetoric es-
poused by conservative intellectual and media institutions for over four decades.
PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICS
Government officials, foundation leaders, and scholars have long viewed foun-
dations as a kind of policy laboratory with the flexibility to pilot reform efforts 
at a scale that governments could then expand (Zunz, 2014). Both the Kaiser and 
Johnson foundations viewed the Clinton administration’s commitment to a na-
tional health plan as a continuation of their missions and cumulation of tens of 
millions of dollars spent on reform efforts. So, when the administration sought 
to develop a comprehensive plan based on expert opinion, the administration 
and foundation directors found it natural for the task force to rely on the de-
cades of foundation research and talent.
However, foundations have long served as a tool to advance political agen-
das, sparking controversy as a result. 2 In fact, since the proposal for the first 
tax-exempt foundation in 1913, lawmakers have been skeptical of the influence 
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of foundations in the democratic process. In an essay expressing his misgivings, 
chairman of the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations Frank Walsh went as 
far as to declare foundations a “menace to the welfare of society” (Walsh, 1915). 
One of the earliest debates on the role of foundations centered around Margaret 
Sanger and her efforts to provide access and information concerning birth con-
trol to women regardless of their class. Sanger’s efforts to educate the public on 
the leading scientific opinions of the time and open health clinics promoted 
ideas that fit the eugenicist beliefs of her donors by increasing the prevalence 
of birth control among racial and ethnic minority groups. Efforts to serve im-
poverished communities seemingly fit Congress’s guidelines for tax exemption 
of organizations dedicated to “religious, charitable, or educational” purposes. 
However, throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s the controversial, and in some 
states illegal, nature of information concerning birth control found Sanger ad-
vocating for policy changes to enable the dissemination of birth control liter-
ature. Regulators felt that advocating for specific policy changes violated the 
congressional intent of the law. The courts agreed. For Sanger’s supporters, this 
meant that the IRS viewed their donations to programs that lobbied for legisla-
tive changes as political contributions and therefore ineligible for a tax deduc-
tion (Zunz, 2014, pp. 76–103).
In 1934, Congress codified previous judicial rulings that attempted to cre-
ate a firewall between philanthropy and politics allowing tax-exempt founda-
tions to educate but not advocate. And yet, the difference between education 
and advocacy proved rather gray throughout the century and often depended 
on the observer. In 1934, the National Economy League watched as Congress 
decided what limits to place on the practices of tax-exempt organizations. The 
tax-exempt group largely consisted of veterans and was organized around a non-
partisan goal of reducing wasteful spending in government. In response to cuts 
in veterans’ pensions, the group sent out material advocating for the restoration 
of the cut in benefits to every member of Congress. The group’s critics argued 
that just like with Sanger, the Economy League should lose its tax-exempt sta-
tus because it was involved in direct lobbying. However, the Economy League 
represented an important voting block of veterans and was left undisturbed by 
regulators (Zunz, 2014, pp. 76–103).
The inconsistent regulation of nonprofits continued with the activities of 
large foundations in the middle decades of the 20th century. In 1967, the Ford 
Foundation sought to continue its work with the Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE) to tackle the problem of growing racial inequality in deindustrialized 
1818. PrIvATE FOuNDATIONS AND THE HEAlTH SECurITY TASk FOrCE
cities. In this, the Ford Foundation appeared to be financially supporting CORE 
in its efforts to organize and register voters in Cincinnati and elect the city’s first 
Black mayor. Foundations had supported voter registration before, but previ-
ous efforts had focused on entire regions. Segregationists in Congress argued 
that the Ford Foundation waded into a specific political contest violating regu-
lations against advocacy. This perceived transgression led segregationists to lend 
their support to long-term critics of private foundations like populists such as 
Rep. Wright Patman (D-TX), who had sought for decades to curb the influence 
of wealth in politics. (Young, 2000; Zunz, 2014, pp. 220–231). Together, Patman 
and the segregationists’ efforts created an explicit definition of a “private foun-
dation” in the U.S. tax code and increased IRS oversight to prevent foundations 
from taking advantage of their tax status.
During the 1970s, new priorities among think tanks and policy researchers 
altered the relationship between philanthropy and politics, ultimately allowing 
foundations to exercise even more influence over policy. Foundations had long 
invested in public policy research based on a Progressive Era faith in the social 
sciences to solve complex problems (O’Connor, 2001, 2007). As social and eco-
nomic problems grew seemingly less localized and more complex throughout 
the 20th century, many foundations underwrote larger and larger projects de-
signed to combat the issues the foundation’s directors viewed as the most press-
ing. For instance, in response to the oil crises of the 1970s, the Ford Foundation 
spent $7.4 million on issues related to energy and the environment, including 
$2.4 million on the creation of a foundation-run policy research center on the 
issue (Ford Foundation, 1973).
Other exclusively grant-making foundations channeled their resources into 
public policy research by relying on think tanks as conduits. As historians Kim 
Phillips-Fein and Jason Stahl have shown, these grants proved influential, al-
lowing think tanks to develop the policy that matched the free-market and 
anti-regulatory beliefs of some foundation leaders that characterized much of the 
New Right (O’Connor, 2008; Phillips-Fein, 2009, 2011; Stahl, 2016). By choosing 
which topics foundations would study and who would study them, foundation 
leaders held immense power to direct policy debates. So long as the research 
avoided explicit partisanship, foundations would be seen as educating without 
advocating. The proliferation of think tanks designed to fit the ideological views 
of their donors inverted the notion of expert policymaking by allowing politi-
cians to find experts to support their favored policy claims rather than having 
expertise lead to policy.
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It was in this environment that the directors of the RWJF had to decide the 
priorities of a foundation that was soon to be the nation’s second largest foun-
dation. The foundation’s namesake, Gen. Robert Wood Johnson, transformed 
the family company, Johnson & Johnson, from a modest national medical sup-
plier to an international standard in medical manufacturing in his 30-year ten-
ure as CEO. His death in 1968 and subsequent $1 billion bequeathment to the 
foundation bearing his name led to a total overhaul of the RWJF that Gen. 
Johnson established in 1936 to manage his contributions to hospitals in the New 
Brunswick, New Jersey, area. In 1971 the foundation’s directors hired the dean 
of the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine as its president and moved out of the 
small two-story clapboard house that had long served as the foundation’s office, 
and in 1972 it committed to donating $45–$50 million to nonprofits and projects 
dedicated to health care. Second in size only to the Ford Foundation at that time, 
the foundation’s president promised to make gifts in concert with Gen. Johnson’s 
desire that all Americas have access to adequate health care regardless of their 
station. An independent Republican, Johnson had favored decentralizing busi-
ness operations, educating workers and nonworkers for a new era, raising the 
minimum wage, and promoting public health — all stances that often found him 
at odds with his peers. After his death, his estate funded the largest foundation 
dedicated almost exclusively to issues of health care training, access, and policy 
(Farber, 1971, 1972; “The Johnson Fund Is Widening Vistas,” 1972; “Robert Wood 
Johnson, 74, Dies,” 1972). This policy mission guided the foundation’s trustees 
in the Clinton health care debate as they pushed to ensure that the task force’s 
plan reflected their priorities and critiqued the plan for what they perceived as 
shortcomings (RWJF, 1994).
While lacking the financial clout of the RWJF, the KFF under president Drew 
E. Altman found innovative ways to utilize its resources into becoming one of 
the most influential voices in health care policy. Henry J. Kaiser, the famed ship-
builder of World War II and whose company played a pivotal role in the con-
struction of the Hoover and Grand Coulee Dams, created the foundation in 1948. 
After his death most of his estate went to the family foundation (Foster, 1989, pp. 
274, 278). While primarily known for his massive infrastructure projects and the 
large planned communities organized along the West Coast to smash production 
quotas during the war, Kaiser also created one of the nation’s first health main-
tenance organizations (HMO), the nonprofit Kaiser-Permanente Health. This 
plan brought doctors, associated health providers, and medical facilities from a 
variety of specialties under one plan to control costs and provide comprehensive 
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care with a particular focus on preventive care. This made it relatively inexpen-
sive for enrollees to seek care from the Kaiser-Permanente network of doctors 
but offered no benefits when utilizing providers outside of the umbrella (Starr, 
2017). While the Kaiser health plan proved popular among the majority of its 
enrollees, Kaiser and his son wanted the KFF to continue to innovate and bring 
robust and affordable health care to the masses with its policy study programs.
In 1990, when the KFF’s directors named political scientist Drew Altman as 
the foundation’s next president, the foundation underwent much more than a 
change of leadership. Altman, the former commissioner of health for the State 
of New Jersey and a former administrator at both the RWJF and Pew Charitable 
Trust, recognized that the KFF did not have the financial resources of the RWJF 
to pursue a wide range of initiatives. Therefore, he wanted to focus in depth on 
three areas and spend resources on ensuring that they reach the media and pol-
icymakers (Pallarito, 1990). Responding to the concerns of 1990, the KFF priori-
tized HIV/AIDS care and policy, reproductive health, and national health policy. 
In each of these areas, the foundation worked to become the premier informa-
tion clearinghouse, making sure that policymakers, members of the media from 
The Washington Post to MTV, and the general public recognized the KFF as a re-
liable source of information (Altman, 1998). The KFF focused on in-house pol-
icy research and media outreach — essentially creating a think tank within the 
foundation — as part of its prioritization of long-term policy solutions, a deci-
sion that Altman felt would allow the KFF to increase access to care far beyond 
what it could hope to achieve through the funding of community health clin-
ics. In the health care debate, foundations contributed directly through person-
nel and advertising that seemingly favored the Clinton plan, which opponents 
of the legislation later claimed crossed the line into direct advocacy.
PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS IN THE HEALTH CARE DEBATE
The work of individuals like Judith Feder, a Harvard PhD in political science and 
an expert in health policy, illustrated how foundations like the Kaiser and John-
son foundations acted as way stations for policy experts, providing resources and 
employment that allowed researchers to continue working when the politicians 
that favored their policies were out of power. Before being named an acting as-
sistant secretary of Health and Human Services, where she became one of the 
most visible members of the task force, Feder previously worked as an associate 
184 DEMOCrACY AND THE MEDIA
director of one of the KFF’s largest programs — the Commission on the Future 
of Medicaid. Before working for the KFF, she served as executive director of the 
Pepper Commission, a bipartisan congressional commission that worked from 
1989 to 1990 to produce a plan for health care reform, as well as working at the 
Urban Institute (C-SPAN, 1993a, 1993d). Feder’s oscillation between time in gov-
ernment and time in the nonprofit sector was far from unique. In fact, it shows 
how a small group of foundation directors shaped national debates by support-
ing the work of particular policy researchers.
Foundations, like universities and think tanks, trade on the stated nonpar-
tisanship of their actors, their perceived expertise, and their research output. 
During the health care debate, foundations magnified the voices of their direc-
tors in various ways. They could directly try to bring policymakers toward their 
way of seeing certain issues by deciding which studies on which issues were 
worth undertaking. Or, they could shape media narratives surrounding specific 
topics by seizing opportunities of having their roster of experts ready to weigh 
in when a particular issue gained public attention. In short, foundations had an 
indirect hand in shaping available options for policymakers during the Clinton 
health care debate by either supporting specific research projects or shaping the 
boundaries of policy. Individuals like Feder pushed this influence further by 
bridging the Clinton administration and the KFF.
The RWJF pursued other initiatives that proved more egregious to critics. The 
foundation funded six “fellows” assigned to various working groups on the task 
force. When court rulings and public pressure forced the administration to dis-
close the names of all task force members, the administration listed the fellows 
as legislative aides to various proponents of the bill, prompting further outcry 
(Center for Public Integrity, 1994). The foundation argued that it had funded 
legislative fellowships for decades, but with the initially secretive nature of the 
task force and the fact that these fellows played an active role in drafting such 
a sweeping and ostentatious proposed overhaul of the nation’s health care sys-
tem, opponents of the bill cried foul (Pear, 1993).
The administration’s connections to the Kaiser and Johnson foundations went 
beyond staffing. In a February 1993 letter from the president of the KFF, Drew 
Altman, to Carol Rasco, assistant to the president for domestic policy, Altman 
wrote, “Let me underscore again my willingness to be helpful with polls, media 
briefings, focus groups, or in any other way.” The letter was then shared with 
Ira Magaziner and Hillary Clinton with a note from Rasco describing Altman 
as a “genuine friend” of the administration (Altman, 1993). Whether due to 
this memo or for other reasons, Kaiser polls were often included in task force 
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proposals and later during the legislative push for the plan (Center for Public 
Integrity, 1994).
Beyond polling, the Clinton administration viewed people like Altman as cen-
tral to its media strategy. Internal memorandums laying out the media blitz to 
accompany the plan showed a reliance on foundation experts (Pellicci, 1994). 3 In 
a reference table of experts that the administration viewed as “sympathetic indi-
viduals whose opinions are valued by the media,” Clinton’s media team flagged 
Drew Altman as being particularly useful in speaking on the need for reform 
and current trends in public opinion and as a spokesman for outside interest 
groups (White House Health Care Task Force, 1994). Additionally, they listed 
Judy Feder as the preferred person to contact Altman. The memo stated that in-
ternal research and outreach had “great potential to backfire” and highlighted 
the need for foundation leaders like Altman to serve as “outside validators” of 
the Clinton health plan (White House Health Care Task Force, 1994). Sociologist 
Thomas Medvetz (2012) argues that one of the primary functions of think tanks 
has become filling media appearances in a 24-hour news landscape. The Clinton 
administration understood this and recruited Altman as an outside expert for 
its larger media rollout. This plan matched Altman’s commitment to a vigor-
ous courting of members of the media and policymakers so that the founda-
tion’s policy briefs reached its intended audience and did not yellow in a drawer.
The RWJF, however, took a more public approach in bringing the health care 
debate to citizens and policymakers. On June 21, 1994, the foundation hosted 
Tom Brokaw, Hillary Clinton, Senator Bob Dole (R-KS), and Senator George 
J. Mitchell (D-ME) for a two-hour primetime special on NBC devoted to the 
health care debate. To secure a two-hour block of ad-free coverage on the is-
sue, the RWJF paid $2.5 million to NBC and an additional $1 million to adver-
tise the special. Like the KFF, the RWJF had increasingly focused on using its 
resources to pursue media partnerships. In 1994 alone, the foundation direc-
tors approved grants to PBS, NPR, and Rock the Vote with the stated goal of 
increasing awareness of health care issues (RWJF, 1994). And in the lead-up to 
the plan’s formal introduction, the RWJF worked with the Clinton administra-
tion to sponsor a series of public listening events featuring First Lady Hillary 
Clinton (First Lady’s Office, 1993).
Yet, the primetime special turned heads as it appeared to some as a clear ex-
ample of a foundation funding the Clinton administration’s PR. In 1972, the 
founding directors of the RWJF made increasing access to basic health care for 
all Americans one of their primary goals: a goal that the foundation had spent 
hundreds of millions in pursuing over 20 years. By 1993, foundation leaders 
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recognized that the Clinton health plan, while not perfect, pushed their agenda 
of universal access and lower individual costs further toward reality (RWJF, 
1993). Defending the special, the foundation’s vice president of communication 
argued that while the foundation favored general reform of the nation’s health 
care system, “it had taken no political stand on the debate over health care” 
(Carter, 1994). However, after 22 years of trying to improve the national health 
care system, the RWJF found that Americans were confused by an overly com-
plex health care system. The foundation wanted to seize on the national focus 
to educate Americans about the menu of potential reforms, not just the Clinton 
plan. In its view, the NBC primetime special was simply the most conspicuous 
in a series of programs meant to inform Americans about the particulars of the 
health care debate under its larger organizational mission (Carter, 1994).
Despite the fact that Tom Brokaw and the NBC News division shaped the ac-
tual program, Republicans like Newt Gingrich’s press secretary, Tony Blankley, 
argued that the RWJF’s previous involvement with the task force would ensure 
unbalanced coverage (Carter, 1994). Such concerns were intensified when Hillary 
Clinton, while accompanied by Dole and Mitchell, emerged as the “star” of the 
evening. In town-hall-style segments, viewers watched as Clinton fielded ques-
tions from audience members who had suffered denials of coverage due to an 
unknown preexisting condition as well as a family at a loss as to how to pay for 
$700,000 in out-of-pocket expenses after the birth of their child with “severe re-
spiratory problems” (Goodman, 1994). The presence of Bob Dole, a Republican 
critic of the plan, did not assuage its opponents. One C-SPAN caller charac-
terized the special as coming “astonishingly close to being an endorsement for 
single-payer” (C-SPAN, 1994b). Overall, many Republicans found it hard to sep-
arate the similarities between the foundation’s mission of expanding access to 
health care and the Clinton administration’s plans of universal coverage. Notably, 
C-SPAN callers illustrate how the relationship between the administration and 
expert policy analysis failed to speak to some of the political concerns of the pe-
riod and the challenge both the administration and foundations had in navigat-
ing a newly matured conservative media apparatus.
THE LINES ARE OPEN
In the spring of 1992, the Times Mirror Center of the People & the Press con-
ducted a survey of respondents’ news consumption habits that provided a clear 
profile of self-described regular C-SPAN viewers. 4 Compared to viewers of PBS’s 
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MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour and regular CNN watchers, among others, C-SPAN 
viewers were the most politically engaged and invested segment of a larger sur-
vey. When asked whether they agreed with the statement “It doesn’t matter 
who gets elected,” only 4% of C-SPAN viewers agreed, compared to the 34% 
of the general population surveyed, illustrating an increased sense of political 
empowerment. Yet, while C-SPAN watchers were the most politically engaged 
and empowered segment of the survey, they also expressed the least amount 
of confidence in the federal bureaucracy, with 46% of C-SPAN viewers com-
pletely agreeing that “when something is run by the government it is usually 
ineffective,” compared to 29% of the total surveyed. Through a battery of ques-
tions, the report’s authors concluded that C-SPAN viewers defied easy catego-
rization. While more C-SPAN viewers typically identified as Republicans, they 
supported both social welfare programs and an “anti-Washington” view of pol-
itics at higher rates than the rest of the field (Times Mirror Center of the People 
& the Press, 1993). 5 C-SPAN viewers’ interactions with foundation-linked pol-
icy experts through C-SPAN call-in segments therefore provide a window into 
communication barriers the administration faced in trying to use policy experts 
to convey their message in a political landscape that proved increasingly hostile 
to expertise and federal bureaucracy.
The administration’s health care task force sought to bring the policy exper-
tise of decades of research to bear on the nation’s health care sector, yet in inter-
actions with the public, many expressed concerns with the notion of expertise 
itself. In a C-SPAN interview with Judy Feder, host Steve Scully focused on 
the policy-writing process before allowing callers to ask Feder questions. In a 
50-minute interview, Feder detailed both the daily workings of the task force and 
the group’s interaction with the president and took viewer questions. Similar to 
sentiments expressed on the evening after the plan’s rollout, callers voiced con-
cerns regarding the federal government’s ability to manage such a large bureau-
cratic undertaking, and for some, the task force’s reliance on experts signified 
an out-of-touch administration (C-SPAN, 1993a).
When given the chance to ask Feder questions, the majority of callers seemed 
more concerned with engaging the Republican talking points surrounding the is-
sue than the workings and recommendations of the task force. Viewers expressed 
fears that any type of health plan would increase the amount of time physicians 
spent filling out paperwork thereby reducing their time with patients. One was 
concerned that the United States must first resolve immigration policy and “re-
turn” undocumented residents to “where they come from” before a national 
health policy could be established. A physician worried that the task force relied 
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more on the advice of bureaucrats and PhDs and lacked a significant number of 
medical doctors (C-SPAN, 1993a). Callers peppered Feder with questions about 
the number of physicians on the task force, making it clear that they trusted the 
expertise of their doctor, not Feder and the federal bureaucracy. For other call-
ers, the use of expertise in policy writing raised suspicions and created distance 
between policymakers and their constituents (C-SPAN, 1993a). While Clinton 
wanted secrecy to avoid partisan dealmaking, some viewers saw it as another 
example of corrupt governance.
Scholars and pundits have long heralded Franklin Roosevelt’s “brain trust” 
as essential to turning progressive impulses into the New Deal administrative 
state, yet attempts to recapture this legacy proved elusive in the health care de-
bate during the 1990s. The Clinton administration attempted to draw on the 
sustained popularity of New Deal programs like Social Security, framing the is-
sue as a debate over “health security” in which each American would receive a 
“health security card” (Skocpol, 1997). But opponents of the New Deal had also 
commenced a campaign to roll back the policy programs and governing philos-
ophy while Roosevelt was still in office, and this opposition had grown tremen-
dously by the end of the 20th century (Phillips-Fein, 2009). Through foundations 
and think tanks, conservatives launched what historian Allison O’Connor calls a 
“counterintelligentsia” to bring works like that of the once-obscure F. A. Hayek 
into the mainstream and inflate the hold of free-market economics on main-
stream policy debates (Mayer, 2015; O’Connor, 2008). By the time Clinton un-
veiled his health care plan, conservatives had constructed their own notion of 
expertise and a robust media apparatus to disseminate their findings, which un-
dermined the legacy of the New Deal and narrative of expert policymaking that 
the administration centered in its media strategy.
In a speech on the House floor, Rep. James Hansen (R-UT) argued that “just 
like Whitewater, the White House has conveniently censored, back dated or tam-
pered with many documents which would enlighten the public as to who the 
members of the so-called working group were, what was actually discussed and 
how it was paid for” (140 Cong. Rec. 18590, 1994). Republicans in the House at-
tempted to slot the initial secrecy of the task force into a larger political narra-
tive about the corrupt nature of the Clinton White House by linking the task 
force to Whitewater — an investigation into a land deal that Clinton had made 
while governor of Arkansas, into which Kenneth Starr launched a full investi-
gation but found no impropriety (see Sherman, 2017). In this, Hansen declared 
that the connections to the Kaiser and Johnson foundations were improper and 
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that the secretive nature of the task force was a full-on scandal from an admin-
istration that lobbied in secret favors and profited off of backroom deals. 6
As such, it did not matter that when pressed for an alternative to the Clinton 
plan most Republicans would point to a plan developed in large part by the 
Heritage Foundation, a think tank that often received contributions from con-
servative foundations. These critics also ignored how the famous Harry & Louise 
ad campaign — which fostered public opposition to the plan and featured prom-
inent Republicans like Newt Gingrich in the lead-up to the 1994 midterms — had 
been funded by the Health Insurers Association of America, a lobbying group 
led by a former Republican representative (Center for Public Integrity, 1994, 
p. 27). In fact, contrary to its name, the Health Insurers Association of America 
only represented small- to medium-sized insurance companies during the health 
care debate. The nation’s largest health insurers left the organization in part be-
cause they favored the Clinton plan and likely stood to gain from the new na-
tional health care market (Chapin, 2019). The effectiveness of the Health Insurers 
Association of America came from its messaging, not its membership. Its mes-
saging focused on sowing fear and uncertainty about costs, coverage, and gov-
ernment control. Conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation then 
grounded these appeals with their own policy analysis. During the two years 
of planning and debate, they published 94 pieces on health care reform, most 
opposing Clinton’s approach (Heritage Foundation, n.d.). These opinions then 
found their way to the growing conservative media base that listened to pro-
grams like that of radio talk show host Rush Limbaugh.
The charges that the task force’s connections to foundations were corrupt 
struck home not because of the purity of the other side but because of the ability 
of Republicans and the plan’s critics to fit the charge into a larger political nar-
rative permeating these conservative media outlets and the millions of listen-
ers that figures like Limbaugh reached (Skocpol, 1997, p. 149). On conservative 
talk radio, the Clinton plan represented bumbling technocrats and government 
overreach. Even as Clinton sat down with Don Imus in 1994, the constant bar-
rage of emotion and attacks appears to have been too much for the health care 
plan rooted in facts and expertise (Hemmer, 2016; Rosenwald, 2019). In conser-
vative media, the feeling of whether or not something was true and fit existing 
beliefs mattered more than the opinions of experts when those experts chal-
lenged what felt true (Hemmer, 2016). In exit polls of the 1994 midterm elec-
tion, half of those surveyed said they listened to conservative radio, and those 
that said they listened frequently voted Republican by a margin of three-to-one 
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(Skocpol, 1997, p. 149). Conservative media, the decades of challenges to ex-
pertise, and the fears of unknowns in health care had proven too much for the 
Clinton plan and the foundations that had hoped to work with the administra-
tion to achieve their policy goals.
On a campaign stop for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, for-
mer senator Rick Santorum (R-PA) reflected on the 1994 health care debate. In 
his remarks, Santorum spoke of an interview featuring Ira Magaziner amid the 
debate. He recalled:
In the mid-1990s, he was on Meet the Press with [former Texas senator] Phil 
Gramm and they were going back and forth about the Clinton health-care 
plan and who cares for this and how good this is where your kids, whatever. 
He finally got frustrated and said I care for your children as much as you do, 
Phil. And he looked at him and said you care for my children as much as I 
do? He said, yes. And he asked, what are their names? You know 
your children’s names, right? You know what they want. As much as 
Washington says they care, they don’t, because they don’t know your 
kids. (C-SPAN, 2012)
Santorum’s recollection reflects much of the scholarly literature on the health 
care debate. In condensing the health care plan’s failings into a policymaker not 
knowing the names of a representative’s children. Santorum was not attacking 
the plan on the merits of the policy or the validity of the expert analysis upon 
which the administration and foundations had relied. Rather, he spoke to the 
nature of government and bureaucracy and the inability of the administration 
to sell the American people on a political proposition.
Bill Clinton introduced his health care plan after much speculation and fan-
fare. Seeking to succeed where others had repeatedly failed, he employed experts 
with connections to large private foundations to try to elevate his proposal above 
partisan politics. Foundations with long-standing interests in health care pol-
icy, like the Kaiser and Johnson foundations, perceived Clinton’s health care ini-
tiative as a way to realize their core mission of expanding access to health care. 
Yet, as C-SPAN callers made clear, the language of expertise had lost some of its 
currency in policy debates as it failed to push the conversation past the political 
narratives popularized by conservative media. Additionally, Republican lawmak-
ers saw foundation connection not as a source of outside validation but as addi-
tional fodder for their attacks on an administration they viewed as corrupt. In 
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the end, it was not special interest lobbying groups that undermined health care 
reform, but rather a failure of the language of policy expertise to overcome grow-
ing fears of the federal government and the politicians that stoked those fears.
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NOTES
 1. Historians have come to view the “golden age of expertise” that supposedly in-
formed the post–World War II period as a somewhat contrived idea that fails 
to account for the barriers surrounding knowledge production during the Cold 
War. Among the most notable are the ideological, racial, gendered, and hetero-
sexist assumptions regarding who could be an expert and the professional and 
sometimes legal repercussions for those who failed to meet or defied those cat-
egorizations. For example, historian Jessica Wang notes that scientists were in 
fact some of the most likely individuals to fall victim to anticommunist hunts 
and purges severally limiting the ability of dissention in the crafting of U.S. nu-
clear policy. See Wang (1999). Likewise, see Rodgers (2012) and Balogh (1991).
 2. See for instance historian Karen Ferguson’s (2013) study on the relationship be-
tween the Ford Foundation and Black Power movement.
 3. In one such memo, task force advisors sent Drew Altman questions to ask the 
author of a report critical of the plan. While it is unclear whether Altman used 
these questions, the fact that the memo’s author thought Altman might be will-
ing to ask the administration provided questions is telling of their relationship 
(see Pellicci, 1994).
 4. Conducted from May 28, 1992, to June 10, 1992, the Times Mirror Center survey 
consisted of 3,517 participants, 90 of whom self-identified as “regular” C-SPAN 
viewers. This survey compared the opinions and beliefs of C-SPAN viewers to 
those who were regular viewers of CNN and PBS’s MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour, 
regular listeners of NPR, and “heavy readers” of daily newspapers. It was pos-
sible for respondents to be considered in more than one category. While only 
90 respondents identified as C-SPAN viewers, the report’s authors considered 
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BREAKING THE FOURTH WALL
C-SPAN2 and Senate Leaders’ Views of Television Coverage
Douglas B. Harris
l
ate in February 1986, the United States Senate’s debate on whether to tele-
vise its own proceedings culminated with key floor votes that paved the way 
for gavel-to-gavel coverage. The Senate would make that choice to televise 
permanent later that same year. Nearly seven years after the House had gone 
live on March 19, 1979, the Senate would now be televised and broadcast to the 
public on C-SPAN2.
This decision had the potential to change how the Senate operated insti-
tutionally, shifting the balance of legislative influence between the committee 
system and the Senate floor, altering the behavior of individual Senators who 
might play to the cameras, and tilting power between the majority and the mi-
nority parties in the chamber. Early proponents of Senate television, like Majority 
Leader Howard Baker (R-TN), were quick to deny that it would fundamentally 
alter the institution, arguing instead that it was but a “simple extension by elec-
tronic means of the public gallery” of the Senate (128 Cong. Rec. 6829, 1982). All 
agreed that it was a decision laden with consequence. Senate Democratic leader 
Robert Byrd (D-WV) thought broadcast coverage was “a great step forward for 
the Senate as an institution” (132 Cong. Rec. 33823, 1986).
Despite the importance of Senate television, scholars know relatively little 
about how Senate leaders regarded television’s potential impact on the institu-
tion, how they made decisions behind the scenes, and how both parties’ leaders 
deliberated and negotiated regarding this pivotal change. Whereas some excel-
lent analyses of the Senate’s choice to televise its own proceedings exist (Fenno, 
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1989; Frantzich & Sullivan, 1996; Maloney 1990), this current work on Senate 
party leaders’ roles sheds new light on this signature moment in Senate history.
Party leaders, always important in key Senate decisions, are particularly active 
on issues that go to the day-to-day operations of Congress and where a choice 
has the potential to change the nature of the institution and the lives and political 
careers of their colleagues. In this case, Senator Robert Byrd, as minority leader, 
was a key figure — what political scientists call a “policy entrepreneur” — press-
ing the case for Senate TV during the 99th Congress. Along with then–majority 
leader Bob Dole (R-KS), Byrd takes center stage in this recounting of the con-
siderations, interparty negotiations, and eventual adoption of the resolution that 
brought gavel-to-gavel broadcast coverage of the Senate. Leveraging documents 
discovered in the archived papers of Senators Dole and Byrd, this chapter ex-
amines how the Senate’s top leaders viewed television and how those views af-
fected the behind-the-scenes search for answers and accommodations as well 
as the ultimate decision to go live. 1
SENATE BROADCASTING: A PRE-HISTORY
The Senate, compared to the House of Representatives, had long had an ambiv-
alent relationship with television. In the 1950s, for example, when both cham-
bers still held to their traditional reluctance to allow too much press and public 
scrutiny, Senate committees were opening up to broadcast coverage more than 
was the case in the House. Seeking to guard the House from efforts to broadcast 
proceedings, speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) would cite the Senate as a caution-
ary tale. His protégé Richard Bolling (D-MO) said that Rayburn believed that 
television coverage of Senate committee hearings had “made ham actors out of 
ambitious Senators” (Bolling, 1965).
If individual senators were increasingly drawn to media politics, the Senate it-
self (institutionally speaking) was more removed and set apart. Constitutionally, 
the Senate’s larger, statewide constituencies and its six-year terms made it less im-
mediately beholden to the people. Characterizations of the 1950s’ Senate claimed 
it was decidedly separate from the outside world and cordoned off. The titles 
of two prominent books on the Senate from that era captured this institutional 
isolation: political scientist Donald R. Matthews’s (1960) U.S. Senators and Their 
World examined the internal folkways of the institution as if it was, in fact, a 
distinctive world, and journalist William S. White’s (1957) Citadel: The Story of 
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the U.S. Senate characterized the institution as a fortress, separated from society 
and nurturing its own internal operations in part by limiting external influences.
Noting a fundamental transformation in the Senate in ensuing decades, po-
litical scientist Nelson Polsby (1969) looked back on the Senate of that earlier 
era as “an encapsulated men’s club” that had nevertheless turned into a “public-
ity machine” by the 1960s, a trend that surely continued in succeeding decades. 
As was the case with the House, the steady march of time was punctuated by the 
influx of new senators in key election years like 1958 and 1974; the consequent 
generational turnover yielded a growing appetite for media politics (Sinclair, 
1989). Still, some senators resisted the growing allure of media politics and de-
nied the strength of arguments in favor of transparency and “sunshine.” Their 
long-standing concerns about Senate television went directly to the Senate’s tra-
ditional role in the American political system and the likely impact that televi-
sion would have on senatorial behavior.
These “traditionalists” believed that televising the Senate would change it 
fundamentally and for the worse. Analyzing the 1982 debate over televising the 
Senate as principally a debate between Howard Baker and Russell Long (D-LA), 
political scientist Richard Fenno (1989) characterized the arguments as repre-
senting Long’s older “communitarian” view of the Senate as opposed to Baker’s 
russell B. long (D-lA), leader of the opposition to Senate television.
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(and other television advocates’) individualistic view of a more outward-looking 
Senate. Long’s view harkened back to characterizations of the Senate as “a club — a 
men’s club, of course — or a small town” where there was a key distinction be-
tween “workhorses” who were to be praised for quietly doing the Senate’s work 
as opposed to “showhorses,” those who self-servingly sought the limelight and 
often sought public credit for the real work done by their workhorse colleagues 
behind the scenes (314–315). 2 For Long, the Senate’s unique qualities and tradi-
tional mores needed to be preserved.
But these older objections were giving way for three primary reasons. First, 
the House of Representatives’ experience with television was mostly positive and 
valuable to its members, especially as C-SPAN’s addition to cable subscriptions 
and viewership grew. Senate leaders were increasingly anxious to follow suit just 
to compete with the House’s newfound prominence. C-SPAN founder Brian 
Lamb recounted a story of how Senator Byrd had been introduced back home 
in West Virginia as the now more famous speaker of the House and, more gen-
erally, how senators were “tired of seeing the House on television in their offices” 
(Lamb, 1986). 3 Lamb noted that the imbalance of House and Senate coverage 
could not only be the source of such embarrassments but it might also become 
a tangible threat to the careers of rank-and-file senators: “I always felt that the 
Senate would get a lot more interested in televising its sessions when it found 
some of its own members being defeated by House members” (Lamb, 1986).
Secondly, the Senate itself was changing as “the arrival of a younger genera-
tion of senators more comfortable before the camera” was growing (Frantzich 
& Sullivan, 1996, p. 57). As was the case with the adoption of House television, 
generational turnover meant that with each election cycle an increased propor-
tion of the chamber’s membership was more comfortable with television and 
had been socialized to its prominence in American society and in contemporary 
politics. C-SPAN, which was tracking senator support for the change, had iden-
tified growth over time to 62 “solid commitments” in favor of broadcast cover-
age. Generational displacement seems to have been pivotal in growing the vote 
for in the early 1980s. Comparing key votes on Senate television in 1982 and 
1986 revealed that generational turnover was determinative: “This new group [in 
1986] was younger, accustomed to a Congress where there was more indepen-
dence from the demands of party leaders, and where their media skills played 
a critical role in their legislative and political interests” (Maloney, 1990, p. 71).
Understanding these first two reasons helps to frame the nature of the question 
that faced advocates of Senate television. Those who considered the permeability 
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of the Senate and thought more broadly about its place in the political system as 
it interacted with the public, the press, and the other branches of government 
in the separation of powers were eager to find a way to televise the institution. 
By contrast, those who still considered the Senate an inward-looking “citadel” 
where the bulk of the work was done by “workhorses,” behind-the-scenes and 
especially in committee, were apt to oppose broadcast coverage, which they 
thought disruptive of the normal workings of the chamber and detrimental to 
its unique role in the American system. 4 Because these competing forces were 
evenly matched enough that the outcome was not preordained, leadership in-
volvement was necessary to find a path forward, to clear obstacles, and to rec-
oncile the chamber’s competing impulses and identities.
This leads to the third reason for the eventual adoption of Senate television: 
pivotal actions taken by Senate Democratic and Republican leaders effectively 
took the Senate into its new era of openness. At first, it seemed that the cham-
pion to do so would be Republican Senate leader Howard Baker, who, in be-
coming majority leader after the 1980 elections, made exploring Senate TV the 
“very first legislative proposal” he offered (Fenno, 1989, p. 320). As committed 
as he was to the cause, though, his advocacy of televising the Senate competed 
with his other aims as leader and lost out to other aspects of the agenda in 1981 
Senator Howard Baker (r-TN), majority leader and advocate for television.
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(Frantzich & Sullivan, 1996, p. 55). In April 1982, facing a filibuster by Senator 
Long, Baker and his pro-TV allies fell 13 votes short of what they would need to 
proceed to consideration of a television proposal. Baker similarly fell short in 
1984, concluding, “It is clear to me that this is an idea whose time has not come” 
(Maloney, 1990, pp. 25, 29).
But Senate TV’s time was fast approaching. After Baker retired from the 
Sen ate in 1984, a new champion of Senate television emerged in the person of 
Democratic leader Robert Byrd, who, along with Republican leader Bob Dole, 
helped to solidify the growing support for Senate television and clear its path 
for adoption. For the Senate to take the crucial, final steps toward television, 
leadership mattered. Byrd would be the “policy entrepreneur” who seized the 
opportunities for change, and, as he put it, “move this institution out of the com-
munications dark ages and into the 20th century before we reach the 21st cen-
tury” (Byrd, 1986b).
SENATE TELEVISION’S ENTREPRENEUR: MINORITY LEADER ROBERT BYRD
In his classic treatment of how a policy idea’s time comes, political scientist John 
Kingdon argued that there is often a pivotal role played by a “policy entrepre-
neur.” For change to occur, change opportunities must be matched to solutions, 
impediments must be cleared, and opponents must be persuaded, appeased, 
or bested. This is accomplished by individual entrepreneurs who are defined 
by their “willingness to invest their resources–time, energy, reputation” in or-
der to achieve change (Kingdon, 1984, p. 122). As minority leader, Robert Byrd 
“became the key player in the battle over Senate television” (Frantzich & Sulli-
van, 1996, p. 55).
Robert Byrd was somewhat oddly cast as Senate television’s entrepreneur. A 
consummate “inside” player, Byrd had entered the formal Senate Democratic 
leadership in 1967 when elected as secretary of the Democratic Caucus, and he 
moved up in the ranks by successfully challenging Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) 
to become whip in 1971. He rose again to the position of leader in 1977 upon the 
retirement of Mike Mansfield (D-MT) and when his chief rival, former vice pres-
ident Hubert Humphrey, withdrew from the race. Observers at the time claimed 
that Byrd had been picked as a candidate of the Senate’s “inside game” thanks in 
part to his having done “little favors” for colleagues and to the fact that Democrats 
“wanted technicians, not policy makers” as their leaders (Rosenbaum, 1977).
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Comparing himself to his Senate Democratic leader predecessor, Mike Mans-
field, Byrd said, “I never sought out the press. Let me put it this way, I felt that 
others were better on television than I was. I felt that there were other leader-
ship responsibilities that I could do well and much better than that of making 
TV appearances, although I made a good many. I did it when I thought it was 
necessary. It was not my forte” (Baker, 1990, Part I, p. 3). At one key moment 
in Howard Baker’s 1982 fight to televise the Senate, Byrd voted against a cloture 
motion that would have cleared the way for a vote to televise. 5 As a result, when 
it came to the showdown question of whether or not he would support tele-
vised coverage of the Senate on a permanent basis, Byrd has been characterized 
as a “one-time opponent” of this next step of openness (Maloney, 1990, p. 31). 
According to Fenno (1989), Byrd “had not perceived the desirability of such a 
change, had not favored it, and had to be converted” by Howard Baker (p. 320).
Baker’s persuasive power notwithstanding, two additional points seem rele-
vant to Byrd’s eventual role as “entrepreneur” in favor of Senate TV. First, even 
if Byrd was not as “telegenic” and media-eager as many of his colleagues, he 
had been a consistent advocate of increased “sunshine” dating back more than 
a decade. As early as 1973, Byrd introduced a resolution (S. Res. 136) to “autho-
rize the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration to study the possibil-
ity of televising and broadcasting sessions of the Senate” (119 Cong. Rec. 22539, 
1973). When Senator Lee Metcalf (D-MT) introduced S. Res. 39 during the 94th 
Congress (1975–1976) to provide for radio and television coverage of the Senate, 
Byrd was one of 35 Senate co-sponsors of that measure, which was referred to the 
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration but was not acted upon (Byrd, 
1985a). Byrd was at least open to the general early 1970s thrust toward greater 
congressional “sunshine.”
Byrd was also an advocate of the Senate temporarily opening up to broadcast 
coverage for high-profile events in the 1970s. As the House experience with tele-
vising the Nixon impeachment hearings received general public approval, Byrd 
took to the Senate floor in July 1974 to advocate for televising the Senate trial of 
Nixon if the House were to impeach (120 Cong. Rec. 13654, 1974). Byrd, along 
with Republican senate leader Hugh Scott (R-PA), introduced a resolution to 
permit broadcast of Nelson Rockefeller’s swearing in as vice president. And, as 
majority leader, Byrd introduced S. Res. 268 in September of 1977 to allow radio 
and television coverage of the Senate’s consideration of the Panama Canal treaty, 
though the provision to televise was stripped out by the Senate Committee on 
Rules and Administration; ultimately, audio portions of the debate were carried 
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by CBS and NBC radio, while NPR carried the debate gavel-to-gavel (Byrd, 1985; 
Maloney, 1990, pp. 19–20).
Second, the generational changes that were adding pressure for more Senate 
openness were also putting pressure on Byrd’s own position as leader. Senate 
party leaders are elected and must be responsive to the demands of their col-
leagues who elect them. Byrd knew this well, having ousted Ted Kennedy as whip 
in 1971 in part because Kennedy had been seen by his colleagues as neglectful 
of the role (Peabody, 1976). Fast-forward to the 1980s, and now it was Byrd who 
was the vulnerable incumbent. Byrd had suffered a last-minute challenge to his 
reelection as leader in 1984 from Senator Lawton Chiles (D-FL). Although Byrd 
easily beat Chiles 36–11 in the party’s closed-door vote, the challenge itself was 
notable, and even those who had supported Byrd voiced criticisms of his lead-
ership and a need for change, including complaints about Byrd’s role as media 
spokesperson for the party (Cohodas & Tate, 1984). Shepherding the historic 
change of televising the Senate may have helped Byrd to inoculate himself from 
mounting frustrations among Senate Democrats regarding his performance of 
the leader’s media role.
On the first day of the 99th Congress (1985–1986) and less than a month after 
the Chiles challenge, Byrd introduced Senate Resolution 28 (S. Res. 28), which 
would provide for radio and television broadcast of the Senate, administer a test 
period, and streamline several chamber rules to make the Senate more intelligi-
ble and watchable for a television audience. In addition to preparing the Senate 
physically for broadcast facilities and equipment and determining how to prop-
erly archive and disseminate the audio and video records of the proceedings, the 
resolution prohibited the political or commercial use of tapes, instituted new 
procedures regarding germaneness of floor amendments and to expedite cloture 
processes, and authorized funds necessary for accomplishing the resolution’s aims. 
This original provision did not provide for “gavel-to-gavel” coverage but rather 
for “continuous coverage at such times as agreed by the Majority and Minority 
Leaders”; such a joint agreement between the two leaders was an effort, according 
to Byrd, to deal with “fairness problems” that might work to the detriment of the 
minority party (Senate Resolution 28, 1985; Democratic Policy Committee, 1985a).
Taking the lead, Byrd pressed the case for Senate television both inside the 
chamber as well as outside to the press and the public. In a March 1985 address 
to the Board of Directors of the Radio-Television News Directors Association, 
he noted that the Senate’s “intricate rules” were the “greatest obstacles to per-
mitting radio and television coverage” as he touted key rules changes that would 
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“speed up the business of the Senate” while still “preserving the rights of the mi-
nority members” (Radio-Television News Directors Association, 1985). Wrestling 
with the rules obstacles required accommodating Senate traditions and existing 
power bastions, all the while “breaking the fourth wall” to think of how televi-
sion viewers would experience Senate debates and proceedings.
Television’s opponents were quick to point out that any such changes would 
impact the Senate’s existing power structures. At issue was the effect that TV and 
the attendant rules changes would have on the power of each party respectively 
and of party leaders overall. Senator Wendell Ford (D-KY) saw in the Senate-TV 
proposal an opportunity to “re-examine the present balance of power” between 
leaders and followers in the hopes of “increas[ing] the power of the leaders” 
and “expedit[ing] the work of the Senate” (U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and 
Administration, 1985, p. 4). Byrd saw the potential impact on the parties and 
was looking for a middle ground between majority rule and minority rights, tell-
ing the Senate Rules Committee, “I think we have a responsibility as Senators to 
protect the minority, and as a former Majority Leader, I well understand that. 
But we’ve also got to protect the Senate against the tyranny of a minority” (U.S. 
Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 1985, p. 41).
There would be effects on the committee system as well, as Russell Long and 
other Senate “traditionalists” pointed out. They anticipated that senators would 
gravitate more to the floor, thus neglecting their committee responsibilities. 
Such shifts would not only impact the power of the Senate’s committee chairs 
but it could also negatively impact the quality of committee deliberations. In 
response, Byrd proposed to the Senate Rules Committee to have the Senate “in 
session Mondays, Tuesdays, and Thursdays, and committee hearings would be 
scheduled at times or on days that the Senate was not in session.” Seeking a mid-
dle ground, Byrd offered his view that “the Senate can maintain its traditions 
while also meeting the realities of our times. We can change without violating 
the unique role of the Senate” (Byrd, 1985b).
Byrd was developing the position that the Senate’s role in the separation of 
powers and in the public view needed preserving, too. He repeatedly argued 
that the Senate needed television because “we can’t hold our own with the White 
House, and we can’t hold our own with the other body if they have TV and we 
don’t” (quoted in Roberts, 1985). Reinforcing these broad institutional aims was 
the fact that minority party Democrats were feeling the pressure of Reagan’s 
media acumen as well as the need to project their own messages from the dis-
advantageous role of the minority. Looking back, Byrd said, “We couldn’t get a 
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message across, especially being in the minority. We didn’t control the commit-
tees; consequently, we had no fora in which to project our view” (Baker, 1990, 
Part I, p. 8). Such pressure was as much due to inter-chamber politics as it was 
to White House media efforts. Byrd cited the House of Representatives’ use of 
C-SPAN in “more successfully molding public sentiment than the Senate” as 
“the most influential factor in laying the groundwork for televising the Senate” 
(Byrd, 1985a). In the hopes of maintaining the Senate’s overall role in the sepa-
ration of powers, Byrd warned, “The Senate must find a workable way to tele-
vise its proceedings if it is to remain a ‘visible policy-making part of our national 
government’” (Byrd, 1985d).
When the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration returned to the 
subject of television in September of 1985, Byrd’s proposals, along with those 
of Senator William Armstrong (R-CO), received consideration. The commit-
tee met with an air of inevitability that the Senate would eventually televise 
and with agreement between the competing proposals about most major ques-
tions. Generally following the regulations that the House had adopted in 1979, 
Armstrong and Byrd agreed: the Senate rather than broadcasters would control 
the cameras; camera shots would focus on the speaker rather than panning the 
chamber; there would be an interim test period of television’s technical aspects 
and political effects; and commercial and electoral-political use of the tapes 
would be prohibited (Blakely, 1985). They differed in that Armstrong called for 
gavel-to-gavel coverage, a larger appropriation than Byrd did ($3.5 million to 
$2.5 million), and minimal rules changes. Byrd, by contrast, called for majority 
and minority leader agreement to televise and significant rules changes outlined 
above related to committees, majority-minority party balance, and streamlin-
ing the debate and legislative processes (Blakely, 1985; Byrd, 1985d). Comparing 
his proposal for televising the Senate to Armstrong’s proposal, Byrd staff noted 
that the “major difference . . . comes in the area of how to protect the rights of 
the minority” (Saffold, 1985).
In late October, the Senate Rules Committee reported out approving the move 
to televise. Byrd’s office issued a press release touting the decision as “an over-
whelming endorsement,” though the committee, in fact, seemed to agree with 
Armstrong more opting for gavel-to-gavel coverage and to delay the consider-
ation of rules changes. Claiming victory and shifting his stance, Byrd was now 
in favor of gavel-to-gavel coverage and would turn his attention to inter-party 
negotiations with Majority Leader Dole to make another attempt at adjusting 
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Senate rules and working to prepare the Senate to look better on TV (Byrd, 1985e; 
Democratic Policy Committee, 1985d).
As Byrd planned for the 2nd session of the 99th Congress (1986), it was clear 
that televising the Senate was among his top leadership initiatives. Staffer Abby 
Saffold advised Byrd that he “should have at least two objectives during the com-
ing session. The first is to ensure that S. Res. 28 is scheduled early in the session 
as Senator Dole committed on the floor. The second is to maintain your lead-
ership in this area.” Far more than a mere “to do” list, the objectives required 
strategic effort and work to get the Republican leadership on board, to con-
structively engage opponents to Senate television, and to marshal allies. Noting 
that Dole was at best ambivalent, Saffold pressed Byrd to “to continue to press 
Senator Dole publicly for floor time for S. Res. 28”; citing senators Russell Long 
and William Proxmire (D-WI) as key potential opponents, she advised, “You 
will need to lay some groundwork with your colleagues”; and knowing that the 
Rules Committee would be a key venue and that Republican votes would be 
necessary (both to keep Dole on board and for final passage), she observed that 
rules chairman Senator Mac Mathias (R-MD) should be enlisted to shore up 
Republican support (Saffold, 1986a).
In but a few short years, Byrd had moved from a position of skepticism and 
ambivalence to being the central player — the policy entrepreneur — in prepar-
ing the chamber for television. More than just a personal conviction, it seems, 
too, to have been a good way to shore up his position as leader with a Senate 
Democratic Party that was eager to compete more in the media politics of the era. 
Byrd wanted not only to lead the effort but, tellingly, to be seen by his colleagues 
as having led it, given that they had voiced their desires for more media-oriented, 
public leadership from Byrd as minority leader. Byrd aimed to deliver.
LEADERSHIP CLEARS THE PATH
Byrd’s entrepreneurship on behalf of moving the Senate toward television in-
volved clearing remaining obstacles by enlisting the support or acquiescence 
of Majority Leader Bob Dole, ameliorating the effects of opposition by Rus-
sell Long and other Senate traditionalists, and countering the argument, made 
by Long and other opponents, that television would fundamentally change the 
Senate for the worse.
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The key action shifted to inter-party negotiations between Byrd and Dole. 
These discussions repeatedly touched on the following puzzles: (1) institutional 
considerations — how to make television logistically possible in order to promote 
the Senate to the public and relative to the other branches in the separation of 
powers; (2) process concerns — how to make existing Senate processes palatable 
and intelligible to a television audience; and (3) partisan differences — how to ac-
complish both of the foregoing without unduly altering the partisan balance of 
power, particularly in regard to the preservation of minority rights.
Logistics and the Technical Aspects of Senate TV
A first-level set of issues for advocates of Senate television to address was how 
to ensure that broadcasts could be accomplished professionally and in a way 
that allowed senators and the Senate to be perceived favorably by the public. As 
late as February 24, 1986, key technical details remained to be hammered out. 
The architect of the Capitol set forth several problems, including the inability to 
“find a supplier who can deliver a proper [camera and remote control] system” 
in time for the interim test as well as considerations regarding proper “lighting 
modifications” and “the establishment of a temporary control room.” Failure to 
address these issues, the architect warned, would produce “deficiencies” that 
could lead to “unjust criticisms” of the overall proposal to televise (White, 1986). 6
Senators Dole and Byrd, the two Senate leaders on the first day of televised proceedings.
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Inter-Party Leadership Negotiations
Majority Leader Bob Dole had a general interest in broader media and public 
opinion politics (especially given his presidential ambitions). Dole was a fre-
quent figure on Sunday television talk programs, his press staff was particularly 
active in promoting Dole to the Washington media, and he even had a “daily ra-
dio ‘debate’ show with Ted Kennedy” (Dole, 1985). Still, he was uncertain about 
institutionalizing television in the Senate. A key sign of this ambivalence was 
the fact that Dole cast the only “no” vote in the September 29, 1985, Rules Com-
mittee vote to push toward broadcast coverage. 7 Dole’s support, or at least his 
acquiescence, still had to be won.
Coupled with his ambition to bring television to the Senate, Robert Byrd also 
wanted to establish an appropriate balance of majority rule and minority rights 
in Senate debate. Whereas the Rules Committee’s passed version of Byrd’s res-
olution had taken out the rules changes that he proposed, Byrd nevertheless 
pressed for their inclusion in his subsequent negotiations with Dole. 8 On January 
14, 1986, leadership staffer Abby Saffold (1986a) noted that “how to guarantee 
fair treatment of the minority by the majority” was a strategic aim and had gen-
erally “been one of the most difficult stumbling blocks to achieving televised 
coverage of the Senate.” To build the case for fairer treatment of the minority, 
the Democratic leadership sent Democratic Policy Committee staff on research 
quests to compile information about state legislative experience with televised 
coverage as well as that of legislatures in “the major industrialized democracies 
around the globe.” In one notable follow-up on the research, Byrd staff sought 
information on how those state legislatures that televise proceedings “deal with 
the general question of fairness to the minority and the specific question of fil-
ibusters” (Bunton 1986a, 1986b).
With the majority’s power at stake, Dole’s staff was monitoring developments 
closely. In a memo to the majority leader, top Dole staffer Sheila Burke character-
ized the bill reported out of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration 
as “a modified version of Senator Byrd’s original resolution” — the modifications 
being the absence of rules changes — and that it had the support of both sena-
tors William Armstrong (R-CO) and Al Gore (D-TN), so the coalition was bi-
partisan and relatively broad (Burke, 1986a). With the rules’ questions still up in 
the air, internal documents indicate that negotiations between the two leader-
ship offices were ongoing behind the scenes. Burke told Dole in mid-February 
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that Byrd was considering a set of rules changes that Dole had suggested but 
that Byrd was “unhappy” with Dole’s suggestion that the TV coverage not be 
gavel-to-gavel but instead that it would only commence with a non-debatable 
motion. 9 (As a counterproposal, Burke recommended that Dole seek “additional 
coverage of the press briefing” that occurs before each session [Burke, 1986b].) 
Though generally cooperative, each side was seeking concessions from the other.
The very next day Saffold wrote a memo to Byrd that cited the fact that “a 
number of [Dole’s] proposals are almost identical to several that you have pro-
posed” but warned that “a number of them seem to me to go too far in the direc-
tion of streamlining Senate procedures at the expense of the Minority” (Saffold, 
1986b). First, she noted Dole’s proposal to televise a day’s Senate proceedings 
pursuant to a non-debatable motion provided only for “consultation” with the 
minority leader but not for joint agreement between both leaders. A second ob-
jection noted that the minority leader also wanted “more of a say” in the deci-
sion regarding when the interim test of Senate TV would occur. Finally, she also 
highlighted a subtle (but consequential) difference in regard to Byrd’s proposals 
to streamline filibusters and invoke cloture, and regarding what it would take to 
overturn rulings of the chair on questions of germaneness. If the first two differ-
ences went to the role that the minority leader himself would play, the last went 
to how far the Senate would go to preserve the rights of minority party mem-
bers to slow or to alter legislation on the Senate floor.
Just days after these negotiations, a deal had been struck. Byrd and Dole, 
along with senators Ted Stevens (R-AK) and Wendell Ford (D-KY), joined in 
an agreement to propose a set of rules changes and to recombine the rules ques-
tions with the Senate’s broadcast decision, streamlining some of the cumbersome 
processes that the Senate used regarding its motion to proceed, the requirements 
for cloture (on rules changes and on other matters) and settling the germaneness 
question, eliminating the practice of considering treaties in the Committee of 
the Whole, and addressing other matters to speed up the Senate so as to make 
it more watchable and intelligible to a viewing public. In addition, they deter-
mined that the rules changes made specifically for television “would only be-
come permanent after the test period upon adoption of a further resolution” and 
only if television was made permanent. The rules were specifically changed for 
the purposes of television and would be eliminated without that central change 
(Republican Policy Committee, 1986a).
Through his intensive negotiations with Dole, Byrd had successfully recon-
nected the question of rules changes and broadcast coverage and had taken yet 
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another big step toward his ultimate goal. In addition to addressing the ques-
tions of party balance and minority rights, the rules changes were also touted 
as a means of allowing the Senate to avoid seeming “anachronistic” and “fool-
ish” to a TV audience. As Byrd put it, television was the occasion for the Senate 
to “clean up our act” (“Stay Tuned for the Senate,” 1986).
Preparing the Senators and Appeasing Opponents
Securing Dole’s acquiescence and protecting the minority party’s interests were 
necessary but not sufficient tasks to push Senate television across the finish line. 
If generational change and changing Senate attitudes toward media politics had 
done a lot of the work for Democratic and Republican advocates of Senate tele-
vision, there was still a need for the leaders to shore up support and to grow 
the coalition.
Both parties’ leadership apparatuses had been laying the groundwork to tout 
the potential advantages of C-SPAN2 coverage to individual senators’ media as-
pirations and constituent outreach. Working to help colleagues understand the 
opportunities that cable television afforded the Senate, the Democratic Policy 
Committee distributed copies of articles to Democratic press secretaries that 
could “tell you just about everything you could or would want to know in dealing 
with cable” (Democratic Policy Committee, 1985b). Later in the year, they encour-
aged Democratic senators to consider holding cable television town halls in their 
respective states (Democratic Policy Committee, 1985c). Both the Republican 
Policy Committee and the Republican Conference were providing informa-
tional documents to colleagues, making Republican press secretaries aware of 
the availability of recorded audio for the production of radio actualities for out-
reach to their constituents, and providing media training for senators, including 
instructing senators on matters such as whether or not to look in the cameras 
and what color shirts and ties to wear (Republican Policy Committee, 1986b; 
Ritchie, 1993; Vastine, 1986).
Some, especially older senators, were unpersuaded and still could offer for-
midable obstacles to Senate TV if they made use of the filibuster or other delay 
mechanisms. As was the case with Howard Baker’s failed bids to bring television 
to the Senate in 1982 and 1984, Senator Russell Long led the opposition. Long 
had argued during the 1982 debate that “every senator is going to change his pat-
tern of conduct if the Senate is on television” (Fenno, 1989, p. 324). More specifi-
cally, he predicted more and longer speeches as senators played to the cameras, 
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effectively turning the Senate floor into a television show starring pandering 
politicians. He also predicted more floor amendments, a shifting of Senate ac-
tion from committees to the floor, and increased incentives to limit debate and 
preclude filibusters that would ultimately harm the character of the Senate and 
the rights of individual senators (Fenno, 1989, p. 324–328; Frantzich & Sullivan, 
1996, pp. 58–59).
Seeking to mitigate this opposition, Byrd personally appealed to Long and 
subsequently claimed to have persuaded him with an argument about the in-
evitability of television and the future of the Senate and with a promise to hold 
floor votes on individual rules changes. This persuasion did not win Long’s vote 
but it did diminish his opposition and may have kept him from resorting to fil-
ibuster or other methods to frustrate Byrd’s quest (Frantzich & Sullivan, 1996, 
p. 58; Fenno, 1989, p. 339).
When amending and floor votes commenced in late February 1986, Majority 
Leader Bob Dole suggested, “We want to take as much time as we can” (quoted in 
Fenno, 1989, p. 340). Still, after the debate on February 26, Dole seemed to quickly 
tire of the subject and was eager to get beyond debate to a final vote. With Dole’s 
patience growing thin (he said on the Senate floor, “We have been dragging this 
bone around long enough”), the Senate turned to voting on amendments the 
next day, disposing of efforts to limit television broadcast. When Senator David 
Boren (D-OK) offered two surprise last-minute amendments, Byrd intervened 
once again, agreeing to one of the amendments that called for a “cooling-off pe-
riod” at the conclusion of the interim test period that would allow for two weeks 
before a vote on whether to make Senate TV permanent. Byrd reluctantly agreed 
to the cooling-off period as a compromise to avoid further delay. 10
On February 27, the Senate agreed 67–21 to the test period and to televise its 
proceedings gavel-to-gavel bundled with several other rules changes to acceler-
ate time schedules to preclude unnecessary delays in order to make Senate pro-
ceedings more watchable. 11
THE INTERIM TEST AND THE CHOICE TO MAKE SENATE TV PERMANENT
The interim televised testing period began where the Senate would scrutinize 
TV’s impacts on the chamber. If Long and other opponents stood a chance to 
stop broadcast coverage, it was in demonstrating that television had changed 
Senate debate and performance for the worse. Thus, it was up to Byrd and other 
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advocates of Senate television to demonstrate that it could be made to work well 
and that its benefits outweighed whatever associated costs there were.
Byrd pressed the case in public, appearing, for example, on The Today Show 
twice in early June to debate Senator Bennett Johnston (D-LA) on the value of 
televising Senate proceedings. Interested in the outcome and anticipating the 
vote to make television permanent, C-SPAN offered encouragement. C-SPAN’s 
staff wrote to Senate press secretaries touting its already substantial audience 
and claiming that “if the Senate votes in July to continue televising its proceed-
ings, C-SPAN2 will continue to grow — just as our original channel did — adding 
subscriber households and additional programming as time goes on, eventually 
taking it to a 24 hour-a-day channel.” Smartly attending to the needs of senators, 
C-SPAN staff also alerted press secretaries to the value of monitoring C-SPAN 
via the Capitol’s internal cable system, as well as how to connect broadcast jour-
nalists to C-SPAN clips for broader exposure in news stories (C-SPAN Public 
Relations Staff, 1986).
Technical and Aesthetic Improvements
Inside the chamber, Senate leaders made careful use of the interim test of tele-
vised coverage and Dole’s staff compiled “comments from a number of Senators” 
making recommendations to Senator Mac Mathias’s (R-MD) committee prior to 
making TV permanent (Burke & Coe, 1986). Mathias had recommended a “mon-
itoring committee” appointed by the leadership to “serve as a clearinghouse and a 
sounding board for Members’ comments, criticisms, and suggestions,” reporting 
to each of the leaders regularly throughout the test period (Stevens & Ford, 1986).
There were early indications that the Senate appeared “too busy” inside the 
camera frame with a lot of distractions for the television viewer and other po-
tentially embarrassing behavior captured. There were concerns, for example, 
that the Senate’s presiding officer would not know that he or she was on camera; 
Byrd specifically warned that “occupants of the Chair should . . . refrain from 
signing mail or reading newspapers, etc.,” and instead “the Chair’s full attention 
should be directed to the floor at all times” (Byrd, 1986a). 12 There was concern, 
too, that too many staff members were “in the frame” busily attending to their 
duties but distracting from the main stars — the senators — potentially confus-
ing and frustrating the audience at home.
Byrd and Dole worked to address these and other problems. Writing to Rules 
chairman Charles “Mac” Mathias (R-MD), Dole wrote that “camera angles are 
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bad” and “camera crews should be instructed to ‘tighten up’ shots of Senators, 
so that, to the extent possible, the picture does not include staff or other indi-
viduals in the background” (Dole, 1986c). Byrd wanted to “caution Senators 
that background conversations often are picked up by an open microphone” 
and added that “staffs of Senators should be as quiet as possible (but not so 
much that they fall asleep, as did one such individual who showed up on cam-
era)” (Byrd, 1986a). Dole asked Mathias to review Senate Rules for existing pro-
visions that might decrease the number of staff members on camera (including 
“specifically to restrict movement of staff near or behind speaking Senators”). 
In addressing initial audio problems that seemed dissatisfying to most observ-
ers, he asked, too, that lavaliere microphones be developed for senators Nancy 
Kassebaum (R-KS) and Paula Hawkins (R-FL), the two women senators, who at 
first had to carry microphones as the audio setup relied on microphones made 
to attach to men’s suits (Dole, 1986c).
In addition to these practical considerations, aesthetics were considered, too, 
as Senate leaders wished to make the appearance of the chamber more pleasing 
to the public and more flattering to senators. Democrats and Republicans were 
agreed that the Senate’s existing color schemes were unflattering. Dole noted 
to Mathias that attention was needed to the “color of paint on the walls,” “the 
color of the drape behind the Presiding Officer,” and the carpet. Whereas there 
were questions about what to do when the Senate’s audio cut out for quorum 
Senator John Glenn (D-OH) hamming it up on the first day of television.
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calls, including the playing of classical music during those interludes, Byrd ap-
proved, noting that it “reflects good taste and is very appropriate” (Dole, 1986c; 
Byrd, 1986a).
Even as they worked to address these issues, the overall assessment was that 
the Senate experimental period was a success. They would continue to trou-
bleshoot problems, including seeking to obtain more and better camera equip-
ment, improving the overall audio quality, and sprucing up. But most agreed 
with the sentiment the Senate sergeant at arms expressed when he wrote to Dole 
that, “from a technical standpoint, the televising of the Senate has been quite 
successful. So far, the test period has proven that the U.S. Senate can produce 
in a professional, non-partisan manner a radio and television signal of network 
quality” (Garcia, 1986).
Assessing the Impact on Senate Behavior and Debate
The heart of the opposition to Senate television had always centered on how it 
would change the Senate’s normal operations and the behavior and rights of indi-
vidual senators. Ultimately, Russell Long’s long-standing objections to adopting 
broadcast coverage could gain steam if the interim test confirmed fears that sena-
tors would “ham it up” and that the unique character of the Senate was imperiled.
The Senate leadership not only established an informal working group of key 
senators to monitor the experience with TV and report back to the leaders, but 
it also commissioned a study by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) that 
analyzed Senate floor and other behaviors that compared the period of the in-
terim test to analogous time periods in 1982 and 1984, respectively.
There were signs that television was changing some aspects of the Sen-
ate — members were seeking the spotlight and changing their behavior to do 
so. The CRS report noted increases in morning business and a nearly 250% in-
crease in the unconstrained special orders floor time, both of which were at-
tributable to “more use by Senators of non-germane speaking opportunities,” 
which they noted was “potentially related to television coverage.” During floor 
debate, points of order nearly quadrupled and session time increased about 15% 
(Rundquist & Nickels, 1986, 1, 17–24). 13 Having gathered comments from Senate 
colleagues, the leadership’s monitoring committee reported a widespread rec-
ognition of the increased requests for special order time as a result of television 
and the use of visual aids (“charts, graphs, and other ‘props’”) by senators while 
speaking (Dole, 1986c).
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Undoubtedly critics would point to these changes as having negative effects on 
the deliberative quality of the Senate and the seriousness of its debates. Another 
potential impact on deliberation was the fact that, as was the case in the House, 
television would make it more likely that senators and staff would stay in their 
offices, monitoring the floor from afar. Byrd himself recognized that televising 
the Senate was likely to affect Senate staff and member behavior in this regard, 
with spillover effects in the House. He wrote:
I suspect that the most avid viewers might well be scattered throughout the 
Capitol complex. They are watching in the Russell Building, the Dirksen 
Building, and the Hart Building. They are watching in the Madison Building 
and the Jefferson Building at the Library of Congress. And, Mr. President, I 
have even heard of some curious viewers tuning in from the Cannon, Long-
worth, and Rayburn Buildings. Senators no longer need to walk onto the floor 
“cold.” They have been viewing from their offices. Staff no longer need to rely 
on cloakroom tapes as they brief their bosses leaving committee hearings to 
come to the floor. They have been watching from their desks. (Byrd, 1987a)
To the extent that this may have been a convenience to those who work on 
Capitol Hill, the decreased opportunities for contact between members limits 
the ability of colleagues to develop important relationships conducive to comity 
and to informal discussion of policy. Too few observers of Congress appreciate 
the potential long-term costs of such decreased interactions between members 
(Harris, 2000).
If these were real concerns and changes that had potentially long-term conse-
quences for the Senate, the overall takeaway from the CRS report and the lead-
ership’s monitoring committee was, as Al Gore (D-TN) put it when sending the 
report to Majority Leader Dole, “television coverage has changed the patterns 
of Senate floor activity very little.” 14 Whereas Long had claimed that floor activ-
ity would increase and amendments would skyrocket, CRS found that, in fact, 
“the number of amendments offered during the test period declined by nearly 
ten percent from the 1984 level.” 15 Neither were there differences in cloture pe-
tition filings and only a slight increase in debate time (though the latter was 
not attributed by researchers to television alone) (Rundquist & Nickels, 1986, 
pp. 15–16). 16
Through bipartisan agreement of the leaders’ monitoring group and the non-
partisan analysis of CRS, the consensus that emerged was that, if there were 
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impacts on debate and behavior, they were minimal and not what opponents 
to Senate TV had predicted. Not only did opponents’ objections prove insuffi-
cient to offset the institutional and public education arguments for Senate TV 
but some were actually making the case that TV had, in fact, improved debate. 
The increased use of visuals and props notwithstanding, proponents claimed 
that, thanks to television, senators took to the floor more prepared and with 
more tightly organized thoughts than before (a prediction that Howard Baker 
had made in 1982). Looking back, Byrd agreed. On the floor in October 1986 he 
said, “The debates are, I think, much better debates than they have been hereto-
fore. Speeches of the Senators generally are more probative and more substan-
tive.” 17 And, overall, he wrote, “Television has improved the substance of Senate 
debate” (Byrd, 1985).
So convinced were proponents of Senate TV’s success that a move was afoot 
to abbreviate the “cooling off ” period that had been required by David Boren’s 
last-minute amendments in February. Rather than lose momentum, Byrd and 
Dole were agreed that the Senate should continue televising proceedings rather 
than go dark for the two weeks between July 15 and July 29; Byrd wrote to Dole, 
“It is my belief that the Senate will be better served by keeping the cameras on 
during the period from the close of business on July 15 and the July 29 vote on 
the question of making television coverage of Senate proceedings permanent” 
(Byrd, 1986d).
For his part, Dole made two key statements in support of continuity rather 
than cooling off, both of which emphasized the public audience the Senate had 
been building. In a statement with the title “Don’t Pull the Plug!,” Senator Dole 
said, “We may not be number one in the Nielsen ratings, but at least we’re now 
only a dial away for millions of viewers. We have had our share of glitches, dead 
air, and more than a little showboating, so there is still room for improvement. 
Let’s hope the novelty of television is wearing off for all of us.” A second statement 
noted that “consistency is key,” and Dole claimed that the Senate had “tentatively 
staked-out a place on the crowded dials of American television and radios,” not-
ing, “We should stay there” rather than “squander the tremendous strides Senate 
television has taken in a few short weeks” (Dole, 1986a, 1986b).
On July 29, 1986, the Senate voted 78–21 to make broadcast coverage and its 
associated rules changes permanent. Gratified at the victory, Senator Robert 
Byrd, who had steered the change through its many obstacles and impediments, 
called the decision both “long overdue” and “just in time”: “I am sure we will 
be able to cite television in the Senate as one of the reasons why 1986 proves 
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the year in which the Senate began to streamline its proceedings and began to 
clean up its act for the cameras. It has made some progress; there is some way 
to go” (Byrd, 1986e).
CONCLUSIONS
Party leaders matter. To be sure, the adoption of broadcast coverage of Senate 
proceedings reflected the impact of significant generational turnover and a grow-
ing support for a newer vision of a transforming Senate institution from a “cit-
adel” to a more public arena for debate, legislation, and public education. But it 
is clear, too, that leadership, organization, and persuasion were required to get 
Senate television over the finish line. Had it succeeded a few years earlier, the 
story of Senate television might have been a story about how Howard Baker led 
the charge, cleared the obstacles, and made the final, persuasive case in favor of 
broadcast coverage. But that was not to be.
The star of the final push to televise the Senate was Minority Leader Robert 
Byrd, an erstwhile “insider” who became a sunshine champion. He introduced 
key resolutions, enlisted the support of an ambivalent Majority Leader Bob Dole 
and cleared the opposition of Russell Long and others, developed convincing 
protections for minority rights and other rules changes, and promoted the fi-
nal arguments and evidence that the benefits of Senate television outweighed its 
minimal costs — the arguments that won the day. The next year, Byrd received an 
award from the National Association of Broadcasters for his “leadership in open-
ing the United States Senate to coverage by radio and television” (Byrd, 1987b).
An expert on Senate history, Robert Byrd was proud of this historic achieve-
ment. In 1987 he said, “With our one year’s perspective on televising the Senate 
now completed, I firmly believe that we can look back with genuine and whole-
hearted satisfaction at how admirably television has been incorporated into the 
legislative life of the Senate” (Byrd, 1987a). And, when asked by Senate historian 
Richard Baker to reflect on his legacy — his “achievements in the Senate” that he 
was “proudest of ” and he’d “like to be remembered by,” Byrd cited Senate televi-
sion as one of but a few lasting achievements he could conjure:
I’m proud of the part I played in bringing television and radio coverage to the 
Senate floor debates. I can’t think of anything else in particular. I’m proud of 
2199. BrEAkING THE FOurTH WAll
the overall record that was established by the Senate in the 100th Congress. 
I’m proud of the input that I had in influencing the outcome of the Panama 
Canal debates. I don’t think of anything else. (Baker, 1990, Part II, pp. 1–2)
The year 2021 marks the 35th anniversary of Senate television, at which point 
about 15% of U.S. Senate history will have been televised. The Senate’s choice to 
televise its own proceedings is now appropriately viewed as a pivotal moment 
in the history of the institution. As Byrd put it in October 1986, the first ses-
sion of the 99th Congress was “an era in which the Senate caught up with the 
20th century and prepared itself to move into the 21st century” (132 Cong. Rec. 
33823, 1986).
NOTES
 1. The papers consulted herein are the Robert C. Byrd Congressional Papers 
Collection, Robert C. Byrd Center for Legislative Studies, Shepherd University, 
and the Robert J. Dole Senate Papers, Robert and Elizabeth Dole Archive and 
Special Collections, Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics, University of Kansas. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the Robert J. Dole Archive 
and Special Collections Research Fellowship and, especially, Audrey Coleman 
and Sarah D’Antonio Gard at the Dole papers. Thanks, too, to Jody Brumage 
and James Wyatt at the Byrd Center for their assistance.
 2. This and other changes in the Senate are captured in Sinclair (1989).
 3. Tip O’Neill had become well-known publicly in the early Reagan years, taking 
significant steps toward a more public speakership (Harris, 1998).
 4. In his analysis of the debates that took hold in early 1982 (echoed again in 
1985) between Howard Baker and Russell Long on this question, Fenno (1989, 
p. 320) framed the question as between an interinstitutional perspective and 
an intra-institutional one, the former “centered on the place of the Senate in 
the larger system of government” and the latter “centered on the internal or-
ganization and the decision-making processes of the Senate.”
 5. Byrd had voted against cloture in 1984, effectively killing broadcast coverage 
due, he said, to the “vagueness of the proposal,” particularly in regard to how 
it would impact the internal operations of the Senate (Byrd, 1985c).
 6. As the audio and video recordings would become official records of the Senate, 
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considerations included, too, how the sergeant at arms and the secretary of the 
Senate’s offices would have to adapt, including transferring audio- and vid-
eotapes to the National Archives (Coe, 1986).
 7. This is Maloney’s (1990) summative judgment; similarly, Fenno (1989) wrote: 
“Dole has never been an enthusiastic supporter” and “he left the strategizing 
to Byrd” (p. 338). On the Rules Committee vote, Dole still gave voice to sup-
porting the overall endeavor; “Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole — who said he 
supported Byrd’s resolution but strongly opposed the change to provide for im-
mediate radio broadcasts — cast the only vote against the measure” (Byrd, 1985e).
 8. Fenno (1989) believed that he did so because he perceived a strategic advantage 
in his efforts to change the rules if pursued sooner rather than later (p. 339).
 9. Byrd had previously advocated that instead of gavel-to-gavel coverage, broad-
cast should commence only on the mutual agreement of the majority and mi-
nority leaders, but he had abandoned that in favor of the gavel-to-gavel approach 
that Armstrong and others advocated (and that mirrored the House’s practice). 
What Dole had proposed was a non-debatable motion that would afford the 
majority more influence by subjecting the motion to a vote.
 10. For a detailed account of this, see Maloney (1990, pp. 36–40).
 11. The Congressional Research Service summarized the rules changes as follows: 
“In the end, the Senate authorized only five procedural changes when it ad-
opted S. Res. 28. Most notably, S. Res. 28 reduced the debate time permitted in 
the post-cloture period from 100 hours to 30 hours. Other rules changes pro-
vided for in S. Res. 28 included (2) a reduction in the required time that com-
mittee reports be available to Senators before floor consideration is in order, 
from 3 days to 2 days; (3) the elimination of the Committee of the Whole pro-
cedure for the consideration of treaties in executive session; (4) a requirement 
that copies of conference reports be available on each Senator’s desk before floor 
consideration is in order; and (5) the establishment of a non-debatable motion 
to waive the reading of the Journal” (Rundquist & Nickels, 1986, p. 5). See too 
(Byrd, 1986c).
 12. To avoid the embarrassment of the presiding officer relying too much on oth-
ers for advice, one of the Democratic group’s recommendations was to “install 
an audio link between the Parliamentarian and the Presiding Officer.”
 13. In response, a rules change had decreased special order speeches from 15 min-
utes to 5 minutes to minimize the legislative time sacrificed to such uncon-
strained floor time (Rundquist & Nickels, 1986, p. 26).
 14. Gore did highlight some of the aforementioned changes, writing that the CRS 
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“found only one category, special orders, whose increase could be attributed 
to television” (Gore, 1986).
 15. Both 1984 and 1986 represented a shift upward from 1982 amending levels, but 
those changes in both years meant that “factors other than television coverage 
were influential” (Rundquist & Nickels, 1986, p. 14).
 16. Reviewing commentary by senators, CRS found “three major areas: (1) con-
cern over the visual appearance of senators and the Senate chamber, which 
dominated most of the commentary; (2) opinions about the effect of television 
coverage on the style and substance of Senate debate; and (3) the need or lack 
thereof for procedural changes to accommodate live television” (Rundquist & 
Nickels, 1986, p. 29).
 17. Congressional Record — Senate October 18, 1986. Byrd reiterated his belief that 
television actually improved debate in “Bringing the U.S. Senate Into Your 
Liv ing Room.”
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EXAMINING ECONOMIC REALITY AND MEDIA 
SPECTACLE AT TRUMP CAMPAIGN RALLIES
Timothy Betts
C
ampaign rallies became as central to the Trump administration as they were 
during the 2016 election. For candidate Trump, campaign rallies became a 
space of lamentation and celebration wherein boisterous crowds cheered 
and booed his own peculiar vision of economic reality. As Trump painted it, the 
United States of America was both an economy on the brink of collapse, ravaged 
by foreign tricksters and incompetent governance, and a bastion of economic 
stability and growth. At these rallies, and in Trump’s performances, these two 
disparate visions of economic reality coexisted. This contradiction, however odd, 
lies at the heart of the spectacle that undergirds Trump’s message of restorative 
conservatism. And although the methods and values behind Trump’s politics 
have been destructive to many ends, the message of “making America great 
again” echoes a call to resilience. Social scientists across a variety of disciplines 
and fields have examined the cultivation or construction of resilience in order 
to provide insight into the creation of a new normal in response to disruption 
(Buzzanell, 2010, 2019; Koenig Kellas, 2010, 2018; Pals & McAdams, 2005); how-
ever, in the case of Trump, the meaning of resilience, the aims of change, and 
even the very nature of the disruption he rails against have been contested and 
negotiated as a political tool and a media spectacle.
After Trump’s election, researchers explained the results by examining his ap-
peals to economic dissatisfaction and rampant mistrust of establishment politics 
(Cozzolino, 2018). However, this study seeks to break new ground by analyzing 
how Trump built on these attitudes to construct a spectacle of resilient reform. In 
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so doing, this study unites two bodies of theory: organizational spectacle (Boje, 
2017) and communicative resilience (Buzzanell, 2010, 2019). Debord (1967/1995) 
conceived of spectacle as a mediated tool of control that thrives on the abundance 
and prosperity of economic systems. He argued that media simultaneously frag-
ments an individual’s understanding of reality and concentrates it into a unified, 
monolithic whole. Best and Kellner (2001) further expanded upon the concept 
of spectacle with the notion of megaspectacle, which transforms the individual 
from passive viewer to active participant in the construction of spectacular logic. 
In the world of organizational communication, Boje (2017) adapted these ideas 
to explain how spectacular logic unfolds and manifests organizations through 
storytelling practices. It is through this lens of organizational communication 
that this study will examine how Trump’s campaign rallies served to organize 
an understanding of economic reality.
This study will analyze how Trump’s performances at three campaign rallies 
across three years worked to construct a spectacle of resilience that simultane-
ously characterized the American economy as booming and busting, on the 
edge of disaster and the dawn of a new age. These three rallies, in Youngstown, 
Ohio, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and Montoursville, Pennsylvania, each pro-
vide unique insight regarding how Trump’s rallies wove a story of economic di-
saster and renewal. This spectacle of economic resilience has been crucial to 
the ethos of the Trump administration and, as he works toward reelection, un-
derscores both the power of these appeals and the troubling assumptions upon 
which they are built. This study will uncover how logics of nationalism and re-
silience intersect to construct Trump’s, and by extension his base’s, understand-
ing of economic reality through disruption, struggle, and resilience. Further, this 
examination will also explore how the notion of economic abundance (or lack 
thereof) interacts with the postmodern concept of spectacle (Best & Kellner, 
2001; Debord, 1967/1995). Finally, by employing Buzzanell’s (2010, 2019) com-
munication theory of resilience, this study will also explore how Trump’s cam-
paign rallies construct a sense of disruption and urge a return to normalcy. To 
do so, I turn to Boje’s (2001) antenarrative framework for analysis of organiza-
tional narrative to explore how, in constructing the spectacle of economic re-
ality and resilience, Trump embeds narrative logics into the very assumptions 
that ground economic reality for his audience. First, I will review the literature 
surrounding organizational narrative, the concept of spectacle, and communi-
cative resilience. Then, I will discuss the contexts of the three rallies examined 
in this analysis and the methods of that analysis. Finally, I will explore three of 
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the narrative logics embedded in these rallies and discuss their theoretical and 
practical implications.
ORGANIZING NARRATIVES AND ECONOMIES
Economies are not just market systems and institutions working toward certain 
ends; they are not just governmental bodies and banks attempting to keep peo-
ple working and financial systems running. Like governments and universities 
and organizations, economies are socially constructed ideas; individuals speak 
economies into existence, unlike material objects, and communicatively con-
struct them to organize how people understand the world around them. Concepts 
such as markets allow people to make sense of the complex ways that individ-
uals interact with money, goods, services, and other economic entities such as 
banks, companies, and, especially, governments.
Organizational communication scholars have recently turned to the theory 
of communicative constitution of organization (for an overview, see Bisel, 2010) 
to explain the nature of the relationship between communicative and organiza-
tional processes. Though there are a variety of disagreements among the various 
perspectives and theorists, the central thrust of the argument is that organiza-
tions exist only insofar as people communicate them into existence. Even earlier, 
Weick (1995) and Boje (1995) described the processes of organization as retro-
spective sensemaking; instead of thinking of extant organizations, these theorists 
urged an active, processual conception of organizing. For example, the organiza-
tion Disney does not exist except insofar as it is a story that people tell to make 
sense of how millions of people flock to a former swampland to pay hundreds of 
dollars to wait in line for hours, purchase branded merchandise, and wear hats 
with circles attached on either side of their heads (Boje, 1995).
Researchers can think of economy in the same way. Nobel Prize-winning 
economist Robert Shiller (2019) recently described the influence of narratives 
on economic outcomes using a model of epidemiological spread. Although his 
work largely deals with how specific narratives affect economic outcomes by 
influencing psychological factors and shaping individual heuristics, this initial 
exploration of the interaction between narrative and economics is a primer for 
the importance of exploring the economy as narratives. Just as Kahneman and 
Tversky (1984) and Harvey (1998, 2006) have described the influence of fram-
ing and psychological heuristics on the actions of economic agents, economists 
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are beginning to examine how communicative phenomena, and especially nar-
rative, not only pass explanatory muster but also provide key insight into the 
erratic and sometimes nonsensical (to economists, at least) world of contempo-
rary economic phenomena.
But researchers like Shiller do not go far enough. Statistical analyses using 
epidemiological (or other) models that demonstrate that certain stories impact 
economic outcomes in certain ways are useful, but they do not give research-
ers insight into how people organize the economic world around them in the 
same way that they organize the social world. Boje (1995) examined Disney 
as a case study of organizational storytelling wherein the interplay of various 
voices and discourses competed in a cacophonous dynamic to dominate the “of-
ficial” narrative of Disney. Much like Fisher’s (1984, 1989) narrative paradigm 
and Czarniawska’s (1998, 2004) work on organization and narrative, Boje’s (1995) 
exploration of Disney conceived of the social phenomenon of organization as a 
complex narrative emergence, constantly overlapping and interweaving. More 
recently, Boje (2017) and other postmodern theorists have begun to examine 
the organization of social reality through sociomaterial (Leonardi, 2013) and 
other lenses that invite researchers to seek complexity rather than simplify and 
to examine the construction of competing social realities as a process steeped 
in power and oppression. In other words, communication is not just a process 
that occurs within an economy; it is the lifeblood through which visions of eco-
nomic reality are constructed. Communication, narratives, and discourses cre-
ate the intersubjective realities in which we live, manifest our material realities 
in certain ways, and embed logics of power, inequity, and disenfranchisement 
into the very foundations of our social fabrics.
Just as these theories have been powerful tools for examining the construc-
tion of social realities in the meso-level context of firms, they can be powerful 
tools for researchers to examine other, macro-level phenomena which, to this 
point, they have dismissed or passed off as a grander discursive context in which 
organization or business occurs. Economies and the very notion of economic 
“reality” itself is a contested and social space that is organized in the news me-
dia, political discourse, and everyday interactions of those who buy, sell, and use 
goods and services — or those who choose not to (read: everyone). Economists 
have conceived of numerical measures such as the gross domestic product, the 
consumer price index, and interest rates to provide a quantification of how “the 
economy” is fairing; however, as these numbers become encased in political dis-
course and negotiation, their reality is not in the number but in the interpretation 
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and contestation of whether or not the number is good, bad, or indifferent; cause 
for concern or cause for celebration; a call to reform or a call to tighten the belt.
For Trump, and he is not alone in this, these numbers can represent all of 
the above and none of the above, as they become mere plot points in narratives 
of economic spectacle and resilience and restoration. In this way, not only is 
the construction of and organization of economic reality a matter of narrative 
struggle, but it is also a spectacle in and of itself. Philosophers such as Debord 
(1967/1995) and Best and Kellner (2001) have examined the concept of specta-
cle as a force that both fragments individual understanding into contradictory 
sentiments and unifies it under the guise of commodified, monolithic narrative. 
This next section will explore the narrative dynamics of spectacle as it relates 
to the construction of economic reality before presenting its application in the 
present examination of Trump rallies and a spectacle of resilience.
SPECTACULAR ECONOMICS
Debord (1967/1995) theorized of spectacle as a force that simultaneously frag-
mented individuals’ experiences and fused them into a monolithic, spectacu-
lar, single understanding of a thing. Spectacle is necessarily tied to the economy. 
For Debord, spectacle served as an outgrowth of the abundance in economies 
from which everything became commodified into an image, a spectacle of it-
self, whereby the very process of consumption related more to the ingest of me-
dia and messages and services rather than of material things. Spectacle disguises 
the misery of the masses by totalizing the abundance of economies and the im-
ages of property as a disguise for the poverty endemic both to the time and to 
capitalism itself. Material things became less the focus of consumption than the 
image of consumption itself.
Postmodern theorists Best and Kellner (2001) took the concept even fur-
ther to examine how media in the postmodern era create a participatory me-
gaspectacle where individuals are no longer simply spectators of the spectacle. 
Instead, individuals are both spectators and participants in the construction of 
the megaspectacle. Media, both mass and social, create a feeling of inclusivity 
and participation that transforms the position of those witnessing the specta-
cle into those who create the spectacle. Take for example the 2019–2020 Hong 
Kong protests, which began as local protests and demonstrations and became 
a megaspectacle encompassing not only business ties related to funding the 
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protestor (or anti-protestor) causes but also every individual tied to the con-
sumption of products from those businesses. Apple, Nike, and the NBA all be-
came embroiled in spectacle and, by association, so did those who consume their 
products. In the megaspectacle, the very concept of activism itself becomes com-
modified and made into spectacle and drives further consumption. In this way, 
the megaspectacle is cyclic, feeding off itself, to drive its participatory logic for-
ward and further drive its own consumption. Researchers have built on the con-
cept of megaspectacle to examine the O. J. Simpson trials (Kellner, 2002), Enron 
(Boje et al., 2004), media representations of poverty and wealth (Kendall, 2011), 
and various other topics.
Boje (2017) describes the influence of megaspectacle as a constitutive logic 
of organizing, whereby as individuals construct narratives to make sense of 
the world around them, the megaspectacle of capitalism itself transforms ev-
ery witness into an actor on stage recreating the spectacle itself. Thinking of or-
ganizing as narrative, Boje (2001) urged researchers to think of the dynamics 
of sensemaking between lived experience (as story) and retrospective framing 
(as narrative). In the in-between, the fragmented pieces of narrative that both 
guide individuals’ interpretation of story and cement the recollected narrative 
are theorized as antenarrative. Playing on the prefix ante-, meaning before, and 
the poker term ante, a prospective bet before players deal the cards, antenarra-
tive refers to the way that fragmented narrative elements emerge in the discur-
sive process of transforming lived experience into narrative, and in that process 
of organization, spectacle serves as a foundational logic. If organization is the 
play acted out on stage, spectacle is the proscenium that shapes how the perfor-
mance is conducted (Boje, 2017). This theoretical frame examines the process of 
organizing as it is constituted in and shaped by narrative at all levels.
Thinking toward the organization of economic reality, then, we can conceive 
of how spectacle shapes the way that individuals both organize and make sense 
of economic conditions. The processual construction of economic reality, as a 
social and communicative phenomenon, is one defined by macro-Discourses 
and micro-discourse, large-scale messages and spectacles that interact with the 
everyday lived experience of people. This is why the influence of Trump’s cam-
paign rallies is worthy of examination in this study: as Trump both calls upon 
individuals in his rallies to meditate on their own experiences with economic dis-
enfranchisement and frames a discussion of his self-defined economic achieve-
ments, he constructs a megaspectacle of economic reality. By both fragmenting 
what is fundamentally real in the economy and totalizing individuals’ experience, 
23310. ExAMINING ECONOMIC rEAlITY AND MEDIA SPECTAClE AT TruMP CAMPAIGN rAllIES
Trump manifests spectacle logic to frame economic conditions for his audience 
and, perhaps more importantly, to manifest a vision of a new, “great” normal.
COMMUNICATING ECONOMIC RESILIENCE
Though it contrasts with the positive connotation of the concept, the notion of 
“making America great again” is a call toward resilience; it is a communicative 
call to return to a new, old era. It is a call toward a new normal. As Trump out-
lined his vision for a new economic reality, he was, in a way, calling upon the 
discourse of resilience. Buzzanell (2010, 2018, 2019) argued for a fundamentally 
communicative understanding of resilience and expounded upon the commu-
nication theory of resilience as a way of understanding how individuals craft 
new normals in the aftermath of disruption. From a narrative perspective, Pals 
and McAdams (2004) and Koenig Kellas (2010, 2018) have discussed the im-
portance of finding coherence in narrative as a way of reinforcing positive out-
comes as individuals reconstruct normalcy.
The critical question, then, is one that asks which normal individuals should 
communicatively manifest, and more directly, how does the manifestation of 
that new reality embed assumptions of power and privilege into the founda-
tions of the new normal? Clair’s (1993) work on narratives of sexual harassment 
demonstrates how these narrative logics become insinuated in the logic of orga-
nizing and begin to shape the ways that individuals make sense of themselves, 
their position, and the organization as a whole. These logics, in turn, shape the 
way that individuals come to terms with and create new normals in the face of 
disruptive events and difficult circumstances (Clair & Kunkel, 1998). More re-
cent work on resilience has highlighted how resilience can serve as a positive 
force to help individuals overcome difficult times, life circumstances such as 
relational issues (Afifi et al., 2019), and chronic health problems (Hintz, 2019), 
among other such disruptions. However, as Hintz (2019) described, resilience 
processes can reinscribe problematic norms and oppressive discourses. Further, 
other researchers have described how resilience processes function within men’s 
rights and incel groups (Eddington, 2020). In this way, resilience theorizing of-
fers researchers a way to examine both the positive and oppressive influences 
that shape resilience processes.
This current exploration of resilience as a macro-discursive phenomenon 
will go beyond these interpersonal treatments of resilience and toward an un-
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derstanding of resilience on a macro level as leaders, officials, and politicians at-
tempt to create coherence and spectacular incoherence in their crafting of new 
normals. And, in the context of the Trump rallies under examination in this 
study, the call toward resilience implied in the spectacular nature of Trump per-
formances and campaign rhetoric necessitates a deeper investigation into how 
megaspectacle shapes logic and narrative construction of a resilient economic 
reality. Thus, this study seeks to answer
RQ: How does Trump use campaign rallies to construct a spectacle of eco-
nomic resilience?
RUST BELT COMMUNITIES AND TRUMP RALLIES
The wave of populist fervor that was a driving factor behind Trump’s ascendancy 
to the presidency in 2016 has been attributed to a variety of factors, locales, cam-
paign strategies, and so forth. However, consistent among the analyses of the 
2016 presidential election was the sense of surprise and shock regarding Hillary 
Clinton’s loss of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, three Rust Belt states 
that had previously been considered part of an impenetrable “blue wall” (Sa-
bato, 2017). Explanations for these specific losses have been expansive and con-
tentious. Economists such as Knoedler (2019) argued that Trump successfully 
spoke to the conditions of economic anxiety surrounding the expansive inequal-
ities of income and economic means in the United States, fomenting a culture 
of discontent. This conclusion is supported by analyses by Manning (2016) and 
Neumann (2016), who examined the ruin and remaking of the Rust Belt as dein-
dustrialization and economic change reshaped the artistic, physical, economic, 
and political landscape of the entire area. Further, the economic deterioration 
of these communities due to the expansion of trade agreements and the weak-
ening of trade union protections enabled the Trump campaign to capitalize on 
this discontentment and offer up his candidacy as a rejection of the neoliberal 
policies that had, in the populace’s eyes, ravaged their communities (Baranes, 
2018; Knoedler, 2019).
To examine this research question, I turned to the C-SPAN Video Library’s 
remarkable collection of presidential records and Trump campaign rally foot-
age. Encompassing footage of Trump’s various rallies since his inauguration in 
2017, the Video Library offers an important glimpse at how Trump constructs his 
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vision of economic reality and sells that pitch to his audience. For the purposes 
of this analysis, I examined footage and transcripts of three Trump rallies. Of 
the 21 Trump rallies featuring economic themes (as designated in the C-SPAN 
Video Library), the three rallies in this study most clearly represent the struggles 
of the postindustrial Rust Belt communities that were so significant and decisive 
in the 2016 election. First, on July 25, 2017, Trump visited Youngstown, Ohio, as 
the battle over the 2018 midterm elections was beginning to evolve. Introduced 
by the first lady, Melania Trump, and featuring a former Democratic voter turned 
Trump supporter, Geno DeFabio, Trump used the rally to speak about work to 
repeal the Affordable Care Act in the Senate, questions of collusion, and the 
overhaul of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The second 
rally examined in this analysis, on August 2, 2018, came right before the midterm 
elections. In Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, this time, Trump discussed his ongo-
ing efforts to build a wall on the border with Mexico, the continued question of 
collusion with Russia, and “the biggest tax cuts in the history of our country” 
as part of an effort to elect Lou Barletta as senator for Pennsylvania (an effort 
that was ultimately futile). Finally, after the midterm elections, on May 20, 2019, 
Trump held a rally in Montoursville, Pennsylvania, in front of Air Force One on 
the tarmac of a regional airport.
All three events attracted large crowds and featured subjects salient to the 
questions of political discontent and postindustrial struggle, and as illustrated 
in Table 10.1, each locale experienced similar economic situations during the 
three years of the Trump administration represented by these rallies. In this way, 
these rallies epitomize Trump’s economic appeal to the Rust Belt and his contin-
ued efforts to draw on them as a source of support and warrant for his policies 
and vision of economic reality in the United States. Analysis of these particu-
lar rallies also offers a glimpse into the evolution of Trump’s appeals over time, 
ranging from soon after his inauguration, to the time right before the midterm 
election, and as his administration faced the prospect of an impending general 
election and possible impeachment proceedings.
METHODOLOGY
To analyze the complex narrative dynamics within Trump’s construction of eco-
nomic reality in these rallies, I turned to Boje’s (2001) narrative method of decon-
struction. Deconstruction analysis builds from the work of Derrida (1967/1995), 
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who described deconstruction as an ongoing process where meaning and inter-
pretation are constantly shifting and changing. He argued that where meaning is 
polysemous and mercurial, there are logocentrisms — constructed logics — that 
guide the interpretation of the text toward particular ends. Unlike other methods 
of analysis, however, Boje’s (2001) application of deconstruction analysis focuses 
on incoherence in data, examining instances where power and artificial bina-
ries can be turned on their heads and resituated to better understand the pro-
cess of organizing economic reality. Deconstruction analysis, therefore, focuses 
researchers’ attention on the process of deconstruction that occurs within texts 
rather than having them act as the agents of deconstruction. By focusing on the 
interplay between moments of incoherence and coherence, analyzing deconstruc-
tion allows researchers to grasp the antenarrative processes of meaning-making 
that actively occur when reading or viewing a text.
For this study, the analysis occurred in three phases. Initially, I conducted 
close readings of the C-SPAN closed-captioning transcripts of the selected ral-
lies. During these readings, I made notes of initial impressions and of moments 
of incoherence in the text. In these running notes, I paid particular attention to 
both where and how Trump’s economic message merged explicitly and implic-
itly in the messages. After these readings of the transcripts, I took my notes to 
the video footage of the rallies and used clean transcripts to record further im-
pressions. During this phase of analysis, I looked to both the contextual meaning 
of Trump’s language and the interaction with the audience and their responses 
to his messages. Following both phases, I conducted a final reading of both sets 
TABLE 10.1 Unemployment Data for Rally Cities
City
2017 2018 2019
rate (rank) Δ % (rank) rate (rank) Δ % (rank) rate (rank) Δ % (rank)
Youngstown, OH 6.7 (368) 0.2 (377) 5.7 (363) −1.0 (10) 5.7 (368) 0.0 (278)
Wilkes-Barre, PA 5.5 (318) −0.5 (197) 5.0 (328) −0.5 (144) 5.4 (351) 0.4 (379)
Montoursville, PA 5.6 (331) −1.0 (41) 4.7 (301) −0.9 (20) 4.8 (323) 0.1 (321)
Note: Rate refers to the unemployment rate for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017a, 2017b, 
2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b) designated statistical area for each city as a percentage of the labor 
force. Rank reflects the placement of the representative statistical area for each city relative to the 
389 total statistical areas represented in the bureau’s data. Percentage change is calculated relative 
to the year prior, such that the entries here represent percentage change between 2016–2017, 
2017–2018, and 2018–2019. Montoursville, PA, resides in the Williamsport, PA, metropolitan 
statistical area. Bolded entries reflect the year that Trump visited the cities for the rallies analyzed 
in this study.
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of transcripts to note comparisons and contradictions in my impressions of the 
rallies. During this final reading, I coded the transcripts for evidence of emer-
gent logics and deconstruction (Rosile et al., 2013). The following section will 
explore how these logics and this deconstruction emerged in the three rallies.
RESULTS
Examining the deconstruction evident in these three campaign rallies offers in-
sight into three foundational logics that undergird Trump’s spectacular presen-
tation of economic reality and resilience. This section will describe and critique 
three logical dynamics that emerged in the rallies as oppositional binaries: be-
trayal/revival, folly/strength, and deconstruction/transcendence. By examining 
these three dynamics that emerged from the narrative logic in the rallies, this 
section will examine how these dynamics construct the notion of economic re-
ality and the implied concept of a resilient economic future.
Betrayal/Revival: Constructing Disruption
The workers of Scranton and Bethlehem and Allentown and Wilkes-Barre are 
the backbone of American might. . . . But the loyalty of our workers 
was repaid with betrayal. You were betrayed by our politicians. You 
were betrayed by the people that ran our country. You are not be-
trayed anymore. (C-SPAN, 2018)
For Trump, the disruption of economic normality that warrants his call to a 
new normal, ostensible in his “make America great again” slogan, is not the re-
sult of natural economic phenomena or the transition of the economy toward 
services rather than material goods. For Trump, there was no neutrality in the 
businesses that chose to walk away from American manufacturing; there is only 
contempt for those who betrayed the American people and, by extension, the 
political leaders who, in Trump’s eyes, simply let it happen. However, thanks to 
Trump, American manufacturing has finally experienced that promised revival 
that he claimed during the 2016 election. He remarked at Wilkes-Barre in 2018 
that “manufacturing is dead, they said. 400,000 incredible jobs, and you’ve heard 
this, but I’m going to say it over and over because I’m really part of it” (C-SPAN, 
2018). Here, at the Wilkes-Barre rally, as he did before and later at other rallies, 
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Trump captured the dynamic of betrayal and revival that simultaneously casts 
economic reality in the Rust Belt as a subject of severe devastation and betrayal 
and as finally receiving the economic recovery it has long needed. In this way, 
he constructed a spectacle where the Rust Belt is simultaneously experiencing 
vast economic disruption and finally restored to greatness.
The logic of betrayal/revival enforces a separation between political oppo-
nent and loyal American that both fragments the reality of political division in 
the nation and unifies a nationalized view of economic reality and resilience for 
authentic, loyal citizens. Trump told his audience as much when he remarked, 
at Youngstown, that people have “reclaimed [their] destiny and defended [their] 
dignity and [taken] back [their] country” (C-SPAN, 2017). Not only does this 
logic construct an ownership of the economy, it nationalizes that economy — not 
by creating universal ownership of the means of production but, rather, by link-
ing the very concept of economy to an image of nationalist pride. Trump fur-
ther noted that “as we defend jobs we’re also defending our borders” from both 
countries that seek to mistreat us and from the political maladroits who sought 
to undermine the country’s international standing. This idea, however, creates a 
tension between an economic reality that warrants the need to restore American 
greatness and one where that greatness has already been restored. In one world, 
Trump’s political authority is derived from the promise of reform but under-
mined by a lack of success; in the other, the successful restoration undercuts 
the sense of betrayal and economic disenfranchisement that fuels Trump’s po-
litical ethos.
This spectacular tension came to a head as Trump meditated on changing his 
campaign slogan from “Make America Great Again” to “Keep America Great.” 
Noting that “in theory we’ve made America Great Again” already, or “we certainly 
will have by the time of the next election,” in this moment, Trump confronted 
the first spectacular, temporal tension that characterizes this view of economic 
reality. Simultaneously, his campaign was dependent on credibly resolving eco-
nomic disparities for those he claimed have been forgotten and on deriving au-
thority from righteous indignation at a system that has forgotten people. For 
Trump, failing to bring back factory work would undermine his credibility as a 
reformer; successfully resolving these underlying inequities would rob him of 
the rhetorical power of mutual victimhood, a victimhood from which he draws 
a sense of mutual admiration from his supporters, who have been left behind by 
an uneven economic recovery, and a sense of personal strength that he exploits.
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Folly/Strength: Constructing Struggle
“So, we’re going to start enriching our country. We’re going to start bringing back 
our jobs, and we will be fools no longer, folks. We’ll be fools no longer” (C-SPAN, 
2017). For Rust Belt communities, such as Youngstown, the promise of returned 
manufacturing jobs and end to trade deals that, in their eyes, had moved jobs 
overseas, brought a roar from the crowd. Following the above promise to no lon-
ger submit to the previous American folly regarding trade deals, Trump ques-
tioned the audience:
Every single president on Mount Rushmore — now here’s what I do. I’d ask 
whether or not you think I will some day be on Mount Rushmore, 
but here’s the problem. If I did it joking, totally joking, having fun, 
the fake news media will say, he believes he should be on Mount 
Rushmore. (C-SPAN, 2017)
Further chants of “USA!” and “Build the wall!” echoed around the audito-
rium as Trump continued on from his tangent. He decried the folly of past 
American administrations and calls for a return to strength — one embodied 
both by a renewed investment in the United States military and Trump’s per-
sonal image as the strong and wise leader, a leader who belongs alongside some 
of the greatest architects and reformers in U.S. history. These dynamics at the 
Youngtown rally in July of 2018 exemplify the second logic that emerged in 
Trump rallies: that of previous folly and personal strength. By linking himself 
to figures such as Washington, Lincoln, Jefferson, and Roosevelt, Trump not 
only provided his audience a call to nationalist pride, he portrayed himself as 
among those who have imprinted themselves on history in indelible ink. This 
is just one way that Trump pivoted to his personal strength as a leader and his 
ability to “save” the country as a way of portraying the struggle of resilience 
as one of personal victimization against economic hardship brought on by the 
folly of his predecessors.
Describing the economic woes facing the United States, Trump largely relied 
upon either the ubiquitous “they,” referring to a combination of bureaucrats, con-
gresspersons, political opponents, and journalists, or the scapegoats of previous 
administrations to cast aspersions and place the blame for people’s current predic-
aments. Both targets became responsible for the betrayal Trump described as the 
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cause of economic downturn in the nation, especially in the Rust Belt. As he said 
during his 2018 Montoursville rally, “What they have done to us is indescribable 
economically. We have rebuilt China. They have done a great job. I don’t blame 
China. . . . Our leaders allowed that to happen. Well it’s not happening anymore. 
I ran and we have saved America” (C-SPAN, 2019). By building upon dissatis-
faction with the economic status quo, Trump casts himself as the source of re-
vival, resilience, restoration, compared to those who seek to tear the nation down.
Although the construction of us versus them dynamics, reliance on the sep-
aration and division of political ideologies, is not a new political strategy, Trump 
manifested such division in relation to the betrayal that he claimed to have re-
solved. In one rally, he claimed that “we don’t apologize anymore. We are stand-
ing up for the heroes who defend America. . . . With every promise we keep, 
every record we break, and every factory we opened, we are restoring American 
strength, and we are restoring American pride” (C-SPAN, 2018). Here, Trump 
cast himself as one of many in the lot of individuals affected by downturns in 
manufacturing, but even as he described himself as one of the many forgotten 
by the recovery, he claims to have resolved the very economic problems that cre-
ated the division in the first place:
Past leaders let China freely plunder the US economy and take the crown jew-
els of American industry. Now we are finally responding to years of chronic 
trade abuses by defending our workers with tariffs and anything else 
that’s necessary. Because nobody’s going to steal our businesses, no-
body’s going to close our factories, and nobody’s going to close our 
plants anymore. They are all coming back. (C-SPAN, 2018)
Thus, even as Trump divided the nation into the haves and have-nots and as-
sociated himself with those who have seen their economy “plundered” by “the 
ideology of globalism,” he constructed a populist image of himself in direct op-
position to the wealthy, privileged position he simultaneously used as a warrant 
for his own relevance and capacity to remake the nation.
Finally, the logic of folly and strength reinforced the idea that not only were 
Trump’s political opponents separate from those loyal supporters, but they were 
also active combatants against American interests. Describing the theory that the 
Obama administration spied on the Trump campaign’s interactions with Russia, 
Trump stated that the action should “have been called treason . . . that’s what 
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it is. It was treason and should never be allowed to happen to another presi-
dent again, ever, ever, ever” (C-SPAN, 2019). In this way, however, Trump con-
structs a view of economic resilience as an oppositional battle against outside 
enemies — namely, his political opponents. And although the economy itself is 
tied to images of national pride and identity, those who did not share the same 
view of economic change were among the sick and evil opponents of Trump, 
his followers, and the very idea of America that must be defeated in order to re-
alize the revival of the American economy that Trump promised. In so doing, 
Trump builds up a persona of strength that allows him to take on the mantle of 
economic and personal resilience.
Destruction/Transcendence: Constructing Resilience
You have some socialist wackos that want to double and triple your 
taxes. They want to knock down all buildings in Manhattan and re-
build them without windows. I used to love the view but now we will 
be forced to close the window. (C-SPAN, 2019)
The above quotation, from Trump’s Montoursville, Pennsylvania, rally, cements 
the choice facing those who are at his rally and the country at large: the destruc-
tion of the “American way” or the Trump way. The logic of destruction and 
transcendence that Trump embedded in his view of economic reality emerged 
as a spectacle of “new normal” constructed in opposition to the very vivid de-
struction of American promise that he described in his rallies.
Trump creates this spectacle image of a transcendent American future by 
contrasting a vague image of the future with details of the drastic, destructive 
tendencies of his political opponents. Eschewing the former calls of other pres-
idents toward a thousand points of light and unity in the face of the division of 
red states and blue states, Trump simply constructed an image of American re-
silience as an avoidance of the radicalism of his Democratic opponents. This oc-
curred at his rallies multiple times as quick topic changes associated Democratic 
politicians with the most violent of stories and gruesome of images.
In doing this, Trump also constructed a vision of contemporary reality steeped 
in scarcity. As he described his policies regarding immigration, Trump referred 
to housing policy for low-income Americans, stating that he wanted to protect 
those resources for loyal citizens. He noted:
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Democrats’ policies that would have left our borders overrun; our detention 
facilities overwhelmed as fast as we build them, they fill up. And our hospitals, 
schools, and public resources overburdened. And our country is full 
and we do not want people coming up here. Our country is full. We 
want Mexico to stop. We want all of them to stop. Our country is 
packed to the gills and we don’t want them coming up. (C-SPAN, 2019)
In this way, not only did Trump position the allocation of social safety net 
resources as a matter of nationalism, he also characterized these resources as 
scarce, while failing to note that this scarcity could be removed by a simple 
investment of federal funds into housing protection and assistance programs. 
Instead, Trump moved on to describe the killing of American soldiers by mili-
tant forces in the Middle East, whom he described as “radical Islamic terrorists.” 
Immediately afterward, he described his political opponents in the same words. 
Much like the ISIS militants he claimed to have beaten back from destroying 
the United States, he claims that his political opponents are “the party of high 
taxes, high crime, open borders, late-term abortions, killing your second amend-
ment, and radical socialism. The Republican party is the party that America 
wants” (C-SPAN, 2019).
By describing his opponents in these terms, he conflates political opposition 
with the destruction of American values and beliefs. This leaves the audience to 
understand their political choices as one of survival: either they/Trump suc-
ceed/s or they face the end of their way of life. In the end, as Trump puts it:
You’ve always been loyal to the nation and you finally have a president who 
is loyal to you. It’s taken a long time. Your dreams are my dreams, your hopes 
are my hopes, and your future is what I’m fighting for each and every day. I’m 
fighting. I had such an easy life. People say I had such an easy life. Who in the 
hell knew it was going to be this difficult, but I love it. You know why I love 
it. Even though we had artificial obstacles put in our way . . . and 
even though we have people who hate Trump and hate you. Angry 
Democrats all after you . . . they are going crazy . . . we are going to 
keep on winning. (C-SPAN, 2019)
The only hope that his audience has is in him; there is only a choice between 
radical destruction of the American way and a transcendence to a final victory.
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DISCUSSION
This study has explored how Donald Trump’s campaign rallies construct a spec-
tacular vision of economic resilience through the examination of three specific 
campaign rallies. From the results presented it is clear that, in the context of 
these rallies, Trump creates a spectacle of resilience by constructing a vision of 
economic disaster that is simultaneously an ongoing crisis and an already re-
solved challenge. Further, by constructing a spectacle of unification and hope, 
Trump projects an air of confidence in the economic future of the country that 
is based in an artificial notion of scarcity. The results of this analysis prompt two 
theoretical implications.
Spectacular Temporality and Organizing Macro-Discursive Resilience
As Trump attempted to manifest a sense of economic resilience through these 
campaign rallies, one of the most interesting things that emerges is the concept of 
time. Simultaneously, the rallies construct this sense of disruption, in terms of the 
economic conditions that the audience is facing and has faced. Buzzanell (2010) 
described the process of resilience as one of finding your way back to a new nor-
mal, but as Trump invoked resilience on the macro-discursive scale, the confla-
tion of past and present disruption changes the nature of resilience and roots what 
could be a positive, forward-looking message into a negative, damning message 
that rejects the past as a means of crafting a vision of the new normal. Largely, 
Trump during these rallies described the future as both the present escape from 
economic ruin and as a future possibility of escape from the same economic ruin.
As originally theorized, and as it is used in the literature, the concept of resil-
ience seems to be a positive, forward-looking force. However, more recent work 
from Buzzanell (2018, 2019) reinforces that we should be looking at both the 
positive and dark sides of resilience. Trump’s consistent and clear meditations 
on the perceived destruction the American way, at the hands of foolish or trai-
torous politicians, reinforces this negative sense of resilience. Much like the in-
cels in Eddington’s (2020) work, in these campaign rallies, Trump crafted a view 
of the future as a vague opposition to the destruction and havoc that would be 
wrought on the United States should his political opponents win.
Together, the spectacular temporality and the vague spectacle of normal that 
Trump constructed during these rallies speaks to a sense of spectacular resilience. 
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As researchers begin to expand the context of resilience research from micro 
organizing contexts and interpersonal relationships toward macro-discursive 
organization of phenomena like the economy, it is important to reflect on the 
mechanisms that shape the notion of resilience on a large scale. Narrative re-
searchers like Pals and McAdams (2004) and Koenig Kellas (2010, 2018) have, 
for a long time, examined the role of narrative coherence and the identifica-
tion of a specific new normal as a step in the process of resilient reintegration; 
at the macro organizational level it appears that, questions of health or ethical-
ity aside, constructing an incoherent view of the future in contrast to a hyper-
realistic, destructive present manifests an altogether different and darker view 
of what it means for a population to be resilient.
Narrative Spectacle and the Economy
As stated above, there is no such thing as the economy; it is a fickle, social un-
derstanding that we construct through macro- and micro-discourse, in every-
day action and negotiation. Even as economists work to deal with difficulties 
of predicting (and thereafter managing) human behavior toward positive eco-
nomic ends, the voices in this study may offer insight into the fragmentation of 
economic experience for many in the United States, unified under a banner of 
dissatisfaction with the status quo. Conceiving of economic reality in this way, as 
an individual act of interpretation of a socially constructed reality, can offer re-
searchers a new way to examine both how individuals experience economic and 
material conditions of their lives and how, on the macro level, people, compa-
nies, and governments attempt to organize and construct new economic realities.
As Trump constructed a spectacular representation of economic reality in 
these campaign rallies, he embedded certain logics into the narrative construc-
tion of what is fundamentally real for individuals facing the simultaneously dev-
astated and revived economy that he described. For example, as he narrated the 
possibility of American revival as an opposition to the betrayal, the treasonous 
behavior, of his political enemies, he constructed the possibility of economic 
prosperity as oppositional not only to his political opponents but to the very 
concept of government itself. These logics, embedded in the construct of the 
spectacle, construct a powerful mythos of victimization, individualization, and 
opposition to the powers of government. As Trump narrated it, the possibility 
of economic revival can only come from a strong, powerful leader unwilling to 
bend to the needs of any but “true,” authentic Americans. This nationalist image 
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of economic reality, as discussed above, not only creates an isolationist logic to 
economic prosperity but also reinforces the concept that economic growth and 
the possibility of a resilient, prosperous future is a zero-sum game where one 
person, party, country must lose in order for another to gain.
These logics of nationalism and isolationism are more insidious than they 
seem at first glance because they construct a logic of economics that ties itself to 
a view of economic growth that cares more for competition than cooperation, a 
free market that resembles more of a Hobbesian nightmare than a contemporary 
economy. As discourses embed these logics into the very ways that individuals 
construct a sense of what is fundamentally real in both the aggregate macroeco-
nomy and in their personal microeconomic reality, communication and other 
researchers should turn to further qualitative inquiry of economic discourse to 
uncover the construction of these logics. By excavating these economic logics 
in situ, we can hope to organize and create a changed view, not of an economy 
ravaged but of a hopeful, different kind of economic reality.
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This study has explored the different logics that emerged from three Trump cam-
paign rallies in the Rust Belt states that were key to his 2016 election victory. These 
three rallies offer insight into the spectacular nature of both macro-discourses 
of resilience and narrative economics. Future researchers should continue to 
explore both the notion of spectacular resilience and narrative economic spec-
tacles as they emerge in the talk of government officials, in the C-SPAN Video 
Library, and in other areas. This analysis is limited to the most epideictic of 
government settings; as much as Trump’s campaign rallies are important to his 
candidacy and to his style of governing, they are also only a small piece of the 
administration itself. Researchers can continue to explore the construction of 
economic logics in governmental actions, deliberations, and communiques on 
many different levels.
Further, this study can serve as a means of reconceptualizing what it means to 
analyze economic phenomena for both economists and communication schol-
ars. Examining the power of economic narratives to organize and construct 
economic reality is only one of many ways that communication scholars, orga-
nizational scholars, and economists can come together in new and exciting ways 
to examine the phenomena that interest them. Economic reality is not a fixed, 
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inevitable reality of the human condition; Adam Smith’s invisible hand is a hu-
man construction of human systems. Exploring the communicative and social 
dynamics that manifest those conditions, though, can get us closer to under-
standing and crafting a better, resilient economic future.
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Analyzing the C-SPAN Video Archive of Wisconsin Trump Rallies
David A. Frank
T
he C-SPAN Video Library hosts most of the 187 Trump Make America 
Great Again (MAGA) rallies held during the 2015–2016 Republican primary, 
137 during the 2016 general election rallies, and the 166 rallies conducted 
during the Trump presidency (“List of Post-2016,” 2021; “List of Rallies,” 2021). 
Donald Trump participated in 490 rallies during this period, with the first 
taking place in Manchester, New Hampshire, on June 17, 2015, and the last on 
January 6, 2021. This invaluable archive of Trump rallies serves as a crucial re-
pository of American history and American public address, offering scholars, 
students, and citizens the opportunity to study the rise of the MAGA movement 
and Donald Trump’s rhetoric.
I use the C-SPAN video archives of Trump rallies as a source of both schol-
arship and instruction. Most of the C-SPAN videos offer high-quality video and 
audio of the rallies. Most are accompanied with transcripts. The C-SPAN Video 
Library offers significant materials for the study of the Trump rallies, including 
the structure of the rallies, the playlist of songs that greet and bid farewell to his 
audience, Trump’s vocal cadence and physical gestures, the themes he presents 
and rehearses, and Trump’s audience and its responses, without commentary. 
I have embarked on a research project featuring the 21 rallies Trump has held 
in Wisconsin, including the ten 2016 Republican primary rallies, the five 2015 
General Election rallies, and the six rallies since his election to the presidency 
(see Appendix A to this chapter).
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The C-SPAN Archives also offers instructors an unmatched pedagogical re-
source. I create assignments for my students, who enroll in my upper-division 
rhetoric classes, to write research reports on the Trump rallies and teach them 
how to use the C-SPAN Video Library to secure their evidence. They write co-
gent essays, providing sharp and detailed analysis of Trump’s rally rhetoric (see 
Appendix B to this chapter). I offer extended illustrations of one student study 
in this chapter.
My study of Trump rallies suggests that the MAGA movement and Trump 
are the consequences of hyperglobalization, economic insecurity, cultural anxi-
eties, and a latent racism that can be activated. Trump, however, is more than a 
consequence — he is the prime mover in galvanizing and giving creative voice to 
those who voted for him during the 2016 Republican primary and the 2016 gen-
eral election, and who supported him in the 2020 election cycle. His rhetorical 
signature, the blending of a speaker’s reasoning and speaking style, is intention-
ally improvisational, which allows him to innovate and craft novel expressions 
of his ideology and that of his political base, often through call and response 
during his rallies. Indeed, Trump rallies are the cauldrons of rhetorical inven-
tion for him and his audience.
Ed Pilkington, in a recent article in The Guardian, noted that “there is no 
understanding Donald Trump without understanding his rallies. They are the 
crucible of the Trump revolution, the laboratory where he turns his alternative 
reality into a potion to be sold to his followers. It is at his rallies that his radi-
cal reimagining of the U.S. Constitution takes shape: not ‘We the people,’ but 
‘We my people’” (Pilkington, 2018, para. 2). Careful study of the rhetoric fueling 
Trump rallies helps explain how and why Trump’s rhetorical potions work. The 
C-SPAN Video Library provides a digital exhibition of these rallies.
I seek in this chapter to set forth a research approach that scholars, students, 
and citizens can use to study the Trump rallies in the C-SPAN Video Library. 
To accomplish this aspiration, I identify the four modes of inquiry — observa-
tional, survey, observer participant, and rhetorical criticism — that help explain 
the discourse of the Trump rally. To illustrate this research approach, I offer 
studies of 3 of the 21 Trump rallies the MAGA movement held in the state of 
Wisconsin between 2016 and 2020 that are hosted in the C-SPAN Video Library 
(see Appendix A to this chapter). Wisconsin was a key battleground state in 2016 
and is “ground zero for 2020 politics” (Gabriel, 2019). I offer a rhetorical analy-
sis of the Trump rally held in Janesville during Republican primaries on March 
29, 2016, a second study conducted by my students of the August 5, 2016, Trump 
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rally in Green Bay that took place during the general election campaign, and a 
Trump rally I attended in person during the Trump presidency on January 14, 
2019. I focus on the rallies and their rhetorical form. I conclude with reflections 
on the meaning of Trump rallies, the need for study of Trump rallies with mul-
tiple modes of inquiry, and the role the C-SPAN Video Library might play in the 
effort to better understand the MAGA movement and Trump.
I. RESEARCHING TRUMP RALLIES
Scholars who study the rise of right-wing populism, the MAGA movement, and 
Trump’s rhetoric do so with four overlapping modes of inquiry: observational 
studies, survey research, participant observation, and rhetorical criticism. Ob-
servational research makes use of industrial and manufacturing patterns and 
worker-firm data, and it measures “so-called hard and objective economic inter-
ests of communities or individuals and their changes over time” to explain the 
rise of MAGA and Trump (Naoi, 2020, p. 334; Rodrik, 2020). This mode of in-
quiry foregrounds “hard” data but cannot fully explain how they are framed and 
understood with symbols. Survey research seeks out the values, identity, and at-
titudes of those who find MAGA and Trump persuasive. As a mode of inquiry, 
it captures noneconomic causes of behavior and often dismisses economic in-
terests as significant explanations of Trump’s success (Naoi, 2020, p. 334). This 
focus underestimates the influence of structural and economic influences on 
cognitions and behaviors. Participant observation studies place scholars in the 
space and with the people enacting rallies (Erichsen et al., 2020). They iden-
tify how rallies unfold and provide communion. These studies pay some heed 
to other modes of inquiry but limit their analysis to rally performances. Rhe-
torical studies seek to describe, interpret, and evaluate the symbols that Trump 
and his base use to represent, activate, develop, and innovate to implement val-
ues, identity, and policy (Hart, 2020). This mode of inquiry tends to bracket the 
tweet, television interview, Facebook message, and speech as prime movers of 
behavior. Those who use rhetorical research methods typically dismiss economic 
explanations of Trump’s success. These four modes of inquiry can offer conflict-
ing results, although each offers unique insights.
Unfortunately, scholars tend to choose one mode to the exclusion of others 
and then explain the MAGA movement and Trump with the received wisdom of 
their respective fields. As a result, scholars using observational methods reduce 
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the MAGA movement and Trump to economic variables. Scholars deploying sur-
vey data argue that Trump’s activation of underlying racist attitudes and beliefs 
explains his success. And scholars using participant observation and rhetorical 
analysis set forth studies demonstrating how the rituals of the rally and Trump’s 
command of the symbol persuade audiences. Similarly, many book-length treat-
ments of Trump are inspired by anger and disgust with their subject, which 
clouds the visions of their authors.
Carlos Lozada read 150 books in the “Trump canon” and found that
too many books of the Trump era are more knee-jerk than incisive, more 
posing than probing, more righteous than right, more fixated on calling 
out the daily transgressions of the man in the Oval Office — this is not nor-
mal! — than on assessing their impact. They are illuminating in part because 
they reflect some of the same blind spots, resentments, and failures of imag-
ination that gave us the Trump presidency itself, and that are likely to outlast 
it. Individually, these books try to show a way forward. Collectively, they re-
veal how we’re stuck. (Lozada, 2020, p. 2)
Yet even Lozada’s judgment, as he acknowledges, is, in his words, “oddly nos-
talgic” as it relies “solely on words that are printed and bound” (Lozada, 2020, 
p. 6). He then claims that “books remain the first draft of how we think about 
that history, how we seek our place in it” (p. 6). American history, he concludes, 
“defines itself in writing” (Politics and Prose, 2020).
While books may codify the first draft of history, the C-SPAN Video Library of 
Trump rallies demonstrates that it is the spoken word, not those that are printed 
and bound, that energized the Trump movement. “I don’t have notes,” Trump 
explained to Washington Post reporters seeking how he communicates at ral-
lies. “I don’t have Teleprompters. That’s not like most of these guys. To stand up 
for an hour and 15 minutes, they’re reading it. It’s easier to do that but you lose 
all of the emotion. You won’t get people going” (Costa & Rucker, 2015, para. 31). 
Trump’s success can be traced to his command of public address during his ral-
lies. Steve Bannon argues that Trump is the greatest “public speaker in those large 
arenas since William Jennings Bryan.” As Bannon observes, “the mainstream 
media or opposition party never caught [on] . . . if you want to see the Trump 
agenda it’s very simple. It is all in the speeches. He went around to these rallies, but 
those speeches had a tremendous amount of content in them” (Blake, 2017, italics 
added). Kenneth Burke, in his seminal study of Hitler’s rhetoric, underscored the 
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importance of the spoken word in the mobilization of the disaffected (Burke, 1974, 
pp. 191–220). To be clear, “Trump is not Hitler and Trumpism is not Nazism,” 
writes Christopher Browning, the dean of Holocaust studies, but there are still, 
he concludes, some “troubling similarities” (Browning, 2018 para. 1).
Hitler, Burke observed, provided a cure for German economic and cultural 
traumas. He dispensed his medicine during two- to three-hour mass meetings 
scheduled intentionally during the evenings. Here, Hitler used “power of the 
spectacle” to reconstruct and celebrate German identity. As Burke explains, Hitler 
found that “mass meetings are the fundamental way of giving the individual the 
sense of being protectively surrounded by a movement, the sense of community” 
(Burke, 1974, p. 217). The medicine itself was Hitler’s oratory. Hitler, Burke noted, 
held that “revolutions are made solely by the power of the spoken word” — and 
his spoken words at the mass meetings achieved a “spontaneous identification 
between leader and people” (p. 216). These words were, according to Burke, both 
sincere and contrived; his “sinister powers of persuasion derive from the fact 
that he spontaneously evolved his ‘cure-all’ to the ‘inner necessities’ of his audi-
ence” (p. 211). Following Burke, we should begin with Trump’s spoken words at 
MAGA rallies, not with written texts, to understand his appeal.
The C-SPAN Video Library archive of MAGA rallies record Trump’s spoken 
words and public address, laced as they are with music and ritual. Proper study 
of the Trump rallies in this archive offers scholars, students, and citizens the op-
portunity to fill the blind spots, discipline the resentment, and remedy the failures 
of imagination Lozada identifies in the Trump canon. And a focus on Trump’s 
spoken words and public address, rather than words in books or on teleprompt-
ers, will better explain Trump’s rhetorical effectiveness. To accomplish this aspi-
ration, observational, survey, participant observation, and rhetorical modes of 
inquiry are necessary in the study of Trump rallies.
A. Observational Research: Hyperglobalization, Economic Anxiety, and Trade Shocks
As I will demonstrate, Donald Trump sounded themes of economic anxiety in 
the rhetoric he and his audience developed during the March 29, 2016, rally in 
Janesville, the August 5, 2016, rally in Green Bay, and the rally in Milwaukee 
on January 14, 2019. He continually targeted the 1994 NAFTA (North Atlantic 
Free Trade Agreement), China’s 2001 entrance into the WTO (World Trade Or-
ganization), and the 2016 TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) as “bad trade deals” 
that destroyed the economies of his audience. These trade deals did propel the 
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economy into an era of what Harvard economist Dani Rodrik calls “hyperglo-
balization,” the almost unlimited economic integration of nation-states with-
out the necessary protections in place for displaced industries (Rodrik, 2011, p. 
28). The flood of cheap goods into the United States caused by these agreements 
created, in the words George Packer, a “tornado” that uprooted the manufac-
turing base in Wisconsin and the Rust Belt. This flood and tornado constitute 
what economics terms “trade shocks.” The evidence supporting this hypothesis 
is corroborated by Rodrik, École des hautes études en sciences sociales’s (The 
School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences) Tomas Piketty, MIT’s Dan-
iel Autor, and Nobel Prize-winning economists Anne Deaton, Paul Krugman, 
and Joseph Stiglitz (Case & Deaton, 2020; Krugman, 2019, pp. 113–120; Piketty, 
2016; Stiglitz, 2019). Trump devotes significant attention in his Wisconsin rally 
rhetoric to decrying bad trade bills. His answer: protectionism.
These trade agreements unleashed the advantages of free trade, and “eco-
nomic globalization became an end into itself ” (Rodrik, 2011, p. 29). The dis-
advantages of hyperglobalization, Rodrik observes, were significant, as “within 
countries, globalization generated inequality and insecurity instead of lifting all 
boats because most countries, with the exception of China and India, did not cre-
ate sufficient systems of occupation transition, community support, and safety 
nets” (p. 29). Hyperglobalization devastated the economic, social, and cultural 
foundations of the industrial Midwest, creating a trade shock. The 1994 NAFTA 
agreement produced a largely unregulated surge of apparel and textile products 
imported from Mexico. The Economic Policy Institute (EPI), a left-leaning think 
tank, estimates that NAFTA displaced 700,000 jobs between 1994 and 2014, pri-
marily in the manufacturing industries (Economic Policy Institute, 2020). The 
data suggested that 14,500 jobs were displaced or lost to NAFTA in Wisconsin 
during this period (Public Citizen, n.d.b). Stanford economist Gavin Wright 
and his colleagues have documented how NAFTA broke up a biracial coalition 
and unleashed a political movement that favored protectionism, turning those 
who had belonged to the labor movement and unions to right-wing politics for 
satisfaction (Wright, 2020). The EPI also estimates that the U.S. trade deficit 
with China led to the loss of 3.2 million jobs, again mostly in the manufactur-
ing sectors (Kimball & Scott, 2014). EPI estimates that 68,000 jobs in Wisconsin 
were lost to the effect of China’s admission into the WTO. When the jobs lost 
to NAFTA and the WTO in Wisconsin are added up, it totals more than 80,000 
(Public Citizen, n.d.b). Jim Tankersley describes the impact of globalization 
in this manner: we are seeing “an economic ladder snapping out from under a 
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cluster of workers, trapping older ones in the middle of their careers and leav-
ing younger ones to wonder if they will ever get their lives off the ground. It can 
traumatize a community, scramble its politics, leave its leaders struggling for an-
swers” (Tankersley, 2020, p. 23).
In the wake of trade shocks caused by NAFTA and China’s entrance into the 
WTO, communities in the industrial Midwest and Wisconsin have suffered from 
“deaths of despair” recorded in Deaton’s scholarship, with citizens turning to opi-
oids and suicide (Case & Deaton, 2020; Dean & Kimmel, 2019). The Trump cam-
paign consciously targeted the sites in Wisconsin, including Janesville, Green 
Bay, and Milwaukee, that suffered in the wake of the NAFTA, China, and TPP 
trade shocks for its rallies (Figure 11.1) (Autor et al., 2020).
Trade shocks, this mode of inquiry suggests, produce economic insecurity, 
which in turn invites the need to target a villain. Autor et al. (2020) found that 
the trade shocks from 2000 to 2016
increased the demand for conservative media content, support for conserva-
tive viewpoints, and campaign contributions by more ideologically extreme 
donors. Distinct from the media viewership data, we see clear polarization in 
political contributions in trade-exposed districts. (p. 3316)
Those who live in areas affected by trade shock, these scholars note, turn to Fox 
News and other right-wing media outlets. Economic anxiety and insecurity can, 
under the right circumstances and framing, activate xenophobia and racism 
(Graetz & Shapiro, 2020, p. 9).
FIGURE 11.1 Sites of NAFTA and Chi-
na trade shocks in Wisconsin. (Source: 
Public Citizen, n.d.a)
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These trade shocks, according to the observational studies conducted by Autor 
and colleagues, directly affected the 2016 election. Autor found that Clinton 
“would have won the states of Michigan and Wisconsin in a counterfactual sce-
nario with a 25% smaller trade shock” (Autor et al., 2017, p. 7). Trump’s margin 
of victory of 24,081 votes would have been reduced by 37,715 votes, producing a 
Clinton win by 13,633 (p. 7). Trade shocks due to hyperglobalization, as Rodrik 
details in the most sophisticated study to date, helps explain the rise of right-wing 
populism and Trump’s electoral victories over the Republican and Democrat es-
tablishments, which both supported free trade policies and rejected protection-
ism as “anti-globalization views appear to be strongly associated with the decision 
to vote for Trump instead of Hillary Clinton” (Rodrik, 2020, p. 7).
Right-wing populism is primed by trade shocks, Autor, Rodrik, and other 
economists who use the observational modes of inquiry argue. Burke, in his rhe-
torical analysis, observed that Hitler offered “a noneconomic interpretation of 
economic ills” (Burke, 1974, p. 174). Namely, “Hitler ends his diatribes against con-
temporary economic ills by a shift into an insistence that we must get to the ‘true’ 
cause, which is centered in ‘race’” (p. 175). Observational modes of inquiry pre-
sent a view of causality, Rodrik observes, that “political preferences that appear 
to be driven by cultural values will in fact have deeper, economic roots” (Rodrik, 
2020, p. 8). The framing and expression of these political preferences, which have 
their origins in economic conditions, can be found in Trump’s rally rhetoric.
B. Survey Studies: Activation of Racial and Ethnic Identities and Attitudes
In contrast to observational studies, survey experiments “are at stark odds” with 
observational studies (Naoi, 2020, p. 334). Many surveys find support for non-
economic explanations of right-wing movements and Trump’s political success. 
Among the best works marshalling evidence that attitudes toward race and eth-
nicity, not economic anxiety, distinguished Trump voters from other candidates 
is Sides, Tesler, and Vareck’s Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and 
the Battle for the Meaning of America (2018). According to their research, Trump 
won the Republican primaries and the general election because he activated 
identity-based prejudice against people of color among white voters. Trump’s 
explicit appeals to xenophobia, racism, and nativism, heard by his audience as 
“authentic” and an expression of their thoughts, better explain his success than 
globalization or economic insecurity.
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Sides, Tesler, and Vareck and other scholars draw from surveys to demonstrate 
that Trump’s plan for a wall between Mexico and the United States, negative views 
of Blacks, Muslims, and Mexicans, and calls for a return to an America that was 
once great reflected and affirmed the views of his base (Sides et al., 2018). Mutz 
offers corroborating evidence, disputing the claim that the Trump supporters are 
those “left behind” by globalization (Mutz, 2018, pp. E4330–E4339). Rather, cul-
tural status, not economic hardship, explains why whites found Trump’s rheto-
ric attractive. Whites, Mutz found, feel “under siege” by a diversifying America 
in which they are losing their dominance and majority (p. E4330).
Challenging the foundational assumptions and conclusions of scholars who 
use observational modes of inquiry, Sides, Tesler, and Vareck invert the rela-
tionship between economic insecurity and racial anxiety. “Economic anxiety,” 
they write, “had been decreasing, not increasing in the eight years before 2016” 
(Sides et al., 2018, p. 7). Trump and his campaign activated white racism: “under 
Obama, white Americans’ feelings about blacks became associated with many 
things, including whether and how they felt about the economy” (p. 7). The issue 
of immigration, they contend, allowed Trump to fold the problems of race and 
ethnicity into a larger narrative of white American identity, offering Trump the 
leitmotif he used to win the primary and general elections. Flipping the causal 
relationship Rodrik sets forth, Sides, Tesler and Vareck conclude that “racial anx-
iety was arguably driving economic anxiety” (p. 7). Political leaders sensitive to 
these conditions craft campaign messages adapted to both the economic and 
cultural insecurities of voters, a capacity Trump possesses. Participant-observer 
studies allow researchers to understand the emotional world of those who at-
tend Trump rallies.
C. Participant Observation: Wading Into Culture
To understand culture, anthropologists and other scholars have developed par-
ticipant observation as a method in which researchers share the “space, events 
and day-to-day living” of those they study (Okely, 2012, p. 87). The fieldwork 
involved requires visiting and, when appropriate, participating in a ritual or 
event, often with the researcher coming from outside the culture to better ap-
preciate that culture from within. Scholars have interrogated the assumptions 
that the fieldworker must identify and bracket to secure a valid representation 
of the culture under study.
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We do have a good body of work making use of participant observation in 
the study of Trump rallies. This method identifies basic questions, and then the 
researcher attends a rally or a series of rallies. Erichsen, Schrock, Dowd-Arrow, 
and Dignam, for example, attended three Trump rallies as participant observ-
ers, seeking an answer to this question: “How did Trump supporters construct 
Hillary Clinton?” They answered this question with interviews of Trump sup-
porters and observing the rallies (Erichsen et al., 2020). A number of prominent 
journalists have attended Trump rallies as well. I make use of this mode of in-
quiry in a study of the Trump rally in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on January 14, 2019.
D. Rhetorical Studies: Rituals, Symbols, and Argument
Colleagues in my field of rhetorical studies have devoted substantial attention 
to the rhetoric of Donald Trump. Rhetorical scholars including Roderick Hart, 
Brian Ott, and Greg Dickinson, Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Doron Taussig, Rob-
ert Rowland, Mary Stuckey, Jennifer Mercieca, Robert Terrill, Joshua Gunn, Ca-
sey Ryan Kelly, Ryan Skinnell, Richard Cherwitz, and Jacob William Justice have 
published books with the best academic presses, refereed journal articles and dis-
sertations, and have offered public scholarship that presents insightful explana-
tions of Trump’s rhetoric (Cherwitz, 2019; Gunn, 2018, pp. 161–186; Gunn, 2020; 
Hart, 2020; Jamieson & Taussig, 2017, pp. 619–650; Justice, 2020; Kelly, 2020, 
pp. 2–24; Mercieca, 2019, pp. 264–279; Mercieca, 2020; Ott & Dickinson, 2019; 
Rowland, 2019, pp. 343–388; Skinnell, 2018; Stuckey, 2020, pp. 366–391; Terrill, 
2017, pp. 493–510). As a scholar of rhetoric, I concur with colleagues who find 
Trump’s use of symbols and rhetoric to be powerful forces helping to explain 
his rise to power. Scholars in my field of rhetoric study his tweets, speeches, and 
other modes of communication to explain his electoral success. They are in con-
sensus that Trump’s discourse is often incoherent, a jumble of word fragments.
Roderick P. Hart’s book Trump and Us: What He Says and Why People Listen 
(2020), published by Cambridge University Press, is the most comprehensive 
analysis to date of Trump’s rhetoric. Hart sides with those who conduct survey 
research, has little respect for Trump’s intellect, and dismisses the findings of 
observational studies when he writes that Trump “produced words constantly, 
often without cortical processing” and that “it was not partisanship, policy, or 
economic factors that landed Trump in the Oval Office but rather how Trump 
made people feel” (Hart, 2020, p. 26, I). Trump persuades because of how he 
commands the feelings and emotions of his audience (p. 242).
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Ott and Dickenson make use of similar descriptors when they stipulate that 
“we have designated Trump’s audience as ‘followers’ rather than ‘supporters’ due 
to their mindless, cult-like response to Trump” who “have sacrificed their sense 
of autonomy (and their capacity for independent, critical thought) to a larger 
movement” (Ott & Dickinson, 2019, p. ix). My study of Trump rallies challenges 
these representations. Without question, there are moments of incoherence in 
Trump’s rally rhetoric, and Trump’s audience can seem to the outsider as “mind-
less.” However, after watching many Trump rallies archived in the C-SPAN Video 
Library and attending one in person, I find that Trump’s rhetoric does cohere and 
achieve an authentic communion with his audience, an audience with agency.
In their attempts to explain Trump’s rhetorical success and signature, scholars 
too often assume his political communication and rationality are best judged as 
written texts studied as “speeches,” prepared in advance, with a clear exordium, 
three points of emphasis, and then a peroration. Trump rallies have not been 
the site of significant scholarly study, with some significant exceptions (Justice, 
2020). Of the 80-plus studies of Trump’s rhetoric to date, the vast majority cen-
ter on his tweets and prepared speeches in their analysis, and when they do in-
clude statements from Trump rallies, they are often abstracted from the context, 
which drains them of their energy and meaning.
My study of Trump’s rally rhetoric, both alone and in collaboration with Wil liam 
Keith, suggests that it should be studied as an expression of improvisation that effec-
tively conveys authenticity to his political base. Indeed, as The New Yorker’s David 
Remnick (2016) observed, Trump “vanquished sixteen rivals rendered hapless by 
a campaign that made improvisation its organizing principle.” Drawing from the 
2,000-year rhetorical tradition, Trump’s rhetorical signature is best understood as 
an expression of a particular form of improvisation, what Italian scholars of rheto-
ric term sprezzatura (I thank William Keith, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 
for this suggestion). In classical rhetoric, sprezzatura is a rhetoric defined as the art 
of concealing art; what seems “spontaneous” is planned (D’Angelo, 2018). Trump’s 
rally rhetoric is planned improvisation — which may seem to be a contradiction in 
terms but is more like an oxymoron, the creative yoking of opposites.
Trump and his campaign employ a modified form of the ancient art of im-
provisation and its more modern definition, sprezzatura. Pure improvisation is 
properly understood as an interactive activity in which the speaker and audience 
construct meaning in a collaboration that may (or may not) have a predetermined 
or knowable goal/end. The Trump campaign did, with the help of Cambridge 
Analytics, target rally sites in 2016 — the rallies themselves and Trump’s speeches 
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have a recurring structure and set of themes. However, the rallies are impro-
visations, yoking preparation with spontaneity. With this insight and those of-
fered by observational and survey modes of inquiry, I address the question What 
emotional and intellectual equipment is needed to understand the Trump rally?
II. EXPLAINING THE TRUMP RALLY
Trump rallies must be placed in their context if one is to achieve a proper under-
standing of their meaning. They are functions of economic and racial anxiety. As 
Rodrik’s research reveals, the significant rise of right-wing populism, both in the 
United States and around the globe, is one result of the economic anxiety cre-
ated by hyperglobalization and trade shocks. The economic insecurity activated 
by hyperglobalization, observational research suggests, triggers racial anxiety.
Observational research identifies NAFTA and China’s entrance into the WTO 
as the primary reasons the manufacturing base in the Rust Belt and Wisconsin 
was shattered. Autor and colleagues and Wright document how these trade 
shocks affected political preferences, turning many who supported Democratic 
candidates to more conservative media and politicians (Autor et al., 2020; 
Wright, 2020). Trump and the MAGA movement are highly critical of hyper-
globalization, NAFTA, and China’s trade policies and sounded the alarm about 
the detrimental prospects of the TPP during the Republican primary and the 
general election. NAFTA and China’s trade with the United States were recur-
ring themes in Trump’s rally rhetoric. His opponents during the Republican 
primary and the general election supported free trade and opposed protec-
tionist policies.
Survey research holds that racial anxiety prompts economic insecurity. Sides, 
Tesler, and Vareck chart how Obama, Clinton, and Trump activated racial anxi-
ety during the 2016 election. “Obama’s candidacy and presidency,” they observe, 
“helped activate racial attitudes more because of who he was than what he said or 
did” (Sides et al., 2018, p. 167). Clinton “moved to Obama’s left in both her rhet-
oric and policies on race-related issues” (Sides et al., 2018, p. 167). Trump’s base, 
primed by Obama’s candidacy and presidency and Clinton’s move to Obama’s 
left, was ripe for his message about borders and race. With race made the prom-
inent value, survey research revealed that Trump’s voters racialized their view 
of economics, “the belief that undeserving groups are getting ahead while your 
group is left behind” (Sides et al., 2018, p. 175).
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Cultural and rhetorical modes of inquiry, I believe, should not categorially re-
ject the research offered by scholars using observational methods. The research 
offered by Rodrik, Autor, and others complements and strengthens the capacity of 
rhetorical criticism to explain why Trump’s rhetoric is persuasive. Similarly, sur-
vey research is invaluable in putting on display the attitudes and beliefs of Trump’s 
audience. A focus on Trump’s rally rhetoric corroborates Lozada’s intuition that 
“economic and cultural forces feed off one another” (Lozada, 2020, p. 22).
While many scholars call for a rapprochement between economic and cul-
tural explanations, seeing the two as “inextricable,” rhetorical criticism goes first 
to the discourse, without preconceptions about the relationship between the two. 
Indeed, foreshadowing the analysis of the Janesville, Green Bay, and Milwaukee 
rallies, Trump’s improvisational rhetoric allows him to range from explanations 
that are economic, to those that are cultural, and then to those that yoke the two. 
To fully appreciate the improvisational rhetoric Trump deploys during his ral-
lies, they must be nested within their dramatic and ritualist form, which The New 
York Times’s White House correspondent Katie Rogers cast as a “play in three acts” 
(Rogers, 2018). I have modified her structure based on my viewing of rallies in the 
C-SPAN Video Library and my experience attending the Trump rally in Milwaukee.
THE TRUMP RALLY: A PLAY IN THREE ACTS*
SETTING
Typically, an arena or large space in rural America.
SETTINGS OF RALLIES IN THIS STUDY
Janesville, Wisconsin (3/23/2016): Janesville Conference Center
Green Bay, Wisconsin (9/5/2016): Ki Convention Center
Milwaukee, Wisconsin (1/14/2020): UW–Milwaukee Panther Arena
ACT I SCENE I: THE INVITATION
Summons. Local Republican Party and other conservative groups notified. Can­
didate/Pres ident Trump and campaign tweets advance notice.
ACT I SCENE II: SUPPORTERS ARRIVE EARLY FOR RALLY
Pre-Rally Function. Rally regulars and locals gather, buy merchandise, and stand 
in line for hours with pop music.
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ACT II SCENE I: PRELUDE TO TRUMP
Pre-Rally Framing. Campaign issues supportive messages as supporters enter 
rally site.
ACT II SCENE II: AUDIENCE TAKES ITS SEATS AS 
CANDIDATE/PRESIDENT TRUMP ENTERS
Supporters find their places, the candidate/president is introduced and arrives 
on stage. Audience members have their seats, hear introductions, and celebrate 
Trump’s entrance, as he uses the same linguistic and topical introductions at ev­
ery rally.
ACT III SCENE I: IMPROVISATIONAL INTEGRATION OF 
RECURRENT THEMES AND ENDORSEMENTS OF LOCALS
Rehearsal of recurring and new themes; inclusion of supportive resident politi-
cians. Adapting to context, audience, and mood, Trump addresses issues that are 
prominent to him and his audience. At a time of his choosing, he invites prominent 
and supportive prominent native politicians on stage.
ACT III SCENE II: IMPROVISATIONAL NARRATIVE AND PERORATION
Development of argument and conclusion. Trump returns to issues he shares in 
common with his audience, tests new ideas, and makes serial adjustments to the 
argument he advances, concluding with the same linguistic and topical notions 
at almost every rally.
*Adapted from Rogers (2018).
The rallies do have a structure, with distinct beginnings, middles, and ends. 
Paired with this structure are moments of genuine improvisation. Trump of-
ten returns to lines of argument and themes he has developed over a lifetime. 
“Trump’s message . . . over three decades would prove fairly consistent — and in 
certain cases, quite prescient” (Alberta, 2019, p. 124). Those who attend the ral-
lies are white and many are from the working class that, as Packer observes, “has 
suffered at least as much as any demographic group because of globalization, 
low-wage immigrant labor, and free trade. Trump sensed the rage that flared 
from this pain and made it the fuel of his campaign” (Packer, 2020). They are 
greeted with playlists, selected by Trump, headlined by Michael Jackson, Journey, 
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Elton John, Adele, and Andrew Lloyd Webber’s Phantom of the Opera. Trump’s 
introductions and conclusions are predictable. He begins by expressing amaze-
ment at the size of the crowd and concludes by returning to the “Make America 
Great Again” theme.
Trump ran as a moderate candidate, supporting Social Security, Medicare, 
and a dovish foreign policy (Yglesias, 2017). During the general election, Trump’s 
rally rhetoric was anchored in three arguments: “Drain the Swamp,” “Build the 
Wall,” and “Lock Her Up” (Stone, 2017, p. 768). As Roger Stone explains,
the throngs showing up at Trump rallies came prepared for a Trump stump 
speech that would give them a chance to chant in unison all three of these slo-
gans. Truthfully, it did not matter the order in which Trump served up these 
three themes, as long as they were all three served up such that the thousands 
packed into auditoriums to see and hear Trump got their chance to chant all 
three. (Stone, 2017, p. 768)
Reflective of sprezzatura, these three slogans were functions of research and 
preparation that often sounds spontaneous.
Cambridge Analytica, the research firm hired by the Trump campaign, had 
tested these slogans. They “were actually coined several years earlier — and not 
by Trump at all — but by the minds behind Cambridge Analytica” (Stroud, 2018, 
para 3). Yet Trump has the deep capacity to create novel applications of old 
themes and to collaborate with his audience to develop novel arguments. Given 
the mood, Trump will use call-and-response patterns, in which the speaker calls 
an argument out to the audience and the audience responds. The response of 
the audience will dictate how the speaker, in turn, answers. The speaker read-
ing from a prepared text is not inviting nor prepared for the audience engage-
ment other than to listen.
The “Drain the Swamp” theme, Trump reports, was imposed on him by his 
audience; it was not a gift from Cambridge Analytica. He confessed during a 
rally in Des Moines, Iowa:
Somebody said, “Drain the swamp.” I said, “Oh, that’s so hokey. That is so 
terrible.” I said, “All right, I’ll try it.” So like a month ago I said, “Drain the 
swamp.” The place went crazy. I said, “Whoa, watch this.” Then I said 
again. Then I started saying it like I meant it, right? (LAUGHTER) 
And then I said it . . . I started loving it. (C-SPAN User-Created 
Clip, 2020)
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A central theme of Trump’s 2016 campaign, “Build the Wall,” served to retain his 
audience as Trump explained to The New York Times’s editorial board:
If my speeches ever get a little off, . . . I just go: “We will build a wall!” You 
know, if it gets a little boring, if I see people starting to sort of maybe think-
ing about leaving — I can sort of tell the audience — I just say, “We will build 
the wall,” and they go nuts. “And Mexico will pay for the wall!” But — ah, but 
I mean it. But I mean it. (“Up Against the Wall,” 2017)
The third theme, “Lock Her Up,” illustrates the agency of Trump’s audience and 
unfolds into an enactment of misogyny.
Jared Yates Sexton (2017) witnessed several Trump rallies and heard the fol-
lowing at one:
An opening speaker referred to “Crooked Hillary Clinton” and a man yelled 
“Bitch!” At first, he seemed almost as surprised as anybody that the word had 
escaped his mouth, but when he took stock of the crowd and heard the oth-
ers cheering and laughing, a smile broke across his face. Somebody clapped 
him on the back. This was a change from the Trump rally in South Carolina 
aboard the USS Yorktown, where the crowd took their cues from the candi-
date and cheered on his racist rhetoric before retiring to the parking lot and 
harassing protesters. There, in Greensboro, I could tell Trump voters were 
beginning to feed off each other and Trump was able to take them up to the 
line of good taste and let them take over where he could not. As a result, the 
rallies grew darker, more hateful, the atmosphere simmering with anger and 
pent-up rage. (pp. 168–169)
Rally audiences create and embellish messages that they offer to and extend for 
Trump. The rallies do exhibit anger and rage, but these emotions blend with a 
sense of community and declarations of love.
Pilkington (2018), who attended five Trump rallies in eight days, reported 
that he was “confronted with an uncomfortable truth: to figure out what’s hap-
pening you have to acknowledge the love.” He found that “love is very much in 
the air” at Trump rallies. The rallies are a “lovefest” and “Trump uses the word 
‘love’ repeatedly” (para 1). The word and emotion create a strong sense of com-
munion, one that is often lacking when rally participants return home. Rallies, 
then, are emotional cauldrons of anger, rage, love, and communion that help to 
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constitute, reconstitute, define, and redefine the identity of the participants and 
their enemies. I turn now to studies of three Wisconsin Trump rallies. I make 
use of observational, survey, and rhetorical modes of inquiry.
III. THREE WISCONSIN TRUMP RALLIES
The University of Wisconsin–Madison’s Katherine Cramer (2016), in her award- 
winning The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the 
Rise of Scott Walker, found in her interviews of citizens in rural Wisconsin, many 
of whom voted for Trump in the Republican primary and in the general elec-
tion, a “rural consciousness” affected by both economic dislocations and racial 
anxiety. Her research, paired with research conducted in Trump-supporting 
communities in Louisiana (Hochschild’s Strangers in Their Own Land), Appa-
lachia (J. D. Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy), Kansas (Hoganson’s The Heartland), and 
Oregon (Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn’s Tightrope; Tankersley’s The 
Riches of This Land), helps illuminate the motivations of those who voted for 
Trump (Hochschild, 2016; Hoganson, 2019; Kristof & WuDunn, 2020; Tank-
ersley, 2020; Vance, 2016). They are in consensus about the characteristics of 
the Trump voter.
Cramer engaged in extensive conversations with citizens in 27 Wisconsin 
rural communities. She found that those who voted for Trump had not been 
“hoodwinked,” that “the people who support Trump are not all a bunch of crazy 
idiots” (Guo, 2016, para 8). Cramer discovered they had rational reasons to sup-
port Trump — they understood his character flaws but supported him “because 
he represented substantial change” (Guo, 2016, para 8). The change they needed 
was economic and cultural: “I see the Trump phenomenon,” Cramer explains, 
“coming out of rising income inequality and the leftovers of the Great Recession. 
[Trump supporters] are feeling unheard and . . . disrespected by the powers that 
be” (Baltz, 2020, para. 27). They emphasize jobs, infrastructure, and economic 
issues. Those who are “struggling economically,” she continues, are “groping for 
targets of blame” (Whitesides & Lopez, 2016).
Trump, Cramer found, had activated “illegal immigrants” as the scapegoat 
for the economic anxiety suffered by those she interviewed. The slogan “Build 
the Wall,” Cramer notes, is a “vibrant indicator” of Trump’s success in giving 
folks in rural communities language they could use to frame their experience. 
“People didn’t come up with that phrase themselves. They’re saying it because 
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Donald Trump said it” (Guo, 2016). A study of three Trump rallies that follow 
corroborate Cramer’s insights.
Rally I. Rhetorical Criticism. 2016 Republican Primary. Tuesday, March 29, 
2016. Janesville, Wisconsin. Janesville Conference Center. 1,000 participants. 
(For video and transcript [CC], see C-SPAN, 2016a.)
The closure of a large GM factory, which was a critically important economic 
engine of Rock County, Wisconsin, hit Janesville hard. “NAFTA and other trade 
agreements . . . fostered GM’s transfer of jobs from the U.S. to Mexico” (Bybee, 
2010). The GM factory was the source “of the city’s identity and the foundation 
of its prosperity” (Bybee, 2010). Amy Goldstein (2018), in her book Janesville: 
An American Story, documents the effects of GM’s departure, writing that in the 
“shadow of the town, hundreds of teenagers are becoming the victims of a dom-
ino effect” (p. 262). She continues:
These are kids whose parents used to scrape by on jobs at Burger King or 
Tar get or the Gas Mart. Now their parents are competing with the unem-
ployed autoworkers who used to look down on these jobs but now are grasp-
ing at any job they can find. So, as middle-class families have been tumbling 
downhill, working-class families have been tumbling into poverty. As this 
down-into-poverty domino effect happens, some parents are turning to drink-
ing or drugs. Some are leaving their kids behind while they go looking for 
work out of town. Some are just unable to keep up the rent. So with a parent 
or on their own, a growing crop of teenagers is surfing the couches at friends’ 
and relatives’ places — or spending nights in out-of-the-way spots in cars or 
on the street. (p. 263)
Trump held his first Wisconsin rally in Janesville and addressed 1,000 rally par-
ticipants in the Janesville Conference Center.
The C-SPAN Video Library provides a crisp visual and audio account of the 
rally, including closed captions and a transcript (C-SPAN, 2016a). A play in three 
acts, the rally offers the audience the Trump playlist of music as he entered to 
the Dutch group 2 Unlimited’s “Get Ready for This,” an introduction focused 
on the size of the crowd, a conclusion repeating the promise that “we’re going 
to make America great again,” and the word “love” and phrase “I love you” scat-
tered throughout the address at 27 points. The public address between the intro-
duction and conclusion is improvised. Trump is in constant motion, holding one 
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piece of white paper. The C-SPAN video makes clear that the paper has hand-
writing in ink on both sides, as he achieves eye contact with audience members 
in all corners of the conference center. His vision — that is, what he sees — seems 
to dictate what he says. Trump spots bikers in the back and engages them before 
returning to the paper he holds in his hand.
He reads from the paper after castigating his opponent, Ted Cruz. Trump, 
using the nickname “Lyin’ Ted Cruz,” declares with glee, using a clever rhyme, 
that Cruz “stands up, Bible high, puts it down and then he lies.” “The message is 
what we want. We want jobs, we want jobs. We want trade deals that are smart, 
not stupid deals.” He then turns to the white paper, stating, “I wrote down some 
notes.” Then, blending insights from observational and survey research, convey-
ing them in his signature improvisational style, he reads from his handwritten 
notes, interspersing interpretations of the data and attacks on John Kasich, an-
other opponent: “Wisconsin has lost 15,000 net jobs to Mexico. Kasich is run-
ning also. He voted for NAFTA. Both of them [Kasich and Cruz] want TPP. 
TPP, both of them want Transpacific. That will make NAFTA look like a baby 
and Wisconsin will be hit so hard.” These arguments are consistent with the ev-
idence presented by Rodrik, Autor, and Bernie Sanders.
After several diversions and tangents (marked by the ellipses below), which 
engage his audience and sustain their attention, Trump continues:
We are going to have borders again. Here we have something that is pretty in-
teresting. I love you, too. You lost 70,000 jobs to China. 70,000 jobs. 100,000 
illegal immigrants living in Wisconsin. . . . We cannot have China ripping us 
off and Mexico and Japan and Vietnam. We cannot have it and they are rip-
ping us like they have never ripped anybody before. We are rebuilding China, 
Mexico. Those Carrier air-conditioners moving to Mexico. Ford moving to 
Mexico. . . . You know what? Look, we’re losing our jobs. When I see that sta-
tistic, you are losing your jobs. (C-SPAN, 2016a)
Here is evidence that Trump’s improvisational style allows him to split or fuse 
issues of economy and race as he determines it fits the context and audience. To 
be sure, the bulk of his address consisted of personal attacks on Ted Cruz, John 
Kasich, Scott Walker, the Club for Growth, the press, John McCain, and Mitt 
Romney. And there are a number of other issues and topics embedded in Trump’s 
improvisation worthy of analysis. The second rally, held in Green Bay during the 
general election, highlights student analysis of Trump’s rhetoric.
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Rally II. Pedagogy. 2016 Republican Primary. Friday, August 5, 2016. Green 
Bay, Wisconsin. KI Convention Center. 3,000 participants. (For video and 
transcript [CC], see C-SPAN, 2016b.)
I paired the students in my English 335 class on rhetorical criticism into teams 
of two. They were assigned to conduct rhetorical criticisms of Trump rallies in 
the C-SPAN Video Library (see Appendix B to this chapter). The assignment 
called for the students to make use of observational, survey, and rhetorical re-
search to explain the rhetorical situation faced by Trump, his audience, and the 
exigences prompting the rally. The students were expected to research the eco-
nomic and cultural backdrops in the cities, counties, and states hosting the ral-
lies they researched. I also provided the students with the rhetorical vocabulary 
they needed to describe, interpret, and evaluate Trump’s rhetoric. The students 
wrote a 4,000-word research essay and made an oral report on their findings 
(see Appendix B to this chapter). I quote from the paper written by the two stu-
dents (Jarvis et al., 2019) who analyzed the Trump rally held in Green Bay, Wis-
consin, on August 5, 2016.
The students set the scene and describe Trump’s audience:
Donald Trump was speaking to the freshly unemployed paper mill worker, 
whose job lost the battle against technology and is now replaced by a machine 
or a robot. And as shown on C-SPAN, Donald Trump was speaking to an al-
most entirely white working class, calloused hands, backbone economy that 
continues to drive the Midwest industry to survive. And that’s exactly how he 
wanted it. (Jarvis et al., 2019)
The students then highlighted the opioid problem faced by citizens in Wisconsin 
that appeared in the wake of economic criticism, describing what Trump intended 
to do to combat the problem:
Woven in the inside of a struggling economy, the audience of Green Bay (and 
the state of Wisconsin as a whole) faces a different, more personal and as a re-
sult more emotional crisis, opioids. According to the Wisconsin Department 
of Health Services, opiate overdoses among Wisconsinites has increased by 
238% in recent years off prescription painkillers alone. This statistic fails to in-
clude the demoralizing increase in illegal opioids such as heroin and the rise 
of fentanyl. (Jarvis et al., 2019)
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Having established this background, the students turned to Trump’s rhetoric.
At the Janesville rally Trump used 2 Unlimited’s “Get Ready for This.” The 
students assigned to the Green Bay rally noted that Trump entered the Green 
Bay rally to the English rock band Free’s “All Right Now,” which was written by 
Andy Fraser and Paul Rodgers. They write:
After his introduction, “All Right Now” rears its motivational head again 
through the venue speakers and out walks the Republican nominee. With the 
spotlight on the podium, pandemonium of supporters clinging on for dear life 
to the promises of hope for the working class and the restoration of a “great” 
nation, Donald J. Trump may as well have been Paul Rodgers himself, the lead 
[singer of the British rock band Free, singing ] “All Right Now” [and] perform-
ing at his own rock concert, a calculated rhetorical situation. (Jarvis et al., 2019)
The students understood that music and its capacity to elevate emotion provided 
an entry to their interpretation of Trump’s rhetoric and his entrance to the rally.
I offer, in my overview of rhetorical theory in my class on rhetoric, an expla-
nation of the three proofs Aristotle offers in Rhetoric, ethos, pathos, and logical 
argument, Burke’s view that rhetoric can provide a cure to despair in his “The 
Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle,” and the five canons of rhetoric Cicero describes in 
Rhetoric ad Herennium (Burke, 1974; Kennedy, 1991). The students, in their in-
terpretation of Trump’s rally speech write:
Throughout the entirety of Donald J. Trump’s speech, he navigates through 
Aristotle’s three proofs; however he relies heavily on pathos. Trump’s use of pa-
thos serves as an aid to bridge the gap between himself and his audience. He 
removes any possibility of misunderstanding by using simple language, cap-
italizes on emotion by mirroring his audience’s frustrations and celebrates a 
utopian future alongside the white working class. In Green Bay, Wisconsin 
Trump uses pathos as a medicine to cure the despair that his audience mem-
bers are experiencing in the aftermath of NAFTA, Obamacare and drug in-
flux. (Jarvis et al., 2019)
Rhetorical theory offers students the equipment needed to explain Trump’s 
delivery. In class, I identify Trump’s rhetorical signature of improvisation. The 
ancient rhetoricians called improvisation a form of digression.
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The students applied rhetorical theory in this manner:
Alongside Trump’s use of Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, he utilizes Cicero’s the-
ory of rhetoric including the five canons. Namely, his use of actio and elocu-
tio. Trump uses figures of speech, rhetorical technique, hand gestures and 
tone of voice to enhance pathos as well as to excite his audience. In the Green 
Bay rally, he stood relaxed and forward facing. He read from papers that were 
folded in his hand, and looked into the eyes of all of his audience members. 
In addition, Trump was able to pause to smile, give a thumbs up or to sarcas-
tically raise his brow in reaction to audience feedback. Trump composed a 
speech that had words that invited his audience to join him, as well as allowed 
for fluidity in his performance that reinforced his pathos. Ultimately, all rhe-
torical devices Trump entwined with his political agenda served to primarily 
elevate his pathos. Thus, speaking directly and effectively to his target audi-
ence. (Jarvis et al., 2019)
Trump, they observe, digresses, but does so with the purpose of elevating the 
ethos of others, which in turn enhances his ethos:
Trump primarily uses figures of amplification to call attention to his main 
points; specifically, digressio. He utilizes digressio as a way of humbling him-
self in the eyes of his audience. He uses phrases such as, “they’re great,” “great 
people,” and “great state” as a way to describe not only his immediate audi-
ence but other audiences and individuals which people living in Green Bay 
Wisconsin admire. For example, following Mike Pence’s introduction, Trump 
says, “Special. Special. He is a special man and special person. And he has 
become my friend.” Trump digresses from his point to elevate the ethos of 
other people who agree with the argument he is making regarding his elec-
tion. (Jarvis et al., 2019)
Finally, I ask students to address Steve Bannon’s claim that Trump is “the greatest 
public speaker in those large arenas since William Jennings Bryan” (Beck-
with, 2017):
The foundations that made William Jennings Bryan known as a great pub-
lic speaker are very similar to those of President Trump. An assumption can 
be made that Bannon is referring to Bryan’s speech, “Cross of Gold,” which 
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landed him the Democratic presidential nomination for the 1896 presidency. 
According to an essay held in the Library of Congress written by Robert 
Cherney, “His voice (William Jennings Bryan’s), a carefully cultivated and pow-
erful instrument, could reach into every part of the great convention hall, a cru-
cial ability before electronic amplification. Many of his most striking phrases 
had been tested, revised, and retested in earlier speeches.
The speech transformed Bryan from a presumptuous youngster into a top 
contender for the nomination” (“William Jennings Bryan and the ‘Cross of 
Gold’ Speech,” Robert Cherney). Similarly, Trump uses rhetorical devices and 
emotion to evoke similar reactions from the attendees within the walls of his 
rallies. Likewise, Bryan was able to speak into the minds of the attendees of the 
Democratic Convention in Chicago in 1896. With this in mind, it is logical for 
Bannon to draw a similarity between William Jennings Bryan and Donald J. 
Trump due to their abilities to speak loudly, and to change their public image 
through their ability to effectively speak to target audiences. (Jarvis et al., 2019)
That the students drew a thoughtful connection between the first popu-
list, William Jennings Bryan, and our most prominent right-wing populist is 
credit to their hard work and intelligence. The final rally I offer for analysis is a 
participant-observer study I conducted when I attended the January 14, 2019, 
Trump rally in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Rally III. Participant Observation. 2019 General Election Primary. Saturday, 
January 14, 2019. Milwaukee, Wisconsin. UW–Milwaukee Panther Theater. 
12,000. (For video and transcript [CC], see C-SPAN, 2020.)
I attended the January 14, 2019, Trump rally in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, as a par-
ticipant observer and entered Donald Trump’s cauldron to answer this question: 
what were the primary differences, if any, between experiencing a Trump rally 
using the C-SPAN Video Library and in person? To secure tickets to the rally, 
I went online to the Trump campaign website, then entered my name, home 
address, email address, and cell phone number. I have, subsequently, received 
hundreds of emails from the Trump campaign. On the day of the rally, I joined 
12,000 others, almost all white, and stood in line for three hours. Given I had spent 
many hours watching C-SPAN Video Library videos, the opportunity to witness 
one in person allowed me to juxtapose the two as experiences of the same event.
I had many opportunities to purchase Trump swag (Figure 11.2), including a 
t-shirt declaring “JESUS IS MY SAVIOR,” which has an image of an American 
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flag bridged to a “TRUMP IS MY PRESIDENT” proclamation. As I stood in 
line, I talked with those around me. I was joined by a colleague who is a profes-
sor at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. Cramer, in her interviews, found 
that many citizens from rural areas find university faculty “arrogant and elitist” 
(Cramer, 2016, pp. 110, 117). We did not reveal our affiliations.
The line snaked around gates as 12,000 people (see Figure 11.3), most wearing 
red “Make America Great Again” hats, waited with patience to find their seats in 
the UW–Milwaukee Panther Theater. Once inside, the 2020 Campaign theme 
was “Keep America Great,” which the scoreboard in the middle of the theater 
displayed as the rally’s North Star (see Figure 11.4). The local newspaper, The 
Journal Times, listed the Trump rally playlist I heard (Rogan, 2021). The play-
list included Lee Greenwood’s “God Bless the U.S.A.” — Trump’s entrance song; 
Queen’s “We Are The Champions,” which was repeated many times; The Village 
People’s “Macho Man”; Elton John’s “Candle In The Wind,” “Rocket Man,” “Tiny 
Dancer,” and “Saturday Night’s Alright for Fighting”; and the Rolling Stones’ 
“Brown Sugar,” “Wild Horses,” “Time Is on My Side,” “You Can’t Always Get What 
You Want,” “Heart of Stone,” and “Let’s Spend the Night Together.” The people 
around me sang along, as I did on occasion, because I grew up with these songs.
Brad Pascale, who was then the campaign manager, Vice President Mike 
Pence, and Wisconsin senator Ron Johnson were among those who introduced 
Trump and “kissed his ring.”
FIGURE 11.2 Trump swag on sale outside the Milwaukee 
Pan ther Theater.
FIGURE 11.3 line for the Trump rally, January 14, 2020.
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His address, much like the one in Janesville, began with the issue of trade 
and jobs:
Before it was talk. I said, “I’m going to do this. We’re going to take care of your 
trade.” What we’ve done with China now, on Wednesday we signed, that’s to-
morrow. What we’ve done with the USMCA, what we’ve done with 
Japan, $40 billion trade deal that a lot of it has to do with the farm-
ers. South Korea. Oh, you got to love Trump, you got to love Trump. 
(C-SPAN, 2020)
He then rehearsed the case against NAFTA:
And we will soon be replacing the NAFTA catastrophe, one of the worst trade 
deals in the history of the world, frankly, with the incredible USMCA, Canada, 
Mexico, a giant victory for Wisconsin workers, farmers and dairy producers, 
FIGURE 11.4 Scoreboard: Trump rally, Milwaukee Panther Stadium.
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a tremendous victory. . . . Tomorrow we’ll also be signing our phase 
one trade deal with China, massively boosting exports of prod-
ucts made and produced right here in the great state of Wisconsin. 
(C-SPAN, 2020)
Trump did not spend much time after the introduction on trade.
Trump did offer brief reprisals of the three general election themes, “Drain 
the Swamp,” “Lock Her Up,” and “Build the Wall,” in his address. Race was not 
an explicit topic but one that informed several of the policy positions. The bulk 
of his address was scattered among a number of topics; he would land on one 
briefly and then flit to another, returning to a previous topic as the spirit moved. 
He ranged from foreign to domestic affairs and back again. Democrats and ter-
rorists in the Middle East served as foes.
From my seat, I could view those around and next to me. They were pay-
ing close attention to Trump’s speech, laughing, nodding — they were engaged. 
Although some of what Trump said was incoherent to me as he skipped from 
one topic to another, I followed the flow of the arguments he advanced. As in 
Janesville, Trump was in constant visual contact with his audience, moving his 
eyes and body to sustain his relationship with his audience. He frequently used 
the word “love” to convey his affection for the audience, law enforcement, the 
military, his family, and the U.S.A.
I am certainly not the first to observe that attending a Trump rally is like at-
tending a high school or college football game. Because the Green Bay Packers 
were to play the San Francisco 49ers that weekend, Trump wove praise of the 
Packers into his address. The atmosphere was cheerful, with a big dose of an-
ger and menace. The people with whom I stood in line were familiar. They were 
like neighbors and classmates I knew in my hometowns in Huerfano County in 
Colorado and Marion County in Oregon — both counties voted for Trump in 
2016. Local newscasters interviewed members of the audience, and they reported 
supporting the notions Trump advanced (MacIver Institute, 2020).
After attending the Milwaukee Trump rally in person, I watched the C-SPAN 
video and read the transcript of the event. Both captured the gist of the Milwaukee 
rally. However, standing in line, hearing the playlist, sitting next to Trump sup-
porters, experiencing the more positive communal function of the rally, and 
listening to Trump speak unmediated by screens did allow me to better under-
stand why he is persuasive to his base. Trump establishes, with the rituals of the 
rally, the themes identified by observational and survey research as important 
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to his audience, and his improvisational style conveys intimacy and authentic-
ity, a presence that creates communion. One needs to be inside the rally to feel 
the emotional bonds Trump and the rally weave between the 12,000 in the arena 
and between the 12,000 and Trump.
IV. UNDERSTANDING DONALD TRUMP’S CRUCIBLE: THE ENDURING 
VALUE OF THE C-SPAN VIDEO ARCHIVE OF TRUMP RALLIES
The C-SPAN video archive of Trump rallies provides a deep resource for schol-
ars, students, and citizens seeking to understand the rise of right-wing populism 
in the United States and to answer the question Why did Trump persuade mil-
lions of Americans to vote for and support him? Far too many dismiss Trump 
and his followers as angry, single-minded racists, unable to marshal coherent ar-
guments, and dismiss the rallies as spectacles of backwater, ill-educated Amer-
icans who have embraced primitive beliefs. To be sure, xenophobia, racism, 
misogyny, and anti-science themes are present in these rallies. However, there 
is much going on in these rallies that helps explain why these themes are pres-
ent and offers some modest upward-inflected assessments. To fully understand 
Trump rallies, MAGA, and this version of right-wing populism, it is necessary, 
in my judgment, to use the four modes of inquiry I have identified.
Observational research, survey methods, participant observation, and rhe-
torical criticism can individually and collectively shed light on the meaning of 
Trump rallies. I do not find the arguments advanced by the proponents of sur-
vey research and rhetorical criticism against the findings of observational re-
search persuasive — indeed, Trump in his Wisconsin rally speeches leads with 
the economic argument, which is potent. To be fair, scholars of observational 
research do not fully acknowledge the power of survey methods and rhetorical 
criticism, but they are open to their influence. The student paper I include here 
demonstrates that observational research and survey methods can inform rhe-
torical criticism and that economic and cultural exigencies blend in Trump’s dis-
course. I have learned as well that participating in a Trump rally offers insights 
that can’t be gained by using the C-SPAN Video Library. Absent attending Trump 
rallies, the C-SPAN video archive of Trump rallies offers the next best alternative.
Trump’s improvisational rhetorical signature allows him to craft messages 
based on the economic and cultural factors that gave rise to his expression of 
right-wing populism. There is an underlying structure to his rallies and rhetoric 
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that his improvisational approach — sprezzatura — translates into an authentic-
ity that is persuasive to his audiences. That he speaks without notes and appears 
to be thinking on the spot conveys to his audience that he is speaking from the 
heart — and many in his audience report that he says what they are thinking.
Those who disagree with their thinking must first appreciate how Trumpism 
has come to pass by using some or all of the modes of inquiry I have identified. 
Accordingly, I have invited my students to consider David Frum’s recent prog-
nosis that the economic and cultural resentments that gave Trump his rhetor-
ical opportunity should be addressed (Frum, 2018) and that these resentments 
should not be met with contempt but with policies that can mitigate pain and 
suffering. My hope is that study of Trump rallies can sponsor constructive em-
pathy that can lead to legislative policies designed to address hyperglobalism, 
the roots of racism, and a political system responsive to the needs of its citizens.
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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH AGENDA
Trump Rallies in Wisconsin Audience rally no.
2016 republican Primaries (March 1–July 21, 2016)
1. Tuesday, March 29, 2016 1,000 1
Janesville, WI, Janesville Conference Center
C-SPAN video and transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?407408-1 
/donald-trump-town-hall-meeting-janesville-wisconsin
2. Wednesday, March 30, 2016 1,000 2
Appleton, WI, Radisson Paper Valley
Video and transcript: Factbase, https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech 
-appleton-wi-march-30-2016
3. Wednesday, March 30 750 3
De Pere, WI, Byron L. Walter
Video and transcript: Factbase, https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech 
-de-pere-wi-march-30-2016
4. Saturday, April 2, 2016 1,500 4
Eau Claire, WI, Memorial High School
Video and transcript: Factbase, https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech 
-eau-claire-wi-april-2-2016
5. Saturday, April 2, 2016 1,200 5
Racine, WI, Memorial Hall
Video: YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K_wXGd7Lr6o
Video and transcript (CC): Microsoft Stream, https://web.microsoftstream.com 
/video/cfef1e45-f07c-4bb0-9451-aa1501bb8723
6. Saturday, April 2, 2016 1,700 6
Rothschild, WI, Central Wisconsin Convention & Expo Center
C-SPAN video and transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?407558-1 
/donald-trump-town-hall-meeting-rothschild-wisconsin
7. Sunday, April 3, 2016 1,000 7
West Allis, WI, Nathan Hale High School
Video and transcript (CC): Microsoft Stream, https://web.microsoftstream.com 
/video/0c000e3f-db6f-4877-aa84-5afcaa13f82b
8. Monday, April 4, 2016 1,700 8
La Crosse, WI, La Crosse Center
Video and transcript (CC): Microsoft Stream, https://web.microsoftstream.com 
/video/ba209660-361f-43d4-a143-c09e72c1e6e4
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Trump Rallies in Wisconsin Audience rally no.
9. Monday, April 4, 2016 — 9
Milwaukee, WI, Milwaukee Theatre
C-SPAN video and transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?407634-1 
/donald-trump-campaign-rally-milwaukee-wisconsin
10. Monday, April 4, 2016 1,000 10
Superior, WI, Richard I. Bong Airport
Video and transcript: Factbase, https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech 
-superior-wi-april-4-2016
2016 General Election rallies (June 10–November 5, 2016)
1. Friday, August 5, 2016 3,000 11
Green Bay, WI, KI Convention Center
C-SPAN video and transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org 
/video/?413593-1/donald-trump-endorses-speaker-ryan-ahead-primary
2. Tuesday, August 16, 2016 2,000 12
West Bend, WI, Ziegler Family Expo Center, Washington County Fair Park & 
Conference Center
Video and transcript: Factbase, https://factba.se/transcript/donald-trump-speech 
-west-bend-wi-august-16-2016
3. Wednesday, September 28, 2016 1,500 13
Waukesha, WI, Waukesha County Expo Center
C-SPAN video and transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org 
/video/?415990-1/donald-trump-campaigns-waukesha-wisconsin
4. Monday, October 17, 2016 3,000 14
Green Bay, WI, KI Convention Center
C-SPAN video and transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org 
/video/?417019-1/donald-trump-campaigns-green-bay-wisconsin
5. Tuesday, November 1, 2016 3,000 15
Eau Claire, WI, W. L. Zorn Arena
C-SPAN video and transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org 
/video/?417801-1/donald-trump-campaigns-eau-claire-wisconsin
Presidential rallies — Thank You Tour — victory rally (December 1–December 17, 2016)
1. Tuesday, December 13, 2016 7,000 16
West Allis, WI, Wisconsin Exposition Center, Wisconsin State Fair
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Trump Rallies in Wisconsin Audience rally no.
2018 Midterm rallies (March 10–November 26, 2018)
1. Wednesday, October 24, 2018 1,800 17
Mosinee, WI, Central Wisconsin Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org 
/video/?453502-1/president-trump-political-violence-attack-democracy
2020 Election rallies (February 11–November 2, 2020)
1. April 27, 2019 10,000 18
Green Bay, WI, Research Center
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org 
/video/?459875-1/president-trump-holds-rally-green-bay-wisconsin
2. January 14, 2020 12,000 19
Milwaukee, WI, UW–Milwaukee Panther Arena
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (Federal News Service): https://www.c-span.org 
/video/?467870-1/president-trump-campaigns-milwaukee-wisconsin
3. August 17, 2020 700 20
Oshkosh, WI, Wittman Regional Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?474841-1 
/president-trump-give-acceptance-speech-white-house-week
4. September 17, 2020 5,000 21
Mosinee, WI, Central Wisconsin Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?475727-1 
/president-trump-rally-mosinee-wisconsin
5. Saturday, October 17, 2020 7,000 22
Janesville, WI, Southern Wisconsin Regional Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?476982-1 
/president-trump-campaign-rally-janesville-wisconsin
6. Saturday, October 24, 2020 1,000 23
Waukesha, WI, Waukesha County Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?477329-1 
/president-trump-holds-rally-waukesha-wisconsin
7. Tuesday, October 27, 2020 1,000s 24
West Salem, WI, La Crosse Fairgrounds Speedway
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?477341-1 
/president-trump-campaign-rally-west-salem-wisconsin
28711. DONAlD TruMP’S CruCIBlE
Trump Rallies in Wisconsin Audience rally no.
8. Friday, October 30, 2020 — 25
Green Bay, WI, Green Bay–Austin Straubel International Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?477542-1 
/president-trump-campaign-rally-green-bay-wisconsin
9. Monday, November 2, 2020 1,000s 26
Kenosha, WI, Kenosha Regional Airport
C-SPAN Video and Transcript (CC): https://www.c-span.org/video/?477686-1 
/president-trump-campaign-rally-kenosha-wisconsin
APPENDIX B: C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY IN THE CLASSROOM
Trump and Clinton Rallies
Research Paper 1: Rhetorical Criticism and Judgment of a Trump Rally
The research team will conduct a rhetorical criticism of the assigned Trump rally. 
The rhetorical criticism will describe, interpret, and evaluate Trump’s speech as it 
is delivered in the context of the rally. The rhetorical criticism will seek to judge 
Trump’s speech, the Bannon theory of Trump, and Denby’s critique (see below).
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA (100 POINTS) RESEARCH TEAM 15
Criterion 1: Meets minimum scholarly standards
• 4,000-word essay that develops a well-developed judgment
• Use of MLA citation style
• Submitted to Canvas on due date
Criterion 2: Quality of scholarly research
• Citations to the best research on the rhetorical situation
Evidence on the audience’s exigence
Economic conditions of audience
Cultural backdrop of the audience
• Transcript of speech included as Appendix 1
Criterion 3: Quality of rhetorical criticism
• Description and interpretation of the rhetorical situation prompting the 
rally





• Judgment of speech
Morality
Effectiveness
Criterion 4: The quality of the judgment of the Bannon theory and Denby’s claim 
that Trump’s rhetoric is guilty of “fervent incoherence.”
• The Bannon theory:
President Trump in the speeches he delivered at rallies did something 
the mainstream media or opposition party never caught. If you want 
to see the Trump agenda, it’s very simple. It was all in the speeches. He 
went around to these rallies, but the speeches had a tremendous amount 
of content in them. I happen to believe he’s probably the greatest pub-
lic speaker in those large arenas since William Jennings Bryan. [Trump’s 
speeches were] galvanizing. Remember, we didn’t have any money. Hil-
lary Clinton and these guys had over $2 billion. We had a couple hun-
dred million dollars. It was those rallies and those speeches. All he’s 
doing right now he’s laying out the agenda with those speeches with 
the promises he made, and our job is to execute on that, to simply get a 
pass to how those get executed. He is focused on that. (Beckwith, 2017)
• Denby’s claim that Trump’s rhetoric is guilty of “fervent incoherence”:
His speeches have no beginning or end, no shape, no culmination and 
release, and none is necessary. For the audience, his fervent incoher-
ence makes him that much more present, for it is Trump alone who mat-
ters, the vividness of him standing there, in that moment, embodying 
what the audience fears and desires. Trump is devoted to anti-rhetoric. 
Boasts and fears and menacing attacks are followed by instant “solu-
tions” (about fighting ISIS: “You don’t want to know what I’m going 
to do”) — punctuated by war whoops and cries of adoration from the 
crowd. (Denby, 2015)
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A COMPUTATIONAL EXPLORATION OF 
THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL 
POLICY RESPONSES TO EPIDEMICS BEFORE 
AND DURING THE ERA OF COVID-19
Philip D. Waggoner
INTRODUCTION
Government in America is an extension of the people. Whether executive, leg-
islative, or judicial, governmental actors at some level are put in place by, and 
thus act in response to, a voting population who desire responsiveness from their 
representatives. One of the primary methods of delivering on this representa-
tional arrangement is in the form of policymaking, where governmental actors 
offer policies aimed at correcting or addressing issues in society (Jones et al., 
2009). While there are a host of avenues for policymakers to be made aware of 
pressing societal issues requiring policy action at some level (Waggoner, 2019), 
some issues are so apparent, there need not be an explicit cue from the public 
constituency. The COVID-19 epidemic is one of these types of issues, where the 
effects are so far reaching, governmental response through policymaking is os-
tensibly expected.
Yet, while the need for action may be overt, recent congressional debate of 
COVID-related legislation has demonstrated that the path to enacting policy 
responding to COVID-19 is not nearly as clear, simple, or even decorous. For 
example, congressional debate on the coronavirus economic stimulus bill with 
a price tag of $484 billion revealed harsh partisan mudslinging by both parties 
and in both chambers. Rep. Jayapal (D-WA) alleged Republicans offered a “bad 
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bill,” with the implication being they (Republicans) do not care as much as we 
(Democrats) do for families and workers (C-SPAN, 2020a). In a similar tone, but 
on the other side of the aisle and in the other chamber, Sen. Barrasso (R-WY) 
criticized the Democrats’ approach to the issue, aided by a poster titled “Pelosi 
is on Fantasy Island.” His remarks included inflammatory terms that resembled 
the tone of the poster (C-SPAN, 2020b). These examples of harsh partisan debate 
highlight the fractured context that defines much of American public policymak-
ing today. And though rooted in the representational responsibility of Congress 
to make policy in response to social and public health issues like COVID-19, the 
problem itself might be apolitical, but the elite response may not.
And to complicate matters, news coverage of highly salient issues like 
COVID-19 often fan the flames of political division, regardless of the direction 
of partisan-slant of the news outlet (Larcinese et al., 2011). News media are cer-
tainly imbued with a powerful role in the policymaking apparatus to responsibly 
report government policymaking back to the public. Yet, a grave limitation in 
this information transfer is a growing perception of biased and partisan-leaning 
news coverage in both directions (Perryman, 2019).
Thus, a multipart question emerges: First, is governmental policymaking on 
such widespread, apolitical issues characterized by political division? If so, for 
how long has this been the case? Put differently, is the brand of public policy-
making we anecdotally see and hear about today a function of historical poli-
cymaking on similar types of issues? Or, is America in a unique era of division, 
where policymaking on far-reaching, nonpartisan issues is similarly tainted by 
partisan division? These questions are grounded in a deep literature finding elite 
partisan division in specific questions (Souva & Rohde, 2007), as well as in pol-
icymaking in general (Layman et al., 2010). And these elite partisan differences 
and their effects are not beholden to the realm of policymaking, but significantly 
influence mass behavior and public opinion (Berinsky, 2007; Druckman et al., 
2013; Robison & Mullinix, 2016).
This study is aimed at exploring these questions from a broad exploratory 
lens, where patterns that naturally exist over time are able to emerge. Thus, us-
ing a suite of computational techniques, I am interested in exploring the evolu-
tion of governmental policymaking on epidemics.
In light of the aforementioned perception of bias that so often characterizes 
news coverage of such consequential, widespread issues and policy responses, 
I opt to look to the medium of policymaking itself: proposed bills. Specifically, 
I leverage an original data set of all U.S. congressional (Senate and House) bill 
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metadata on COVID-19 and epidemics broadly defined from 1973 to 2020. These 
data are mined for cross-temporal comparison of congressional policymaking 
on epidemics.
My goal is to allow the policies offered by the elected representatives to speak 
for themselves, untarnished by news coverage or any perception of biased report-
ing. This approach will shed important light on two key points: first, whether 
congressional policymaking on related public health issues is an evolutionary 
process; and second, the contours of the landscape of policymaking in this “ep-
idemics” issue space.
To explore the evolution of government policymaking responses to epidem-
ics, there are two dimensions of variation of interest for present purposes: time 
and partisanship. For the time dimension, I address the evolutionary question, 
which allows for a deeper, contextualized understanding of the current policy-
making climate in American politics in the era of COVID-19. The second di-
mension of partisanship is closely linked with the first. Namely, I am interested 
in exploring not only whether the types of bills introduced on addressing epi-
demics have changed over time, but especially in the modern, hyperpolarized 
era. The second part of the goal, then, is to detect whether and to what degree 
partisan differences appear.
Over the five stages of analysis detailed below, there were several striking 
patterns that emerged. Notably, the “what” of the policy substance remained 
relatively stable over time. That is, members of both parties tend to focus their 
policies on the epidemic in question, using terms related to the given epidemic. 
However, the “how” changes and grows steadily over time. In the earliest days 
of the study period, the tone of the policies was remarkably neutral. This trend 
faded away in favor of more pronounced sentiment over time, culminating in 
the starkest period of negative sentiment in the current COVID era. The trend 
was present for members of both parties and across both chambers.
Diving into the current COVID era explicitly, bigram network models showed 
that members of both parties tended to use terms that appeal to their bases in 
crafting bill descriptions. For example, Republicans invoked “China” and “small 
business,” whereas Democrats invoked terms like “Medicaid” and “fair housing.” 
An additional striking pattern is that Republicans are much more homogenous 
within their ranks as to the number and types of terms used. This is in compar-
ison to Democrats, who use a much wider set of terms and cover many more 
topics in their policies. These patterns are in line with similar research demon-
strating that the Democratic base is more fractious compared to the Republican 
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base, which tends to be focused more on ideological purity and consistency 
(Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016).
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
This exploration begins with the time dimension, and then is followed by the 
partisan dimension, and is organized by two time periods: pre-COVID (1973–
2018) and COVID (2019–2020). There are five sections comprising the analysis: 
first, descriptive differences between the COVID and pre-COVID eras; second, 
topic models (the “what” question) and sentiment analysis (the “how” question) 
by decade; third, sentiment analysis by decade and party, bringing in the parti-
san dimension; fourth, deeper exploration into topic models for the COVID era 
only; and finally, bigram networks for the COVID era only.
Data and Preprocessing
The data used in this project include metadata on all bills related to (1) COVID-19 
(spanning 2019 to 2020), and (2) epidemics broadly defined over a longer period, 
from 1973 to 2018 (i.e., policymaking in the pre-COVID era). These data were 
scraped from congress.gov and are also available in the C-SPAN Archives. The 
bill-level data includes several useful features: Congress number (e.g., 115th), year 
sponsored, descriptive bill title (different from and longer than short bill title), 
primary bill sponsor (name, district/state, and party affiliation), date of bill in-
troduction, number of cosponsors, initial committee assignment, date of most 
recent action, and the most recent action (e.g., referred to another committee).
From the bill data, a corpus was constructed based on the long, or “descrip-
tive,” bill titles. In some cases these titles, which act as brief summaries of the 
bills, are dozens of words in length. Thus, this choice was largely made for rea-
sons of computational efficiency, such that if the full bill text were used, not only 
would the bill text offer a noisier signal as to the intent, and tone impacted by the 
legal jargon comprising congressional bill text, but also the massive size of the 
corpus would have led to an infeasible processing task for most personal com-
puters. Substantively, long bill titles are carefully developed to give a summary 
of the full bill, thereby offering a signal of authors’ intentions and goals behind 
writing the bill in the first place.
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With the corpus of long bill titles constructed, I preprocessed and staged the 
data in line with traditional text mining techniques, including removing stop 
words (extraneous terms like the articles “the” and “a,” but also domain-specific 
terms like “act” and “bill” that fail to add substantive meaning to the text), re-
moving numbers and punctuation, stripping white space left behind from pre-
processing, and performing various other cleaning tasks. The result is a corpus 
that is a bag of words, wherein word order is not important compared to the in-
clusion of words.
The full corpus was then staged as a document-term matrix (DTM), where 
documents (bills) are rows and individual terms are columns. Elements of the 
matrix are term frequencies. DTMs are required for fitting topic models. The 
other two techniques described below, sentiment analysis and bigram networks, 
do not require the data to be staged as a DTM, but rather require the corpus to 
be tokenized, or broken down into smaller chunks of text. For my purposes, I 
used two tokenizers for these stages respectively: word (single words) and bi-
gram (two-word combinations).
Methods
Though deployed across five stages, there are three main text mining techniques 
used in this chapter: topic models, sentiment analysis, and bigram networks.
First, regarding topic models, there are a variety of ways of thinking about 
and modeling topic structure in text. But in general, most of these methods share 
the same goal: to uncover the latent structure of topics that define the “what” of 
a corpus — that is, the topics underlying bill long titles. Topic models of this sort 
are considered unsupervised, where there is no ground truth conditioning the 
modeling process, as well as a lack of an expected outcome from the run of the 
algorithm. Rather, the core assumption of topic models is that some structure 
of topics is latent and exists across the full document space. So, the task is to un-
cover these topics that likely characterize the space most efficiently. Importantly, 
as this is an unsupervised task, there is no set number of topics that formally de-
fines the space; there are no labels. Rather, there is some configuration of topics 
that likely exist and precede production of the documents and words themselves. 
The goal is to recover this latent topic structure.
The topic model leveraged in this project is latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) 
(Blei et al., 2003). In brief, LDA is an algorithm that starts with assuming a 
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mixture of topics, k, which defines the document-feature space. Assuming the 
topics and topic memberships are Dirichlet distributed, the goal is to find the 
configuration of topics that represent the space the best. “Best” defined here is 
the unique combinations of words contributing to each topic. Each topic, then, 
is defined by a combination of words that frequently co-occur to some degree 
of proportion. For example, a topic relating to “America” might have the terms 
“United” and “States” associated with it to high degrees. Then, at the aggregate 
level, the optimal set of topics defining the corpus is a blend of topics that are in-
dividually compact, and well-separated from all other topics. This result would 
suggest not only that the topics are well-defined but that the corpus is clearly 
composed of a set of topics, as opposed to being a more opaque blend of topics. 1
The next method used is sentiment analysis, or “sentiment scoring.” This 
method measures the overall tone of a corpus based on the frequency of words 
that occur in the corpus as well as appear in a sentiment dictionary. A common 
use of sentiment analysis is to score some text as more “positive” or “negative” 
overall based on frequency of “positive” terms versus “negative” terms. Scoring is 
carried out based on the choice of tokenizer, which is the size of text into which 
the full corpus is broken down. For my purposes, all sentiment scores are based 
on a word tokenizer for a more granular look at the text. This is compared to 
many other possible tokenizers, such as scoring by sentences or even full para-
graphs. The idea is that the algorithm uses a supplied dictionary of words that 
are scored as either “positive” (1) or “negative” (−1) and then scores words ac-
cordingly in the corpus that also appears in the dictionary. I use the Bing dictio-
nary for all analyses that leverage sentiment analysis (Liu, 2012). For example, 
suppose a document includes the term “happy.” If this term is also included in 
the sentiment dictionary and is scored as a “positive” (1) word, then this word 
gets a score of 1 in the text. The final step is to sum and average the scores to give 
a summary of the sentiment of a corpus, which in my case is either more neg-
ative or positive on balance. This is a simple, yet powerful approach to under-
stand the tone and thus the “how” of a set of documents.
Lastly, I use bigram networks in the final stage. These networks are similar 
to topic models. Yet, instead of searching the space for an optimal configuration 
of topics that are defined by a set of words that frequently co-occur, bigram net-
works build a network representation of connections between the usage of terms 
(two, to be precise; hence bigram). The nodes in the network represent the use of 
a term, and the edges represent the connections between the usage of multiple 
terms. Edges can be weighted to capture the frequencies of term co-occurrence, 
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as I demonstrate below. These are extremely valuable for visualizing how terms 
that occur in a common space are linked to usage of other terms. This gives 
unique insight into the focus of the full document space.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Descriptively Exploring the “Epidemics” Space
In the first stage of analysis, I present a high-level look at policymaking on epi-
demics across the two main periods: COVID (2019–2020) and pre-COVID (1973–
2018). The purpose of this first stage is to offer a launching place to understand 
subsequent results exploring whether differences in policymaking exist over time. 
Importantly, in this first stage I am not yet looking at parties. Rather, I am setting 
the stage for exploring the first dimension of “time,” which addresses the evo-
lutionary question. Descriptive trends are presented in two word clouds in Fig-
ure 12.1, with the COVID era (a) and the pre-COVID era (b). Note that in light 
of limitations in diagnosing word clouds, bar plots of the top terms used at least 
150 times are presented in Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix to this chapter.
A few notable trends emerge. First, a rallying call is present in both eras, in-
cluding terms like “emergency,” “national,” “supporting,” “resolution,” and so on. 
This is in line with naive expectations on government policymaking related to 
major epidemics, where the government is fulfilling its representational duty to 
respond to a crisis, while also signaling shows of strength and unity.
Further, it is interesting to note that in the pre-COVID era (Figure 12.1 [b]) 
the terms related to the epidemic in question are used. For example, terms like 
“hiv,” “aids,” and “drug” are used. This is in comparison to much less frequently 
used terms that might be associated with COVID-19, such as “COVID” or “coro-
navirus.” Rather, the COVID-era plot (Figure 12.1 [a]) seems to focus more on 
relief-type legislation and response, which makes sense given the unprecedented 
widespread nature and impact of COVID-19.
Topic Models and Sentiment Analysis Over Time
Building on the descriptive patterns discussed in the previous section and shown 
in Figures 12.1 (a) and (b), I now shift to probe the “what” and “how” questions 
explicitly. I start with constructing topic models by decade to explore the “what” 
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question pertaining to the topics that are present in the legislation across all pe-
riods in the data set. I then pivot to the “how” question by leveraging sentiment 
analysis, which will build on the “what” and give a clue as to the general tone of 
these bills on epidemics across the full study period.
Notably, with these two analytical approaches, I am interested in the evolu-
tionary or “time” dimension discussed above. Topic models will help address re-
lated questions like Does evolution exist, or are bill topics relatively stable? and 
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Are foci of topic structures similar between eras or not? Sentiment analysis will 
also help address the evolutionary question, but in addition it will help address 
slightly different questions like What is the tone, and does it shift over time? and 
Do we see differences across chambers?
First, I present the results of the topic models. Recall that the goal of topic 
models is to find the optimal latent topic structure that likely defines a corpus. 
As this is an unsupervised problem, though there are many ways to think about 
optimality. For my purposes, I calculate and compare perplexity scores, which 
describe how well a model predicts some sample. Note, LDA models are gener-
ative, meaning they are interested in predicting distributions, which in my case 
is a mixture of topics in a single space. Calculating multiple perplexity scores 
varying the number of topics, k, in the mixture, I will pick the value of k for 
which perplexity is smallest, signaling that mixture of topics does the best job 
of predicting the full sample of terms. The optimal perplexity score, and value 
of k, varies across decade subsamples. These scores are presented in Figure 12.2. 
I then used the optimal k values for each of the respective topic models fit to 
each subsample of bills from each respective decade. The top words in each de-
cade across each topic are presented in Figure 12.3.
A few notable trends are clear in the terms that characterize the different top-
ics over time. First and foremost, in addition to the perplexity values in Figure 
12.2, it is clear when zooming in on decades/periods that different topic struc-
tures define different periods. This is an important pattern as it provides a first 
clue that policymaking on epidemics is not a static endeavor. This initial signal 
would have been lost if a global topic model were fit on the full document space.
In the COVID era in plot (a) in Figure 12.3, four topics are addressing four 
distinct areas (a pattern that is corroborated by the clearly lowest value of per-
plexity at k = 4): topic 1 involves domestic relief for businesses, Medicaid, and 
general emergency response; topic 2 involves global security and health, seen by 
the three terms comprising the topic; topic 3 involves China and international 
affairs; and topic 4 involves workers, care, and assistance. These four topics not 
only make intuitive sense but they reflect the different ways in which legislators 
brand their policy proposals. Indeed, some tend to focus on marketing relief ef-
fort by focusing on domestic workers for example, whereas other bills tend to 
focus on the global aspects of the pandemic (topics 2 and 3).
Further (as shown in Figures 12.2 and 12.3), the 2000s decade (plot [c]) is more 
succinctly defined by only two topics, though less clearly separated compared to 


















































































FIGURE 12.2 Perplexity across k topics by decade. (a) COvID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s.
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FIGURE 12.3 Topic model terms at optimal k.  
(a) COvID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s. (Figure continued )
(a)
of several of the same terms in both topics. Substantively, this means that there 
is not a clear topic structure in legislation branded as addressing an “epidemic” 
in this decade. In the absence of a clear epidemic such as COVID-19, the cast-
ing of an epidemic (via use of the term) could be much more widely understood. 
For example, in plot (c) for the 2000s, topic 1 has terms like security and defense, 
whereas topic 2 has terms like education and health. Thus, while there may not 
be clear separation between types of epidemics and thus topics, it is still possi-
ble to pick up on temporal cues as to those issues considered as “epidemics” by 
policymakers at the time.
FIGURE 12.3 Topic model terms at optimal k (continued ).  
(a) COvID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s. (Figure continued )
(b)
FIGURE 12.3 Topic model terms at optimal k (continued ).  
(a) COvID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s. (Figure continued )
(c)
FIGURE 12.3 Topic model terms at optimal k (continued ).  
(a) COvID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s. (Figure continued )
(d)
FIGURE 12.3 Topic model terms at optimal k (continued ).  
(a) COvID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s. (Figure continued )
(e)
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FIGURE 12.3 Topic model terms at optimal k (continued ). 
(a) COvID era, (b) 2010s, (c) 2000s, (d) 1990s, (e) 1980s, (f) 1970s.
(f)
To the evolutionary question at this point, it seems as though the content of 
proposed legislation tends to vary expressly with the epidemic in question, re-
gardless of the specific epidemic and however broadly or narrowly defined that 
epidemic may be. Thus, to the “what” question on the topics comprising the in-
troduced legislation over time, it appears as though policymaking is not evolu-
tionary in the sense that trends in preceding time periods overtly spill over to 
affect topics in subsequent time periods. In other words, the 1990s do not seem 
dependent on the 1980s in the branding and definition of policy responses to ep-
idemics. Rather, the epidemics of the decade are seemingly responded to with 
policy accordingly.
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Building on these relatively stable patterns pertaining to the content of the 
policy proposals, I pivot now to explore the “how” question to add to the depth 
of the evolutionary question. More specifically, I am interested in understand-
ing whether the tone in which policy responses to epidemics is evolutionary 
such that tone type (positive/negative) as well as intensity (proportion of posi-
tive/negative tone of the overall document space) builds over time, remains rel-
atively stable, or decreases over time.
To accomplish this task I conducted a sentiment analysis by Congress, the 
results of which are presented in Figure 12.4.
Before discussing patterns, it is important to note that the sentiment scores 
presented in Figure 12.4 are scaled (divided by its standard deviation) but not 
mean-centered. This choice was made to account for variance in overall sponsor-
ship rates over time, as well as across chambers, where the Senate typically intro-
duces fewer bills than the House given the smaller size of membership. Further, 
the scores are disaggregated by chamber (yet not by party at this point), with 
dark gray for the U.S. House and light gray for the U.S. Senate. To read Figure 
12.4, values below the 0.0 cut point suggest greater negative sentiment in the 
given chamber’s sponsored bills on epidemics for the given Congress (two-year 
period). Values above the 0.0 dashed line point to greater positive tone for the 
given chamber and Congress.
The pattern indeed appears evolutionary, where in the earliest days of the 
study period (1970s–1980s), the tone of bills is largely neutral, with relatively 
small dips below and rises above the 0.0 cut point. Indeed, in some Congresses 
there were no sentiment scores registered, implying ultimate neutrality in tone. 
The intensity grows over time, picking up in the 1990s and culminating in the 
largest negative dip in both chambers in the current COVID era (the bottom 
right plot in Figure 12.4).
This pattern in bill sentiment is notably different from the patterns from 
the topic models, where different topic structures define different decades 
and different terms made up the topics by decade as well. Rather, regarding 
the “how” question pertaining to the tone of the bills on epidemics, we see 
a steadily building intensity in tone, both positive and negative, across both 
chambers over time.
At this point, a few key trends are clear. First, the topics of the proposed bills 
do not substantively deviate from the epidemics at hand (e.g., topics tend to fo-
cus on whatever the given epidemic is), implying little change in the types of 
policy being offered. Yet, when considering the tone or “how” of the bills, there 
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983



































2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983

























Note: Bars below the dashed line indicate greater overall negative sentiment, compared to bars above the dashed line indicating greater overall positive sentiment.
FIGURE 12.4 Scaled sentiment scores over time, by chamber.
Note: Bars below the dashed line indicate greater 
overall negative sentiment, compared to bars above 
the dashed line indicating greater overall positive 
sentiment.
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Note: Bars below the dashed line indicate greater overall negative sentiment, compared to bars above the dashed line indicating greater overall positive sentiment.
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appears to be an evolution in the tone of the policymaking. In the earliest days, 
the sentiment was largely neutral or absent entirely, with the intensity of tone of 
epidemic-related legislation increasing in more recent years. There was a spike 
in overly positive tone in the mid-2000s, and then a bottoming out of tone for 
both chambers in the COVID era (2019–2020).
In sum, the results from these two stages of analysis indicate that there seem 
to be evolutionary dynamics in how policy on epidemics is branded, but not nec-
essarily in that which the policy is addressing.
Partisan Differences in Bill Sentiment
At this point, I pivot to address the other dimension of partisanship. I begin 
with this third stage in the analysis on sentiment analysis again, but this time 
disaggregated by the party of the sponsor instead of the chamber as in the pre-
vious stage. The results for the party-focused sentiment analysis are presented 
in Figure 12.5.
Figure 12.5 is read the same as Figure 12.4, where scaled sentiment below the 
cut point on the y-axis suggests a generally negative tone in sponsored legisla-
tion compared to scaled sentiment scores above the 0.0 cut point, suggesting 
a generally positive tone in the proposed legislation addressing epidemics. In 
Figure 12.5, though, color varies by the party of the bill sponsor, with dark gray 
for Republicans, black for Democrats, and light gray for Independents.
A strikingly similar pattern exists at the party level as it did previously in 
Figure 12.4 at the chamber level, where tone intensity, both positive and nega-
tive, increases steadily over time. Also as in Figure 12.4, in Figure 12.5 there is a 
prominent drop in tone positivity (or an increase in negative tone) in the current 
COVID era. This suggests that there is likely an evolution to tone in proposed 
legislation along a partisan dimension as well. Both parties seem to be follow-
ing a similar pattern. Yet is this enough to support the anecdotal motivation at 
the outset that policymaking on this apolitical issue of pandemics is character-
ized by divided partisan politics? Perhaps as a clue, but not in a systematic way. 
Indeed, the tone swings widely, but these patterns are not beholden to a single 
party, nor are they substantively political in nature, where one party might be 
more negative or positive than the other party. I come back to this evolution-
ary pattern in tone and limitations relating to partisan division in the discus-
sion section at the end of this chapter.
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Topic Structure of the COVID Era
Given the contextual clarity around a long series of legislating on epidemics in 
American politics, I now shift focus to the COVID era to better understand the 
nature of policymaking in response to the massive epidemic with which the 
country is currently grappling. In this stage, I continue to probe the partisan di-
mension, but only in the COVID era.
In light of the topic model results previously found, it may be reasonable to 
expect both parties to discuss COVID similarly. However, given the introduc-
tory anecdotal evidence on fractious approaches to policymaking on COVID-19, 
there is room to expect the parties to approach COVID from very different per-
spectives as well. These differences may be present in their proposed legisla-
tion. Thus, I return to the “what” question explored using topic models in the 
COVID era only.
Recall in the earlier topic models, I did not explicitly account for party. At 
this stage, while I will not account for party in the estimation of the model (e.g., 
using a structural topic model), I will instead proceed to fit a topic model with 
k = 2 and pull the results apart by party affiliation to understand whether la-
tent partisan differences exist in topics. To do so, I start by examining the pro-
portions of γ values by party affiliation. γ scores from topic models measure the 
probability a bill is associated with a given topic. Conditioning by party of the 
sponsor, I gain insight into the probabilities of bills sponsored by different parties 
being associated with one of the two topics. The results are shown in Table 12.1.
Most notably in Table 12.1, the probabilities of Democrats and Independents 
sponsoring bills related to topic 1 is higher than for topic 2, with γ = 0.832 and 
0.528 for Democrats and Independents, respectively. This makes intuitive sense 
in that Independents in Congress nearly always caucus with Democrats. And 
adding to this, Republicans are more likely to sponsor bills related to topic 2 at 
γ = 0.669, compared to topic 1, with a value of 0.331. As such, there seems to be 
a clear partisan distinction in sponsored bills. Though stability in general top-
ics was uncovered earlier, here I explicitly account for party of the sponsors, 
allowing for partisan differences in policymaking to emerge. But what terms 
define these topics? See Figure 12.6 for a bar plot of the topics with color con-
ditioned on party.
In Figure 12.6 there is clear partisan difference in the branding of proposed 
legislation. For example, Democrats’ bills include terms like “pandemic” and 
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Note: Bars below the dashed line indicate greater overall negative sentiment, compared to bars above the dashed line indicating greater overall positive sentiment.
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983


























Note: Bars below the dashed line indicate greater overall negative sentiment, compared to bars above the dashed line indicating greater overall positive sentiment.
FIGURE 12.5 Scaled sentiment scores over time, by party.
Note: Bars below the dashed line indicate greater 
overall negative sentiment, compared to bars above 
the dashed line indicating greater overall positive 
sentiment.




































(Topic 1) Democratic (Topic 2) Republican
FIGURE 12.6 Topics in the COvID era, by party.
TABLE 12.1 γ by Party and Topic
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“workers,” whereas Republicans’ bills include terms like “China,” “combat,” and 
“international.” Though the motivation driving the use of these terms is unable 
to be obtained from the current analysis, of greatest value for present purposes 
is the partisan distinction in types of bills sponsored in responding to the same 
apolitical pandemic of COVID-19.
This stage gives a closer look at the partisan question, suggesting that poli-
cymaking as an expression of elite responsiveness in the current congressional 
climate is one distinguished by party division. Whether this is a normatively 
“good” or “bad” trend is beyond the scope and goal of this project. Rather, this 
project is interested in exploring these data in search of natural patterns. The 
unsupervised nature of the modeling strategy allows the structure to emerge. 
And the emergent structure points to partisan forces at work in policymaking 
in response to COVID-19.
Exploring Networks of Partisan Term Co-Occurrence in the COVID Era
In the final stage of analysis, I continue with focus on the COVID era. I build 
on the previous findings that the parties approach policymaking in response to 
COVID-19 differently. Now, I am interested in understanding the structure of 
term usage within and across both major parties. To do so, I leverage bigram 
networks. I weight the edges of the network connecting use of bigrams to cap-
ture the frequencies of co-occurrence of terms. I break down term usage by 
party and present networks in Figures 12.7 and 12.8 for Democrats and Repub-
licans, respectively.
Substantively, this approach allows for visualizing usages of the terms by 
both major parties in the COVID era to understand the topology of how terms 
are used together. The goal of this final stage is to place the broader topic trends 
found in the previous sections into context, which is exploration of patterns 
within party ranks. Cross-party comparisons are also possible. But the focus of 
this section is to offer a window into how parties use and recycle certain words 
in their proposed policies, giving another angle of policymaking dynamics in 
the era of COVID-19.
For both figures, the network is an undirected, weighted graph with shad-
ing varying by weighted edges, such that darker shades mean greater frequen-
cies of bigram usage.
In Figure 12.7, the volume of bigrams Democrats used as well as their intercon-
nection is much greater than that of the Republicans, shown in Figure 12.8. Some 




















































































































































































Note: Shading indicates greater density of co-occurrence.
Bigram Network Representations
DEMOCRATIC BILLS
FIGURE 12.7 Bigram networks of Democratic bills.
of the dense regions in Figure 12.7 for Democrats involve discussion on extending 
and authorizing governmental funding (seen in the upper left of Figure 12.7). The 
other dense region in Figure 12.7 is toward the middle, which focuses on worker re-
lief, Medicaid, and families. These results are consistent with findings to this point.
Regarding the patterns for Republican bills in Figure 12.8, not only are fewer 
terms used, implying greater homogeneity and consistency within their ranks, 
but there is also a relatively high, consistent density across the full space (i.e., 
darker shading in most of the network). This pattern means that these bigrams 
are used together and frequently, reflecting a possible strategy within the party 
(e.g., sticking to party-derived talking points, organized policy priorities, and 
so forth). Some of the terms in the Republican policies include “foreign service,” 
Note: Shading indicates greater density of co-occurrence.
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“lifesaving treatments,” and “small business.” While these terms might be ex-
pected in the context of such a massive pandemic, some other frequently used 
terms are unique to Republicans, such as “Communist Party,” “protecting our 
pharmaceutical supply chain,” and “People’s Republic” (possibly “of China”).
Building on topic model results in Figure 12.6, Republicans seem more fo-
cused on responding to COVID in the contexts of securing the domestic econ-
omy and the international aspects of COVID (e.g., “People’s Republic,” “World 
Health Organization,” “Dr. Li Wenliang,” and so forth). Democrats, inversely, 
focus virtually zero attention on such international aspects and instead focus 
efforts very broadly on domestic politics and policies, in sum resulting in clear 

























































Note: Shading indicates greater density of co-occurrence.
Bigram Network Representations
REPUBLICAN BILLS
FIGURE 12.8 Bigram networks of republican bills.
Note: Shading indicates greater density of co-occurrence.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
To recap, a few key patterns emerged across the five stages of analysis. Regard-
ing the time dimension and the question of evolutionary dynamics, there were 
two dominant trends. First, the “what” question pertaining to the topics of fo-
cus tend to remain relatively stable over time. Policymakers tend to address the 
given epidemic with epidemic-specific terms in their policies, implying virtually 
no evolutionary, time-dependent process. However, the more prominent differ-
ences that point to evolutionary dynamics were the shifts in overall tone of the 
proposed policies. In the earlier days of the study period (1970s–1980s), the tone 
was relatively muted, with few positive- or negative-toned policies being offered 
by either party or chamber. In the 1990s and early 2000s, this tone, both positive 
and negative, significantly ticks upward, where more extreme terms are used in 
policy descriptions. This pattern culminates in the most recent era of COVID-19 
(2019–2020), where the negative tone defines policymaking and is starker than 
in any other period and across both chambers and parties.
Regarding the partisan dimension, in the COVID era specifically, the parties 
cast their solutions to COVID in starkly different lights, highlighting different 
realms and focus within their party ranks. Democrats highlighted domestic re-
sponses on average, while Republicans highlighted international actors and re-
sponses to a greater degree. This suggests that there is indeed a partisan flavor to 
policymaking regarding COVID-19. Yet, whether this qualifies as “bitter” or “polar-
ized” politics and policymaking is a trickier question and is addressed more below.
Though they are exploratory, from these results it is clear that, perhaps as ex-
pected, the two major American political parties are different in their approaches 
to governing in the time of COVID-19. Yet, despite these partisan differences, the 
intensity and negativity of tone both at the chamber and party levels has been 
steadily growing since the 1970s. This suggests that there is an evolutionary dynamic 
to epidemic policymaking, which is at a climax in the current era of COVID-19.
Limitations
Though patterns from the sentiment analysis appear to have been evolutionary and 
growing in intensity, this may not be a reflection of division or bitter policymak-
ing but rather a reflection of the grave nature of COVID-19. Such a negative epi-
demic could certainly be accompanied by an increase in negative-toned legislation.
Yet while this may be the case, it would make sense that negative-toned leg-
islation should characterize virtually all epidemics across all periods given the 
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scope and nature of these types of social problems. Indeed, epidemics are cast as 
emergencies and issues of prime importance for the government to address, seen 
at the first stage in Figure 12.1, where frequently used terms in both pre-COVID 
and COVID eras implied that epidemics are emergent issues.
The tone of related legislation, then, should also be more negative than posi-
tive if tone is a function of subject and rather than an era of harsh or bitter pol-
icymaking. Yet there are numerous dramatic spikes in positive sentiment that 
grow over time. This could be a reflection of the approach to branding the pol-
icy response (e.g., a triumph over the epidemic in question). Given the plausibil-
ity of numerous explanations underlying these patterns, future research should 
take up the question drivers behind tone and linguistic patterns in policymaking 
through a targeted causal study to shed light on the “why” behind these trends.
Concluding Remarks
In sum, this project is an exploratory effort focused on uncovering and under-
standing the contours of government policymaking as a formal response to ep-
idemics over a long period of time. The duration of time, as well as these data 
being the clearest signal of government priorities, make this an ideal place from 
which to launch an exploration of many other related topics. For example, future 
work might consider the role of media and reporting on government responses 
in times of epidemics, or the presence of partisan division in policymaking sur-
rounding epidemics like the opioid crisis or COVID-19.
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CONCLUSION
I
n this volume we have presented 12 papers on a wide variety of topics. The 
authors have used the C-SPAN Video Library to explore research questions 
in communication, politics, and history, employing a variety of research ap-
proaches and techniques. Each has asked a slightly different question and when 
approaching the same topic have addressed it in different ways.
This is what is exciting about this volume and the underlying research. When 
the call for papers goes out, we do not know what we will receive and what ideas 
will be conceived. Scholars each take a different question and approach. The re-
sult is a collection of research on such a range of topics and approaches.
In this volume we learned about the range of bills on COVID-19 and the role of 
African American women in promoting legislation. We learned about Trump ral-
lies from one who directly observed and supervised student research and another 
who looked at Rust Belt appearances. We learned how members of Congress used 
humor adopted from late-night television often in self-effacing ways. Members of 
Congress were not as critical of the media as was President Trump.
A historian found that C-SPAN callers gave voice to the phenomenon he 
was studying and found the intertwined interactions of government and pri-
vate foundations. The history of televising the Senate is carefully documented 
in another account.
Future conferences will open possibilities for additional research that pushes 
the boundaries since it is based on questions and data that C-SPAN video allows 
us to ask and potentially answer. That research will be published in the next vol-
ume. But at this time, let’s celebrate the work of these scholars.
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